

BT 21 .S532 1909 v.2
Shedd, William Greenough
Thayer, 1820-1894.
A history of Christian
doctrine

v. 2



Digitized by the Internet Archive
in 2019 with funding from
Princeton Theological Seminary Library

A HISTORY

OF

CHRISTIAN DOCTRINE

BY

WILLIAM G. T. SHEDD, D.D.

IN TWO VOLUMES


VOL. II.

FIFTEENTH EDITION

NEW YORK

CHARLES SCRIBNER'S SONS

1909



Entered, according to Act of Congress, in the year 1863, by
CHARLES SCRIBNER,
In the Clerk's Office of the District Court of the United States for the Southern District
of New York.

COPYRIGHT, 1891, BY
W. G. T. SHEDD



CONTENTS
OF THE SECOND VOLUME.

BOOK FOURTH.

HISTORY OF ANTHROPOLOGY.

CHAPTER I.

Theories of the Origin of the Soul.

	PAGE
§ 1. Pre-existence,	3
§ 2. Creationism,	10
§ 3. Traducianism,	13
§ 4. Mediaeval and Modern Theories,	23

CHAPTER II.

The Greek Anthropology.

§ 1. Preliminary statements,	26
§ 2. The Alexandrine Anthropology,	31
§ 3. Later-Alexandrine and Antiochian Anthropology,	36
§ 4. Recapitulatory Survey,	41

CHAPTER III.

The Latin Anthropology.

§ 1. Tertullian's Traducianism,	43
§ 2. Anthropology of Cyprian, Ambrose, and Hilary,	47

	PAGE
§ 3. Anthropology of Augustine,	50
§ 4. Recapitulation,	91

CHAPTER IV.

Pelagianism and Semi-Pelagianism.

§ 1. Pelagianism,	93
§ 2. Semi-Pelagianism,	102

CHAPTER V.

The Anselmic Anthropology.

§ 1. Anselm's theory of Original Sin,	111
§ 2. Anselm's idea of the Will and Freedom,	127

CHAPTER VI.

The Papal Anthropology.

§ 1. Tridentine theory of Original Sin,	140
§ 2. Tridentine theory of Regeneration,	149

CHAPTER VII.

Anthropology of the Reformers.

§ 1. Lutheran-Calvinistic theory of Original Sin,	152
§ 2. Lutheran-Calvinistic theory of Regeneration,	164
§ 3. Melanchthon's Synergism,	173
§ 4. Zuingle's doctrine of Original Sin,	174

CHAPTER VIII.

The Arminian Anthropology.

§ 1. Arminian theory of Original Sin,	178
§ 2. Arminian theory of Regeneration,	186
§ 3. Recapitulation,	194

CHAPTER IX.

	PAGE
<i>Total survey of the history of Anthropology,</i>	197

BOOK FIFTH.

HISTORY OF SOTERIOLOGY.

CHAPTER I.

Soteriology of the Ancient Church : A. D. 70-730.

§ 1. Preliminary statements,	203
§ 2. Gnostic and Ebionite theories of the Atonement,	205
§ 3. Soteriology of the Apostolic Fathers,	207
§ 4. Early Patristic Soteriology,	212
§ 5. Alexandrine Soteriology,	226
§ 6. Soteriology of Athanasius, and the Greek Fathers,	237
§ 7. Soteriology of Augustine, and Gregory the Great,	253
§ 8. Recapitulatory survey,	265

CHAPTER II.

Soteriology of the Mediaeval Church : A. D. 730-1517.

§ 1. Anselm's theory of satisfaction,	273
§ 2. Soteriology of Abelard, and Lombard,	286
§ 3. Soteriology of Bernard, and Hugh St. Victor,	289
§ 4. Soteriology of Bonaventura,	292
§ 5. Soteriology of Aquinas,	304
§ 6. Soteriology of Duns Scotus,	315
§ 7. Recapitulatory survey,	317

CHAPTER III.

The Papal Soteriology.

§ 1. Preliminary statements,	319
§ 2. Soteriology of the Council of Trent,	321
§ 3. Soteriology of Bellarmin,	328

CHAPTER IV.

Soteriology of the Reformers.

	PAGE
§ 1. Forerunners of the Reformation,	333
§ 2. Protestant and Anselmic Soteriologies compared,	335
§ 3. Recapitulatory survey,	345

CHAPTER V.

The Grotian Soteriology.

§ 1. Preliminary statements,	347
§ 2. Grotian idea of law and penalty,	350
§ 3. Grotian theory of relaxation and substitution,	356
§ 4. Critical estimate of the Grotian Soteriology,	366

CHAPTER VI.

The Arminian Soteriology.

§ 1. Positive statements,	370
§ 2. Arminian objections to the theory of satisfaction,	374

CHAPTER VII.

The Socinian Soteriology.

§ 1. Socinian idea of justice,	376
§ 2. Socinian objections to the theory of satisfaction,	379

BOOK SIXTH.

HISTORY OF ESCHATOLOGY.

CHAPTER I.

Second Advent of Christ.

§ 1. Millenarianism,	389
§ 2. Catholic theory of the Second Advent,	398

CHAPTER II.

The Resurrection.

	PAGE
§ 1. The Intermediate State,	400
§ 2. The Resurrection-Body,	403

CHAPTER III.

The Final State.

§ 1. Day of Judgment,	408
§ 2. Purgatory,	409
§ 3. Endless Rewards and Punishment,	411

BOOK SEVENTH.

HISTORY OF SYMBOLS.

CHAPTER I.

Ancient and Mediaeval Symbols.

§ 1. Preliminary statements,	423
§ 2. Apostles' Creed,	428
§ 3. Nicaeno-Constantinopolitan Symbol,	435
§ 4. Chalcedon Symbol,	438
§ 5. Athanasian Creed,	439
§ 6. Recapitulatory survey,	440

CHAPTER II.

Modern Symbols.

§ 1. Lutheran Confessions,	444
1) Augsburg Confession,	445
2) Apologia Confessionis,	454
3) Confessio Saxonica,	456

	PAGE
4) Confessio Wurtembergica,	456
5) Articles of Smalcald,	456
6) Luther's Catechisms,	457
7) Formula Concordiae,	457
§ 2. Reformed (Calvinistic) Confessions,	458
1) Confessio Tetrapolitana	458
2) Zuingli's Fidei Ratio,	459
3) First Helvetic Confession,	465
4) Consensus Tigurinus,	467
5) Consensus Genevensis,	468
6) Second Helvetic Confession,	469
7) Formula Consensus Helvetici,	472
8) Heidelberg Catechism,	473
9) Confessio Belgica,	475
10) Confessio Gallicana,	476
11) Confessio Scoticana,	476
12) Canons of Dort,	476
13) Thirty-Nine Articles,	479
14) Westminster Confession,	479
15) Savoy Confession,	480
16) Cambridge Platform,	482
17) Boston Confession,	485
18) Saybrook Platform,	490
§ 3. Papal Confessions,	491
§ 4. Confessions of the Greek Church,	494
§ 5. Arminian Confessions,	495
§ 6. Socinian Confessions,	498

BOOK FOURTH.



HISTORY

OF

ANTHROPOLOGY.

LITERATURE.

AUGUSTINUS : Operum Tom. X.

VOSSIUS : Historia de controversiis quas Pelagius ejusque reliquiae moverunt.

GANGAUF : Metaphysische Psychologie des Augustinus.

WIGGERS : Darstellung des Augustinismus und Pelagianismus.

II. Theile (first part translated by Emerson).

NEANDER : Church History, II. 557-627.

GUERICKE : Church History, § 91-93.

CALVIN : Institutes, Book II.

USHER : Works, Vol. III.

WHITAKER : On Original Sin.

TAYLOR (JEREMY) : On Original Sin.

WHITBY : On Original Sin.

MÜLLER : Christliche Lehre von der Sünde (translated by Pulsford).

HASSE : Anselm von Canterbury, Buch II. Cap. ix-xi.

REDEPENNING : Origenes, in locis.

BAUR : Der Gegensatz des Catholicismus und Protestantismus.

MÖHLER : Symbolik.

CHAPTER I.

THEORIES OF THE ORIGIN OF THE SOUL.

§ 1. *Pre-existence.*

THE inquiry and the theory respecting the origin of the human soul exerted a decisive influence upon the formation of the Doctrine of Sin, and hence we commence with this topic.

The views of the Ancient Church concerning the origin of the soul ran in three directions; though not with equal strength, or to an equal extent. The three theories that appear in the Patristic period are: *Pre-existence*, *Creationism*, and *Traducianism*.¹

¹ "La première difficulté est, comment l'âme a put être infectée du péché originel, qui est la racine des péchés actuels, sans qu'il y ait eu de l'injustice en Dieu à l'y exposer. Cette difficulté a fait naître trois opinions sur l'origine de l'âme même: celle de la *préexistence des âmes humaines*

dans un autre monde, ou dans une autre vie, où elles avoient péché, et avoient été condamnées pour cela à cette prison du corps humain; opinion des Platoniciens qui est attribuée à Origène, et qui trouve encore aujourd'hui des sectateurs. Henri Morus docteur Anglois a soutenu quelque chose

The theory of *Pre-existence* teaches that all human souls were created at the beginning of creation,—not that of this world simply, but of all worlds. All finite spirits were made simultaneously, and prior to the creation of matter. The intellectual universe precedes the sensible universe. The souls of men, consequently, existed before the creation of Adam. The pre-existent life was Pre-Adamite. Men were angelic spirits at first. Because of their apostasy in the angelic sphere, they were transferred, as a punishment for their sin, into material bodies in this mundane sphere, and are now passing through a disciplinary process, in order to be restored, all of them without exception, to their pre-existent and angelic condition. These bodies, to which they are joined, come into existence by the ordinary course of physical propagation; so that the sensuous and material part of human nature has no existence previous to Adam. It is only the rational and spirit-

de ce dogme dans un livre exprès. Quelques-uns de ceux qui soutiennent cette préexistence, sont allés jusqu'à la metempsychose . . . La seconde opinion est celle de la *traduction*, comme si l'âme des enfans étoit engendrée (per traducem) de l'âme ou des âmes de ceux dont le corps est engendré. S. Augustin y étoit porté, pour mieux sauver le péché originel. Cette doctrine est enseignée aussi par la plus grand partie des theologiens de la Confession d'Aus-

bourg. Cependant elle n'est pas établie entièrement parmi eux, puisque les universités de Jena, de Helmstat, et autres y ont été contraires depuis long-tems. La troisième opinion et la plus reçue aujourd'hui est celle de la *creation*: elle est enseignée dans la plus grande partie des ecoles Chrétiennes, mais elle reçoit le plus de difficulté par rapport au péché originel." LEIBNITZ: Théodicée, Partie I. 86.

ual principle of which a Pre-Adamite life is asserted.

The principal defender of this theory was Origen. Some things akin to it are to be found in the Pythagorean and Platonic speculations,—particularly in the doctrine of metempsychosis, or transmigration of souls from one body into another; and in the theory that man's innate ideas are reminiscences of an antecedent life in a higher world than that of sense of time.¹ But Origen endeavored

¹ GANGAUF: *Psychologie des Augustinus*, p. 235 sq.; BEAUSOBRE: *Manicheisme*, VI. iv.; STUDIEN UND KRITIKEN, Vol. IX.—In the *Phædo*, Plato maintains the doctrine of the pre-existence of the soul. He lays down the position that ἡ μάθησις οὐκ ἄλλο τι ἢ ἀναμνησις. This position he supports by the following argument. When the soul awakes to consciousness, and begins to have intellectual perceptions, it observes that such a thing is good, and that such a thing is beautiful, and that such a thing is true, etc. But at the same time it perceives that these objects, thus denominated, are not goodness, beauty, and truth themselves, but only participate in these qualities. The soul, therefore, possesses *ideas* of goodness, beauty, and truth, distinct from any particular things in which such properties inhere. But these ideas, the soul brings with it. They are not derived from the things of time and sense,

because the soul carefully distinguishes between them and the concrete sensible object. It says: "This beautiful object which I see is not beauty itself, but only a manifestation of it." But these ideas of absolute beauty, goodness, and truth are not figments of the brain, to which there is no objective correspondent. There actually are such objects as eternal truth, eternal beauty, and eternal goodness. Now, argues Plato, the fact that the soul upon awaking to intellectual perception is already in possession of such ideas proves that it has had a vision of the corresponding objects in a previous mode of existence. The knowledge of these abstract ideas is only the recollection of a pre-existent vision enjoyed by the soul, before its union with the body. Ἦσαν ἄρα αἱ ψυχὰι καὶ πρότερον, πρὶν εἶναι ἐν ἀνθρώπῳ ἔδει, χωρὶς σωμάτων, καὶ φρόνησιν εἶχον.

"It was a beautiful system

to defend the theory of Pre-existence upon Scripture grounds, though he was undoubtedly much influenced by the speculations of pagan philosophy in adopting it. The Mosaic narrative of the temptation and apostasy, in Genesis iii, according to him, is an allegorical representation of the fall of the finite spirit from the higher into the lower sphere. Adam in the Hebrew is a generic term, and denotes not an actual historical individual, but the image and representative of the race. The serpent emblemizes the devil; the death threatened is not temporal but eternal death, of which the death of the body is the shadow and symbol; the expulsion from paradise is the loss of the pre-existent blessedness, and the "coats of skins" signify the clothing of the fallen spirit in a material body. That the

which represented that the forms of all that is good and fair in the visible world, having an independent previous existence in the Supreme Mind, had indeed become obscured and tarnished in their union with the matter of the visible world; but that the souls of men, having before their entrance into the body once in a higher sphere gazed upon the original patterns or *ideas* of beauty, and justice, and holiness, are now from a faint reminiscence kindled by such imperfect shadows of those lovely realities as the dark and gross things of the earth still exhibit; and that if they cherished by the exercise

of pure mutual affections their love of these heavenly images, and improved their acquaintance with them by serene contemplation, they should after death wing back their flight again to those realms of beatific vision which had once before been their happy home." LONDON QUARTERLY REVIEW. 1838.

This theory reappears also in some portions of English literature,—as, for example, in WORDSWORTH'S Ode on Immortality.

"Our birth is but a sleep, and a forgetting:
The soul that rises with us, our life's
star,
Hath had elsewhere its setting,
And cometh from afar."

narrative is to be explained in this manner, and not to be understood literally, is plain, says Origen, to every one who penetrates into the real meaning of Scripture, and takes worthy views of the Divine Being. Such allegorical costume for the higher truths is not strange; it is found in the Greek symbolism. Plato's myths of Poros and Penia, in the Symposium, have much similarity with this Mosaic account of the fall.¹ Origen also interprets the language of the apostle Paul respecting the creation "groaning and travailing in pain together" (Rom. viii. 19), as referring to the low and degraded condition of spirits who once occupied a higher sphere. Alluding to the fall of some of the angelic spirits, he says: "Hence God the creator made them bodies suited to a most degraded condition (*congrua humilibus locis*), and fabricated the visible world for them, and sent into this world ministering angels, for the care and discipline of those who had fallen."² Origen also cites Rom. ix. 11 sq., in proof of the pre-existence of the human soul, remarking that "there was no injustice in Jacob's supplanting Esau in the womb, in case we suppose him to have been chosen of God on the ground of merit acquired in a preceding life (*ex praececedentis vitae meritis*), so that he deserved to be preferred to his brother."³

¹ ORIGENES: De Princip. IV. i. 16; Contra Celsum, IV. xxxix.

See THOMASIUS: Origenes, 191, 192; SCHUBERT: Geschichte der Seele, p. 657.

² ORIGENES: De Principiis, III. v.

³ Origenes: De Principiis, II. ix. (Ed. Bas. p. 705).

Another proof for the soul's pre-existence is derived by Origen, from the parable of the vineyard and the laborers, in Matthew xx. 1 seq. They who are hired first are Adam and those of that time. They who are hired at the third hour are Noah and his generation. Abraham and his generation are hired at the sixth hour; Moses and his generation at the ninth. All mankind at, and since, the time of Christ, are represented by the laborers employed at the eleventh hour.¹ But these are described as having been standing idle all the day long,—that is during the entire *saeculum* represented by the “day” spoken of in the parable. “If therefore,” says Origen, “the soul has no existence anterior to the body, but is generated with it (*συνεσπάσθη*), how could those who were born since the birth of Christ have been in existence, to stand idle previous to that event?”²

The theory of Pre-existence may be said to rise and set with Origen. Only here and there was a voice heard in its favor after his death; and during his life-time it was confined chiefly to the Alexandrine school. Cyril of Alexandria³ and Nemesis of Emesa,⁴ defend the doctrine of the simple pre-existence of the soul, but not of its fall in a pre-

¹ This allegorical interpretation is to be found in the middle ages. See ORDERICUS VITALIS: I. 40, Bohn's Ed.

² ORIGENES: In Matt. Tract. X. (Ed. Basil 1571, p. 81.)

³ CYRILLUS ALEXANDRINUS: Com. in Johan. Op. IV. p. 78 sq.

⁴ NEMESIUS: De natura hominis, cap. ii.

existent state. The theory, however, was generally refuted and combatted, so that by the latter part of the 4th century it had become obsolete. Jerome¹ denominates it a *stulta persuasio* to believe "that souls were created of old by God, and kept in a treasury;" and Philastrius² enumerates it among the heresies. Augustine³ opposes the doctrine of a fall in a pre-existent state, as contradicting the Scripture statement that "God saw everything that he had made, and behold it was very good." He also remarks that if earthly bodies were given to fallen spirits on account of the sins they have committed, the bodies should be proportioned to the degree of the sins; and that the devils, therefore, should have worse bodies than men,—which Augustine thinks is not the fact.

The theory of Pre-existence, it is obvious, is the most extreme form of individualism as applied to the origin of man. It rejects the idea of race-connection, and race-unity, in every form. Each human individual is created by a distinct fiat at the very beginning of creation, and antecedent to all material worlds. As such, it has no physical or generic connection with other souls; but is a pure unit alone and by itself. And this individualism, pure and simple, pervades its entire history. It apostatizes alone and by itself; it is associated with a material

¹ HIERONYMUS: Ep. LXXVIII,
Ad Marcellinum.

³ AUGUSTINUS: De civitate Dei,
XI. xxiii.

² PHILASTRIUS: Haereses, XCIX.

body, as a disciplinary infliction, alone and by itself; and it is redeemed alone and by itself, only to be still liable to another and yet another apostasy, alone and by itself. The notion of a created *species*, a common human *nature*, is wholly and energetically excluded by the theory of Pre-existence. The material body, into which the rational spirit descends from its antecedent sphere of existence, is, indeed, propagated; but this is only a temporary prison, and not a permanent constituent of humanity. The sensuous and earthly part of man, according to the Origenistic theory, is not a part of his real and proper humanity.

§ 2. *Creationism.*

2. The theory of *Creationism* maintains that God immediately creates *de nihilo* a new soul, in every instance that a new individual of the human family is born. But the human body is not created *de nihilo*, in this successive manner. This part of man is created in and with Adam, and is propagated from him.

Creationism met with far more favor in the Ancient Church, than the doctrine of Pre-existence. Its advocates cited in favor of it, the declaration of Christ, in John v. 17: "My Father worketh *hitherto*, and I work,"—interpreting the "work" here spoken of as that of creation, and not providence

merely. They also quoted Ps. xxxiii. 15: "He fashioneth their hearts alike;" and Zech. xii. 1: "The Lord . . . formeth the spirit of man within him."

Speaking generally, the theory of Creationism was the dominant one in the Eastern Church, and found advocates in the Western. Jerome asserts that God "*quotidie fabricatur animas*," and cites in proof the above mentioned texts of Scripture.¹ He remarks that Creationism is the true church doctrine (*ecclesiasticum est*), though not much received as yet by the Western bishops. In another place, however, he refers the inquirer upon the subject of the soul's origin to Augustine, whose work *De origine animae*, although it does not explicitly decide the question, he praises, and shows an inclination to Augustine's views.² Hilary of Pictavium is the most explicit advocate of Creationism in the West. In his tractate upon Psalm xci (§ 3), he lays down the position that the souls of men are daily (*quotidie*) originated by the secret and unknown operation of divine power.

Creationism, it is obvious, is a mixed theory. As respects the human soul, it teaches that there are as many repeated and successive fiats of creation, as there are individuals in the series of human beings; while so far as the human body is concerned, there is but a single creative fiat. In the in-

¹ HIERONYMUS: Ad Pammachium, a 397.

² HIERONYMUS: Epist. LXXVIII, LXXIX.

stance of each and every individual soul after Adam, there is creation, but not procreation or propagation. In the instance of each and every individual body after Adam, there is procreation or propagation, but not creation. The physical part of every man, considered as a creation *de nihilo*, dates back of birth and individual existence, to the creative act mentioned in Genesis i. 27; but his spiritual part, as a creation *de nihilo*, dates back only to birth, or to the commencement of individual existence, in whatever generation, or year of the world, that may happen to be. Reckoning from the strict and absolute *creation* of each, the body of a man of this generation, upon the theory of Creationism, would be six thousand years older than his soul; for there is this interval of time between the creative fiat that originated the former, and the creative fiat that originated the latter. The theory, therefore, is a composite one. It has affinities with Traducianism, in adopting the idea of race-connection, and generic unity, so far as respects man's sensuous nature. And it has affinities with Origen's theory of Pre-existence, in excluding the idea of species when applied to the human soul, and in adopting the idea of pure individuality alone. The tenet of pre-existence in the angelic world, it rejects.

§ 2. *Traducianism.*

The theory of *Traducianism* maintains that both the soul and body of the individual man are propagated. It refers the creative act mentioned in Gen. i. 27 to the human *nature*, or *race*, and not to a single individual merely. It considers the work of creating mankind *de nihilo*, as entirely completed upon the sixth day; and that since that sixth day the Creator has, in this world, exerted no strictly creative energy. He rested from the work of creation upon the seventh day, and still rests. By this single act, all mankind were created, as to both their spiritual and their sensuous substance, in and with the first human pair, and from them have been individually procreated and born, each in his day and generation. According to Traducianism, creation is totally distinct and different from birth. Creation relates to the origination *de nihilo* of the total substance or nature of mankind, considered as a new and hitherto non-existent species of being. Birth is subsequent to creation, and refers only to the modifications which this substance undergoes,—its individualization in the series of generations. Hence man can be created holy, and be born sinful. By creation he may be endowed with the moral image and righteousness of his Maker; while by birth, or rather *at* birth, he may be possessed of a moral guilt and corruption that was originated after creation, and before birth.

This view of the origin of the soul was first stated with distinctness by Tertullian, and from his time onward gained ground and authority in the Western Church; while the Eastern Church, as has been remarked, preferred the theory of Creationism. The Biblical support for Traducianism was derived from Paul's statement of the Adamic connection and the origin of sin, in Romans v. 12–19, corroborated by 1 Cor. xv. 22: "In Adam all die," Eph. ii. 3: "And were by nature children of wrath, Heb. vii. 10: "For Levi was yet in the loins of his father when Melchizedec met him," Ps. li. 5: "Behold I was shapen in iniquity and in sin did my mother conceive me," and Gen. v. 3: "And Adam begat a son in his own likeness, after his image."

Tertullian was the first to state this theory in express terms, and defend it upon speculative grounds. He does it in a somewhat crude and materializing manner, because he attempts to explain and illustrate the manner in which the individual life is deduced from the generic. In this respect, he falls into the same error into which Justin Martyr, and the first theoretic Trinitarians, generally, fell, in the speculative construction of the doctrine of the Trinity. In his tract *De Anima* (c. 19), Tertullian remarks that "the soul of man, like the shoot of a tree, is drawn out (*deducta*) into a physical progeny from Adam the parent stock." In another place (c. 27), in this same tract,

he asserts that "both substances (body and soul) are conceived, finished, and perfected together;" and holds to both a corporeal and a psychical generation, each proceeding from its own appropriate base, though each is inseparable from the other, and both are simultaneous.¹

The Traducian theory continued to gain ground in the North-African, and in the Western European Church, by reason of its affinity with that particular mode of stating the doctrine of sin which prevailed in these churches. Jerome remarks that in his day it was adopted by "maxima pars occidentaliū." Leo the Great († 461) asserts that the "catholic faith teaches that every man, with reference to the substance of his soul as well as of his body, is formed in the womb."² Among the Orientals, this theory obtained little currency. Gregory Nyssa,³ and Anastasius Sinaita,⁴ alone, were inclined to adopt it.

But the theologian who contributed most to the currency and establishment of Traducianism was Augustine. And yet this thinker, usually so explicit and decided, even upon speculative points, nowhere in his works formally adopts the theory itself. In his *Opus imperfectum* (IV. 104) he re-

¹ Nam etsi duas species confitebimur seminis, corporalem et animalem, indiscretas tamen vindicamus, et hoc modo contemporales ejusdemque momenti." De Anima, c. 27.

² LEO MAGNUS: Epist. XV, Ad Turribim.

³ GREGORIUS NYSS: De hominis opificio, c. 29.

⁴ ANASTASIUS SIN: Homilia in BANDINI Monumenta, II. 54.

plies to Julian : " You may blame, if you will, my hesitation because I do not venture to affirm or deny that of which I am ignorant; you may say what you please concerning the profound obscurity of this subject; nevertheless let this doctrine be fixed and unshaken that the guilt of that one man is the death of all, and that in him all died."¹ Yet Augustine's entire speculation upon the origin and nature of sin is indirectly, and by implication, an earnest defence of the Traducian theory. His anthropology, as we shall see when it comes up for examination, is both illogical and inconceivable without it. The transmission of *sin*, to which Augustine held, logically involves, as Tertullian had perceived before him, the transmission of the sinning soul; and this implies the Adamic existence and unity.

The attitude and tendency of Augustine's mind, in respect to the two systems of Creationism and Traducianism (for the theory of Pre-existence he expressly rejects and argues against),² may be seen from an analysis of the first book of his treatise *De Anima*. Renatus had sent Augustine the work of Vincentius Victor, in which the doctrine of Creationism was defended. Augustine in his critical reply takes the ground that Victor cannot *demon-*

¹ Similar statements are made in Ep. XC, Ad Optatum; De Genesi ad litteram X. 21; Ep. CXLIII, Ad Marcellinum; and De peccatorum meritis et remiss. II. 36, III. 10.

² AUGUSTINUS: De civitate Dei, XI. 23.

strate from Scripture, the position that souls are created and in-breathed in every instance of birth, and asserts that we are in ignorance upon the whole matter. He examines one by one those texts which Victor has quoted, and contends that they are insufficient to prove Creationism. In summing up, he remarks, that if any one prefers to hold that souls are created in each individual instance, he must take care not to hold the four following errors: 1. That the souls thus immediately created are made sinful at the instant of creation, by the Creator, through an original sin, or sinful disposition, that is infused into them, and which is not truly their own sin; 2. That those who die in infancy are destitute of original sin, and do not need that baptism which puts them in possession of the merits of Christ; 3. That souls sinned in some other sphere before their connection with flesh, and that for this reason they were brought down into sinful flesh; 4. That the newly-created souls of those who die in infancy are not punishable for existing sin, but only for sins which it is foreknown they would have committed had they been permitted to arrive at a suitable age.¹

The difficulties that beset the subject of the origin of the individual soul, whether the theory of creation or of traduction be adopted, are very clearly stated by Augustine in his epistle *Ad Optatum*,

¹ AUGUSTINUS: De Anima, Liber I. (Opera X. 481. 482, Ed. Migne).

his treatise *De peccatorum meritis et remissione*, his tract *De anima*, and his exegetical work *De Genesi ad litteram*. We will briefly give the line of remark in these treatises, which we take from the learned and discriminating work of Gangauf¹ upon the Metaphysical Psychology of Augustine.

So far as the question of the divine agency in creation is concerned, says Augustine, we may accept either Creationism or Traducianism. By either theory, God is recognized as the creator; for even in case the theory of traduction or generation be adopted, God is still the absolute origin and author, inasmuch as in the primal act of creating the human soul he so created it that it possesses the power of reproducing and perpetuating itself in individual souls, just as in the sphere of nature and matter the first seed is indued with the power to reproduce individuals after its own kind. This *endowment* of reproductive power, says Augustine, as much requires creative energy to account for its existence, as does the existence of the first seed, or the first soul; "for who can make a seed to produce individuals invariably after its kind, except that Being who made the seed itself from nothing?" Nevertheless, continues Augustine, both theories have their difficulties. In reference to Traducianism, the question arises, how it is possible to hold to such a propagation of the soul without falling into ma-

¹ GANGAUF: *Metaphysische Psychologie des Augustinus*, Hauptstück III. § 3. p. 248. sq.

terialism, and regarding the soul as a corporeal entity, after Tertullian's example, whose fancies in this respect need not awaken our wonder, since he represents God the creator himself as corporeal.¹ On the other hand, he who adopts Traducianism finds little difficulty with the doctrine of original sin, while the advocate of Creationism finds a great difficulty here. For the soul as newly created (and it is newly-created in every individual instance according to the Creationist) cannot be anything but a pure and perfect soul. It cannot be tainted with evil of any kind; but on the contrary, as coming immediately from the creator's hand, must possess his holy image and likeness. If, now, it be thus pure and perfect, the question arises: Why does it deserve to be associated at very birth with a diseased and dying body, and to be stained and polluted with a corrupted sensuous nature? ² The

¹ Augustine, however, takes Tertullian too literally. In combatting the Gnostic idea of the deity, which was hyperspiritualizing, Tertullian, it is true, employs phraseology that is materializing, and has furnished ground for the charge of materialism. But if he is interpreted by his context, it will be found, we think, that he meant merely to assert that God, though a spirit, is a *substance* or *essence*. "Corpus" in his vocabulary is equivalent to "substantia." He expressly declares that "God has not

any diversity of parts in himself; he is altogether uniform." This, of course, could not be, if he were corporeal or material. Augustine himself (De Genesi ad literam, X. xxv. 41) remarks that Tertullian, "quoniam acutus est, interdum contra opinionem suam visa veritate superatur. Quid enim verius dicere potuit, quam id quod ait quodam loco, 'Omne corporale passibile est' (De anima. c. 7)? Debit ergo mutare sententiam, qua paulo superius dixerat etiam Deum corpus esse."

² This was an objection strongly

fact that its connection with such a body does not depend at all upon the soul, but rests entirely upon the will of the creator, would seem to imply that God himself is the cause of the soul's deteriorated state and condition. But if so, its restoration would be no act of grace. It would, rather, be a matter of obligation, since the creator would be merely healing a wound which he himself had made. Furthermore, in the case of infants who die without baptism,—a thing that occurs in thousands of instances, and with the Divine foreknowledge,—how is the justice of God to be vindicated, if such infantile souls, without any agency and fault of their own, are visited with disease, sickness, pain, and death temporal and eternal? Can we believe that the creator *makes* these newly-created spirits guilty at the time of creating them, and then inflicts these evils upon them as a punishment? How, upon the theory of Creationism, shall we find an interval of time between the act that creates the soul and the act that unites it with a diseased and mortal body, of sufficient length for Satan to present his temptation, and the newly-created spirit to yield and fall? Neither is it any relief to say that God punishes the souls of unbaptized infants upon the ground of those sins which they *would* have committed had

urged by the Pelagians, as Augustine remarks in *De peccatorum meritis* III. iii. 5,—“Si anima non est ex traduce, sed sola caro, ipsa tantum habet traducem peccati,

et ipsa sola poenam meretur; injustum esse . . . ut hodie nata anima non ex massa Adæ, tam antiquum peccatum portet alienum.”

they lived, and which he foreknew they would commit. For this would conflict with the nature of retribution and the idea of justice. Punishment supposes some *actual* offence in the past. It is always retrospective. Hence penalty cannot be anticipated. No being can be justly punished in advance. If he can be, then there is nothing to prevent a child who dies at the age of three years, from being punished for all the sins which he would have committed had he lived upon earth to the age of forty, or sixty, or sixty thousand years. With respect to such questions as the following, which were urged against the theory of Creationism: Why does God create souls for children who die at birth, or immediately after? and why does he create souls in the instance of adulterine offspring? Augustine remarks, that he thinks he could give an answer from the position of Creationism. But to the question: Why does God *punish* an infant soul? he can give no answer from this position.

Augustine finally remarks, that if one goes to the Scriptures for a *decisive* settlement of the question at issue between Creationism and Traducianism, he does not obtain it. In respect to the doctrine of original sin, the preponderance of Scripture proof is upon the side of Traducianism. But passages may be quoted in favor of the soul's new creation in each individual instance; still, no one of them is so decisive that it might not be in-

terpreted in favor of its traduction. All such passages prove, indeed, that God is the giver, the creator, the former of the human soul. But *how* he is, whether by in-breathing them newly-created, or by the traduction (trahendo) of them from the parent, the Scriptures nowhere say.¹ "As yet," says Augustine (Ep. cxc, Ad Optatum), "I have found nothing certain and decisive in the canonical Scriptures, respecting the origin of the soul."²

It is evident from these trains of remark, which are drawn from a very wide surface in Augustine's writings, that his mind felt the full force of the mysteries that overhang the origin of the indi-

¹ Proinde quia non dixit ex anima viri factam animam mulieris, convenientius creditur eo ipso nos admonere voluisse, nihil hic aliud putare, quam de viri anima novaramus, id est similiter datam esse mulieri; cum praesertim esset evidentissimæ occasionis locus, ut si non tunc quando formata est, postea certe diceretur, ubi ait Adam, 'Hoc nunc os ex ossibus meis, et caro de carne mea.' Quanto enim carius et amantiusque diceret, Et anima de anima mea? *Non tamen hinc tam magna quaestio jam soluta est, ut unum horum manifestum certumque teneamus.*" AUGUSTINUS: De Genesi ad lit. X. i. 2.

² In his final revision of his works he says: "Quod attinet ad ejus (sc. animi) originem, qua fit ut sit in corpore, utrum de illo

uno sit qui primum creatus est, quando factus est homo in animam vivam, an semper ita fiant singulis singulae, nec tunc sciebam nec adhuc scio." Retractationes I. i. 3.—At the time when Augustine wrote the 2d and 3d books of his treatise De libero arbitrio, viz.: about 395, he attributed more value to the theory of pre-existence than he afterwards did, as the following extract proves. "Harum autem quatuor de anima sententiarum, utrum de propagine veniant, an in singulis quibusque nascentibus novae fiant, *an in corpora nascentium jam alicubi existentes vel mittantur divinitus, vel sua sponte labantur, nullam temere affirmare oportebit.*" De libero arbitrio, III. xxi. 58.

vidual soul, and its inborn sinfulness. That his mind inclined to Traducianism, the course of reasoning which has been delineated plainly shows. That he was not averse to Creationism, provided the problem of sin could be solved in a way to accord with what he believed to be the teaching of Scripture and the Christian experience, is evident from the following remark which he makes respecting this theory in his letter to Jerome: "Ecce volo ut illa sententia mea sit, sed nondum esse confirmo." Again in this same letter he says to Jerome: "Teach me now, I beg of you, what I shall teach; teach me what I shall hold; and tell me if souls are every day, one by one, called into being from nonentity, in those who are daily being born."¹

§ 4. *Mediaeval and Modern Theories.*

In the Middle Ages, the theory of Creationism prevailed over the rival theory. Traducianism fell into disrepute with the Schoolmen,² for two reasons: 1. Because they regarded it as conflicting with

¹ AUGUSTINUS: De origine animae, seu epistola CLXVI, Ad Hieronymum. Compare FLEURY: Eccl. Hist. Book XXIII. xvii.

² "Licet igitur anima non sit ex traduce, tamen originalis culpa ab anima Adæ transit ad animas posterum mediante carne per concupiscentiam generata; ita quod sicut ab anima peccanti infecta fuit

caro Adæ, et prona effecta ad libidinem; ita seminata caro secum trahens infectionem vitiat animam. In carne est materialiter et originaliter, et in anima formaliter tanquam in subjecto." BONAVENTURA: Compendium Theologicae Veritatis (De corruptela peccati Lib. III. cap. viii.).

the doctrine of the soul's immortality, and as materializing in its influence. 2. Because, rejecting as most of them did, the anthropology of Augustine, and adopting the Greek anthropology, they had less motive than Augustine had, for favoring the theory of the soul's traduction.

The revival of the Augustinian anthropology at the Reformation naturally led to the re-appearance of the Traducian theory. The symbols of both the Lutheran and the Calvinistic divisions, so far as they make any speculative statement at all upon the subject, generally enunciate, or at least logically involve, the doctrine of the Adamic unity in respect to both soul and body. But as we have seen Augustine himself hesitating to take a decided position respecting the origin of the individual soul, it is not strange that minds in the Protestant Church that were agreed upon the doctrine of original sin, should differ upon this metaphysical question. Advocates of both Traducianism and Creationism are to be found among the early Protestant divines.¹

¹ LUTHER taught Traducianism, and the Lutheran theologians, generally, followed him, with the exception of CALIXTUS, who adopts Creationism in his treatise, *De animae creatione*. GERHARD (*Loci* IX. viii. § 116, 118.) leaves the determination of the manner to the philosophers; but holds that "*animas eorum qui ex Adamo et Eva progeniti fuissent, non creatas, neque enim generatas,*

sed propagatas fuisse." CALOVIVS, III. p. 1084, and HOLLAZ, take the same view.

CALVIN, and the Reformed party generally, declare for Creationism, though retaining the Augustinian doctrine of original sin. Calvin (*Inst.* II. i. 7) takes the ground that the decision of the question, as between the two theories, is unimportant. "Who will be solicitous about a trans-

The subject itself, like other purely speculative ones, has attracted less attention for two centuries past, than it did in the previous history of the Church. One of the most decided of modern advocates of Traducianism is the American theologian Edwards, in his treatise *On Original Sin*.¹

mission of the soul, when he hears that Adam received the ornaments that he lost, no less for us than for himself? that they were given, not to one man only, but to the whole human nature?"

BEZA (Qu 47.) rejects Traducianism decidedly: "Doctrina de animae traduce mihi perabsurda videtur, quoniam aut totam animam aut partem ejus traduci oporteret."

PETER MARTYR (Thes. 705.) declares that: "Animae non sunt omnes simul creatae ab initio, sed creantur quotidie a deo corporibus inserandae."

POLANUS (p. 2183) asserts: "Eodem momento Deus creat animam simul et unit corpori infecto."

See HAGENBACH: Dogmengeschichte, § 248; HASE: Hutterus Redivivus, § 85.

¹ SAMUEL HOPKINS, also, (Works, I. 289) seems to have been a Traducianist. "The mother, therefore, according to a law of nature, conceives both the soul and body of her son; she does as much towards the one as towards the other, and is equally the instrumental cause of both." EDWARDS: Against Watts's Notion, § 7.

CHAPTER II.

THE GREEK ANTHROPOLOGY.¹

§ 1. *Preliminary Statements.*

THE universality of human sinfulness, and the need of divine grace in Christ in order to deliverance from it, were acknowledged in the doctrinal system of the Christian Church from the beginning. There was no denial, except among the confessedly heretical sects, of the doctrines of Sin and Redemption stated in this *general* form. In constructing the more specific statements there was, however, a difference of opinion in the Ancient Church, which showed itself in two great tendencies. The one resulted in what we shall denominate the *Greek An-*

¹ Compare GUERICKE: *Church History*, §§ 91, 92, 93. WHITBY on *Original Sin* (Chapters VI–VIII) cites from those Fathers who deny the imputation of Adam's sin to his posterity as a ground of condemnation; he is somewhat biased by his polemic aims, and in many instances gives a deeper color to the quotation as extracted, than it wears in its original connections. WIGGERS' *Augustinism*, Chap XXII, presents the views of the earlier Fathers, in respect to the contested points between Augustine and Pelagius.

thropology; the other in the *Latin Anthropology*.¹ These types of doctrine were not rigorously confined, the one to the Eastern and the other to the Western Church. But each was the *predominating* scheme within its own borders, while yet each found some advocates, and exerted some influence within the limits of the other.

The two questions upon which the controversy turned were the following: 1. Is man's power to good diminished by sin, and if so to what extent? 2. What is the precise relation which the agency of the human will sustains to the workings of the Holy Spirit, in regeneration?

¹ "While in the Western Church the Augustinian scheme of doctrine had become dominant, in the Greek Church the *older*, and *more indefinite* mode of apprehending the doctrines of grace, of free-will, and of providence, a theory bordering upon Pelagianism, had been preserved." NEANDER: III. 554. The reformers of the English Church recognized the difference between the anthropology of the East and the West, a fact noticed by HALLAM: Constitutional History, VII. i. See, also, MACKINTOSH: Ethical Philosophy, Section III. (p. 106. Pa. Ed.). "He lent Burnet's commentary on the Thirty Nine Articles to me, and I have now a distinct recollection of the great impression which it made. I read with peculiar eagerness and pleasure, the commentary on the 17th

article,—that which regards Predestination; and I remember Mr. Mackenzie's pointing out to me, that though the bishop abstained from giving his own opinion on that subject, in the commentary, he had intimated that opinion not obscurely in the preface, when he says that 'he was of the opinion of the Greek Church, from which St. Austin departed.' I was so profoundly ignorant of what the opinion of the Greek Church was, and what St. Austin's deviations were, that the mysterious magnificence of this phrase had an extraordinary effect on my imagination. My boarding mistress, the schoolmaster, and the parson, were orthodox Calvinists. I became a warm advocate for free will, and before I was fourteen I was probably the boldest heretic in the country." MACKINTOSH'S Life, I. 5.

The views of the entire Church, both the Western and Eastern, upon these points, during the 2d and 3d centuries were shaped very much by the controversy with Gnosticism. The dualistic theory of the universe, held by the Gnostic, involved the eternity of evil as well as of good, and the further tenet that man is sinful by *creation*, because all creation is the work of the Demiurge. In opposition to this view, the Christian Fathers contended for the biblical doctrine that man was created holy, and a free moral agent, and that by the misuse of his moral freedom he is himself the author of his own sin.¹ Again, the Gnostic, dividing mankind into three classes,—οἱ πνευματικοὶ, οἱ ψυχικοὶ, οἱ ὑλικοὶ,—asserted that only the first class were capable of being redeemed, and that the other two classes, who constituted the great mass of mankind.

¹ JUSTIN MARTYR (Apol. I. 43) thus argues against the Pagan doctrine of fate. "But lest any should infer from what has been said, that we are assertors of fatal necessity, and conclude that prophecy must needs infer predestination, we shall clear ourselves as to this point also; for we learn from these very prophets that rewards and punishments are to be distributed in proportion to the merits of mankind. And it is a truth which we ourselves profess; for if it be not so, but all things are determined by fate, then farewell freedom of will; and if this man is destined

to be good, and that one to be evil, then neither the one nor the other can be justly approved or condemned; so that unless we suppose that man has it in his power to choose the good, and refuse the evil, no one can be accountable for any action whatever. But to prove that men are good or evil by choice, I argue in this manner: We see in the same person a transition to quite contrary actions; but now were he necessitated either to be good or bad, he would not be capable of this contrariety." Compare, also, Apologia I. 10; and 80.

were hopelessly given over to evil lusts and satanic powers. In opposition to this theory, the Christian Fathers maintained the essential moral equality and similarity of all men, and contended that the varieties of character seen in human society are varieties in the manifestation only, and not of the inward disposition, and that even these are owing to circumstances, and to the different use which individuals make of their faculties and powers.

It was a natural consequence of this polemic attitude towards Gnosticism, that the anthropology of the 2d and 3d centuries of both the Western and the Eastern Church was marked by a very strong emphasis of the doctrine of human freedom. At a time when the truth that man is a responsible agent was being denied by the most subtle opponents which the Christian theologian of the first centuries was called to meet, it was not to be expected that very much reflection would be expended upon that side of the subject of sin which relates to the weakness and bondage of the apostate will. The Gnostic asserted that man was created sinful, and that he had no free will. The Ancient Father contented himself with rebutting these statements, without much reference to the consequences of human apostasy in the moral agent, and the human will itself. When, therefore, the question respecting these *consequences* was raised, it is not surprising that there was some variety in the answers that were given

by the different theological schools, and parties, of Primitive Christendom.¹

¹These varieties of opinion have been observed and conceded. Says CALVIN (Inst. II. i. 4): "On the subject of original sin the Fathers had much contention, nothing being more remote from natural reason, than that all should be criminated on account of the guilt of one, and thus his sin become common; which seems to have been the reason why the most ancient doctors of the Church did but obscurely glance at this point, or at least explained it with less perspicuity than it required." HOOKER (On Justification, Works, II. 530), making a distinction between error of ignorance, and distinct and persistent heresy, remarks: "Was not their opinion dangerous, who thought the kingdom of Christ should be earthly? was not theirs, who thought the gospel should be preached only to the Jews? What more opposite to prophetic doctrine concerning the coming of Christ, than the one? concerning the catholic church than the other? Yet they which had these fancies, even when they had them, were not the worst men in the world. The heresy of free-will was a millstone about the Pelagian's neck; shall we therefore give sentence of death inevitable against all those Fathers in the Greek church, who being mispersuaded, died in

the error of free-will?" WHITBY (On Original Sin, Ch. viii.) makes the following statements. "We have, first, the great *Petavius* (De incar. lib. xiv. cap. 2. § 1), ingenuously confessing: 'That the Greeks in their writings seldom make any mention, and never an express mention, of original sin.' *Whitaker* (Original Sin, lib. ii. c. 2), after he had produced many passages in which the Fathers have spoken of original sin and free will incautiously, and with too little exactness, has these words: 'Why should I recite many other passages of the same kind? From these it abundantly appears that the Fathers before the rise of Pelagius did very often think and write more inaccurately of original sin and free will, in which two articles his heresy did mainly consist, than it became great doctors of the church; and God suffered Pelagius to go on for a while, that the catholic Fathers might learn to judge and speak more soundly concerning matters of so great consequence. And therefore, what the *Magdeburg Centuriators* have written,—that the Fathers ascribed too much to man's power, have something darkened the subject of human corruption, and explained it in a manner too slight and mean,—is so true that nothing can be more certain. *Du Moulin*, also, holds

§ 2. *The Alexandrine Anthropology.*

The most unqualified position, in reference to the power of free will in apostate man, was taken by the Alexandrine School. This was partly the result of the excessive speculative tendency by which this school was characterized, and partly of its collision with Gnosticism. The Alexandrines represent the will of man as possessed, notwithstanding its apostasy in a pre-existent state, of a plenary power to good, and able to turn from sin by the exercise of its own inherent energy (*αὐτεξούσιον*). *Clement of Alexandria* asserts that “to believe or to disbelieve is as much at the command

with Petavius and Whitaker; but *Vossius* endeavors to prove that the Greek and Latin Fathers taught the same doctrine of original sin essentially.” NIEBUHR (*Life and Letters*, p. 530. N. Y. Ed.), remarks that, “all who are acquainted with church history know, that no system of doctrine respecting redemption, hereditary sin, grace, &c., existed for at least the first two centuries after Christ; that on these points, opinions and teaching were unfettered, and that those were never considered as heretics who simply accepted the creed (the so-called *Symbolum Apostolicum*), kept in communion with the church, and were subject to her

discipline.”—In investigating the anthropology of the Fathers, generally, it is of great importance to notice whether the writer is speaking of man as *fallen*, or as *unfallen*. Assertions made respecting the primitive freedom of man as he is by creation should not be transferred to his apostate condition; and, on the other hand, statements that relate to the bondage and helplessness of the apostate will are not to be applied to the unfallen human will. Unless this distinction is taken into view, one and the same writer will, oftentimes, be found to teach contradictions; sometimes asserting freedom, and sometimes bondage.

of our will as to philosophize or not to philosophize." "Man, like every other spiritual being, can never lose the power of arbitrary choice. By means of this power, noble minds, at all times, here and hereafter, aided by that Divine Power which is indispensable to success, are lifting themselves up from ignorance and deep moral corruption, and are drawing nearer to God and the truth."¹

Yet these statements undergo some modification. Clement also insists upon the necessity of divine influences in order to deliverance from sin, because, although man is able to *commence* moral improvement by the resolute decision of his will, he cannot bring it to completion without the aid of divine grace. "God," he remarks, "co-operates with those souls that are willing." "As the physician furnishes health to that body which synergizes towards health [by a recuperative energy of its own], so God furnishes eternal salvation to those who synergize towards the knowledge and obedience of the truth."² In these extracts, which might be multiplied, Clement teaches that the *initiative*, in the renewal and change of the sinful heart, is taken by the sinner himself. The first motion towards holiness is the work of man, but it needs to be succeeded and strengthened by the influences of the Holy Spirit. Whenever,

¹ REDEPENNING : Origenes, I. *dives salvus*, Cap. XI.; *Stromata* VIII.

² CLEMENS ALEXANDRINUS: *Quis*

by virtue of its own inherent energy, the soul is itself willing, then God co-operates, and concurs with this willingness.¹

These views of Clement, respecting the power to good in apostate man, were shared by *Origen*.² In the third book of the *De Principiis*, he argues that the assertion of the apostle that man's salvation "is not of him that willeth," but "of God that showeth mercy," means merely that the *existence* of the will as a faculty depends upon Divine power, and not that the *use* of the faculty is thus dependent. "As we derive it from God that we are men, that we breathe, that we move, so also we derive it from God that we will. But no one would infer from the fact that our capacity to move, the hand, e. g., is from God, that therefore the motion of our hand in the act of murder, or of theft, is from God."³ Throughout this first chapter of the third book of the *De Principiis*, in which Origen enunciates his view of human freedom, and examines the Scripture texts that relate to this subject, he holds that the relation which the human will sustains to moral good is precisely the same as that

¹ JUSTIN MARTYR (Apologia I. 10) remarks that, "though we had no choice in our creation, yet in our regeneration we have; for God persuades only, and draws us gently, in our regeneration, by co-operating freely with those rational powers he has bestowed upon us."

² For Origen's anthropology, compare REDEPENNING: Origenes. II. 318, 360. sq.; THOMASIIUS: Origenes, p. 195. sq.

³ ORIGENES: Tom. I. 720. Ed. Bas. 1771.

which it sustains to moral evil. The will *initiates* both holiness and sin; so that, in Origen's view, it is as incorrect to deny to the human will, be it fallen or unfallen, the power to holiness, as it would be to deny it the power to sin. Origen's position is, that the will of man is the ultimate efficient in either direction, or else it is the ultimate efficient in neither direction.

Origen's view of the relation which the agency of the human will sustains to Divine power in regeneration, coincides with that of Clement. The finite faculty begins the process of right action, and divine grace perfects and completes it. The faculty by which to will the right, man has from God; but the decision itself is his own act. God's part is therefore greater than man's; as the creation of a faculty is greater than the use of it. Moreover, every right beginning of action on the side of man, requires a special succor and assistance from God. Through the Holy Spirit this succor is granted, according to the worthiness of the individual; and thus every right act of man is a mixture of self-choice and divine aid.¹

The views of Clement and Origen respecting original sin harmonized with these views of free will and regeneration. To understand their theory

¹ REDEPENNING : Origenes, II. 522; De Princ. III. 279; Sel. in 318. His citations are : Fragm. Ps. p. 571, 672; Tom. in Matt. de Princ. III. p. 35; Hom. in Jer. XII. 561. VIII. 170; Com. in Rom. iv.

of original sin, it will be necessary first to exhibit their psychology. They subdivided the constitution of man into *σῶμα*, *ψυχή*, and *πνεῦμα*. The first, was the material part; the second included the principle of animal life, together with the sensuous appetites and passions that relate to the physical world; while the third was the rational and spiritual principle, including the will and the moral affections of human nature. Original sin, according to the Alexandrine theologians, was confined to the two first subdivisions in the trichotomy. It was an inherited corruption which has its seat in the body and the sensuous nature, but does not inhere in the *πνεῦμα*, because this is not propagated, and therefore cannot inherit anything. Adopting then, as the Alexandrine anthropologist did, the theory of pre-existence, it was easy to see that the rational part, the *πνεῦμα*, coming down from the angelic sphere, would be kept, more or less, in isolation from the body and its sensuous corruption, and might thus be regarded as able by its intrinsic energy to rule and overcome this "original sin," this corrupted sensuousness, that was all around it, but was not *in* it.¹

Original sin, being only physical corruption, and pertaining only to the bodily and physical nature, was not regarded as truly and properly culpable by

¹ Ἀνεπίδεκτον τῶν χειρόνων τὸ πνεῦμα. PRINC. III. 1. THOMASIIUS: Origenes, p. 196. ORIGEN in Joh. xxxii. 11; ii. 9; in Matt. x. 11; de

the Alexandrine school. There is no guilt except in the wrong action of the *πνεῦμα*. Sin, in the strict sense, therefore, has no origin in Adam, but is the act of the individual will, either in a previous world, or in this one. That the individual will, in every instance, yields to the solicitation of the corrupt sensuousness, Origen accounts for by the force of example and education, and not by any connection or union between the posterity and the progenitor. "Parents," says Origen, "not only generate their children, but also imbue them; and they who are born are not merely the children, but the pupils, of their parents; and they are urged to the death of sin, not so much by natural connection (*natura*), as by training. For illustration, if a man apostatizing from Christianity should take up the worship of idols, would he not teach the children that should be begotten, to worship demons and offer sacrifice to them? This is what Adam did when he apostatized from God."¹

§ 3. *Later-Alexandrine and Antiochian Anthropology.*

The Anthropology indicated in these statements of Clement and Origen, in a modified form, became the type of doctrine in the Oriental Church generally. It received a modification in three par-

¹ ORIGENES: Com. in Rom. v. 18, Opera II. p. 534. Ed. Basil, 1571.

ticulars: 1. The theory of pre-existence was rejected, and that of creationism was substituted. 2. There was more recognition of the *indirect* effects of the Adamic transgression upon the soul itself, including the will ($\piνεῦμα$). 3. There was a more qualified assertion of power to holiness in the fallen man.

These modifications are apparent in the writings of the *Later-Alexandrine School*, composed of those Greek theologians who had felt the influence of Origen, viz.: Athanasius, Basil, Gregory Nazianzen, Gregory Nyssa, Cyril of Jerusalem, and Cyril of Alexandria. These Fathers endeavored to exhibit the doctrine of the universality of sin in its relation to the sin of Adam, yet did not adopt that doctrine of a propagated sinfulness of the *will* ($\piνεῦμα$) which we shall meet with in the Latin Anthropology. Original Sin, with them also, is not culpable. It is only an inherited disorder of the sensuous nature, from which temptation issues, and to which the will yields; and not until this act of the will is there any sin, properly so called, in man. *Athanasius* was engaged with the discussion of the doctrine of the Trinity all his life, and exhibits his anthropological opinions only rarely, and in passing. But his view of original sin would probably be summed up in the above-mentioned statement. Hagenbach (*Dogmengeschichte*, § 108) quotes a remark of Athanasius, to the effect that "many men have be-

come pure from all sin,"¹ in proof of his own statement that Athanasius did not hold to the universality of sin. But the remark of Athanasius when read in its original connection shows that he was speaking not of the unregenerate, but of those who were the subjects of renewing divine influence. "Many," he says, "have *been made* holy and clean from all sin; nay Jeremiah was hallowed from the womb; nevertheless death reigned from Adam to Moses, even over those that had not sinned after the similitude of Adam's transgression," and thus "*man remained mortal and corruptible as before*, liable to the affections proper to his nature."

Cyril of Jerusalem makes the following statements respecting original sin: "When we come into the world we are sinless (*ἀναμάρτητοι*), but now we sin from choice." "Where God first sees a good conscience there he bestows the saving seal." "We did not sin before our souls came into the world; but coming into it free from evil, we transgress by the choice of our mind. There is no kind of souls that are either sinful or righteous by nature, but that we are either the one or the other proceeds only from free choice." "The sentence of death threatened against Adam extended to him and all his posterity, even unto those who had not sinned as Adam did when he disobeyed God by eating the

¹ Πολλοὶ γὰρ οὖν ἅγιοι γεγόνασι καθαροὶ πάσης ἁμαρτίας. *Contra Ari-*
anos, III. 33.

forbidden fruit.”¹ Cyril here implies, that as infants have not sinned by a conscious and deliberate act of choice they have not sinned at all, and that death passes upon them not as penalty, but for other reasons. *Gregory Nazianzen* denominates unbaptized children ἀσφαγίστους μὲν, ἀπονήρους δέ.² *Gregory Nyssa* asserts a universal tendency to sin in mankind, but denies sin in the sense of guilt, in infants.³

The *Antiochian School*, represented by *Theodore of Mopsuestia*, *Chrysostom*, and *Theodoret*, adopted substantially the same anthropology with the Later-Alexandrines. They held the doctrine of the Adamic connection only so far as the physical nature is concerned, and taught that there is an inherited evil, or corruption, but not an inherited sin. The best representative of this school, and perhaps of the Greek anthropology generally, is *Chrysostom*. He concedes that the mortal Adam could beget mortal descendants, but not that the sinful Adam could beget sinful descendants. The doctrine of propagation, according to him, applies to the physical nature of man, but not to his spiritual and voluntary. The first progenitors of the human race brought corruption, i. e. a vitiated *sensuousness*, but not a sinful *will* into the series of human beings,

¹ CYRILLUS HIEROS.: Catecheses, IV. xix.; I. iii. Compare WHITBY: On Original Sin, Ch. VI.

² GREGORIUS NAZ.: Orationes, XL. p. 563, B.

³ GREGORIUS NYS.: De oratione Dom.; De Infantibus.

and these latter universally adopt it, and strengthen it, by the strictly individual choice of their will. In his Commentary upon Romans v., Chrysostom thus expresses his views. "It is not unbefitting (*οὐδὲν ἀπεικός*) that from that man who sinned, and thereby became mortal, there should be generated those who should also sin, and thereby become mortal; but that by that single act of disobedience another being is made a *sinner*, what reason is there in this? No one owes any thing to justice, until he first becomes a sinner for himself (*οἰχοῦθεν*). What, then, is the meaning of the word *ἁμαρτολοὶ*, in the phrase 'were made sinners?' It seems to me, to denote liability to suffering and death." Here, plainly, Chrysostom limits the connection of Adam with his posterity to that part of man which is other than the strictly voluntary part. The union of Adam and his posterity accounts for the origin of strong animal passions, of inordinate sensual appetites, but not for the origin of voluntary wickedness. This, as it is the act of will, and not the mere working of sensuous appetite, has a purely individual origin.

Chrysostom's theory of regeneration was firmly synergistic.¹ If man upon his side works towards holiness, God's grace will come in to succor and

¹ Synergism (*σύν ἔργον*) teaches that there are two *efficient*s in regeneration; that the human will *co-operates*, in the strict sense of the term, with the Holy Spirit,

in the renewing act. But strict coöperation implies concert and agreement between the two co-operating agents; hence synergism asserts a certain degree of

strengthen him. In his 16th Homily on Romans, his exegesis is as follows: "The phrase 'it is not of him that willeth, nor of him that runneth' does not denude man of power altogether, but indicates that the *whole* power is not of man. Assisting grace is needed from above. For, it is necessary that the man himself should both will and run; but he is to be courageous (*ὑπαρρέειν*) and constant [in well doing], not by his own efforts, but through God's loving kindness." Again, Chrysostom remarks, that "it is necessary for us first to choose goodness, and when we have chosen it, then God introduces (*εἰσάγει*) goodness from himself. . . . It is our function to choose beforehand, and to will, but it is God's function to finish and bring to completion."¹

§ 4. *Recapitulatory Survey.*

The Greek Anthropology, commencing with the extreme positions of Clement and Origen, and passing from these into the more guarded statements of the Later-Alexandrine and Antiochian Schools, became the general type of doctrine for the Eastern Church; and under new forms and names has perpetuated itself down to the present time. Christen-

right inclination remaining in the human will after apostasy, by means of which it can concur with the Divine in regeneration. This degree may be more or less,

a maximum or a minimum, and hence the varieties of synergism.

¹ CHRYSOSTOMUS: *Homilia XII. Ad Hebraeos.*

dom from the very beginning became divided into two great dogmatic divisions; in one of which the Greek, and in the other, the Latin Anthropology has prevailed. A recapitulatory survey of the cardinal points of the former presents the following particulars: 1. Original Sin is not voluntary, and, therefore, is not properly sin in the sense of guilt.¹ 2. The Adamic connection relates only to the corporeal and sensuous nature, and not to the voluntary and rational. 3. The voluntary and rational *πνεῦμα* is not propagated, but is created in each individual instance, and its action is individual altogether. 4. The Adamic connection exerts no *immediate* effect upon the will; it affects it only mediately, through the fleshly corruption. 5. Infants are guiltless, because they possess only a propagated physical corruption. 6. The will takes the initiative in regeneration; but though the first to commence, it is unable to complete the work; and hence the need of the Divine efficiency, with which the human will co-operates as itself an efficient power.

¹ "All, or at least the greater part of the Fathers of the Greek Church, before Augustine, denied any real original sin." WIGGERS: Augustinism and Pelagianism, p. 43 (Emerson's translation).

CHAPTER III.

THE LATIN ANTHROPOLOGY.

§ 1. *Tertullian's Traducianism.*

As has been observed, the Greek anthropology was the dominant theory in the Eastern Church, and prevailed extensively in the Western. In the 2d and 3d centuries, many of the Occidental Fathers, judging from their writings, would not have quarrelled with a statement of the doctrines of sin and regeneration substantially like that of Chrysostom. But in the writings of the leading minds at the West, in the 3d and 4th centuries, we can discover the swelling germs of that other theory which afterwards became dominant in the Latin Church. The fathers in whom this tendency is most apparent are Tertullian, Cyprian, Hilary, and Ambrose.¹

Tertullian's Traducianism, which gradually be-

¹ HIPPOLYTUS, the pupil of Irenaeus, states the doctrine of free will in a somewhat guarded man-

ner, and particularly the doctrine of the origin of sin. "Man was born a creature endued with free will,

came the received psychology of the Latin Church, paved the way for the doctrine of innate *sin*, in distinction from innate *evil*, and also for the theory of monergism¹ in regeneration. This Father, starting from the fact that from birth man is constantly inclined to sin, deduced from it his famous maxim: *Tradux animae, tradux peccati*,—the propagation of the soul implies the propagation of sin.

His argument, drawn out in full, was as follows. If there can be a traduction of the soul, there can be a traduction of sin. If a free-agent can be propagated, then free-agency can be; for the agency follows the agent, and shares in all its characteristics. If, therefore, there be nothing in a continuous process of transmission from a generic unity that is incompatible with the nature of a rational and voluntary essence like the soul, then there is

but not dominant (οὐκ ἄρχον); having reason, *but not able to govern everything with reason, authority, and power*, but a slave (δοῦλον), *and having all contraries* (τὰ ἐναντία) *in himself*. He, in having free will, generates evil; but nothing evil comes to pass accidentally, but only unless thou doest it [by design and intentionally]. For, in the volition or cogitation of evil, evil receives its name, and does not exist from the beginning, but came into existence subsequently." WORDSWORTH: Hippolytus, p. 289 (Philosophumena, Ed. Miller, p. 336).—In another place (p. 388, Ed. Miller, Words-

worth, p. 295), he remarks that "God made nothing evil, and man is endued with free will, having the power of willing or not willing in himself, and being able to do both [good and evil]."

¹ Monergism (μόνον ἔργον) teaches that there is but one *efficient* agent in the regeneration of the soul, viz. the Holy Spirit. The apostate will, according to this theory, possesses not the least degree of efficiency, or inclination, to act holily, until it has been acted upon by Divine grace, and therefore cannot co-operate in the renovating act.

nothing in such transmission that is incompatible with the *activity* of such an essence, or, in other words, with the *voluntariness* of sin. If God can originate the entire human nature by the method of *creation*, and then can individualize this nature by the method of *procreation*, it follows that he can preserve all the qualities of the nature,—its rationality, its immateriality, its freedom, &c.,—in each of its individualizations, and from one end of the process to the other; for preservation is comparatively less difficult than creation from nothing. In other words, if mind, considered as an immaterial substance, does not lose its distinctive qualities by being procreated, but continues to be intelligent, rational, and voluntary at every point in the process, and in every one of its individualizations, then it follows that the activities and products of such a mental essence do not cease to be rational and responsible activities and products, though exhibiting themselves in that unbroken continuity which marks a propagation. It is evident that everything depends upon the correctness of the hypothesis that there is a *tradux animae*,—that man is of one generic nature as to his spiritual part as well as his physical, and that his entire humanity is procreated. Hence the importance attached to the Traducian theory of the origin of the soul, by Tertullian, and the earnestness with which he maintained it.

It is only the beginnings, however, of the Latin or Augustinian anthropology, that we can trace in

Tertullian's writings. In some instances, he still speaks of original sin in the same terms with the Greek theologians. His well-known plea for the delay of paedo-baptism rests upon the comparative innocency of infancy. "Why should the age of innocency be in haste to obtain remission of sin?"¹ Yet it would not be correct to infer from this phraseology, that Tertullian held to an absolute innocency upon the part of infants. The innocency is relative only; the infant has not committed "actual" sins, though possessed of a sinful bias, which Tertullian held to be condemning, certainly to the extent of needing the remission of baptism.

Tertullian at times, also, employs phraseology that looks towards the synergistic theory of regeneration. "Some things are by virtue of the divine compassion, and some things are by virtue of our agency."² Yet, in his writings, generally, the human efficiency is a minimum, and almost disappears, so that the rudiments of the monergistic theory of regeneration are distinctly visible in the anthropology of the North-African Church, which was mainly shaped by them. In his tract *De Anima*, Tertullian, with allusion to Scripture phraseology, remarks: "And thus stones shall become the children of Abraham, if they be formed by the faith of Abraham, and the progeny of vipers shall bring

¹ "Quid festinat innocens aetas
ad remissionem peccatorum?"
De Bapt. 18.

² TERTULLIANUS: Ad uxorem,
c. 21.

forth the fruits of repentance, if they spit away the poison of their malignity. But this involves the energy of divine grace, more powerful than that of nature, and which holds in subjection to itself that free power of will within us which is denominated *αὐτεξούσιον*.”¹

§ 2. *Anthropology of Cyprian, Ambrose, and Hilary.*

The writings of *Cyprian* († 258) exhibit an increasing tendency in the Western Church towards the doctrine of an original sinfulness, and a monergistic renovation of the human soul. The pressure from Gnosticism was now less heavy, and the attention of theologians was being turned more to *the effects of sin upon the will itself*. As a consequence, less emphasis was placed upon the doctrine of human power, and more upon that of Divine grace. “All our ability,” says Cyprian,² “is of God. In him we live, in him we have strength. Our heart merely lies open and thirsts. In proportion as we bring a recipient faith, do we drink in the inflowing grace.” Respecting the *guilt* of original sin, Cyprian is fluctuating, and not entirely consistent with himself. He seems to hold that original sin is not so culpable as actual sin, and yet teaches that it needs remission. “The infant,” he remarks,³ “has committed

¹ TERTULLIANUS: De anima, c. 21.

² CYPRIANUS: Ad Fidum, c. 5.

³ CYPRIANUS: De gratia, ad Donatum, c. 4, 5.

no sin. He has only contracted the contagion of death from his progenitor, and hence remission of sin is more easy in his case, because it is not his own but another's sin that is remitted to him."

In the writings of *Ambrose* († 397) and *Hilary* († 368), the two most distinguished Latin theologians of the 4th century, we find the doctrine of a *sinful*, as distinguished from a corrupt, nature still more distinctly enunciated than in Tertullian and Cyprian, and more use made of the ideas and phraseology of the fifth chapter of Romans. The following passages from Ambrose¹ will indicate his general view of original sin, and of the Adamic connection. Quoting Romans v. 12, which in the version of his day was rendered "in whom all have sinned," he remarks: "Adam existed (*fuit*), and we all existed in him; Adam perished, and all perished in him." "We all sinned in the first man, and by the succession of nature, the succession of guilt (*culpae*) was transfused from one to all." "Before we are born, we are stained with contagion, and before we see the light we receive the injury of the original transgression." "'In whom all

¹ AUGUSTINE (*Opus imp. lib. IV. Ed. Migne X. 1400*) quotes Ambrose to Julian as follows: "Audi ergo Juliane: 'Omnes' inquit, 'in Adam moriuntur; quia 'per unum hominem peccatum intravit in mundum, et per peccatum mors; et ita in omnes

homines pertransiit, in quo omnes peccaverunt; illius ergo culpa mors omnium est (*Lib. IV. in Lucam iv. 38*). Audi adhuc aliud: 'Fuit,' inquit, 'Adam, et in illo fuimus omnes; periit Adam, et omnes in illo perierunt' " (*Lib. VII. in Luc. xv. 24*).

sinned,'—thus it is evident that all sinned in Adam, as if in a mass; for having corrupted by sin those whom he begat, all are born under sin. Wherefore we all are sinners from him (*ex eo*), because we all are [men] from him."¹ Statements similar to these are made by *Hilary*.²

We find, then, the germinal substance of the Augustinian theory of sin, so far as concerns the Adamic connection, in the century previous to that in which Augustine's principal dogmatic influence falls. Indeed, it is evident that this latter Father was the recipient as well as the propagator of that particular system which goes by his name. He only developed an anthropology that had been gradually forming in preceding centuries, out of that remarkable dogmatic material which is contained in the fifth chapter of the Epistle to the Romans.

Respecting the other anthropological question: viz. To what degree is the power of the human will weakened by sin? both Ambrose and Hilary teach the synergistic theory; although with less firmness, and more self-contradiction, than we have found in the earlier Latin Fathers. The following passages from *Ambrose* illustrate his vacillation. "The apostle says, 'Whom he foreknew, them he also predestinated:' for he did not pre-

¹ AMBROSIUS: Apol. David posterior; Ad Psalmum LII. 7; In ep. ad Rom. c. 5. Expositio sec. Lucam 7.

mentatio in Matthaeum X. § 23; In Psalmum 118; Cont. duas Epist. Pelag. lib. IV., Ed. Migne, X. 614.

² Compare AUGUSTINE: Com-

destinate before he foreknew, but to those whose merit he foreknew, he predestinated the rewards of merit." "The will of man is brought into a state of recipiency (*praeparatio*) by God. For that God may be honored by a holy will is through God's grace."¹ A comparison of the latter passage with the former evinces a mental wavering between synergism and monergism. *Hilary* is more explicit and firm in favor of the theory of co-operation; although asserting the weakness of the apostate will. The following passages indicate his views. "In preserving our righteousness, unless we are guided by God, we shall be inferior through our own nature. Wherefore, we need to be assisted and directed by his grace in order to attain the righteousness of obedience." "The persevering in faith is of God, but the origin and commencement of faith is from ourselves." "It is the part of divine mercy to assist the willing, to confirm those who are making a beginning, to receive those who are approaching. But the commencement is from ourselves, that God may finish and perfect."²

§ 3. *Anthropology of Augustine.*

The anthropology indicated in these extracts

¹ AMBROSIUS: *De fide*, lib. V. tera i. 12; In *Psal. CXIX*, litera n. 83; *Expositio in Lucam*, lib. I. xiv. 10; In *Psal. CXIX*, litera

² HILARIUS: In *Psal. CXIX*, li- xvi. 10.

from Tertullian, Cyprian, Hilary, and Ambrose, grew more and more definite in the Latin Church, and became theoretically the established faith within it. It was wrought out into its most distinct form, and received its fullest statement, in the Patristic period, in the Augustinian anthropology, of which we shall now make a detailed examination.¹

In the first part of his Christian life, Augustine was influenced by the views of his teacher Ambrose, and occasionally attributed a certain amount of co-operating efficiency to the human will in the work of regeneration. In his earlier writings, some tendency to synergism is apparent.² For example, in his Exposition of certain points in the Epistle to

¹ Compare GUERICKE : Church History § 91-93, for a comprehensive and compressed statement.

² The treatises of Augustine in which synergism appears are: *De libero arbitrio* lib. III; *Ad Simplicianum* lib. II; *De catechizandis rudibus*; *Expositio propositionum ex epistola ad Romanos*.—"Augustine, in the earlier part of his Christian life, had the Semi-Pelagian view of the nature of faith. In *De Praedestinatione Sanctorum* III, and *De Dono Perseverantiae* XX, Augustine grants, that at a former period, he was himself in error, and held faith in God, or the assent which we give to the gospel, not as a gift from Him, but as something

which we ourselves produce, by which we obtain God's grace to live devoutly and righteously; but that he had been taught something better, especially by the words of Paul, 1 Cor. iv. 7: 'What hast thou, that thou hast not received?'" WIGGERS: *Augustinism*, translated by Emerson, p. 199. "But it will be said, Ambrose, Origen, and Jerome, believed that God dispenses his grace among men, according to his foreknowledge of the good use which each individual will make of it. Augustine also was of the same sentiment; but when he had made a greater proficiency in scriptural knowledge, he not only retracted it, but powerfully confuted it." CALVIN: *Inst.* III. viii.

the Romans he remarks: "It is nowhere said that God believes all things in us. Our faith, therefore, is our own; but the good works that we perform are of him who gives the Spirit to those who believe . . . It is ours to believe and to will; but it is his to give, through his Spirit, to those who believe and will, the power of performing good works. . . . God gives his holy Spirit to one whom he foreknows will believe, so that by performing good works he may attain eternal life."¹ The two last statements, Augustine formally retracts in his final revision of his works.²

The external cause of this synergism in Augustine's earlier writings, besides the influence of the undecided views of Ambrose and Hilary, was the Manichaeism from which he had just escaped, and against which he felt a strong repugnance.³ This scheme, like the Gnosticism of the 2d and 3d centuries, made sin a thing of creation and natural necessity, so that the same motive for emphasizing the doctrines of free-will and human responsibility existed in the case of Augustine, that existed in the instances of Origen and Tertullian. On the other hand, his growing experience of the depth of moral evil within his own soul, and the whole course of his Christian life so vividly

¹ *Expositio quorondarum propositionum ex Epistola ad Romanos*, c. 60, 61, 6. Compare BAUMGARTEN-CRUSIUS: *Dogmengeschichte* II. 246, Note b.

² *Retractationes* I. 23; II. 3.

³ *Confessions* VII. iii. 4, 5, sq.

portrayed in his *Confessions*, were forcing upon his notice the fact, that the *will*, the higher spiritual faculty, as well as the lower sensuous nature, has felt the effects of the apostasy in Adam. The Greek anthropology, we have seen, excepted the voluntary part of man when speaking of the consequences of Adam's transgression, and limited them to the bodily and sensuous part. But the severe conflict which Augustine was called to wage with his bodily appetites, and his old heathen habits, revealed to him the fact that the governing power of the soul, the will itself, has been affected by the same apostasy that has affected the other parts of human nature. "I was bound," he says, "not with another's irons, but by my own iron will. My *will* the enemy held, and thence had made a chain for me, and bound me. For of a perverse will came lust; and a lust yielded to becomes custom; and custom not resisted becomes necessity (*necessitas*). By which links, as it were, joined together as in a chain, a hard bondage held me enthralled."¹ In this way, Augustine's attention was directed to the reflex influence of sin itself upon the voluntary faculty, whereby its energy to holiness is destroyed, and it becomes by its own act an *enslaved* will. His experience of the truth that even after regeneration, "to will is present," but "how to perform," the will "finds not," led Augustine to his fundamental position, that original

¹ AUGUSTINUS: *Confessiones imperfectum*, Ed. Migne X. 1467. VIII. v. 10, 11. Compare *Opus*

sin is in the *will* as well as in the sensuous nature, and has vitiated the *voluntary* power along with all the other powers of man. This practical experience, and the important speculative conflict with Pelagianism and Semi-Pelagianism, were the causes of Augustine's transition from the Greek anthropology of his earlier days, to that other view to which his own name has been affixed.¹

The following are the essential points in the Augustinian anthropology.² Man was created in the image of God,—that is with a will inclined and determined to holiness, and positively holy. The primitive holiness of man was not his own product, in the sense that he is the ultimate author of it, because he would then be entitled to the glory of it. All finite holiness, be it in man or angel, is only *relatively* meritorious, because it is the result of God's working in man or angel to will and to do. As possessed of this con-created holiness, man was immortal, both in regard to body and soul. He was not liable to death in any form. With this condition of holiness, was coupled the possibility of originating sin *de nihilo*.³ This, in re-

¹ Respecting the alleged contradictions in Augustine's views, compare GANGAUF: *Psychologie des Augustinus*, 325 sq.

² The Biblical data for Augustine's theory are presented in WIGGERS' *Augustinism* (Emerson's translation), Chap. XX.

³ AUGUSTINUS: *De lib. arbitrio*

II. 20 (Ed. Migne I. 1270). "Motus ergo ille aversionis, quod fate-mur esse peccatum, quoniam defectivus motus est, *omnis autem defectus ex nihilo est*, vide quo pertineat, et ad Deum non pertinere ne dubites. Qui tamen defectus quoniam est voluntarius, in nostra est positus potestate."

lation to the existing determination to goodness, was the power of contrary choice. This power was not added for the purpose of making man a *free* agent, but a probationary agent. Adam was already free, in his inclination to good. When God works in the finite will, to will and to do, there is no compulsion. But man could not be put upon probation, unless a power to the contrary, or a power to create sin out of nothing, were superadded to his freedom. The power to the contrary, therefore, was not the substance of moral freedom, but only an accident existing for a temporary purpose merely. Man, though endowed with this power of contrary choice, was commanded not to use it,—which is another proof that it is not needed in order to moral freedom. Man would not have been forbidden to use a power that belongs *necessarily*, and *intrinsically*, to free will. But if the power were used, Adam would become both sinful and mortal. His original righteousness would be totally lost; original sin would take the place of it in his soul; his body would be subject to temporal death, and his soul to eternal.

Augustine distinguished between absolute perfection, and relative perfection. The former is the perfection of God, who is destitute of the power of sinning.¹ Those angels who have passed through pro-

¹ The Divine will is free, and yet it does not possess the power of originating sin. The apostle James affirms that "God cannot be tempted with evil." The Deity is absolutely untemptable,

—ὁ γὰρ θεὸς ἀπειραστός ἐστι. But a being who cannot even be tempted cannot sin, because this would imply voluntary action without any motive.

bation successfully are also absolutely perfect ; not, however, because of a self-subsistent energy like that of God, but because they are "kept from falling." But the primitive state of man was that of relative perfection only. Though holy, his holiness was neither self-derived nor self-subsistent ; and neither was it so established by divine power that he could not apostatize.¹ Whether he should become absolutely perfect, like God and the elect angels, depended upon the use which he should make of his probationary power to the contrary, during the period of probation. If Adam had continued to will holiness, his power to will sin would have diminished, by the operation of a natural law, until it reached the minimum point, and would then have vanished forever. When his probation was thus over, his will would have become so profoundly harmonized with that of God, that the hazards of apostasy would no more pertain to him, than to the Deity. The relative perfection with which he had been endowed by creation, would have resulted in absolute perfection ; that is, the incapability of sinning, which belongs to God and the holy angels.²

But this was not the actual result. Adam was

¹ "Man in his state of innocence had freedom and power to will and to do that which is good and well-pleasing to God ; but yet *mutably*, so that he might fall from it." WESTMINSTER CONFESSIO: Ch. IX. Compare also,

AUGUSTINUS: De Genesi ad lit. XI. vii. (Ed. Migne III. 433); HOWE: I. 133, II. 1196 ; SAMUEL HOPKINS: Works, I. 143, 172, 173, 176.

² AUGUSTINUS: Opera X. 1518; VII. 802 (Ed. Migne).

tempted, and induced by Satan to use the power of contrary choice. He thereby originated sin *de nihilo*, and by *ultimate efficiency*. He is now sinful in the inclination and determination of his will. His body has become mortal,¹ and his soul is condemned to everlasting death. His condition is now directly contrary to what it would have been, had he continued in holiness. Had he passed through probation safely, he would have become unable to sin; but having failed to do so, he is now unable to originate holiness and recover himself from apostasy.² According to the Augustinian anthropology, there are two reasons for this. In the first place, the power to the contrary, in either direction, is only an accident of voluntariness, and not its sub-

¹ "If Adam had not sinned, he would not have been despoiled of his body, but would have been clothed with immortality and incorruptibility, that what is mortal should be swallowed up of life, i. e. pass from the animal to the spiritual state." AUGUSTINUS: De pec. mer. I. ii. 4. "The death of the body is a penalty, since the spirit, because it voluntarily left God, leaves the body against its will; so that, as the spirit left God because it chose to, it leaves the body although it chooses not to." AUGUSTINUS: De Trin. IV. xiii.; De Gen. ad lit. IX. x. Augustine distinguished between a "minor" and a "major" immortality. Adam by creation possessed the

first,—namely, the possibility of dying, in case of sinning. Had he not fallen, he would have attained the latter, which is possessed also by the resurrection body, and the angels,—namely, the impossibility of dying, founded upon the impossibility of sinning. AUGUSTINUS: Op. Imp. VI. xxx.

² "Man was so created with free-will, as not to sin if he willed not to, but not so, that if he willed, he could sin with impunity. What wonder, then, if, by transgressing, i. e. by changing the rectitude in which he was made, he is followed with the punishment of not being able to do right." AUGUSTINUS: Op. Imp. VI. xii. (Ed. Migne X. 1522.)

stance. Voluntariness, whether it be holy or sinful, consists in *self*-motion with absence of compulsion. Adam's righteousness was spontaneous self-motion, and the power to originate sin did not render it any more so, by being bestowed, nor would it have rendered it any less so, by being withheld. Adam's sinfulness was pure and simple self-will, self-decision, and did not require the additional power to originate holiness, in order to be self-will. Voluntariness consists in positively willing the one thing that is willed, and not in the bare possibility of willing a contrary thing. If a person walk by his own self-decision, this self-decision would be neither strengthened nor weakened by endowing him with another power to fly. His voluntariness depends upon the single fact that he is walking without external compulsion, and of his own accord. There are many other things which might be denied to his option, yet the denial would not invalidate the fact that he is moving *of, and from, his own determination*. In the second place, the power to the contrary, in reference to a sinful will, would be a power to originate holiness by an ultimate efficiency. But this power, according to Augustine, belongs solely to the Deity, and is as incommunicable to any created will human or angelic, as omnipotence or omniscience itself. For any being who originates holiness by his own ultimate efficiency is worthy of the veneration and worship due to holiness. The finite will can be the ultimate

efficient of sin; and hence unfallen Adam could be endowed with a power to originate sin,—or, with the power to the contrary, downward. But holiness in the creature must always be the result of God working in him to will.¹ Hence fallen Adam could not be endowed with the power to originate holiness by ultimate efficiency,—or, with the power to the contrary, upward. The power of contrary choice, therefore, according to the Au-

¹ “Free will was sufficient for sin; but not adequate to good, unless aided by the Omnipotent Good.” AUGUSTINUS: *De cor. et gratia*, XI. xxxi. (Ed. Migne, X. 935). To the objection which the Pelagians continually urged against the doctrine of an enslaved and impotent will, that “God would not command man to do what cannot be done by man,” Augustine makes the reply, that, “God commands man to do what *he was able to do by creation*, but is now *unable to do by reason of apostasy*, in order that he may come to know what he must seek from Him and His grace,”—“ideo jubet aliqua quæ non possumus, ut noverimus quod ab illo petere debeamus.” AUGUSTINUS: *De gratia, et lib. arbitrio*, I. xvi. 32. After quoting the words of Christ: “No man can come unto me, except the Father, which hath sent me, *draw* him” (John vi. 44), Augustine remarks: “He does not say *lead* him, for this would imply that the sinful will antici-

pates and goes before the Holy Spirit. For who is drawn, if he is already inclined to go? And yet no one comes to Christ unless he is inclined. The sinful man therefore is *drawn*, not led, in a wonderful manner, by Him who knows how to work within the hearts of men, so that they are changed from opposition to willingness.” Again, quoting the declaration of St. Paul (2 Cor. iii. 5): “Not that we are sufficient of ourselves to think anything as of ourselves; but our sufficiency is of God,” he adds: “To *think* anything, especially any good thing. But to think is less difficult than to desire; for we can think of anything that we desire, but we cannot desire anything that we think of. If then our sufficiency is of God in order to *think* any good thing, much more is it to *desire* and to *do* any good thing.” AUGUSTINUS: *Contra duas epistolas Pelagianorum*, I. xix. 37; II. viii. 18.

gustinian anthropology, can be given in only one direction. It is a transient and accidental characteristic of the human will, which is intended to belong to it only during the middle or probationary stage in its history, and which disappears either in a state of immutable holiness, or immutable sin. The assertions of Augustine are frequent upon this point, and very explicit. "God," he remarks, "was able to make man so that he should not be able to sin; but he chose rather to make him so that it should lie in his power to sin, if he would, and not to sin, if he would not; forbidding the one, enjoining the other; that it might be to him, first, a merit not to sin, and afterwards a just reward to be unable to sin. For in the end, he will make all his saints to be without power to sin." ¹

It is here that we notice the marked difference between the Latin and the Greek anthropology, in respect to the *idea, and definition, of the will*. The Latin anthropology regards the will as always in a state of decision, by its very nature. Voluntariness belongs as intrinsically to the faculty of will, as intelligence does to the faculty of understanding. A will that is characterless would be an involuntary will; which is as great a solecism as an unintelligent understanding. The Greek anthropology, on the contrary, conceives of the voluntary faculty as in-

¹ AUGUSTINUS: De continentia, Church History, p. 379, Note c. xvi. Compare GUERICKE: 2.

trinsically undecided. At and by creation, it is without character, because it is in a state of indifference. Taken and held at the instant of creation, the human will is an inactive and involuntary essence, because it is undetermined either to good or evil. From this unelective and inactive state, it starts out an election, a voluntariness, either of good or evil. Hence, God cannot create a holy will, any more than he can create an evil will; because this would imply a determined will. In brief, the Greek idea of the will is, that it is a vacuum which is to make itself a plenum by a vacuum's activity.¹

Again, the Latin *definition of freedom* is wholly diverse from the Greek. In the Latin anthropology, freedom is *self-determination*; in the Greek anthropology, it is *in-determination*, or indifference. According to Augustine, a faculty is free when it acts purely from within itself, and is not forced to act from without.² If, therefore, the human will moves

¹ PELAGIUS adopts this idea, and applies it to original sin. He denies that man, as born, possesses any inherited vitiosity,—“*capaces enim utriusque rei, non pleni nascimur; sine virtute et vitio procreamur.*” PELAGIUS: *De libero arbitrio*, quoted in AUGUSTINUS: *De peccato orig.* c. xiii.

² “No man is compelled by the power of God to evil or good; but that he wills the good is a work of grace.” AUGUSTINUS:

Contra duas epist. xviii. I. (Ed. Migne, X. 567). Augustine argues that the will is free (in the sense of uncompelled) in sin, because it *delights* in sin. “*Sed haec voluntas quae libera est in malis, quia delectatur malis, ideo libera in bonis non est quia liberata non est.*” *Contra duas epist.* Pelag. lib. I. (Ed. Migne, X. 554). “Voluntariness has not perished in the sinner, because he sins with delight, and *delight is vol-*

towards a proposed end, by its own *self*-motion, this *self*-motion *alone* constitutes its voluntariness.¹ It is not necessary to endow it with an additional power to move in a contrary direction. Such a super-addition of power would add nothing to the already existing fact of an unforced *self*-motion. Even when the power to the contrary, or the *possibilitas peccandi*, is given for purposes of probation, the real freedom of the will, according to Augustine, is seen in *not* using it, rather than in using it,—in continuing to will the right, and refusing to will the wrong. Persistency in the existing determination, and not a capricious departure into another determination, is the token of true rational liberty. “Velle et nolle, propriae voluntatis est,”²—by which Augustine means that, to will holiness and to nill sin, not, to will *either* holiness or sin, is the characteristic of the

voluntariness.” Contra duas epistolas Pelag. I. ii.

¹ Compulsion may be by physical law: as when, for example, the particles of water fall down a precipice. In this instance, the molecule of water is as really pushed down by the power of gravitation, as if there were a hand behind it urging it on. The real motive power is the force of gravity, and not a force in the particle of water. There is, consequently, no *self*-motion in a water fall. The same reasoning also applies to the spontaneity of physical growth. There is no *self*, and no *self*-mo-

tion, in the plant, but only the movement caused by the *law* of life. Augustine's idea of will makes it a power of *origination*, or *causation*, in distinction from a power of alternative choice. In this respect, his view resembles that of KANT (*Practische Vernunft*, 78 sq.), with the important difference, however, that Augustine would not attribute a power of origination to the finite will, upon the side of holiness, except as the Infinite Will works in and upon it.

² AUGUSTINUS: De gratia et libero arbitrio, c. iii.

will. In the Greek anthropology, on the contrary, the substance of moral freedom consists in what the Latin anthropologist regards as the accident,—viz., in the power to do another thing, or to do differently. It is not sufficient that the will be uncompelled, and self-moved. It must possess, over and above this, a power of alternative choice,—the *possibilitas utriusque partis*. Hence the human will, by creation and structure, is indifferent and undetermined. Having no choice by and at creation, it can choose with equal facility either of the two contraries, holiness or sin. And in *this* fact, and not in its positive self-motion, consists its freedom.

To recapitulate, then, the principal points in the Augustinian anthropology are the following. Adam as created and unfallen was positively holy, in the sense of possessing a holy inclination or determination of his will. This holy inclination or determination was accompanied, for merely probationary purposes, with an accidental and negative power to the contrary, or a possibility of originating sin *de nihilo*. His freedom consisted solely in this holy inclination,—in this unforced *self*-motion of his will to good. Neither the presence nor the absence of a power to do something other than the right, could affect the fact that he was doing the right, and without compulsion. Hence, according to Augustine, Adam's power to the contrary, which was the power to ruin himself and his posterity, was not necessary to constitute him a *voluntary* agent. He would still have

been willingly holy, even if God had not placed him upon probation, and super-added the power of willingly sinning. The *possibilitas peccandi*, therefore, was an accident, and not the essence, of moral agency. God is a moral agent, and yet can neither apostatize, nor be put upon probation.¹ Hence Adam was commanded *not* to use this accident of moral agency. It was intended to disappear in and with the process of probation; and when it had so disappeared, Adam would have still been, as before, willingly holy, without the possibility of sin and self-ruin. The relative perfection of a creature

¹ AUGUSTINE notices that there is a point, even in reference to the human will, where freedom and necessity coincide. "Some voluntary things are also necessary things. It is necessary, for example, that we will to be happy; for we cannot will to be miserable. And it is necessary that we will something or other; for we cannot stop willing. It is necessary, therefore, that we will, and that we will happiness. *Sunt et voluntaria necessaria, sicut beati esse volumus, et necesse est ut velimus.*" *Opus imp.* V. lxx. (Ed. Migne, X. 273, 1489). JEREMY TAYLOR (*Efficient Causes of Human Actions*, Rule I. 5) remarks that "in moral and spiritual things, liberty and indetermination are weakness, and suppose a great infirmity of our reason, and a great want of love. For if we understood all the degrees of

amability in the service of God, and if we could love God as he deserves, we could not deliberate concerning his service, and we could not possibly choose or be in love with obedience, we should have no liberty left, nothing concerning which we could deliberate; for there is no deliberation but when something is to be refused, and something is to be preferred, which could not be, but that we understand good but little, and love it less. For the saints and angels in heaven, and God himself, love good and cannot choose evil, because to do so were imperfection and infelicity; and the devils and accursed souls hate all good without liberty and indifferency: but between these is the state of man in the days of his pilgrimage, until he comes to a confirmation in one of the opposite terms."

placed upon temporary trial, to see if he would retain his virtue, would have become the absolute perfection of a creature who has safely passed through probation. On the other hand, Adam the fallen is positively sinful; in the sense of possessing a sinful inclination or determination of will. This inclination is the *activity* of the will, and not its substance. It is the creature's unforced, self-moved energy. It is not, as holiness is, the activity of the will when under the influence of God "working in it to will." On the contrary it is the creature's merest self-will, uninfluenced by the Holy Ghost. It is, consequently, the most extreme kind of *self*-motion. It is self-will, or wilfulness, in its most intense form. It is voluntariness in the strongest manner conceivable. This wrong inclination of the will is not accompanied with a power to the contrary, as the primitive right inclination was. And this for two reasons. First, the power to the contrary is not necessary in order to voluntary action. It is needed only for purposes of probation; and after probation has been ended by an act of apostasy there is no further need of it, because it has answered the purpose for which it was bestowed. Secondly, a power to the contrary possessed by a will with a sinful inclination, would be a power to originate holiness *de nihilo*. The creature, in this case, would be the ultimate efficient of holiness as he is of sin, and be capable of an absolute merit as he is of an absolute

demerit. But such a power is incommunicable to the finite will, because it would place the creature upon a level with the Creator, in respect to moral excellence, and desert of worship. The guilt of sin consists in its unforced wilfulness; and this guilt is not in the least diminished by the fact that the will cannot overcome its own wilfulness. For this wicked wilfulness was not created in the will, but is the product of the will's act of apostasy. The present impotence to holiness is not an original and primitive impotence. By creation Adam had plenary power, not indeed to *originate* holiness, for no creature has this, but to *preserve* and *perpetuate* it. The present destitution of holiness, and impossibility of originating it, is due therefore to the creature's apostatizing agency, and is a part of his condemnation.¹

— Augustine's theory of regeneration is, consequently, entirely monergistic.² The work of the

¹ "If any one wish to dispute with God, and to escape his judgment by the pretext of having been incapable of acting otherwise, he is prepared with an answer, which we have elsewhere advanced, that it arises not from *creation*, but from the *corruption* of nature, that men, being enslaved by sin, can will nothing but what is evil. For whence proceeded that impotence, of which the ungodly would gladly avail themselves, but from Adam's

voluntarily devoting himself to the tyranny of the devil?" CALVIN: Institutes, II. v. 1.

² "Without grace we can do nothing, achieve nothing, commence nothing." "There are certain characteristics of the soul which perish through an evil will, and this so that they cannot be recovered by a good will, unless God does that which men cannot do." AUGUSTINUS: Ad Bonifacium, II. ix.; Opus imperfectum, VI. xviii.

Holy Spirit is necessary not merely to supplement a deficiency in the power of fallen man, but to take the very initiative, and renovate the will itself. Divine agency is the sole originating cause of holiness in fallen man.¹ The only righteousness which the unrenewed will is able to work out is that external righteousness which Augustine denominates *justitia civilis*, and which the modern denominates "morality." That internal righteousness, which consists in a spiritual and total conformity to law, Augustine contended is beyond the competence of the apostate will to produce. Grace is imparted to sinful man, not because he believes, but in order that he may believe; for faith itself is the gift of God.² The method of regeneration, in Augustine's

¹ See AUGUSTINUS: Cont. duas epist. lib. IV. (Ed. Migne, X. 618) for the Scripture citations: 1 Cor. iv. 7. "For who maketh thee to differ from another? and what hast thou that thou didst not receive?" John xv. 5. "Without me ye can do nothing." John vi. 44. "No man can (*δύναται*) come to me, except the Father which hath sent me draw him." 1 John iv. 7. "Love is of [from] God." Rom. xii. 3. "God hath dealt to every man the measure of faith." John iii. 8. "The wind bloweth where it listeth." Rom. viii. 14. "As many as are led by the spirit of God, they are the sons of God." John vi. 65. "No man can come unto me, except it

were given him of my Father." Jer. xxxii. 40, 41. "I will put my fear in their hearts, that they shall not depart from me, and I will visit them that I may make them good" (Sept. Ver.). Ezekiel xxxvi. 22-38.

² "The Pelagians say in praise of free will, that 'grace assists the good intention of every man.' This might be accepted as a true and catholic doctrine, provided such a merit were not supposed to be in the good intention as deserves the assistance of grace; and provided it were acknowledged, and added in explanation, that the good intention which has grace for its consequent could not have been in man unless it

scheme, is as follows. The Holy Spirit is the efficient ; the human spirit is the recipient. The former acts independently ; the latter acts only as it is acted upon. The consequence of the divine efficiency is regeneration ; the consequence of the human reciprocity is conversion. God regenerates, and as a sequence therefrom man converts.

The following are the several degrees of grace, which mark the several stages in the transition of the human soul from total depravity to perfect holiness. The first is that of *prevenient grace* (*gratia praeveniens*). In this stage of the process, the Holy Spirit employs first the moral law, as an instrumental agent, and produces the sense of sin and guilt ; and then, by employing as a second instrumentality the gospel promise of mercy, it conducts the soul to Christ, in and by the act of faith. This second stage in the transition is the result of what Augustine denominates *operative grace* (*gratia operans*). By means of faith, thus originated by operative grace, the Divine Spirit now produces the consciousness of peace and justification through Christ's blood of atonement, and imparts a new divine life to the soul united to Christ. In this manner, a will freely and firmly determined to holiness is restored again in man, and the fruits of this *μετάνοια*, or change of heart and will, begin to

had had grace for its antecedent." AUGUSTINUS : Contra duas epist. IV. vi. 13 (Ed. Migne, X. 618).

appear. But the remainders of the apostate nature still exist in the regenerate soul,¹ though in continual conflict with the new man. In the life-long struggle that now commences, the now renovated and holy will is efficiently operative for the first time, and co-works with the Holy Spirit. Hence this third degree of grace is denominated *co-operating grace* (*gratia co-operans*).² The final and crowning act of grace results in the entire cleansing of indwelling sin from the soul, and its glorified transformation into complete resemblance to its Redeemer,—a state of absolute perfection, as distinguished from the relative perfection with which man was created, and characterized by the incapability of sinning and dying (*non posse peccare et mori*). This grade of grace is never witnessed this side of the grave.

Experience and observation show that all men

Augustine did not hold that baptism possesses an efficiency in and of itself to remove sin. Nothing but spiritual influence can do this. Hence there is indwelling sin even in the regenerate and baptized. "For neither in adults is this effected in baptism (unless by an ineffable miracle of the Almighty Creator) that the law of sin which is in our members, striving against the law of the mind, is wholly extinguished and ceases to be." "All his old infirmity is not removed from the moment a person is baptized, but

his renovation *commences* with the remission of sins. . . . For although in baptism there is a total and plenary remission of sins, yet, if a perfect renewal were wrought in the mind itself, the apostle would not say, 'the inward man is renewed day by day.' For he who is daily renewed, is not yet totally renewed; and by as much as he is not yet renewed, by so much is he still in the old state." AUGUSTINUS: *De peccatorum meritis*, I. xxxix. ; II. vii.

² Compare HOWE: *Works*, I. 555-6. (New York Ed.)

are not regenerated. Now, since, according to the above theory, the sinner can contribute nothing in the way of *efficiency* towards his own regeneration, because he acts holily only as he is acted upon, it follows that the difference between man and man, in respect to regeneration, must be referred to God. Hence Augustine accounts for the fact that some men are renewed, and some are not, by the unconditional decree (*decretum absolutum*), according to which God determines to select from the fallen mass of mankind (*massa perditionis*), the whole of whom are alike guilty and under condemnation, a portion upon whom he bestows renewing grace, and to leave the remainder to their own self-will and the operation of law and justice.¹ This is a method of pure sovereignty upon his part, wherein are manifested both the “goodness and severity of God,”—upon them who were not interfered with, and were left to their own self-will, severe and exact justice; upon them whose obstinate and hostile self-will was overcome by the Holy Spirit, unmerited pity and

¹ The opponents of Augustine objected that “it is unjust in the case of those who are alike guilty to pardon one and punish the other.” To this Augustine replies: “It is certainly just to *punish both*; we ought then to render thanks to our Saviour that he has not treated us like our fellows. For if all men were saved, the justice due to sin would not be discerned; if none were saved,

the benefit of grace would not be known. We must not then seek for a cause, either in the distinction of merit, or in the necessity of fate, or in the caprice of fortune, but in the depth of the treasures of God’s wisdom, which the Apostle admires without unfolding.” AUGUSTINUS: Epist. ad Sixtum, Cap. ii. (Ed. Migne, II. 875).

compassion.¹ The ground and reason of this selection of only a portion of mankind, according to Augustine, is God's wise good-pleasure, and not a foreseen faith upon the part of the individual man. For faith itself is a gift of God. It is the product of grace, and grace results from the unconditional decree.² As the mere consequent of electing mercy, faith can no more determine the divine decree of election, than the effect can determine its cause. "Predestination," says Augustine,³ "is the preparation for grace, but grace is the gift itself."

¹ "Many hear the word of truth; but some believe, others contradict. Therefore the first have a will to believe, the last have not. Who is ignorant of this? who would deny it? But since the will is prepared to some by the Lord, to others not, we must discriminate what proceeds from his mercy, and what from his justice. That which Israel sought, says the apostle, he obtained not: but the election obtained it, and the rest were blinded. Behold mercy and justice; mercy upon the elect who have obtained the righteousness of God, but justice upon the rest who were blinded. And yet the former believed because they had a will [were inclined] to believe; and the latter did not believe because they had a will [were inclined] to disbelieve. Mercy and justice, therefore, were manifested in the wills themselves (in ip-

sis voluntatibus facta sunt)." "To know, why, of two persons who hear the same doctrine or see the same miracle, one believes, and the other believes not; it is the depth of the wisdom of God, whose judgments are unsearchable, and are not the less just for being hidden. 'He hath mercy on whom he will have mercy, and whom he will he hardeneth;' but he does not harden in hatred, *but only in not showing mercy.*" AUGUSTINUS: De predestinatione, Cap. vi. (Ed. Migne, X. 968); Ep. ad Sixtum (Ed. Migne, II. 879).

² HOWE (Works, I. 123) remarks that "God uses a certain arbitrariness, especially in the *more exuberant* dispensation of his grace," in order that men "may be cautioned not to neglect lower assistances."

³ AUGUSTINUS: De predestinatione, c. x. (Ed. Migne, X. 971).

“God elected us in Christ before the foundation of the world, predestinating us to the adoption of sons, not because he saw that we should become holy and spotless through ourselves, but he elected and predestinated us that we might become so. But he did this according to the good pleasure of his will; that man might not glory in his own will, but in the will of God towards him.”¹ “How can it be,” he writes to Vitalis,² “that God waits for the wills of men to move first, that he may then impart grace to them; since we properly give him thanks in reference to those whom while unbelieving and persecuting his truth with an ungodly will he anticipates with his mercy, and with an almighty facility converts unto himself, and out of unwilling makes them willing? Why do we give him thanks for this, if he really does not do this?”³

The unconditional decree, in reference to the non-elect, according to Augustine, is one of preterition, or omission merely.⁴ The reprobating decree is not accompanied, as the electing decree is, with any direct divine efficiency to secure the result. And there is no need of any; for according to the Augustinian anthropology there is no possibility of

¹ AUGUSTINUS: De predestinatione, c. xviii. (Ed. Migne, X. 987). In another place (Tom. X. 582, Ed. Migne) Augustine defines election in the following terms: “Electio dicitur, ubi deus non ab alio factum quod eligat invenit, sed quod inveniat ipse facit.”

² AUGUSTINUS: Ep. CCXVII. ad Vitalem (Ed. Migne, II. 987).

³ Augustine's proof texts for election are given in WIGGERS: Augustinism, p. 295. (Emerson's Trans.)

⁴ AUGUSTINUS: De libero arbitrio, II. (Ed. Migne, I. 1272, sq.)

self-recovery from a voluntary apostasy, and, consequently, the simple passing by and leaving of the sinful soul to itself renders its perdition as certain, as if it were brought about by a direct divine efficiency.

Not all grace, but the grace which actually regenerates, Augustine denominates *irresistible* (*gratia irresistibilis*). By this he meant, not that the human will is converted unwillingly or by compulsion, but that divine grace is able to overcome the utmost obstinacy of the human spirit.¹ "When God wills to save any one, no will of man resists him." "No man is saved but he whom God wills to be saved; it is necessary, therefore, to pray that he may will it, because if he wills it, it must come to pass." "It is not to be doubted that the human will cannot resist [so as to overcome and defeat] the will of God."² Divine grace is irresistible, not in the sense that no form of grace is resisted by the sinner; but when grace reaches that special degree which constitutes it *regenerating*, it then overcomes the sinner's opposition, and makes him willing in the day of God's power. The only sure sign that an individual is one of the elect is his perseverance

¹ "God so moves the creature, that he may suffer him in the mean while to exercise his own motion." AUGUSTINUS: De Civitate, VII. iii. PROSPER, a follower of Augustine, remarks (De lib. arbitrio, sub fine) that "the in-

flux and efficacy of Divine grace does not take away, but regulates the voluntary faculty; does not destroy, but converts the will."

² AUGUSTINUS: De correptione et gratia, xiv.; Enchiridion, cii.; De libero arbitrio.

in the Christian life ; for he is elected to holiness, as well as to happiness. Perseverance, like faith, is the gift of God, and Augustine denominates it *donum perseverantiae*. In answer to the objection urged against the doctrine of unconditional election, according to which it is impossible for any but the elect to be saved, drawn from the text, "God our Saviour will have *all* men to be saved, and to come unto the knowledge of the truth" (1 Tim. ii. 4), Augustine explains this passage to mean : "all who are predestinated." "It is said that he wills all men to be saved, that it may be understood that predestination is no respecter of persons, but that all classes, ages, and conditions of mankind are among the elect." ¹

Augustine denies that the heathen are saved, although he is particular to remark that there are degrees in the scale of their condemnation. He takes this position, in opposition to Pelagianism, which contended that natural virtue may be a ground of salvation, and asserted that some of the more virtuous pagans were saved by their personal excellence, and irrespective of redemption. Argu-

¹ AUGUSTINUS : De correptione et gratia, xlv. GREGORY THE GREAT interprets the passage thus : "God *wills* that all men should be saved, that is, none are saved except as the effect of the Divine will ; or, some are saved from every class of mankind." ANSELM (Opera I. 584 Ed. Migne)

adds to this explanation the further one : "Or he wills that all should be saved in the sense that he does not *compel* any one to be lost." HOWE'S explanation is : "Where he will he hardeneth, or doth not prevent but that men be hardened." (Works, I. 123, New York Ed.)

ing against Julian, who was a much more able defender of Pelagianism than Pelagius himself, he remarks: "In the day of judgment, the consciences of the heathen will 'excuse' them (Rom. ii. 15) only to the degree that they will be punished more mildly, in case they have been a law unto themselves, and have obeyed it in some measure. Fabricius will be less severely punished than Catiline; not because Fabricius is good, but because he was less wicked than Catiline. Fabricius was less sinful than Catiline, not because he possessed true holiness, but because he did not depart so far from true holiness."¹ In the fifth book of the *De Civitate Dei*, Augustine shows that God rewarded the natural virtues of the early Romans with temporal prosperity; yet that their frugality, contempt of riches, moderation, and courage, were merely the effect of the love of glory that curbed those particular vices which are antagonistic to national renown, without ceasing to be a vice itself. He concedes the praise of external rectitude (*justitia civilis*) to many actions of the heathen, yet he maintains that when these are viewed in the motive or principle from which they sprung they are sins; for whatsoever is not of faith is sin (Rom. xiv. 23). "It is sin, then," objects Julian, "when a heathen clothes the naked, binds up the wounds of the infirm, or endures torture rather than give false testimony?" Augustine

¹ AUGUSTINUS : Contra Julianum, IV. xxiii.

replies that the act in itself, or the matter of the act, is not sin; but as it does not proceed from faith, and a purpose to honor God, the form of the act, which contains the morality of it, is sin.¹ Augustine supposed that unbaptized infants are lost,² although he believed that the punishment allotted to them is the mildest possible of all (*omnium mitissima*). Yet he is explicit in asserting that "there is no middle place; so that he who is not with Christ, must be with the devil." This he affirms in opposition to that middle sort of state which the Pelagians denominated "eternal life," in distinction from the world of perfect blessedness, which they held to be denoted by the "kingdom of heaven."³

We have seen that Augustine refused to declare for either Creationism or Traducianism, when the question came up before him as a purely speculative and philosophical one. When, however, he is defending his view of the doctrine of Original Sin, he makes statements that are irreconcilable with any theory of the origin of the human soul, but that of creation by species, and the propagation of both soul and body. When endeavoring to justify his position that all men are *guilty* of the Adamic transgression, or "Adam's sin," he distinctly teaches that all mankind were created in Adam. "God the

¹ AUGUSTINUS: De civitate Dei, V. xii., xiii.; Contra Julianum, IV. iii. (Ed. Migne, X. 750).

³ AUGUSTINUS: De peccatorum meritis, I. xxviii.

² AUGUSTINUS: De peccatorum meritis, I. xxi.

author of nature, but not of sin (*vitium*), created man upright, but he having through his own will become depraved and condemned, propagated depraved and condemned offspring. For we were all *in* that one man, since we *were* all that one man who lapsed into sin through that woman who was made from him, previous to transgression. The particular form in which we were to live as *individuals* had not been created and assigned to us man by man, but that seminal *nature* was in existence from which we were to be propagated." "All men at that time sinned in Adam, since in his *nature* all men were as yet that one man." "Adam was the one in whom all sinned." "The infant who is lost is punished because he belongs to the *mass* of perdition, and as a child of Adam is justly condemned on the ground of the ancient obligation."¹

These passages, which might be multiplied indefinitely, are sufficient to indicate Augustine's theory of generic existence, generic transgression, and generic condemnation. The substance of this theory was afterwards expressed in the scholastic dictum, "*natura corrumpit personam*,"—human *nature* apostatizes, and the consequences appear in the human *individual*. In the order of nature, mankind exists before the generations of mankind; the *nature* is

¹ AUGUSTINUS: De civitate Dei, XIII. xiv.; De peccatorum meritis, III. vii. 14; De peccatorum meritis, I. xv.; De peccato origi-

nali, c. xxxvi. Compare also: Contra duas epistolas Pelagianorum, IV. iii. 7; De nuptiis et concupiscentia, II. v. 15.

prior to the individuals produced out of it. But this human nature, it must be carefully noticed, possesses all the attributes of the human individual; for the individual is only a portion and specimen of the nature. Considered as an essence, human nature is an intelligent, rational, and voluntary essence; and accordingly its agency in Adam partakes of the corresponding qualities. Hence, according to Augustine, generic or original sin is truly and properly sin, because it is moral agency. The Latin anthropology extended the doctrine of the Adamic connection to the whole man, instead of confining it, as the Greek did, to a part only. Chrysostom, for example, conceded a union between the physical part of the individual, and the first progenitor. But this logically involved an existence, as to the body, in Adam; because it is impossible to unite two things, one of which is an absolute non-entity. Even according to the Greek anthropology, the physical nature of the individual must have existed generically in the physical nature of Adam, in order to such a union and propagation. But what the Greek anthropologist affirmed of a part, the Latin affirmed of the entire man. The rational and voluntary principle, equally with the physical and animal, existed in Adam. A mystery overhangs the existence of the posterity in the progenitor, even when the existence is limited to the body, and not extended to the soul; yet the mere fact of mystery did not prevent the Greek anthropology from adopting the

doctrine of the Adamic unity up to the line that separates the sensuous from the rational part. And, in like manner, the mere fact of mystery did not deter the Latin anthropology from extending the oneness and connection to the whole man, both body and soul.

The principal source of this theory was the fifth chapter of Romans.¹ Augustine's Platonic studies may have exerted some influence upon his development of the Scripture data, but those writers mistake greatly who suppose that he would have favoured one of the most difficult of all theories to understand and defend, if he had had no higher authority to embolden him, than that of Plato. And as it was, we have seen that he shrank from adopting it, as a philosopher, however he might as a theologian. But the fifth chapter of Romans, it was universally conceded, teaches an Adamic union of some kind; and Augustine contended that it was of the most comprehensive species, and included both the soul and the body. He was led to this exegesis, by a theological, and not by a philosophical interest. In no other way could he account for sin at birth, and for the sufferings and death of infants.

It was one consequence of this theory of the Adamic unity, that Augustine held that all sin, both original and actual, is *voluntary*,—meaning thereby, in accordance with the Latin idea of free-

¹ The proof texts are given in (Emerson's Trans.).

dom, that it is unforced self-will, without power to the contrary, or the power of originating holiness de nihilo. There is no author in the whole theological catalogue, who is more careful and earnest than Augustine, to assert that sin is *self*-activity, and that its source is in the voluntary nature of man.¹ Sin, according to him, is not a substance, but an agency; it is not the essence of any faculty in man, but only the action of a faculty. The Manichæan theory that sin is a substance created, and infused into man by creative power, Augustine refuted and combatted with all the more energy because he had at one time been entangled in it. Hence, he was careful to teach that original sin itself, as well as the actual transgressions that proceed from it, is moral agency. But in order to agency there must be an agent; and since original sin is not the product of the individual agent, because it appears at birth, it must be referred to the generic agent,—i. e. to the human *nature* in distinction from the human *person*, or individual. Hence the stress which he laid upon the

¹ In his *Retractationes* (Lib. I.), Augustine complains that the Pelagians quoted his statements to this effect, in his treatise *De libero arbitrio*, in proof that he contradicted himself, and sometimes taught their views. In answer, he remarks first, that in this treatise he was speaking only of the *origin* of sin, in opposition to the fatalist, and not of its effects

upon the soul; and secondly, that in teaching that sin is ultimately in the will, and not in the physical nature, he implies that the voluntary faculty cannot renew itself, and therefore needs renovation by Divine grace. If sin were in the sensuous part only, and not in the will, the will might overcome sin.

act of transgression in Adam. At this point in the history of man, he could find a common agent, and a common agency; and only at this point. Ever after, there are only portions or individualizations of the nature, in the series of generations. This one common agent yields him the one common agency which he is seeking. In this manner, original sin is voluntary agency, as really as actual sin is,—the difference between the two being only formal. Both are equally the product of human will; but original sin is the product of human will as yet unindividualized in Adam, while actual sin is the product of human will as individualized in his posterity.¹

In proof that Augustine held to the voluntariness of sin in both its forms, original and actual, we mention the following of his positions.

¹ It is important to notice that the term "actual," applied to sin in this connection, is employed in its *etymological* signification, to denote the sin of single choices and distinct acts, in distinction from the sin of heart, or natural disposition. The ordinary use of the word, in common parlance, makes "actual" the opposite of "imaginary," or "unreal;" and hence it is sometimes supposed that "original" sin, as the opposite of "actual" sin, must be a fictitious or imaginary sin,—that is, no sin at all. But in the Augustino-Calvinistic nomenclature,

both forms of sin are alike *real*; both are alike the product of the human will. A similar error is also committed in reference to the phrase "Adam's sin." To be guilty of Adam's sin, in the Latin anthropology, meant to be guilty of the *Adamic* sin. It implied the oneness of Adam and his posterity, and a guilt that belonged to the sum total, only because the sin was the act of the sum total.

SAMUEL HOPKINS (Works I. 224. Note) objects to the distinction between "original" and "actual" sin, "because," he says, "the sin-

1. In the first place, he carefully distinguishes between the work of the Creator and that of the creature, and designates the former by the term "natura." In this sense and use of the word, he denies that sin is by "nature," or belongs to "nature." "All fault or sin (vitium)," he says, "is an injury to nature, and consequently is contrary to nature."¹ "In one and the same man, the intention [i. e. the inclination] may be blamed, but the nature praised; for they are two different things. Even in a little child, that nature which was created by the good and holy God is not the only thing that exists; but he has also that fault (vitium sc. intentio), i. e. intention or disposition, which through one man passed over to all."² For this reason, Augustine prefers the phrase "*peccatum originale*," to the phrase "*peccatum naturale*" or "*peccatum naturae*," as the designation of the Adamic sin; and employs it, particularly when the Pelagians charge him with holding to a "natural," in the sense of a "created" sin. "The good," he remarks, "which is in nature as

ful disposition of the heart is as *actually* sin as the expression or acting out of the disposition." This is a criticism that would have been precluded by an acquaintance with the history of these theological terms.

¹ AUGUSTINUS: De civitate Dei, XII. i. Compare De lib. arbit. III. xvii.; De Gen. ad lit. Cap. xxvi.

² "In uno homine jure vituperatur intentio, et natura laudatur, quia duo sunt quae contrariis applicentur. Etiam in parvulo, non unum est tantum, id est, natura, in qua creatus homo a Deo bono: habet enim et vitium (sc. intentio) quod per unum in omnes homines pertransit." AUGUSTINUS: De nuptiis et concupiscentia, II. xxix.

such, cannot be destroyed, unless nature itself is destroyed. But if nature is destroyed [i. e. as to its substance] by corruption, then corruption itself will no longer remain; for there is then no nature in which corruption can exist." "If man had lost the whole divine image [as to substance, i. e.], there would be nothing remaining, of which it could be said, 'Though man walketh in an image he is vainly disquieted (Ps. xxxix. 6).'

"That is good which deplores the lost good; for if there were nothing of good remaining in nature, there would be no pain for the lost good, as punishment." "Everything good is from God; there is therefore no nature that is not from God (*omne autem bonum ex Deo; nulla ergo natura est quae non sit ex Deo*)."¹

In these passages, which might be multiplied, in which "nature" is synonymous with "creation," sin is denied to be natural, or to belong to the course and constitution of nature; while yet, in the secondary signification of a natural disposition or inclination (*intentio*), Augustine, it is needless to say, constantly affirms that sin is both "natural" and a "nature." In harmony with these statements, Augustine also distinguishes between "substance" and "quality," and asserts that sin is not substance but quality. Arguing with Julian of Eclanum, he says: "Julian speaks as if we had said that some

¹ AUGUSTINUS: *Enchiridion* iv; *ad literam*, VIII. xiv; *De lib. arbit.* II. xx; *Retractationes*, I. xxvi; *De Genesi*

substance was created in men by the devil. The devil persuades to evil as sin, but does not create it as nature. But evidently he has persuaded nature, as man is nature ; and by persuading has corrupted it. For he who inflicts wounds does not create limbs, but injures limbs. But wounds inflicted on bodies make the limbs falter or move feebly, but do not affect that voluntary faculty (*virtutem*) by which the man is or does right ; but the wound which is called sin, wounds that voluntary faculty (*vitam*) by which man leads a holy life. . . . And yet that weakness (*languor*) by which the power of living holily perished, is not nature, but a corruption ; just as bodily infirmity is not a substance or nature, but a vitiation." "Evil is not a substance ; for if it were a substance, it would be good."¹

2. Secondly, Augustine denies that God can himself sin, or efficiently cause sin in his creatures. He maintains that moral evil must, from the nature of the case, originate within the sphere of the finite solely. Only a *finite* will can sin, or be the author of sin. The only relation which the Infinite Will can sustain to moral evil is permissive and regulative. "Evil does not arise except in a good being ; and this, too, not in the Supremely and Immutably Good, but in a being made from nothing, by the wis-

¹ AUGUSTINUS: De nuptiis et concupiscentia, II. xxxiv ; Confessiones, VIII. xii. In his Opus imperfectum (III. 189), Augustine

objects to the Manichaeans that they regard "evil, not as the accident of a substance, but as the very substance itself."

dom of God.”¹ Every finite rational being, in other words, must be created holy. From this position he lapses into evil. Holiness is thus always from the creator; and sin always from the creature. Hence, says Augustine, the *efficient* cause of sin cannot be found back of the will of the creature, and must not be sought for at any point more ultimate than this. The caption of the seventh chapter of the twelfth book of the *De Civitate Dei* runs as follows: “The *efficient* cause of an evil will is not to be sought for.” By this Augustine means, as his argument goes on to show, that it contradicts the idea of sin to ask for an *originating* cause of sin other than the sinner himself. To seek an efficient cause of an evil will, is to ask for the efficient cause of an efficient cause. The whole argument in the sixth chapter of the twelfth book of the *De Civitate Dei* aims to prove that moral evil is the purest possible *self*-motion, and consequently cannot be referred to anything, or any being, but the *self*. “Let no one,” Augustine says, “seek an efficient cause for the evil *will*; there

¹ “Non ortum est malum nisi in bono; nec tamen summo et immutabili, quod est natura Dei, sed facto de nihilo per sapientiam Dei.” AUGUSTINUS: De nuptiis et concupiscentia, III. 1. Compare De libero arbitrio I. xi. Augustine teaches that God ordains sin, but does not produce it. “Some things God both produces and ordains; others he only produces.

The holy he both produces and ordains; but sinners, so far forth as they are sinners, he does not produce, but only ordains.” De Genesi ad literam. “Since no one by the act of memory compels the performance of past acts, so God does not, by his foreknowledge, compel the performance of future acts.” De libero arbitrio, III. iv.

is no efficient cause, only a deficient one.”¹ In other words, the sinful inclination of the human will is not a product originated by a positive external cause, but it is a deficiency, or falling away, within the will itself. Augustine then goes on to show how God’s agency, the agency of an Infinite Being, can never be a deficiency, but must always be an efficiency; and thereby evinces the impossibility of sin in the Divine will. It is in such speculations as these, that the Latin Father laid the foundation of the scholastic doctrine that sin is a negation.² By this it was not meant that sin is a non-entity; but only a negative, or privative, entity. It has existence, and is to have it endlessly, now that it has come into existence. But evil has not that intrinsic and positive *excellence* of being, that eternal *right* to be, which good possesses. Hence evil, unlike good, is eternal only *a parte post*. Holiness is from eternity to eternity, like God. But sin is from time, and of time, to eternity.

3. Thirdly, Augustine expressly asserts that all sin, both original and actual, is voluntary. “If sin, says Julian, is from will, then it is an evil will that produces sin; if from nature, then an evil nature. I quickly reply: Sin is from will. Then he asks whether original sin also [is from will]? I an-

¹ AUGUSTINUS: De civitate Dei XII. vii. trio, I. xx. (Ed. Migne, I. 1270).
Compare HOWE: Works, I. 134

² AUGUSTINUS: De libero arbi- (New York Ed.).

swer, certainly, original sin also ; because this too was transmitted (*seminatum est*) from the will of the first man, that it might both be in him, and pass over to all.”¹ Here, it is plain that Augustine proceeds upon the ethical maxim, that that which springs from a voluntary cause is itself to be reckoned voluntary, and places voluntariness beneath all the sin of man,—voluntariness either generic or individual. Hence he remarks, in another place, that “moral evil would not be in infants except by the *voluntary action* of the first man, and the traduction of original sin.”² Speaking, in his *Confessions*, of his erroneous views of evil when involved in Manichaeism, he says : “I maintained that Thy unchangeable substance did err compulsorily, rather than confess that my changeable substance had gone astray voluntarily, and now for punishment, lay in error.”³ Arguing with Julian, he remarks : “We, too, say that there cannot be sin without free will. Nor does our doctrine of original sin contradict this position ; because we arrive at this kind of sin through free will,—not, indeed, through the will of the individual at birth, but through the will of him in whom all were originally, at the time when he vitiated

¹ AUGUSTINUS : De nuptiis et concupiscentia, II. xxviii. 2. Compare WHITBY On Original Sin, Chapter VII., for citations to this same effect. This writer, however, mistakenly supposes that Augustine’s assertion of the vol-

untariness of sin infers the power to the contrary ; and that therefore Augustine’s definition of sin contradicts his theory of grace.

² De nuptiis et concupiscentia, III. 1.

³ Confessiones, IV. xv.

the common human *nature*, by an evil act of will. Hence, infants do not, at their birth, originate the sinful will which they have; but Adam in that time of his apostasy committed that great common sin (*magnum illum peccatum*) with a free will.”¹ Again, in this treatise *Contra Julianum*, he says: “In vain, therefore, do you imagine that there is no guilt (*delictum*) in infants, for the reason that guilt cannot be without voluntariness, and there is no voluntariness in infants. This is true, so far as individual transgression (*proprium cujusque peccatum*) is concerned; but not so far as concerns the original contagion of the first [Adamic] sin. But if this Adamic sin is a nullity, infants would not be involved in any evil, and certainly would not be exposed to any species of evil, either of body or soul, under the government of a perfectly just God. The guilt that is in *original* sin, therefore, takes its origin from the sinful will of the first pair (*priorum hominum*). Thus, *neither original nor individual sin can originate but from a wrong will.*”² In his treatise *De Vera Religione*, Augustine remarks that “sin is an evil so voluntary, that there can be no sin but what is voluntary; and this is so very manifest, that none of the learned few or the unlearned many ever dissent. In fine, if we do not perform evil with our *will*, then ought no person to be reprovèd or ad-

¹ *Opus imperfectum*, Cont. Jul. IV. xc.; compare *Opus imperf.* II. xxi, IV. xci. xcv, V. xl.

² *Contra Julianum*, III. v.

monished; but if you deny this fact, the Christian law and the discipline of every religion must be set aside.”¹ In his Epistle *Ad Sixtum*, Augustine represents the Pelagian as objecting that “men will excuse themselves by saying, ‘Why should we be blamed if we live ill, since we have not received grace to live well?’” To this he answers: “Those who live ill cannot truly say that they are not to blame; for if they do no ill, they live well. But if they live ill, it proceeds from *themselves*, either from their original evil, or from that which they have themselves added to it. If they are vessels of wrath, let them impute it to themselves as being formed out of that mass (*massa*) which God has justly condemned for the sin of that one man, in whom *all* men have sinned. . . . Every sinner is inexcusable, either by his original sin, or because he has added to it of his own will, whether knowingly or ignorantly; for even ignorance itself is without doubt a sin in those who have chosen not to know; and in those who have not been able [to know], it is the punishment of sin. The just judgment of God does not spare even those who have not heard [the law]: ‘For as many as have sinned without law, shall also perish without law’ (Rom. xii.). And although they may seem to have an excuse for their disobedience, yet God does not admit this excuse, *because he knows that he made man upright and gave him the rule of*

¹ De vera religione, xiv.

obedience, and that it is only by the abuse of free will that sin originated and passed over to the posterity.”¹ Julian cites the passage in Deut. xxiv. 16: “The fathers shall not be put to death for the children, neither shall the children be put to death for the fathers: every man shall be put to death for his own sin,” in proof that the sin of Adam cannot be imputed and punished. To this Augustine replies, that this refers to the fathers and the children in their *individual* capacity, and not as existent in a common unity, or nature. It refers to a condition of things subsequent to the existence in Adam. The *individual* sins of a father cannot be imputed to the son, and vice versa; because in this capacity, the father and son are not one. The doctrine of oneness does not apply in this instance. But, previous to birth, and as existing in the first man, parents and children, says Augustine, are one numerical human nature, and the imputation of the sin of this *nature* is not, therefore, the imputation of *another's* sin. Original sin is a common act of transgression; and in charging it upon the posterity, the very principle enunciated by Moses is carried out, viz.: that no agent shall be punished for another's agency. Augustine concedes that if Adam and his posterity did not, at the time of the apostasy, constitute one human nature and one indivisible agent, it would not be just to impute the primitive act

¹ Opera II. 882, 883 (Ed. Migne).

of apostasy to the posterity. In other words, he charges the posterity with the Adamic transgression, upon the principle of *suum cuique*.¹

§ 4. *Recapitulation*

The Latin anthropology, in a recapitulation, presents the following points. 1. Man was created holy, and from this position originated sin de nihilo by a purely creative act. Original sin is voluntary in the sense of being self-will, and is therefore properly punishable as guilt. 2. Man was created as a species, in respect to both soul and body; and hence the Adamic connection relates to the entire man,—to the voluntary and rational nature, equally with the corporeal and sensuous. 3. By the Adamic connection, the will, the *πνεῦμα*, is corrupted, as well as the *ψυχὴ* and *σῶμα*. 4. Infants are guilty, because they possess a sinful bias of will, and not merely a corrupt sensuous nature. 5. The corruption of the sensuous nature is the consequent, and not the antecedent, of apostasy in the rational and voluntary; so long as the voluntary and rational powers are in their created holy condition, there is nothing disordered or corrupt in the lower nature. The corruption of the flesh (*σῶμα*) is not the cause, but the effect, of the corruption of the reason and will (*πνεῦμα*). 6. The Holy Spirit takes the initia-

¹ Compare *Opus imperfectum*, III. xii. (Ed. Migne, X. 1251).

tive in the change from sin to holiness, and there is no co-operation of the human with the Divine agency in the regenerating act. The efficiency or activity of the human will up to the point of regeneration is hostile to God, and therefore does not co-work with Him.

CHAPTER IV.

PELAGIANISM AND SEMI-PELAGIANISM.

§ 1. *Pelagianism.*

PELAGIUS, a British monk, directly by his own teachings, and indirectly by the controversy to which he gave occasion, and the adherents who developed his views, constructed an anthropology totally antagonistic to the Augustinian.

The fundamental points in his theory are the following. The soul of man by creation is neither holy nor sinful.¹ His body by creation is mortal. The fall of Adam introduced no change of any kind into either the souls or the bodies of his posterity.

¹ "Omne bonum ac malum, quo vel laudibiles vel vituperabiles sumus, non nobiscum *oritur*, sed *agitur* a nobis; capaces enim utriusque rei, non pleni nascimur, et ut sine virtute, ita sine vitio procreamur, atque ante actionem propriae voluntatis id solum in homine est, quod Deus condidit."

PELAGIUS: De lib. arbitrio, quoted in AUGUSTINUS: De peccato originis, c. xiii. "Nemo naturaliter malus est; sed quicumque reus est, moribus, non exordiis accusatur." JULIANUS, in AUGUSTINUS: Op. imp. I. cv. Conp. Op. imp. V. lvi. See MÜNSCHER-VON CÖLLN: Dogmengeschichte, I. 375 sq.

Every man, therefore, when born into the world is what Adam was when created.¹ At birth, each man's physical nature is liable to disease and death, as was Adam's at creation;² and, at birth, each man's voluntary faculty, like Adam's at creation, is undetermined either to sin or holiness. Being thus characterless, with a will undecided either for good or evil, and not in the least affected by Adam's apostasy, each individual man, after birth, commences his own voluntariness, originates his own character, and decides his own destiny, by the choice of either right or wrong.³ Temporal death

¹ It was charged upon Coelestius, at the synod of Diospolis, and condemned, that he held that "Adam did not injure his posterity," and that "new-born infants are in the same condition as Adam was before the fall." Pelagius, according to Augustine (*De pec. orig.* xi.), professed to disagree with Coelestius, and made out the following points of difference between Adam and his posterity: 1. Adam injured his posterity by setting a bad example; 2. Adam was created an adult, but his posterity are born infants; 3. Adam could consciously use his free will, but infants cannot.

² AUGUSTINE (*Contra duas epist.* IV. iv. Ed. Migne, X. 614) represents the Pelagians as saying that "death only, and not sin (*crimen*), passed to us from Adam." To

this he objects that: "Adam died, because he sinned; but in our case, according to Pelagius, death is transmitted without sin; and innocent infants are punished unjustly, by contracting death without the desert of death."

³ "All good and evil, by which we are praiseworthy or blameworthy, does not originate with us, but is acted by us. We are born capable of either; we are not born full [of character]; we are procreated without holiness, and also without sin; before the action of his own individual will, there is nothing in man but what God has created." Quoted by Augustine from PELAGIUS, in AUGUSTINUS: *De peccato originis*, c. xiii. "Children (*fili*), so long as they are children, that is before they do anything by their own will, cannot be punishable (*rei*)."

is no part of the punishment of sin, because it befalls man by creation. His body is mortal per se, and irrespective of sin.¹ Eternal death is therefore the whole of the punishment of man's sin.

The general, but not strictly universal prevalence of sin in the world is accounted for, by the power of temptation, and the influence of example and of habit.² It is possible for any man to be en-

Quoted by AUGUSTINUS: Op. imperf. II. xlii. "Free will is as yet in its original uncorrupted state, and nature is to be regarded as innocent in every one, before his own will can show itself." Quoted from JULIAN, by AUGUSTINUS: Op. imp. II. xx.

¹ "The words 'till thou return to the earth from which thou wast taken, for dust thou art and unto dust shalt thou return' belong not to the curse, but are rather words of consolation to man. 'Thy sufferings, toils, and griefs shall not endure forever, but shall one day end.' If the dissolution of the body were a part of the punishment of sin, it would not have been said, 'thou shalt return to dust, for dust thou art;' but, 'thou shalt return to dust, because thou hast sinned, and broken my command.'" Quoted by AUGUSTINUS: Op. imp. VI. xxvii. "Adam himself, say the Pelagians, would have died as to the body, though he had not sinned; and hence he did not die in consequence of his

guilt, but by the necessity of nature." AUGUSTINUS: De haer. c. lxxxviii.

² The ἐφ' ᾧ, in Rom. v. 12, Pelagius translated, as did Augustine and all at that day, by *in quo*; but he explained it in this phraseology: "It is said we sinned in Adam, not because sin is innate, but because it comes from imitation." Quoted by AUGUSTINUS: De natura et gratia, c. x. JULIAN explains it thus: "*In quo omnes peccaverunt nihil aliud indicat, quam: quia omnes peccaverunt.*" PELAGIUS in his letter to the nun Demetrias, remarks: "While nature was yet new, and a long-continued *habit* of sinning had not spread as it were a mist over human reason, nature was left without a [written] law; to which the Lord, when it was oppressed by too many vices, and stained with the mist of ignorance, applied the file of the [written] law, in order that, by its frequent admonitions, nature might be cleansed again, and return to its lustre. And there is no other

tirely sinless, and there have been some such, even among the heathen. The grace of the Holy Spirit is not absolutely, but only relatively necessary, in order to holiness; it renders its attainment easier to man.¹ Regeneration does not consist in the renewal of the will by an internal operation of Divine efficiency, but in the illumination of the intellect by the truth, the stimulation of the will by the threatenings of the law and the promise of future rewards, and by the remission of sin through the Divine indulgence. God's grace² is designed for all, but man

difficulty of doing well, but the long-continued habit of vice, which has contaminated us from youth up, and corrupted us for many years, and holds us afterwards so bound and subjugated to herself, that she seems in a measure to have the force of nature." Augustine (Ed. Migne, X. 115) objects to Pelagius's explanation of "in quo peccaverunt omnes," that men are not said to sin "*in* the devil," because they imitate him.

¹ "Pelagius enim *facilius* dicit impleri quod bonum est, si adjuvet gratia. Quo additamento, id est, addendo *facilius*, utique significat hoc se sapere, quod etiam si gratiae defuerit adiutorium, potest, quamvis *difficilius*, impleri bonum per liberum arbitrium." AUGUSTINUS: Contra duas epistolas Pelag. II. viii. 17; Comp. De gratia Christi, c. xl.—"Confidunt in virtute sua, et creatori nostro

quodammodo dicunt, Tu nos fecisti homines, justos autem ipsi nos fecimus." AUGUSTINUS: Ep. clxxvii. Ad Innoc. Coelestius was condemned by the council of Carthage as holding that "*lex sic mittit ad regnum coelorum, quomodo et evangelium.*" Augustine (De haer. 88) represents Pelagianism as allowing of no immediate divine influence, but only that of the truth: "[deo] *adjuvante per suam legem et doctrinam, ut discamus quae facere et quae sperare debeamus.*"

² By "grace" Pelagius meant: 1. The natural freedom of will which every man receives by creation; 2. The truth, both natural and revealed; 3. A species of inward illumination; 4. The remission of sins. Augustine's representation is as follows, in De gestis contra Pelagium, c. xxxv.: "The Pelagians say, that man's nature, which was made with

must make himself worthy of it by an honest striving after virtue. The Son of God became man, in order, by his perfect teaching and example, to afford the strongest motives for self-improvement, and thereby redeems us. As we are imitators of Adam in sin, so we are to become imitators of Christ in virtue.

Pelagius held that infant baptism is necessary

free will, is sufficient to keep us from all sin, and to fulfil all righteousness; and that this is the grace of God, that we were so made that we could do this by our own will; that he has given us the aid of his law and commandments; and that he pardons sins that are past to those who are converted to him. In these things alone, is the grace of God to be acknowledged, and not in assistance given in our single acts." In his work, 'On free will,' written against Jerome, and *after* the council of Diospolis, Pelagius explained his view of will and grace, by distinguishing the faculty, the volition or decision, and the external act (*posse, velle, esse*), and maintaining that the first alone is from God, while the other two are from man alone. AUGUSTINUS: *De gratia christiana*, IV. v. Hence, Augustine directed the attention of Innocent of Rome, and John of Jerusalem, to Pelagius's idea of "grace," and referred them to passages in which Pelagius represented grace

to be the natural endowments of man, which, inasmuch as they are the gift of God, are "grace." AUGUSTINUS: *Ep. clxxix. ad Paul.* § 2. In his letter to Sixtus, with allusion to the Pelagian position that the endowments with which man is created are "grace," since he does not merit them, Augustine says: "The grace which the Apostle recommends, is not that by which we have been created men; but that by which we have been justified, when we were already bad men. Christ did not die for the creation of those who were not in existence, but for the justification of those who were in existence, and were sinful." AUGUSTINUS: *Ep. Sixto.* (Ed. Migne, II. 877). Julian, according to Augustine (*Op. imp. I. xciv.*), includes under the name of "grace" all the gifts of God,—"*innumerae species adjutorii divini.*" Compare AUGUSTINUS: *De pec. mer. II. xviii.* (Ed. Migne, X. 168).

in order to the remission of *future* sins;¹ but children who died without baptism he thought would be saved, although they would experience a less degree of felicity than the redeemed enjoy.² Respecting the doctrines of the trinity and the deity of Christ, of revelation, of prophecy, and of miracles, Pelagius adopted the supernaturalism of the Church, although his anthropology logically developed would have brought him to the rationalistic view upon these subjects.

Pelagius advanced his views first at Rome, from 409 to 411, principally through a commentary upon the Pauline Epistles. His system was brought to

¹ AUGUSTINE (De pecc. meritis, III. vi.) remarks: "A short time ago, when I was at Carthage, I heard the passing remark from some, that infants are not baptized for the forgiveness of sins, but as an act of consecration to Christianity (ut sanctificentur in Christo)." It is probable that he refers to some of the Pelagians, whether Pelagius and Coelestius themselves is uncertain.—There were some, whom Augustine (De pec. mer. I. xvii. xxxiv.) plainly distinguishes from Pelagians, who founded infant baptism upon *actual* sins committed by infants.

² According to Augustine (De pec. mer. I. xxxiv. xxxvi.), the Pelagians made a distinction between "salvation," or "eternal life," and the "kingdom of heaven." The former could be gained by the un-

baptized: the latter was the salvation of Christians, or the baptized.—Augustine (De Haeresibus, lxxxviii. Ed. Migne, VIII. 47) states the Pelagian theory of baptism as follows: "The Pelagians maintain, that infants are so born without any shackles whatever of original sin, that there is nothing at all to be forgiven them through the second birth, but that they are baptized in order to admission into the kingdom of God, through regeneration to the filial state; and therefore they are changed from good to better, but are not by that renovation freed from any evil at all of the old imputation. For they promise them, even if unbaptized, an eternal and blessed life, though out of the kingdom of God."

the notice of the North-African Church, in 411, by his pupil Coelestius, who was judged heretical by a council at Carthage in 412, and was excommunicated upon his refusal to retract his opinions. Pelagius in 411 went to Palestine. The Eastern Church were suspicious of his views, and he was accused of heresy before the synods of *Jerusalem* and *Diospolis*. But he succeeded in satisfying his judges, by qualifying his assertions respecting the possibility and the actual fact of human sinlessness.¹ The North-African Church, however, under the leadership of Augustine, were not satisfied with Pelagius's explanations, and followed up the discussion. Pelagianism was condemned as a heresy by the synods of *Mileve* and *Carthage*, in 416, and this decision was ultimately endorsed by the vacillating Roman bishop Zosimus,² in 418, and thus by the Latin Church. The Eastern Church, as represented at

¹ Before the synod of Jerusalem, he explained, "that in asserting that man could live without sin if he only would, he spoke of man after conversion, and did not deny the influence of grace upon the converted man, or intend to teach that any man had actually lived free from sin." GUERICKE: Church History, § 92. By "grace" Pelagius meant outward aids, as distinct from inward operation. The natural endowments of will and understanding, the communication of truth, the knowledge of the commandments, the influence

of favorable circumstances would be "grace," according to Pelagius's use of the term.

² In his statement of belief to Zosimus, Pelagius said: "We have a free will, either to sin, or to forbear sinning; and in all good works it is aided by the Divine assistance. We maintain that free will exists generally in all mankind, in Christians, Jews, and Gentiles; they have all equally received it by nature, but in Christians only it is assisted with grace. In others, this good of their original creation is naked

the *Council of Ephesus*, in 431, also condemned Pelagianism.

But though the Eastern Church came into this decision, its opposition to Pelagianism was not so earnest and intelligent as that of the Western, and particularly as that of the North-African Church. There were two reasons for this. In the first place, the Greek anthropology was adopted by the Oriental bishops. This, we have seen, maintained the position that original sin is not voluntariness but physical corruption, together with the synergistic view of regeneration.¹ The Greek anthropology would therefore come in conflict with the theory of Augustine upon these points. In the second place, the doctrine of unconditional election and predestination, which flowed so naturally from the Augustinian view of the entire helplessness of human nature, was extremely offensive to the Eastern

and unarmed. They shall be judged and condemned, because, though possessed of free will, by which they might come to the faith, and merit the grace of God, they make an ill use of their freedom; while Christians shall be rewarded, because by using their free will aright, they merit the grace of the Lord, and keep his commandments." In answer to the question: "Where do unbaptized children go?" Pelagius said: "I know where children who die unbaptized do not go; but I know

not where they do go." AUGUSTINUS: *De gratia Christi*. Cap. xxxi. (Ed. Migne, X. 376).

¹ "During Pelagius's residence at Rome, he fell into the heresy against grace, being instructed by a Syrian called Rufinus. For that error had already gained a footing in the East. It was taught by Theodore of Mopsuestia; and it was thought to take its rise from the principles of Origen." FLEURY: *Eccl. Hist.* B. xxiii. § 1. Compare OLSHAUSEN: *Com. über Rom.* vii. 7-24, p. 259.

mind. Hence we find that when the controversy between Augustinianism and Pelagianism was transferred from the West to the East, and the examination was conducted in the Eastern synods, there were bishops who either asserted that the matters in dispute were unessential, or else sided with Pelagius, if the choice must be made between Pelagius and Augustine.¹ The *Antiochian School*, as represented by Theodore of Mopsuestia and Isidore of Pelusium, stood midway between the parties, and the condemnation of Pelagianism which was finally passed by the Council of Ephesus seems to have been owing more to a supposed connection of the views of Pelagius with those of Nestorius, than to a clear and conscientious conviction that his system was contrary to Scripture, and the Christian experience.

Such a settlement, consequently, of the strife could not be permanent. Moreover, the views of Augustine respecting predestination were misstated by some of his followers, and misrepresented by some of his opponents, in such a manner as to imply the tenet of necessitated sin,—evil being represented as the product of an efficient decree, instead, as Augustine taught, of a permissive one. The

¹ During the controversy, the Pelagians quoted as upon their side, Lactantius, Hilary, Ambrose, Jerome, Basil, Chrysostom, Theodore of Mopsuestia, and Diodorus of Tarsus; on the other

hand, Irenaeus, Cyprian, Innocent, Gregory, Hilary, Ambrose, Jerome, Basil, and Chrysostom were claimed as agreeing with Augustine. WHITBY: On Sin, Chap. VIII. p. 251.

doctrine of election was construed into a motive for indifference, instead of fear and supplication for mercy. The same abuse was made of the doctrine of sovereign grace in the salvation of the human soul that was anticipated and warned against by the Apostle Paul. These causes, and this condition of things, led to the revival, by a party in the West, of the synergistic theory of regeneration, as the only thing which, it was supposed, could relieve the honest-minded of their difficulties respecting predestination and election, and make conversion an intelligible and practical matter. This party were the so-called *Semi-Pelagians*.¹

§ 2. *Semi-Pelagianism.*

The Semi-Pelagian controversy arose in the following manner. The monks of the cloister of Adrumetum, in North-Africa, were most of them advocates of the Augustinian theory, but had fallen into dispute respecting its meaning. Some of them, by the doctrine of absolute predestination, had been thrown into great mental doubt and despair. Others were making this doctrine the occasion of entire indifference, and even of licentiousness. A third class were supposing that some virtuous efficiency, even

¹ This name was not given them until the Middle Ages; they were called, previously, the *Massiliensians*, from their principal seat at Marseilles, in Southern Gaul.

though it be very slight, must be ascribed to the human will, in regeneration. The abbot of the cloister referred the case to Augustine, in 427, who endeavored in his two treatises, *De gratia et libero arbitrio*, and *De correptione et gratia*, to relieve the difficulties of the monks, and appears to have been successful.

But, contemporaneously with this occurrence, a far more extensive opposition to Augustine's theory arose in Southern Gaul. A theological school was formed among these enterprising and active French churches which, in fact, reproduced with modifications the Greek anthropology of the preceding centuries. A Scythian monk, *John Cassian*, a pupil and friend of Chrysostom, and the founder and president of the cloister at Marseilles, stood at the head of it. It became a vigorous party, of which the most distinguished members and leaders were *Vincent of Lerins*, *Faustus of Rhegium*, *Gennadius*, and *Arnobius the Younger*.

Augustine, also, had his disciples and adherents in these same churches of Southern Gaul. Among them were two influential theologians, viz.: *Hilary* and *Prosper*. These informed Augustine of the controversy that was going on in the French churches, and he endeavored, as in the instance of the monks of Adrumetum, to settle the dispute by explanatory treatises. He addressed to the Massiliensians the two tracts: *De praedestinatione sanctorum*, and *De dono perseverantiae*. He meets the

objection that the doctrine of predestination ministers to moral indifference and licentiousness, by teaching that the decree of election is not a decree to bestow eternal happiness upon men full of sin, but that only he can be sure of his election who runs the Christian race, and endures to the end. The divine decree includes the means as well as the end, and therefore produces holiness in order to secure happiness. Handled in this manner, the doctrine, Augustine claims, is not a dangerous one for the common mind ; but on the contrary affords the only strong ground of confidence to a helpless and despairing spirit. Augustine, however, did not succeed in convincing his opponents, and the controversy was afterwards carried on with some bitterness between Prosper and Vincent of Lerins.

The ablest advocate of the Semi-Pelagian theory was *Faustus of Rhegium*. His treatise *De gratia et libero arbitrio* greatly influenced the decisions of the council of *Arles*, in 475, and of *Lyons*, in the same year,—both of which councils sanctioned Semi-Pelagianism. The fortunes of this system, however, declined in Southern Gaul, from two causes. In the first place, the later defenders of Augustinianism, particularly *Fulgentius*, while holding the doctrine of predestination with entire strictness in its relation to holiness, were more reserved respecting its relations to sin,—thus affording less opportunity for the charge of necessitated evil. Secondly, the personal influence of some highly respected and excellent

bishops, such as *Avitus of Vienne*, and *Caesarius of Arles*, was thrown in favor of the views of the North-African Father. By these means, a change was effected in the churches of Southern Gaul, to such an extent, that in the year 529, a little more than fifty years after the councils of Arles and Lyons, they declared for the Augustinian anthropology, in the two councils of *Orange* and *Valence*. The following are some of the decisions of the council of Orange, and indicate in their condemnatory clauses the Semi-Pelagian positions, particularly respecting grace and free-will. "If any one assert that by reason of man's prayer the grace of God is conferred, but that it is not grace itself which causes that God is prayed to, he contradicts the prophet Isaiah (lxi. 1), and the apostle Paul (Rom. x. 20) saying the same thing: 'I was found of them that sought me not, and have been made manifest to them that asked not after me.' If any one maintains that God waits for a willingness in us to be purged from sin, and does not allow that the very willingness to be cleansed from sin is wrought in us by the infusion and operation of the Holy Spirit, he resists the Holy Ghost saying by Solomon (Prov. viii. 35, Septuagint ver.), 'The will is prepared by the Lord;' and by the apostle (Philip. ii. 13), 'It is God which worketh in you, both to will and to do, of his good pleasure.' If any man say, that we believe, will, desire, endeavor, labor, watch, study, ask, seek, and knock, without and previous

to grace, and that grace is conferred by God upon this ground, and does not confess that it is wrought in us by the infusion and operation of the Holy Ghost, that we believe, will, desire, endeavor, and do all the above-mentioned things as we ought, and thus makes the aid of grace to follow after man's humility or obedience, and does not allow that it is the gift of grace itself, that we are obedient and humble: he resists the apostle (1 Cor. iv. 7; xv. 10) saying: 'What hast thou, that thou hast not received,' and: 'By the grace of God I am what I am.' It is God's gift both when we think aright, and when we hold our feet from falsehood and unrighteousness. For as often as we do good things, God worketh in us, and with us, that we may work. There are many good things done *in* man which are not done *by* man (*multa in homine bona fiunt, quae non facit homo*). But man doth no good things which God does not cause man to do (*quae non Deus praestet, ut faciat homo*). In every good work, we do not begin, and are helped afterwards by the grace of God, but he first of all, no good merits of ours going before, inspires into us both faith and love of himself, that we may both believingly seek the sacrament of baptism, and after baptism, by his help, may fulfil the things that are pleasing to him."¹

Respecting the Semi-Pelagian theory itself: It

¹ USHER'S WORKS, III. p. 540 sq.

was intended by its advocates to be a middle-position between Augustinianism and Pelagianism. The essence of the theory consists in a *mixture* of grace and free-will. There are two efficient agencies concerned in the renovation of the human will: viz., the will itself and the Holy Spirit.¹ Hence, the product can not be referred either to one or the other, as the sole originating cause. Upon this co-existence of two co-efficients and their co-operation,

¹The *degree* of power to good which the Semi-Pelagians asserted was certainly less than that asserted by the Alexandrine anthropology. Hilary's account of their synergism is as follows: "They agree that all men perished in Adam, and that no man can be saved *merely* by his own will. But this they say is agreeable to truth, that when the opportunity of obtaining salvation is announced to such as are prostrate and would never rise again by their own strength (*prostratis et nunquam suis viribus surrecturis, annunciaturobtinendae salutis occasio*), they, by that merit whereby they will to be healed of their disease and believe that they can be, obtain both an increase of this [slender] faith itself, and entire restoration in the end (*eo merito, quo voluerint et crediderint a suo morbo se posse sanari, et ipsius fidei augmentum, et totius sanitatis suae consequantur effectum*)." HILARY Epist. ad Aug. AUGUSTINUS: Opera II.

p. 825. In this same letter, Hilary represents the Semi-Pelagians as affirming that, "grace is not denied, when such a species of voluntariness is said to go before grace, as only seeks and desires a physician, but is not able to do anything more than this;" and as "explaining the passage, 'according as God hath dealt to every man the measure of faith,' and similar ones (e. g. Rom. i. 17), to mean, that that man shall be assisted who has commenced to will; but not that this very commencement of willingness is also the effect of grace (*ut adjuvetur qui coeperit velle; non ut etiam donetur, ut velit*)." PROSPER charges the Massiliensians with taking positions that logically, and in their tendency, favor Pelagianism. These positions are the following: 1. The beginning of salvation is placed in man; 2. The human will is honored more than the Divine; since the sinner is helped because he commences to will, and does not commence to will

Cassian lays great stress, as the distinguishing and essential position which would retain the element of truth that, in his judgment, was in Augustinianism and in Pelagianism, and would exclude the errors into which, he believed, both fell. Hence, in answer to the test question: Which agency begins the work of regeneration? Cassian affirms that sometimes it is the divine, and sometimes it is the human. Sometimes he ascribes the commencement of good in man, to man, and its completion to God; and sometimes he derives the first desire after grace itself from God. Sometimes he even ascribes to the human spirit a compulsion to good. "Sometimes," he remarks, "we are drawn to salvation against our will (*inviti*)."¹ In another place,² he asks: "What was that which stood in the way of Paul, because he seems to have been attracted to the way of life, as it were unwillingly; though afterwards consummating and perfecting this initial compulsion (*necessitas*), by a voluntary devotedness."

Semi-Pelagianism was the revival in the Western Church of the Greek anthropology, though made somewhat more guarded by the discussions and statements of the Pelagian controversy. The following recapitulation, taken from Wiggers' rep-

because he is helped; 3. The sinner's recipiency towards holiness is represented as originating from himself, and not from God; 4. It is thought that God is pleased with something in the sinner,

which God himself has not bestowed or produced.

¹ CASSIANUS: *De institutionibus coenobitorum*, XII. xviii.

² CASSIANUS: *Coll.* III. v.

resentation, embraces the principal points in the system.¹ In his primitive state, man was possessed of certain physical, intellectual, and moral advantages which he does not now possess. His body was immortal; he lay under no earthly ills or burdens, such as the curse of labor, and in the instance of woman the pains of child-bearing; he possessed remarkable knowledge of nature and the moral law; and was entirely sinless. The sin of the first pair, to which they were tempted by the devil, resulted, not only for them but also for their posterity, in both physical and moral disadvantages. The body became mortal, and a moral corruption entered which was propagated to the posterity, and gradually becomes greater and greater. Freedom of will, in the sense of power to good, is not wholly lost, but it is very much weakened. Man in his present condition is morally diseased. The imputation of original sin is removed in baptism, and without baptism no one attains salvation. Owing to his morally diseased and weakened condition, man needs the assistance of divine grace, in order to the practice of holiness, and the attainment of salvation. The moral freedom of man, or his power to good, works in connection with divine grace. The two things are not to be separated from each other. There is no unconditional decree of God, but predestination to salvation or to perdition depends

¹ WIGGERS: Augustinismus: Th. II. 357 sq.

upon the use which man makes of the remainder of his freedom to good. The decree of election is therefore a conditional one; God determines to bestow forgiveness and assisting influences upon those who he foresees will make a beginning. And yet the merit of his salvation man must not ascribe to himself, but to the grace of God, because without this grace man's endeavors would be unsuccessful.

Wiggers compares the three systems with each other as follows: Augustinianism asserts that man is morally *dead*; Semi-Pelagianism maintains that he is morally *sick*; Pelagianism holds that he is morally *well*.

CHAPTER V.

THE ANSELMIC ANTHROPOLOGY.

“Many things have carried the appearance of contradiction, and inconsistency, to the first view of our straitened minds, which afterwards we have, upon repeated consideration and endeavor, found room for, and been able to make fairly accord, and lodge together.”—JOHN HOWE.

§ 1. *Anselm's theory of Original Sin.*

THE Augustinian theory of sin and grace, we have seen, was adopted as the anthropology of the Western Church, at the councils of Orange and Valence. But it would be an error to suppose that the Western Church as a body continued to adhere strictly to the views of the North-African father. The more devout and evangelical minds in the 5th and 6th centuries, like *Leo* and *Gregory*, and even in the 8th and 9th centuries, like *Bede* and *Alcuin*, propagated the teachings of Augustine respecting the corruption of human nature, and the agency of the Holy Spirit in its regeneration; but were less

distinct and bold, in their statements respecting the preterition and reprobation of the lost. They were content with affirming, in the most unqualified manner, the doctrine of an enslaved will, and the need of divine efficiency in order to its renewal and liberation, and left the darker and more difficult side of the doctrine of predestination, without explanation. So far, therefore, as the practical part of the Augustinian anthropology,—its relations, namely, to the renewal and salvation of men,—is concerned, the more distinguished Fathers of the Western Church, during the two or three centuries succeeding that of Augustine, were steady adherents to his opinions. But the general decline that was advancing in all the great interests of the church brought with it a departure from the high vantage-ground which had been gained in the contest with Pelagianism. The middle theory of Semi-Pelagianism, even in Augustine's own century, we have seen, found some able defenders, and was oftentimes associated with genuine devotion and piety. Its less rigorous and scientific character, together with its comparative silence upon the more difficult parts of the doctrines of original sin, predestination, and free-will, recommended it to a large class of minds; while the element of human efficiency which it introduced into the doctrine of regeneration was thought to render it a more intelligible and practical doctrine. It was not strange, consequently, that in course of time, the Latin Church, though holding the name

of Augustine in high respect, should have lapsed down very generally upon the Greek anthropology.¹

That brief chapter in the doctrinal history of the Middle Ages which records the attempt of *Gottschalk* (†868) to revive the Augustinian anthropology evinces how alien this system had at length become to the thinking and feeling of the Papal Church. This serious and earnest-minded monk contended for a two-fold predestination, in accordance with the teachings of the revered bishop of Hippo. He simply applied the doctrine of pre-

¹ "The debates in the first assembly of the Council of Trent (A. D. 1546) between the Dominicans who adhered to Aquinas, and the Franciscans who followed Scotus, on original sin, justification, and grace . . . show how strongly the whole Western Church, through all the divisions into which it has been separated, has manifested the same *unwillingness to avow the Augustinian system, and the same fear of contradicting it.*" MACKINTOSH: *Progress of Ethical Philosophy*. Note I. PETAVIUS cites from the *earlier* writings of Augustine, to prove that the Augustinian and Tridentine anthropologies are identical, and gives the following definition of a Pelagian: "*Ille vero Pelagianus est, qui libero isti arbitrio tantum arrogat ut sine adjutorio Dei niti posse viribus suis ad Deum colendum existimet, hoc est ad recte agendum,*

vel ad Christianam inchoandam, promovendam, perficiendamque justitiam." De Pelag. et Semi-Pelag. haeresi, Lib. I. Cap. 2. § 12. PETAVIUS maintains that the theory of coöperation in regeneration is the truth, and that the Papal Church agrees with Augustine in holding it. HASE (*Hutterus Redivivus*, § 85) remarks that Semi-Pelagianism maintained that "durch den Sündenfall entstand nur allgemeinen Neigung zur Sünde, der Mensch ist krank, aber er kann und soll neben der göttlichen Gnade wirken, obwohl er nur durch diese zur vollen Heiligung und Seligkeit gelangt. Diese *fur Augustinismus ausgegebene Meinung*, in der durch die Scholastiker gegebenen Fortbildung, wurde zu Trient Kirchenlehre; und auch die morgenländische Kirche hat nie mit vollem Ernste in den Abgrund der Sünde geblickt."

destination to the lost as well as to the saved, being careful at the same time to limit the divine *efficiency*, to the production of holiness. His statement of the doctrine of predestination was that of a permissive decree, only, in respect to sin,¹ and yet it was condemned as heretical by a church which had rejected Semi-Pelagianism.

Upon passing, however, into the period of Scholasticism, we find one thinker who both reproduces the Augustinian anthropology, and makes a positive contribution towards the metaphysical solution of the difficult problems involved in it. This thinker is *Anselm*, a man who, in reference to the doctrine of original sin, as in reference to that of the atonement, belongs not to the Papal but to the Protestant Church.

The anthropology of Anselm is stated in his two tracts, *De conceptu virginali et originali peccato*, and *De libero arbitrio*. A rapid analysis of a portion of each of them, which we derive from the ex-

¹ "Credo atque confiteor, prae-scire te ante secula quaecunque erunt futura sive bona sive mala, praedestinasse vero tantummodo bona." Quoted by NEANDER : III. 475. The employment of *praescire* in the one instance, and of *praedestinare* in the other, was undoubtedly designed by Gottschalk to indicate the different relation which God sustains to evil from what he does to good ; while, yet, both are equally comprehend-

ed in the divine plan. For had Gottschalk not been endeavoring to establish this latter position, he would not have incurred the opposition of the Church. For other extracts see HAGENBACH : Dogmengeschichte, § 103. Gottschalk's Augustinianism was defended by Ratramnus and Remigius, and opposed by Hincmar and Erigena. See GUERICKE : History of the Mediaeval Church, § 123.

cellent monograph upon Anselm, by Hasse, will be sufficient to indicate the position of this profound and devout Schoolman, respecting the doctrine of original sin, and the kindred doctrine of regeneration.

The phrase "original sin," says Anselm,¹ may direct attention, by the use of the word "original," either to the origin of human nature, or to the origin of the individual man. But so far as the origin of human nature itself is concerned, this is pure and holy. The phrase "original sin," therefore, has no reference to man as he was originated or created by his Maker. It must refer, consequently, only to the origin of the *individual* man,—either to his nearer, or his more remote origin; either to his birth from immediate ancestors, or his descent from the first human pair.² For every man possesses that universal quality which is common to all men, viz.: human nature; and also that peculiar quality, which distinguishes him from all other men, viz.: his individuality. Hence, there is a two-fold sin to be distinguished in man; that sin, viz.: which he receives in the reception of human nature at the very first moment of his individual existence, and that which he afterwards commits as this or that

¹ ANSELMUS: De originali peccato, c. 1.

² Man, according to Anselm as well as Augustine, was not created sinful, but he is born sinful. The distinction between

creation and birth must be carefully distinguished in order to a correct apprehension of this anthropology. *Man* was created on the sixth day; but *men* are born every day.

particular individual. The first may be also denominated the sin of nature, *peccatum naturale*; yet it does not belong to the original essence of human nature, but is only a *condition* or *state* into which that human nature has come since the creating act. In the same manner, there is an original righteousness, and an individual righteousness. For human nature would have been propagated in its original con-created state or condition of holiness, had the first human pair kept their first estate. But as they did not, original sin, instead of original righteousness, has passed upon all men. In this way, each individual man is now characterized by both corruption and guilt. By corruption, because the act of apostasy has vitiated his nature, both upon the physical and the spiritual side. By guilt, because inasmuch as he was created in a righteous state, the obligation still lies upon him, even in his apostasy, to have all that he was originally endowed with by his Maker, and he is a debtor to this obligation.¹ Hence, the requirement rests upon human nature as individualized in every child, and in every adult, to fulfil that original and perfect righteousness which belonged to it at creation, and which it was under no necessity of losing; and

¹ AQUINAS (De Peccato Originali, Art. 2) affirms that "there is sin, not only when a man has not what he ought to possess, but also when he has that of which he ought not to be possessed."

Hence the "blindness of the heart," and the "ignorance" spoken of as belonging to the unregenerate, in Eph. i. 18, is sin in the sense of guilt.

also to make satisfaction to justice for that sin which it was commanded not to commit. The inability of apostate human nature, in the child, or the adult, to fulfil this perfect righteousness, and atone for this sin, does not excuse it, because this inability is its own product, and because it ought not to have lost the power with which it was previously endowed.

Thus, all sin, original as well as actual, is unrighteousness and guilt. But sin supposes the existence of will. *How then can original sin be imputed to the infant, and why is the infant baptized for its remission?* Anselm recurs to the Augustinian doctrine of the Adamic unity for his answer. Three facts, he remarks, must be taken into account, in endeavoring to solve this difficult problem. First, the fact that there is a common human nature.¹ Sec-

¹ "The realism of Anselm," says BAUR (*Dreieinigkeitslehre*, II. 412), "consists in his maintaining the actual existence of a universal that is distinguished from the individual. He objects to Roscellin that he does not conceive of man except as an individual. 'Nondum intelligit quomodo plures homines in specie sint unus homo,—non potest intelligere, aliquid esse hominem, nisi individuum.' " In Anselm's theory, the species is an entity as truly as the individual. For him, the universal has *objective* existence, and is not a mere name for the collective aggregate of particulars. The human "nature"

is prior to the individuals that are produced from it, and is as substantially existent as they are. For the individuals are only the nature *distributed*; they are the "species" metamorphosed into persons. The "nature," therefore, is not the collective aggregation of individuals; for in this case the nature is not an entity,—it is only the name given to the aggregation of particular individuals, and the only entity is the individual. On the contrary (according to the theory of Realism), the nature is a primary entity, having real existence, which is metamorphosed by distribution into a multitude of individual

ondly, there is a particular individuality. And, thirdly, the individual is a production from the nature. As merely possessing the common human nature, the infant participates in no sin, guilt, or condemnation. For abstract human nature is the pure creation of God. If the mere fact of being human were sufficient to constitute an individual man a sinner, then Adam himself would have been a sinner before his act of apostasy. Neither is the second characteristic, viz.: that the infant possesses individuality, sufficient to account for his birth-sin; for this equally with the generic nature is a creation of God. The third fact, consequently, alone remains by which to explain the sin and guilt that belong to every man at birth: the fact, viz.: that the individual is produced out of the nature, and the nature has apostatized subsequent to its creation. Adam differed from all other human individuals by containing within his person the entire human nature out of which the millions of generations were to be propagated, and of which they are individualized portions. He was to transmit this human nature which was all in himself, exactly as it had been *created* in him; for propagation makes no radical changes, but simply transmits what is given in the nature, be it good or bad. If therefore he had not apostatized, human nature would not have apostatized,

persons. Compare Baur's remarks upon Anselm's universal not being a mere conception, but a substance or reality, in his Dreieinigkeitslehre, II. 411 sq.

tized, and would have been procreated, or individualized from generation to generation in the same holy and perfect condition in which it came from the hand of God. If, on the contrary, the first father, by an act of apostasy, should introduce a total moral change into the human nature that was included in him, then the same law of propagation must operate, and the individuals produced out of it must be characterized by a sinful state and condition. Hence Anselm speaks of a necessity of being sinful which now, since the apostasy, overhangs the *individual*, though it did not overhang the nature. The nature in Adam was under no compulsion to apostatize. There is no original and created necessity for sin. But if human nature in Adam does by a free act lose its original righteousness, then the individual, inasmuch as he is produced out of the nature, cannot possibly escape depravity. The greater inevitably includes the less; and no individual can be sinless in case the nature out of which he is produced, and of which he is a portion, has lapsed into sin. Since apostasy, it is impossible that any child of Adam should be born sinless; and in this sense, and with this explanation, Anselm asserts a necessity of sin in reference to the individual,—not a necessity founded in creation, but in the unavoidable relation which an individual sustains to his race. *Descent*, then, or the *propagation of an apostate nature*, is the fact by which Anselm would account for the existence of sin in every indi-

vidual man at birth. And he holds that the miraculous and anomalous birth of Christ, by which he was kept out of the line of ordinary human generation, indicates that sin now unavoidably flows down within that line.

In endeavoring to impart a notion of *the precise relation of that which is individual to that which is generic*, Anselm theorizes in the vein of Augustine. That the posterity have sinned in and with the progenitor, supposes an original existence in him. Nonentity cannot sin. The first forefather seminally contained his posterity.¹ Their essence, both on the spiritual and the physical side, was part and particle with his; their nature was consubstantial (*ὁμοούσιος*) with his. But this one common nature or essence is not yet individualized. The pos-

¹ Adam differed from every one of his posterity, in that his person included the *whole* human "nature" or species. Of no other human person is this true. The moment that he was created a solitary individual, the nature was all in him, undistributed, and unindividualized. When Eve, the second individual, was formed, she was not created *de nihilo*, but made out of his substance,— "bone of his bone, and flesh of his flesh." The human "nature" then became included in two individuals, the first human *pair*,— the masculine side of the nature being in Adam, and the feminine side

in Eve. Eve, seduced by Satan, tempted Adam to disobedience, and in their *joint* act of transgression the entire human "nature" or species transgressed and apostatized. In the birth of Cain there was an individualization of a *portion*, only, of this (now) corrupted nature. Cain, it is evident, did not, like Adam at the instant of creation, include the whole humanity in himself. He did not include Adam and Eve, neither did he include the other children of Adam and Eve, and the millions of individuals who sprang from them.

terity do not exist in the progenitor as so many distinct persons. Hence a distinction must be made between the sin which the *nature* in Adam originates, and the sin which the *individual* after Adam commits; or, in the technical phrase, between "original" and "actual" sin. In the case of Adam, an individual transgression resulted in a sin of nature; while in the case of his posterity, a sin of nature results in individual transgressions. Adam by a single distinct transgression introduced a corruption into that entire human nature which was in, and one with, himself. Here, the individual vitiates the generic, because the generic is included in the individual. Adam's posterity, as so many distinct individualizations of this vitiated human nature, act out this corruption, each in his day and generation. Here the generic vitiates the individual.¹

¹ AQUINAS (Summa, Pt. II. Q. 81, Art. 1) states the relation of the individual to the generic transgression as follows: "All men, who are born from Adam, can be regarded as one man; just as all who are members of the same civil community, may be regarded as one body, and the whole community as one man. Thus all men who spring from Adam are like members of one material body. But the act of any particular member of the human body, say the hand, is not a voluntary act by reason of a voluntariness that is in the hand itself, but by reason of the volun-

tariness of the soul which moves the hand. In like manner, the actual, that is the individual, transgression which is committed by some particular member of the body, is not the sin of that member, except so far as that member is a part of the total man himself, and for this reason is called a *human* sin; and in like manner original sin is the sin of the individual only so far as the individual receives a sinful nature or disposition from the first parent, and hence it is denominated the *sin of nature* (*peccatum naturae*)."

In the instance of the progenitor, the “actual” sin, or the sin of a single act, originates the “original” sin, or the sin of nature and disposition. In the instance of the posterity, the “original” sin, or the sin of the nature, originates the sin of single acts, or “actual” transgressions. In the first instance, the individual corrupts the nature; in the last instance, the nature corrupts the individual.

Anselm next raises the question, *whether the sins of the immediate ancestors are imputed to the posterity*, as well as the sin of the first father. This question he answers in the negative; because the individual sins, be they of immediate or of remote ancestors, are not committed by the common *nature* in Adam. The entire nature, at the moment of the temptation and apostasy, was in two persons. All mankind fell in the first human pair, who are *conjointly* denominated Adam,—“God created man in his own image, in the image of God created he *him*; male and female created he *them*” (Gen. i. 27). The first act of transgression was unique. There was never a second like it. The sins of Cain, or Abel, or of any other individual, were not the transgressions of *an individual who included within himself the entire humanity*. Even the individual transgressions of Adam, subsequent to the first act of apostasy, were only manifestations in his particular person of the generic sin, and sustained the same relation to it that the transgressions of any other individual do. There is, therefore, no imputation

of the strictly *individual* sins of Adam to his posterity. That only is imputed to all men which *all* men have committed; and the only sin which *all* men have committed is that one sin which they committed when they were all, "*ille unus homo*," one human nature, in the first human pair.

Thus, in Anselm's anthropology, as in Augustine's, everything starts from the *original unity of the human race*. If this idea is not conceded, the whole doctrine of original and transmitted sin, as Anselm constructs it, falls to the ground. Original sin is original agency; but original agency supposes an original agent; and this original agent is the whole human nature undistributed and unindividualized, in distinction from this or that individualized part of it. Original sin, coming into existence by the single primitive act of apostasy, is then transmitted along with the nature, from generation to generation,—the generation being so many individualizations of the common humanity. The first pair of individuals are created, and contain the substance of the entire race, both upon the spiritual and the physical side. All the posterity, as individualizations, are propagated, not created. Herein consists the possibility of a transmission of sin from the first human pair, to the whole posterity, and also of a transmission of holiness. For had there been no apostasy, or change in the moral character of human nature, as it existed in Adam, the propagation of human nature would have simply trans-

mitted holiness,—that original righteousness with which man was endowed by the creative act. For Anselm did not hold the doctrine of the later Schoolmen, that the primitive man was only negatively holy,—that is, created *in puris naturalibus*, without either holiness or sin. Hence, if human nature in the person of Adam had remained as it was created, it would of course have been propagated as it had remained. Original righteousness instead of original sin would have been the inherited and native character of the posterity. For propagation makes no changes in the type or kind. Propagation does not *originate* either sin or holiness, but simply transmits it. Had holiness, consequently, continued to be the intrinsic quality of human nature as generically in Adam, it would have continued to be that of all the individualizations of that nature. But the original righteousness with which mankind in the person of Adam was endowed, was only a relative perfection. It was positive holiness, and not the mere negative destitution of any character either good or evil; yet it was not that immutable and absolute perfection which belongs to God and the angels who have kept their first estate. The power of a contrary choice, or the possibility of apostasy, was attached to it, for purposes of probation merely, and not to complete moral freedom. Thus, along with the possibility of the transmission of original holiness to all the posterity, there was also established the possibility of

the transmission of original sin ; and which of these it should be, was left by the Creator to depend upon the decision of the human race itself in the person of its progenitor. Hence the uncommon and strange influence which the first parents exert upon the whole future of the posterity. A sinful character having been determined by a voluntary act for the entire race in the persons of the first human pair, nothing but the instantaneous intervention of God, by a renewing act, could have prevented the transmission of the sin thus originated. For propagation inevitably conveys human nature precisely as it finds it, and hence if human nature has, within itself and by its own act, substituted original sin for original righteousness, the fact must appear in every individual instance. Thus the individual is *born* in sin, because he is born an individual; but he was not *created* in sin, because he was created in Adam who was created holy.

Another fact urged by Anselm is, that *in the progenitors the guilt of the nature, or of original sin, rests upon the guilt of the individual*, but *in the posterity the guilt of the individual rests upon the guilt of the nature*. The guilt, in both instances, results from the loss of that primitive holiness with which mankind was endowed by the Creator. But in the instance of the first pair, this loss and lack of original righteousness is the consequence of an individual act, while in the posterity it is the consequence of a generic act. Adam was

an individual that included the species. By an act of his will, as an individual thus inclusive of humanity he vitiated human nature. But the posterity of Adam are none of them individuals inclusive of the species. They are purely and simply individuals. As such they cannot perform a generic act. Hence, in the individual determinations of their will, they merely manifest, but do not *originate* the generic sin. In the instance of the progenitor, the individual corrupts the nature, because the individual includes the nature; but in the instance of the posterity, the nature corrupts the individual, because the individual does not include the nature but receives it. The first act of the individual, in the instance of the posterity, must consequently be a sinful act, from the nature of the case; because original sin, or the sin of nature, has already been brought into existence, and now lies as the potential basis of the individual life; and from such a source as this, nothing but sin can issue. The origin of this original sin must not be sought for within the sphere of the *individual* life and experience, but in the primary unity of the race in the person of Adam. At this point, mankind were free to stand or fall, and were endowed with plenary power to do either. But when the election has been made, and the apostasy of the entire race is a foregone conclusion, an accomplished fact, nothing but sin can appear in the individual life, except there be an act of divine interference immediately succeeding

the act of apostasy, to prevent. The Creator puts forth no such act, and hence the transmission of original sin proceeds parallel with the individualization of that common humanity that was created in Adam.

§ 2. *Anselm's idea of the will, and freedom.*

The anthropology of Anselm would be incompletely represented, if we failed to exhibit his views respecting *the nature of freedom and the human will*. These are contained in his Dialogue *De libero arbitrio*, from which we derive the following particulars.¹

The pupil, with whom the dialogue is held, brings forward the popular definition of freedom, as the power of sinning and of not sinning,—*potes-tas peccandi et non peccandi*, or the *possibilitas utriusque partis*. This definition Anselm asserts to be altogether inadequate. For it does not hold good when applied to God and the holy angels. These possess moral freedom, and yet are destitute of the power to sin. If, therefore, there is a species of freedom from which the power to sin is absolutely excluded, then this power is not a necessary or essential element in the idea of moral freedom. That this is so, says Anselm, is evident from the nature of the case. For he who possesses that

¹ HASSE: Anselm von Canterbury, II. 364 sq.

which is right and excellent, in such a manner that he cannot lose it, is freer than he is who can lose it, and exchange it for that which is shameful and evil. Therefore that will which, of itself, and without external compulsion, is so strongly determined to the right as to be unable to desert the path of rectitude, is freer than that will which is so feebly determined to the right as to be able to do this. Hence the power to sin, if attached to a will, diminishes its liberty, but if subtracted from it increases it. Hence it is neither liberty itself, nor a part of liberty. But, objects the pupil, if the possibility of sinning does not belong to the essence of freedom, can we call that act by which the evil angels and our first parents apostatized a free act? Was it not, rather, an act of necessity? For there is no medium between a free and a necessary act. And if, according to our Lord's saying, "Whosoever committeth sin is the *servant* of sin," can we properly call such an one free? In other words, is not sin a *compulsion*, if the power to sin is no part of freedom? To this Anselm replies, that the evil angels and the first human pair certainly sinned without being *forced* to do so; and in this sense they were free in the act of apostasy. It was unquestionably an act of spontaneity, and of pure untrammelled self-will;¹ though not an act of genuine freedom. For

¹ "Sin is an act so free, that if we shall
Say 'tis not free, 'tis no sin at all."

HERRICK: Noble Numbers.

they sinned not *because* of their freedom,—for their freedom consisted in their holiness, and their power *not* to sin,—but in *spite* of their freedom. They apostatized not by virtue of their power to be holy, which constitutes the positive substance of moral freedom, but by virtue of the *possibilitas peccandi*, which was merely a negative accident attached to the positive substance of moral freedom, for purposes of probation. This negation, this power to do otherwise than they were already doing, did not add anything to their freedom, because they were voluntarily holy without it. Neither did it bring them under necessity, or force them to the act of sin. Nay, they were commanded not to use it. “Hence,” says Anselm to his pupil, “you draw a wrong inference, when you infer that because the power to sin is not an essential part of moral freedom, therefore the apostate angels and man were necessitated in the act of sin. For to sin was merely a possibility, but not a necessity. A rich man cannot be denominated poor, merely because he has the power to give away all his property; neither can the apostate angels and man be regarded as necessitated, merely because they were endowed with the power of losing their true freedom,—that is, their holy disposition and determination.” “Very well,” replies the pupil, “*before* the fall man was voluntary, but is he *after* it?” “Yes after it also,” answers Anselm. “For although he has made himself the servant of sin, yet he has not thereby

destroyed the voluntary faculty itself." His will still exists, and his sin is the unforced action of his will; but sinful activity excludes holy activity from the nature of the case. Self-motion in the direction of sin is incompatible with self-motion in the direction of holiness. At this point, Anselm enters upon an elaborate investigation of the nature and true destination of the will, in order to show yet more clearly how the apostate will may be both guilty in reference to sin, and impotent in reference to holiness.

The true end and destination of the will is not to choose *either* good or evil, but to choose good.¹ The voluntary faculty was intended by its Creator to will the right, and nothing else. Its true freedom, consequently, consists in its self-determination to holiness; in its acceptance of the one single righteous end which the Creator has prescribed to it. The notion that freedom is *caprice*, that the will is created with the liberty of indifference, and that the choice of *either* right or wrong is granted to it by the Creator, Anselm rejects. By creation, the will has no option of choosing *either* of two contrary objects, but is shut up to the choice of but one, namely, holiness. But its acceptance of this one object must be uncompelled. It must be a *self*-determination, and not a compulsion from without. If it chooses holiness *proprio motu*, by its own in-

¹ "I have set before you life and death . . . therefore choose *life*." Deut. xxx. 19.

ward self-activity, then it exercises true and rational freedom, and the power to choose an entirely contrary object like sin would not add anything to this freedom, because, by the terms of the statement, there is already a self-election of the one true and proper object.¹ On the contrary, the power to choose the wrong, when given for purposes of probation, subtracts from the perfection of voluntary freedom, because it exposes it to the hazards of an illegitimate choice. The human will, according to Anselm, was created in possession of true and rational freedom. It was *made* with a determination to the one sole proper object, with an inclination to holiness, with a choice of the right. It was

¹ An objection presents itself, here, that if the freedom of the will consists merely in the fact that it is *self*-moved, and not at all in the existence of a power to move contrarily to what it does, then must we not ascribe freedom to the animal and the plant? For the animal follows its impulses with perfect spontaneousness, and reaches its true end and destination in every instance. But, the animal does not reach the end of its creation by a real *self*-decision. It reaches it by the operation within it of a *law* of nature, under which it is created. The instincts and appetences which it obeys are merely the workings of an impersonal principle of animal life. There is no true *self*. The agency of a brute, like the

process of growth in a plant, is merely one mode in which the great law of life operates. The water falls over a dam by virtue of the law of gravitation; which law is not the water, or any rudimental part of it. Hence there is no *self*-motion in a water-fall, because the moving force is gravity, and not water. In like manner, an animal performs all its various functions and acts by virtue of the law of vitality and instinct; so that it is the *law* and not the *animal* that is the real determinant in the case. But in the instance of man, the rational ego, it is the *will* itself, and not a force or a law other than the will, and using the will as its mere instrument, which is the determiner.

not created characterless, and left to form a character subsequently. Man was "made upright," in the possession of positive rectitude, of which he was not himself the ultimate and therefore *adorable* author, but only the receptive and willing subject.¹ Hence, with respect to holiness, though there was freedom, self-decision, and the entire absence of compulsion, on the part of the will of the unfallen Adam, there was yet no absolute merit. The Creator was the primal author of man's concreated holiness, and consequently man's desert could only be of a secondary and relative species. Accordingly, the chief duty of the unfallen Adam was to keep what had been given to him by the creative act,—not to *originate* holiness, but to retain holiness. He was simply to maintain that set and bias of his will towards God and goodness with which he had been endowed by his Maker. He was not, from an undetermined, indifferent, and characterless state of his voluntary

¹ Anselm has left a treatise entitled *De casu diaboli*, in which he discusses the origin of evil in its most absolute and metaphysical aspects with a subtlety and depth that are wonderful. In this tract, he argues (c. 12) that no rational creature can put forth its first act of will of and by itself alone. Before the first volition, the creature, if we can so conceive of him, is involuntary. But no being that is in an involuntary condition can by its own isolated power start out a volition

or originate voluntariness (*nihil potest per se velle, qui nihil vult*). The first volition in a creature must therefore be referred to the Creator, and must therefore be a holy volition. From this, Anselm deduces the further position, that the will which has deserted righteousness can never of itself alone recover it. If the will cannot originate holiness at the beginning of its existence, still less can it originate it, when after its apostasy it is pre-occupied with sin. (*De casu diaboli*, c. 19.)

faculty, to originate holiness *de nihilo*; but was merely to stay where he was put, to continue just as he was made. His true freedom consisted in the unforced determination of his will to holiness, and of course the perpetuity of his freedom depended simply and solely upon his perseverance in this. And neither temptation, nor external compulsion, can force the human will out of its holy state and determination. If it leaves rectitude, it does so of its own motion. Man cannot sin against his will. So long as his will perseveres in its right decision and determination, there is no power that can force it in any other direction, and there is nothing that can force it to continue in its holiness; for the efficiency of the Holy Spirit is not a compulsory force. If it is holy, it is so by self-decision. If it is sinful, it is so by self-decision. And it is this *self*-activity, in each instance, which constitutes the substance of voluntariness. When, therefore, a holy will is exposed to temptation, as Adam's was in the garden, it is at perfect liberty, and possesses plenary power, to persist in its existing holiness, in which case it resists the temptation, or to desert its existing holiness and take a contrary choice. In both courses alike, it is *voluntary*, though not truly *free* in both, according to Anselm. If it persists in holiness, it is both voluntary and free. If it deserts its holiness, it is voluntary but not free, because freedom is the choice of the right object, and not of the wrong one.

The pupil, at this point, alludes to the very

great power which temptation has over man's will, and the great difficulty which it finds in resisting temptation, and suggests whether the will is not, after all, under a necessity of sinning. Anselm in answer replies, that it certainly cannot be a *created* and *excusable* necessity; because a holy will, such as Adam's was by creation, certainly had plenary power to continue in holiness, and therefore if it yields to temptation, and becomes sinful, it must be by its own pure and mere self-decision. But that by the exercise of this pure and mere self-will it does bring itself under a species of necessity, under a *moral* and *guilty* necessity of sinning, Anselm does not deny. And to make this plain, he distinguishes between the *faculty* of the will and the *act* of the will,—the two things being frequently confounded. As the term “vision” is sometimes employed to denote the organ of vision and sometimes the act of vision, sometimes the eye and sometimes the eyesight, so also the term “will” sometimes means a particular faculty of the human soul,—as when the soul is divided into understanding and will,—and sometimes it means the exercise of this faculty. The former is the instrument itself; the latter is the use which is made of the instrument. We remain, says Anselm, in possession of the faculty of will, even though we perform no act of will,—as, for example, when we are asleep. The voluntary faculty is always one and the same; but the acts are as various as the objects and motives by which

the voluntary faculty is influenced. When, therefore, we are speaking generally of the strength of the will, we mean by it the natural force of the faculty itself, and not any particular act of the faculty. "Suppose," says Anselm to the pupil, "that you knew a man who was strong enough to hold a wild lion so still that he could not stir, would you call this man a weak man because upon a certain time a little lamb which he was leading slipped away from him?" "No," replies the pupil, "because in this instance he did not make a right use of his strength." "Just so is it," says Anselm, "with the will. As a *faculty*, it is irresistible in the sense that no temptation can force it to yield in opposition to its own determination. It cannot be made to sin against its own choice. But the *use* which is made of the faculty, the activity of the faculty itself, is oftentimes weakening and enslaving in the highest degree; and having reference to a particular act of willing, such as the act of conversion to God, we certainly find the will powerless in the extreme. But in this case, the ground and cause of the impotence is always in the misuse, or abuse, of the original energy of the will." Anselm concludes his reply to the query of the pupil whether the will is not under a necessity of yielding to temptation and of sinning, with the strong assertion that even God himself cannot turn the will of man from the willing of right to the willing of wrong. God can reduce to nothing the entire universe which

he has created from nothing; but he cannot turn a holy will away from the right. For what is the right? Is it not that which the will *ought* to choose? And is not that which the will ought to choose that which *God* wills that it should choose? To will the right, therefore, is to will what God wills that we should will. To say, then, that God could by the exercise of his efficiency lead us, or force us, away from willing the right, would be the same as saying that God wills that we should *not* will what he himself wills that we *should* will,—in other words, that he does not will his own will. There can be nothing freer therefore, says Anselm, than the holy free will of the unfallen Adam. For there is absolutely no power out of itself, either finite or infinite, that can alter its self-determination to the right. Nothing but itself can bring this thing about. And the only connection that the Divine causality has with the origin of sin in the human will is the merely negative fact that God *does not hinder*. His agency in reference to human apostasy is merely *permissive*. He could prevent the apostasy of the holy will of Adam, because he could concur with Adam's choice of holiness in such a degree as to render Adam's relative perfection an absolute one, like his own. But he does not exert this degree of concurrence, and thus establishes for purposes of probation a possibility of apostasy, but no necessity. Whether this possibility shall become reality, God does not decide by any efficiency

of his own, but leaves wholly to the self-decision of the creature.

The will of man, thus having been created positively holy, and endowed with a plenary power of repelling all temptation, and remaining holy, it is fitting and just, continues Anselm, that if it *does* surrender its original holiness, it should then fall into the bondage of sin,—such a state of the will as disables it from the re-origination of perfect holiness. “But how,” interrupts the pupil, “can this bondage into which the will falls, in case it apostatizes, be reconciled with its continued and perpetual freedom? Can the will be both enslaved and free at one and the same time?” “Certainly,” answers the teacher; “it is always in the power of the finite will to preserve its righteousness, in case it possesses righteousness; though never in its power to originate righteousness, in case it is destitute of it. If therefore it loses its righteousness by a voluntary act, it still remains as true as ever, that it would have the power to maintain itself in righteousness, if it had righteousness, and it had righteousness by creation. Its enslavement arises not from creation, but solely from the fact that it has dispossessed itself of its original dowry of holiness. Having thus become destitute of inward holiness, it cannot, of course, do anything but sin. But this does not alter the fact, that there was no necessity of its losing its righteousness, and that if it had not lost it, it could do right as easily as it now does wrong.

An evil tree, to employ the figure of Christ, cannot bring forth good fruit; but then there was no original created necessity that the tree should be an evil one."

It will be seen from this analysis of the Anselmic anthropology, that everything is made to depend upon the primitive act of apostasy described in Genesis. The sin of man, considered as an evil *principle* or *nature*, was originated at the beginning of human history; and all the acts of individual transgression, since the act of eating the forbidden fruit, have been the developement of that principle. A total change in the moral character of human nature was made by an unforced act of self-will upon the part of Adam, whose person included the nature, and hence every individual at his very birth is characterized by original sin, or innate depravity; and as his powers unfold, he acts out this inherent sinfulness in daily life and conduct. But the whole process from first to last, according to Anselm, is *voluntary*; provided that the term be made to include the activity of the common nature, as well as the activity of the particular individual. Original sin is the self-will of human nature while in Adam, and not yet individualized. Actual sin is the self-will of this same human nature individualized in the series of its generations.

The harmony of Anselm's doctrine of Original Sin with that of Augustine is apparent. Had the anthropology of the Mediaeval Church been shaped

by the profound contemplations of Anselm, instead of the superficial speculations of Lombard,—had the archbishop of the then unknown and insignificant see of Canterbury been accepted by the Latin Church as its leader and thinker, instead of the Master of Sentences,—the history of the Western Church would have been that of a gradual purification and progress, instead of a gradual corruption and decline.¹

¹ The anthropology of Bernard and Aquinas, though not so strongly pronounced as that of Anselm, is yet in the same general direction with that of the

Augustino-Anselmic. For a good sketch of Bernard's anthropology, see HELFFERICH: *Christliche Mystik*, I. 293 sq.

CHAPTER VI.

THE PAPAL ANTHROPOLOGY.

§ 1. *Tridentine Theory of Original Sin.*

As there had been two tendencies within the Roman Catholic Church,—a stricter one inclining to the Augustinian anthropology, and a laxer one inclining to the Semi-Pelagian,—the Council of Trent adopted an ambiguous method of treating the vexed subject of original sin. The *phraseology* of their canons favors the Augustinian theory, but the exposition of the canons in the negative anathematizing clauses, and by their leading theologians, supports the Semi-Pelagian doctrine. Chemnitz,¹ after a brief specification of the Pelagianizing sentiments of many of the schoolmen, remarks, “I, for my part, should judge that these profane opinions were condemned in the *language* of the decrees [of Trent]. But Andradius, the expositor of the coun-

¹ *Examen Concilii Tridentini*, Pars I. locus iii. sectio 1. cap 1.

cil, says that ‘the decrees were composed with such ingenuity, that neither these nor similar opinions of Papal theologians respecting original sin were condemned, but were left free to be received or rejected.’” A glance at the *Canones*, and then an examination of the explanations of them, particularly by *Bellarmin*, will corroborate the remark of the learned Lutheran divine.

The Tridentine theologians give their general statement of the doctrine of Original Sin in the following terms. “If any one shall not confess that the first man Adam, when he had transgressed the command of God in paradise, lost immediately the holiness and righteousness in which he had been created, and incurred through the offence of this disobedience the wrath and indignation of God, and thus the death which God had previously threatened, and with death captivity to the power of him who has the kingdom of death, that is the devil, and that the entire Adam, both soul and body, through this transgression was changed for the worse (in deterius): let him be accursed. If any one assert that the transgression of Adam injured himself alone, and not his posterity, and that he lost the holiness and righteousness which he had received from God, for himself alone and not for us, or, that having been polluted by the sin of disobedience he transmitted death and the punishment of the body only to the whole human race, but not sin itself, which is the death of the soul, let him be ac-

cursed, because he contradicts the apostle who says : ‘ By one man sin entered into the world, and death by sin, and so death passed upon all men, in whom all sinned ’ (in quo omnes peccaverunt). If any one assert that this sin of Adam, which is one in origin, and, being transmitted by propagation not imitation, is inherent in all and belongs to each, is removable by the power of man’s nature, or by any other remedy than the merits of the only Mediator our Lord Jesus Christ . . . let him be accursed.”¹ This assertion of apostasy and need of redemption taken by itself, and with the construction which the phraseology naturally suggests, could have been accepted by the Reformers themselves.² But the doctrine of Original Sin as actually formed by the leading Roman Catholic divines evinces plainly, that this construction was not intended to be put upon it.

1. The first peculiarity in the Papal anthropology consists in the tenet, that *original righteousness is not a natural, but a supernatural endowment*. The germ of this view appears in one of the statements of the *Roman Catechism*,—a work which followed the Tridentine Canons, and is of equal authority with them in the Papal Church. “Lastly,” says the Catechism, “God formed man out of the clay of the earth, so made and constituted as to his

¹ CANONES CONCILII TRIDENTINI, Sessio V. §§ 1, 2, 3.

² The phraseology “in deteri-

us” does not necessarily teach *total* depravity, however.

material body, that he was immortal and impassible, not indeed by the force of nature itself, but by a Divine favor. But as to his soul, he formed him after his own image and likeness, endowed him with free-will, and so tempered within him all the emotions of his mind and his appetites, that they would never disobey the rule of reason. Then he *added* the admirable gift of original righteousness, and decreed that he should have the pre-eminency over other animals.”¹ Bellarmin² explains very clearly what he understands by original righteousness as a supernatural endowment; and his explanation is as authoritative as any individual opinion can be within the Papal Church. “In the first place it is to be observed that man naturally consists of flesh and spirit. . . . But from these diverse or contrary propensities, there arises in one and the same man a certain conflict, and from this conflict great difficulty of acting rightly. . . . In the second place, it is to be observed that Divine Providence, in the beginning of creation (*initio creationis*), in order to provide a remedy for this disease or languor of human nature, which arises from the nature of a material organization (*ex conditione materiae*), *added* to man a certain remarkable gift, to wit, original righteousness, by which as by a sort of golden rein the inferior part might be easily kept in subjection to the superior, and the superior to God; but the flesh

¹ CATECHISMUS ROMANUS, P. I.
Cap. ii. Q. 18.

² BELLARMINUS: *Gratia primi hominis*, c. v.

was thus subjected to the spirit, so that it could not be moved so long as the spirit was unwilling, nor could it become a rebel to the spirit unless the spirit itself should become a rebel to God, while yet it was wholly in the power of the spirit to become or not to become a rebel to God. . . . We think that this rectitude of the inferior part was a *supernatural* gift, and that, too, intrinsically, and not accidentally, so that it neither flowed nor could flow from the principles of nature (*ex naturae principiis*)."¹

Upon examining this statement, it will be found to conflict with the Latin anthropology. Man as created is a synthesis of body and soul; but the two *are in antagonism at creation*. Creation is thus imperfect. The addition of the original righteousness, which is not a part of the *creative* act, is requisite in order that the higher shall obtain the victory over the lower nature, and the creature be made perfect. It is true that this supernatural endowment is bestowed "*initio creationis*,"—still the work of creation proper does not include it, but this is super-added, in the phrase of Bellarmin, "to provide a remedy for the *disease* or *languor* of human nature." The Papal idea of creation, therefore, differs from the Augustinian, in that it involves imperfection. We have seen that the Latin anthropology regards man as created with a will that is holy, and which thereby possesses entire domination over the lower

¹ By this Bellarmin means, that over the flesh could not issue such a domination of the spirit from anything in the "flesh."

physical and bodily nature. It also teaches that the physical nature by creation has in it nothing corrupt or imperfect. Original righteousness, according to Augustine's theory, enters into the very idea of man as coming from the hands of the Creator. It is a part of his created endowment, and does not require to be superadded. The work of the Creator is perfect, and needs no improvement. There is no "disease" or "languor" in it. But in the Papal anthropology, man as he comes from God, is imperfect. He is not created sinful indeed, but neither is he created holy. To use the Papal phrase, he is created *in puris naturalibus*; without positive righteousness, and without positive unrighteousness. The body is full of natural carnal propensities, and tends downward. The soul as rational and immortal tends upward. But there is no harmony between the two *by creation*. An act subsequent to that of creation, and additional to it, is necessary to bring this harmony about; and this is that act by which the gift of original righteousness is *superadded* to the gifts of creation. In and by this act, the higher part is strengthened to acquire and maintain dominion over the lower, and a positive perfection is imparted to human nature that was previously lacking in it. Original righteousness is thus, in reference to the created and natural characteristics of man, a *supernatural* gift.

2. The second peculiarity in the Papal anthro-

pology consists in the tenet, that *apostasy involves the loss of a supernatural, but not of a natural gift*. By the act of transgression, human nature lapses back into that condition of conflict between the flesh and the spirit in which it was created. In losing its original righteousness, therefore, it loses nothing with which it was endowed by the *creative* act, but only that superadded gift which was bestowed subsequently to this. The supremacy of the higher over the lower part is lost by the Adamic transgression, and the two parts of man, the flesh and the spirit, fall into their *primitive* and *natural* antagonism again. Original righteousness being a supernatural gift, original sin is the loss of it, and in reality the restoration of man to the state in which he was created. Original sin brings man back again to a negative condition, in which he is neither sinful nor holy. It is a state of conflict, indeed, between the flesh and the spirit; but the flesh has nothing in it which was not created in it, and nothing that does not naturally and necessarily belong to the flesh as such. And the spirit, in like manner, contains only its own intrinsic characteristics. So that the conflict is one that arises from the nature of things, or by creation itself, and not from any act of apostasy on the part of man. Here appears another marked point of difference between the Papal and the Latin anthropology. The latter does not concede that *by creation and the nature of things*

the flesh must be in conflict with the spirit.¹ It regards this as a relic of the Gnostic idea of matter and of a fleshly organism. On the contrary, the Augustinian anthropology maintains that the "flesh" as it comes from the creative hand contains nothing corrupt or disordered in it. It is a just tempering and mixture, which is in perfect harmony with the higher laws of mind and of God. If, therefore, there is ever found to be a conflict between the flesh and the spirit, this is proof positive that some change, some disorder, has been introduced into the flesh by the action of the spirit itself. Corruption begins in the spirit or will itself, and descends into the sensuous and bodily parts. The Augustinian anthropology regards the conflict between the flesh and the spirit, as a consequence and evidence of an apostasy. The Papal anthropology, on the contrary, considers it as the primitive and natural condition in which man was created, and which required to be remedied by the addition of a supernatural gift.

3. A third characteristic, consequently, of the Papal anthropology is that it *does not regard original sin as truly and properly sin*. This follows necessarily from the position that human nature is not created with holiness, but that holiness is a su-

¹ "Sed in corpore vitae illius, ubi homo, nisi peccasset, non erat moriturus, alius procul dubio status fuit: unde aut nulla ibi, aut talis, qualis nunc est, libido non fuit, qua caro contra spiritum concupisceret; ut ei necesse esset aut subjugari, aut reluctari." AUGUSTINUS: Op. imperf. cont. Julianum, lib. V. (Vol. X. p. 1449, Ed. Migne.)

pernatural endowment specially bestowed after the act of creation proper is complete. For the loss of this endowment simply puts man back to the negative and characterless position upon which he stands by creation. But this cannot be a position of guilt and sin properly so called. If so, then God creates man in a sinful state. Original sin, according to the Tridentine theologians, is, indeed, a conflict between the flesh and the spirit, between the body and the mind. It is a state of corruption, and of inordinate physical desires. But this is not a state of sin and guilt. This conflict is necessary from the nature of the case. For by *creation*, the flesh is inordinate, and the spirit is weak. It is not until something subsequent to creation is bestowed,—viz.: the supernatural gift that subdues the lower to the higher part,—that righteousness or positive moral character exists. That act, therefore, whereby this righteousness is lost, the act of original transgression, is not one that plunges man into guilt proper, but only into corruption or an inordinate and ungoverned condition of the lower nature,—which inordinate condition belongs to the flesh by creation, just as the properties of matter belong to matter by creation. Hence, Bellarmin remarks that “the state of man after the fall of Adam differs no more from the state of man as created *in puris naturalibus* [i. e. previous to the bestowment of the supernatural gift of original righteousness], than a man originally naked differs from one who was once clothed, but

has been stripped of his clothing; neither is human nature any worse if we except the guilt of the act of transgression in eating the forbidden fruit, than it was made by God, nor does it labor under any more ignorance or infirmity than it labored under as created *in puris naturalibus*. Hence, the corruption of nature results, not from the subtraction of any gift belonging to nature by *creation*, nor from the addition to it of any evil quality, but solely from the loss of a supernatural gift which was over and above the gifts of nature.”¹ In conformity with this, the Council of Trent decide that indwelling sin in the regenerate is not properly sin. After stating that concupiscence (*concupiscentia vel fomes*) remains in the baptized, they add that “this concupiscence, which the apostle sometimes denominates sin (Rom. vi. 12, vii. 8), the holy synod declares the catholic church never understood to be called sin because it is really and truly sin in the regenerate, but because it is from sin, and inclines to sin.”²

§ 2. *The Tridentine Theory of Regeneration.*

Holding such views of the nature of original sin, it was logical that the Tridentine theologians should combat the doctrine of human impotence, and the

¹ BELLARMINUS: De gratia primi hominis, c. v.

² CANONES TRIDENTINI: Sessio V.

helpless dependence of the apostate will upon the Divine efficiency in order to its renewal. They adopt the theory of synergism in regeneration, and defend it with great earnestness. "If any one," say the Tridentine Canons, "shall affirm that the free will of man was lost, and became extinct, after the sin of Adam. . . . let him be accursed. If any one shall affirm that the free will of man, moved and excited by God, co-operates nothing by assenting to God thus exciting and calling, so that it *disposes and prepares itself* for obtaining the grace of justification, but like some inanimate object does nothing at all, but is merely passive, let him be accursed. If any one shall affirm that all works that are performed before justification, from whatever reason they are done, are really and truly sins, and merit the displeasure of God, or that the more a man endeavors to dispose himself for grace, the more does he sin, let him be accursed. If any one shall affirm that the sinner is justified by faith alone, in the sense that nothing else is requisite which may co-operate to the attainment of the grace of justification, and that the sinner does not need to be prepared and disposed by the motion of his own will, let him be accursed."¹

There was no part of the anthropology of the Reformers which the divines of Trent opposed with more vehemence, than the monergistic theory of re-

¹ CANONES TRIDENTINI: Sessio VI. Canones iv. v. vii. ix.

generation. The theory that man cannot co-operate efficiently in the regenerating act was, and is to this day, represented by the Papal theologians as fatalism. This is the charge made by Bellarmin, and by Möhler.

CHAPTER VII.

ANTHROPOLOGY OF THE REFORMERS.

§ 1. *Lutheran-Calvinistic Theory of Original Sin.*

THE Reformers constructed the doctrines of Sin and Regeneration after the same general manner with Augustine and Anselm; so that the somewhat minute account which we have given of the Augustinian and Anselmic anthropologies renders a detailed representation of the Protestant anthropology unnecessary. The principal Lutheran and Calvinistic symbols agree in their definitions of sin and grace, and from them we shall derive our account.

The leaders of the Protestant Reformation reëffirmed, in opposition to the Papal anthropology, the Augustinian doctrine that original sin is truly and properly sin, and also that it was committed in Adam. The *Augsburg Confession* is explicit respecting the guilt of original sin, in the following terms. "The churches teach that after the fall of Adam, all men propagated according to ordinary

generation, are born with sin, that is without the fear of God, without trust in God, and with concupiscence (*ἐπιθυμία*), and that this disease (*morbis*) or original depravity (*vitium originis*) is truly sin, damning, and bringing eternal death upon those who are not regenerated by baptism and the Holy Spirit. They also condemn the Pelagians and others, who deny this original depravity to be sin.”¹ The explanatory defence of the Augsburg Confession, which goes under the name of the *Apologia*, explains what the authors of this Confession meant by their assertion that original sin is “concupiscence.” “Some persons assert that original sin is not a depravity (*vitium*) or corruption in the nature of man, but only a *condition* of servitude or mortality which the descendants of Adam come into without any proper and personal guilt. Furthermore, they assert that no one is under condemnation to eternal death on account of original sin. It is as when slaves are born of a slave woman, and come into this servile condition without any fault of their nature, but through the misfortune of their mother.”² In opposition to this view, we have made mention of concupiscence, and have called it desire, to indicate that the *nature* of man is born corrupt and vitiated.”³

¹ HASE: Libri Symbolici, pp. 9, 10.

³ HASE: Libri Symbolici, p. 50 sq.

² This was ZUINGLE's view; see History of Symbols.

The Papal opponents of the Reformers had converted the doctrine of original sin into the doctrine of original evil, and had defined original sin as *fomes*,—not sin itself, but the fuel of sin; not the depravation of the will, but the corruption of the sensuous nature only. Taking this merely physical theory of the Adamic sin, they had gone so far as to raise the questions: “What is the particular quality of the body in which this *fomes* consists; was it contracted from eating the apple (*contagio pomi*), or from the breath of the serpent; and can it be cured by medicines?” Alluding to these notions, Melanchthon, the author of the Apology, remarks that the “scholastic doctors” bury up the real matter in discussion. “When they speak of original sin, they do not specify the greater and graver faults of human nature,—namely, ignorance of God, contempt of God, destitution of the fear of God and of trust in Him, hatred of the government of God, terror at the justice of God, anger against God, despair of God’s favor, reliance upon things visible.”¹ It is this class of sins which the Symbol has in view, when it speaks of original sin, and which it sums up under that term and name.

The same view of original sin is taught with yet greater decision and particularity, in the *Formula Concordiae*. This symbol carries out the doctrines of the Augsburg Confession to their logical results,

¹ HASE: Libri Symbolici, p. 52.

and is the best expression of scientific Lutheranism. After distinctly rejecting the view of Flacius, which made original sin to be the substance of the human soul, and after asserting that sin in all its forms is the soul's agency and not the soul's essence, the Formula Concordiae affirms, that "Christians ought not only to acknowledge and define actual faults and transgressions of the commands of God to be sins, but they ought also to regard that hereditary disease (*morbis*) by which the whole nature of man is corrupted, as a specially dreadful sin, and, indeed, as the first principle and source of all other sins, from which all other transgressions spring as from their root." The first position in the statement of the doctrine of original sin, according to the Formula Concordiae, is that "this hereditary evil is guilt (*culpa*) or crime (*reatus*); whence it results that all men, on account of the disobedience of Adam and Eve, are odious in the sight of God, and are by nature the children of wrath, as the apostle testifies." ¹

The same view of original sin was adopted by the Calvinistic division of the Protestants. *Calvin* defines original sin to be "an hereditary pravity and corruption of our nature, diffused through all the parts of the soul, *rendering us obnoxious to the Divine wrath*, and producing in us those works which the Scripture calls 'works of the flesh.'

¹ HASE: Libri Symbolici, pp. 639, 640.

And this is, indeed, what Paul frequently denominates ‘*sin* ;’ while the works which proceed thence, such as adulteries, fornications, thefts, hatreds, murders, revellings, he calls the ‘fruits of sin,’—though they are also called ‘sins’ in many passages of Scripture, and even by himself. This thing, therefore, should be distinctly observed: namely, that our nature being so totally vitiated and depraved, we are, on account of this very corruption, considered as convicted, and justly condemned in the sight of God, to whom nothing is acceptable but righteousness, innocence, and purity. And this liability to punishment arises not from the delinquency of another; for when it is said that the sin of *Adam* renders us obnoxious to the Divine judgment, *it is not to be understood as if we, being innocent, were undeservedly loaded with the guilt of his sin*; but, because we are all subject to a curse, in consequence of his transgression, he is therefore said to have involved us in guilt. Nevertheless, we derive from him, *not the punishment only, but also the pollution to which the punishment is justly due*. Wherefore Augustine, though he frequently calls it the sin of another, the more clearly to indicate its transmission to us by propagation, yet at the same time also asserts it properly to belong to every individual. And the apostle himself expressly declares, that ‘death has therefore passed upon all men, for that all have sinned,’—that is, *have been involved in original sin*. And therefore infants themselves, as they bring

their condemnation into the world with them, are rendered obnoxious to punishment by *their own* sinfulness, not by the sinfulness of another. For though they have not yet produced the fruits of their iniquity, yet they have the seed of it within them. . . . Whence it follows that this native depravity is properly accounted sin in the sight of God, *because there could be no guilt without crime.*"¹

Calvin does not examine the metaphysical grounds for the imputation of the Adamic sin, so fully as do Augustine and Anselm. But the extract cited above involves the doctrine of the unity of the race in the primitive apostasy. It teaches that original sin is not a mere individual sin, but is common or generic; otherwise, the individual "being innocent" would be "undeservedly loaded with the guilt of a sin not his own," and foreign to him. We derive from Adam, "not the *punishment* only, but also the *pollution* to which the punishment is justly due."

The clearest and most explicit statement of the doctrine of original sin in its relations to the Adamic connection, that was made in any of the Calvinistic symbols of the 16th and 17th centuries, is found in the *Formula Consensus Helvetici*. This creed sustains the same relation to the Calvinistic system that the Formula Concordiae does to the Lutheran. It is confined to the doctrines of original sin and

¹ CALVIN : Institutes, II. i.

grace, and upon these subjects makes statements that are more exhaustive and scientific than are found in any of the other creeds drawn up by the Reformed or Calvinistic theologians. It was composed by the distinguished Swiss divines *Heidegger*, *Turretine*, and *Geneler*, primarily to oppose a particular theory of original sin and election which was obtaining some currency, and which these theologians regarded as a deviation from genuine Calvinism. In order to a proper understanding of the positions of the Formula, it is necessary to give a brief account of this theory.

In the year 1640, *Joshua Placæus*, a distinguished theologian of Saumur, in the west of France, published the theory,¹ that God cannot justly, and therefore does not actually, impute Adam's sin itself to his posterity, but only the consequences of that sin. And inasmuch as punishment follows imputation, God cannot justly and does not actually punish Adam's sin itself in the posterity, but only the consequences of that sin,—viz.: the corruption of nature resulting from it, and transmitted by propagation. The apostatizing *act* itself was the act of the individual Adam simply and solely. The posterity, therefore, did not participate in it, and therefore it could not be *immediately* imputed to them as guilt. But the *conse-*

¹ PLACÆUS : Theses theologici de statu hominis lapsi ante gratiam ; followed by Disputationes de imputatione primi peccati Adami.

quences of that individual apostatizing act of Adam,—viz.: the corruption of the whole nature, issuing from it and transmitted to the posterity,—are imputed to them. This imputation of the effects of Adam's act of apostasy, Placaeus denominated “mediate;” while the imputation of the apostatizing act itself, or of the cause of these effects, he called “immediate.” “If,” says Placaeus, “by the first sin of Adam, his first actual sin be meant, and not his habitual sin which followed it, then imputation must be distinguished into *immediate* or *antecedent*, and *mediate* or *consequent*. The first imputation occurs immediately, that is without the medium of any corruption. The last imputation occurs mediately, that is through the medium of hereditary and inward corruption. The former precedes inward and hereditary corruption, in the order of nature; the latter follows it. The former is the cause of inward and habitual corruption; the latter is the effect.” Placaeus rejects the former, and admits the latter.¹

In opposition to this theory of “mediate” imputation, the Formula Consensus makes the following statements. “As God entered into a covenant of works with Adam, not only for himself *but also with the whole human race in him as the head and root*, so that the posterity who were to be born of him would inherit the same integrity with which he was

¹ MÜNSCHER-VON CÖLLN-NEUDECKER: Dogmengeschichte, III. 438. TURRETTIN: Institutes, IX. ix. 5, 6.

created, provided he should continue in it; so Adam by his sad fall sinned not for himself only, *but for the whole human race* who were to be born 'of blood and the will of the flesh,' and lost the blessings promised in the covenant. We are of opinion, therefore, that the sin of Adam is imputed to all his posterity by the secret and *just* judgment of God. For the apostle testifies that 'In Adam all have sinned. By the disobedience of one man many were made sinners;' and, 'In Adam all die' (Rom. v. 12, 19; 1 Cor. xv. 21, 22). *But it does not appear how hereditary corruption, as spiritual death, could fall upon the entire human race by the just judgment of God, unless some fault (delictum) of this same human race (ejusdem generis humani), bringing in the penalty of that death, had preceded. For the most just God, the judge of all the earth, punishes none but the guilty.* Wherefore man, previous to the commission of any single or 'actual' transgression, is exposed to the divine wrath and curse from his very birth (*ab ortu suo*), and this in a twofold manner; first, on account of *the transgression (παράπτωμα) and disobedience which he committed in the loins of Adam*; and secondly, on account of the hereditary corruption inherent in his conception, which is the consequence of this primitive transgression, and by which his whole nature is depraved and spiritually dead. Thus it appears that original sin, by a strict discrimination, is twofold, and consists of the imputed guilt of Adam's

transgression and the inherent hereditary corruption consequent upon this. For this reason, we are unable to assent to the view of those who deny that Adam represented his posterity by the ordinance of God, and, consequently, deny that his sin is *immediately* imputed to them, and who, under the notion of a 'mediate' and consequent imputation, not only do away with the imputation of the first sin, but also expose the doctrine of innate and hereditary corruption itself to grave peril."¹

According to this statement of Turretine and Heidegger, mediate imputation must rest upon immediate; and *both* imputations must be asserted. They did not consider it conformable to justice, to impute an effect without imputing the cause. The posterity could not properly be regarded as guilty for their inward corruption of heart and will, unless they were guilty for that primal Adamic act of apostasy which produced this corruption. It does not appear reasonable, they say, that a corrupt nature should be transmitted and imputed to the universal race of mankind, "*unless some fault*" (delictum), some voluntary and culpable act, "of this same human *race* had preceded." The attempt, therefore, of Placaeus, to sever the inherited de-

¹ FORMULA CONSENSUS HELVETICI, X.-XII. (Niemeyer's Collectio, p. 733). —TURRETINE also asserts both imputations in his Institutes, upon two grounds,

viz.: the *natural* union between Adam and his posterity, and the *political* or *forensic* union whereby he is "the representative of the whole human race."

pravity from the Adamic act of apostasy, to impute the effect but not the cause of the effect, appeared to them in the highest degree illogical. More than this, it brought the doctrine of innate depravity itself into "grave peril." For, according to the theory of "mediate imputation," moral corruption together with temporal and eternal death come upon the posterity, while yet the posterity have no part in that primitive act of apostasy which is the originating cause, and sole justifying reason of this very corruption and death. The justice of the Divine procedure, according to Turretine and Heidegger, is imperilled by a method that permits the misery and corruption that issue from an act of sin to fall upon a posterity who do not participate in that act, and are innocent of it. The Adamic sin itself must, therefore, be imputable to the posterity, in order to legitimate the imputation of its consequences. And, furthermore, this act, they imply, must be imputed upon *real* and not nominal grounds. The imputation of Adam's sin must not be a "gratuitous" imputation, for this would yield only a "gratuitous" condemnation. Righteousness may be imputed when there is no righteousness; but sin cannot be imputed when there is no sin. "David describeth the blessedness of the man unto whom God *imputeth righteousness* without works: saying, Blessed are they whose *iniquities are forgiven*, and whose *sins are covered*. Blessed is the man to whom the Lord *will not impute sin*" (Rom.

iv. 6-8). The imputation of righteousness when there is no inherent and real righteousness, according to this explanation of St. Paul, is simply the forgiveness of iniquity, or the non-imputation of sin. It is a gratuitous imputation, and a gratuitous justification. But when Placaeus proposed to carry the doctrine of a gratuitous imputation, such as holds true of Christ's righteousness, over to Adam's sin, and proposed to impute the Adamic guilt without any real and inherent demerit upon the part of the posterity, in the same manner that the righteousness of Christ is imputed without any real and inherent merit upon the part of the elect, Turretine and Heidegger opposed him. The doctrine of a gratuitous justification is intelligible and rational; but the doctrine of a gratuitous damnation is unintelligible and absurd. Hence the Formula Consensus taught that "man previous to the commission of any single or 'actual' transgression, is exposed to the divine wrath and curse from his very birth, . . . first, on account of the transgression and disobedience *which he committed in the loins of Adam.*" The posterity must be really, and not fictitiously, in the person of the progenitor, in order that they may be "immediately" and justly charged with a common guilt.¹

¹ The Swiss theologian STAPPER and the elder EDWARDS have been represented as adopting the Saumur theory of imputation, that is, as affirming the imputation of

the corruption of the nature, but denying the imputation of the first act of apostasy. The late Principal CUNNINGHAM so represents Stapper in his "Reformers

§ 2. *Lutheran-Calvinistic Theory of Regeneration.*

The leading Protestant symbols adopt the Augustinian view of regeneration, and particularly of the impotence to good of the apostate will. One

and the Reformation" (p. 384). But this seems to be an error. The following extract from Stapfer, which Edwards quotes with approbation (Original Sin, Works II. 484. New York Ed.), is sufficient to prove that he held to the imputation of *both* the Adamic sin and its consequences "Our opponents contend with us chiefly on this account: that according to our doctrine of original sin such an imputation of the first sin is maintained, that God without any regard to universal native corruption esteems all Adam's posterity as guilty, and holds them liable to condemnation purely on account of that sinful act of their first parent; so that they, without any respect to their own sin, and so as innocent in themselves, are destined to eternal punishment. I have, therefore, ever been careful to show that our opponents do injuriously suppose *those things to be separated*, in our doctrine, which are *by no means to be separated*. The whole of the controversy which they have with us about this matter evidently arises from this: that they suppose the mediate and the immediate imputation are

distinguished one from the other, not only in the manner of conception, but in reality. And hence they conceive of imputation as immediate only, and abstractly from the mediate; while our divines suppose that *neither one ought to be conceived of separately from the other*. Therefore, I choose not to use any such distinction, or to suppose any such thing [as a separation of the two], in what I have said on the subject; but have only endeavored to explain the thing itself, and to reconcile it with the divine attributes. And therefore I have everywhere *conjoined both of these conceptions* concerning the imputation of Adam's first sin as inseparable, and judged that one ought never to be considered separately from the other. [And although I have abstained from using the distinction, I have nevertheless implied *both kinds of imputation* in my statements, nor have I in fact departed from the opinion of our divines, or from that of the apostle Paul."] This last clause in brackets is omitted in Edwards's quotation from Stapfer. See STAPFERUS: Institutiones, Cap. xvii. § 78. Op. IV. p.

of the most striking characteristics of the anthropology of the first Protestant theologians is the marked difference which they find between the un-

562. Ed. Tiguri, 1745. EDWARDS is equally explicit in affirming the imputation of both the Adamic transgression and its consequences. In the opening of his treatise "On Original Sin," he remarks as follows: "By original sin, as the phrase has been most commonly used by divines, is meant the innate sinful depravity of the heart. But yet when the doctrine of original sin is spoken of, it is vulgarly understood in that latitude as to include not only the *depravity of nature*, but the *imputation of Adam's first sin*; or in other words, the liableness or exposedness of Adam's posterity, in the divine judgment, to partake of the punishment of that sin. So far as I know, *most of those who have held one of these have maintained the other*; and *most of those who have opposed one have opposed the other*; both are opposed by the author (Taylor) chiefly attended to in the following discourse, in his book on Original Sin; and it may, perhaps, appear in our future consideration of the subject, that they are closely connected, and that *the arguments which prove the one establish the other*, and that *there are no more difficulties attending the allowing of one than the other.*"—The views of STAP-

FER respecting the voluntariness of original sin are expressed in the following objections and replies. "*Objection*: In order that any action may be called sin, it must be free and voluntary, for whatever occurs compulsorily, or in unconsciousness and without our consent and will, cannot be regarded and imputed to us as sin. But if we are corrupt by birth, the consent of our will is excluded. Hence, corruption by birth cannot be held to be sin, or imputed to us as such. *Reply*: In the first place, there is ample room for such a voluntary consent, in the instance of birth-sin. For the human race is to be regarded as one moral person, which person in Adam its head, not its natural merely but also its federal head, made a covenant with God, and in so doing gave consent to all those things which Adam as a public person stipulated and performed for himself and all his posterity. But where there is consent there is a place for will and liberty; and where these are, there can be transgression of the law and sin. In the second place, if man is born corrupt, and is such from the first moment of his existence, he also sins spontaneously; but in being a spontaneous transgressor of the

fallen and the fallen Adam, or between man by creation and man by apostasy. Man as created has plenary power to be perfectly holy. Man as apostate is destitute of this power. According to Luther and Calvin, the loss of power to good is one of the inevitable effects of sin, so that sin might be defined to be an inability to holiness. Hence they refuse to attribute to fallen man those gifts and energies of unfallen humanity which they held to have been lost in and by the voluntary act of apostasy. After this act of self-will, which is subsequent to the creative act, they concede to man no power to become spiritually perfect and holy. The utmost to which he is competent, without renewing grace, is acts of external morality. "The churches," says the *Augsburg Confession*, "teach that the human will has a certain liberty sufficient for attaining morality (civilis justitiam), and choosing things that appear reasonable. But it has not the power, without the Spirit of God, to attain holiness or spiritual righteousness, because the carnal man cannot (*οὐ δύναται*) know spiritual things (1 Cor. ii. 14). Augustine says this in the same words (*Hypognosticon*, lib. iii.), 'We acknowledge that free will is in all men; that it has indeed a rational judgment by means of which it is able to begin and finish, without God's grace, not those things which pertain to God, but those works that relate to this present

law, he consents to that corruption, and thus it is also his own sin." STAPFERUS : *Institutiones*, Cap. XVI. § 58, 59.

life,—the good as well as the bad. The good, I say ; meaning those which are in their place right and proper: e. g. : to choose to work in the field, to choose to eat and drink, to choose to have a friend, to choose to have clothes, to choose to build a house, to marry a wife, to learn an art, or whatever allowable and proper thing it may be that pertains to the present life.’ The churches also condemn the Pelagians and others who teach that without the Holy Spirit, by natural powers (*naturae viribus*) alone, we are able to love God supremely.”¹ Consonant with these statements of the Augsburg Confession, is the following from the *Apology*. “The human will is able, after a certain sort (*aliquo modo*), to attain civil righteousness, or the righteousness of works: It is able to converse about God, to render to God an external worship, to obey magistrates and parents in externals, to keep the hands from murder, adultery, and theft. . . . We concede, therefore, to the will of man the power to perform the external works of the law, but not the inward and spiritual works,—as, for example, to truly revere God, to truly trust in God, to truly know and feel that God regards us with pity, hears our prayers, and pardons our sins, &c. These are the genuine works of the first table of the law, which no human heart is able to perform without the Holy Spirit, as Paul says (2 Cor. ii. 14): ‘The natural man, that is man using

¹ HASE: *Libri Symbolici*, p. 15.

only his natural powers, perceiveth not the things of God.' ”¹ The *Formula Concordiae*, the symbol of High Lutheranism, teaches that “before man is illuminated, converted, regenerated, and drawn by the Holy Spirit, he can no more operate, co-operate, or even make a beginning towards his conversion or regeneration, with his own natural powers, than can a stone, a tree, or a piece of clay.”² *Luther's* expressions respecting the impotence of the sinful will are marked by his usual decision and boldness. At the Leipsic Disputation, he compared man to a saw in the hand of the workman; and in his commentary upon Genesis xix. he says: “In spiritualibus et divinis rebus, quae ad animae salutem spectant, homo est instar statuae salis, in quam uxor patriarchae Loth est conversa; imo est similis trunco et lapidi, statuae vita carenti, quae neque oculorum, oris, aut ullorum sensuum cordis usum habet.” In his work *De servo arbitrio*, written against Erasmus, he compares the divine exhortations to obedience addressed to men, to the irony of a parent who says ‘Come now,’ to a little child, although he knows that he cannot come.³

The Reformed or Calvinistic division of the Protestants were equally positive and clear, in their as-

¹ HASE: Libri Symbolici, pp. 218-219.

² HASE: Libri Symbolici, p. 662.

³ Compare also LUTHER: On Galatians ii. 20.

sertion of the bondage of the apostate will, and of the monergistic theory of regeneration.

The *First Helvetic Confession*, an important Calvinistic symbol drawn up under the influence of Bullinger, makes the following statement. "We attribute free will to man in this sense, viz.: that when in the use of our faculties of understanding and will we attempt to perform good and evil actions, we are able to perform the evil of our own accord and by our own power, but to embrace and follow out the good, we are not able, unless illuminated by the grace of Christ, and impelled by his Spirit. For it is God who works in us to will and to do, according to his good pleasure; and from God is salvation, from ourselves perdition."¹ The *Second Helvetic Confession*, drawn up entirely by Bullinger, is yet more explicit and detailed upon the subject of regeneration, and the relations of the human will to it. It considers the state of man in three respects: first, his state before his fall; second, his state after his fall; third, the nature of his agency in regeneration. Its language is as follows: "Man before the fall was upright (*rectus*) and free; he was able to remain holy, or to decline into evil. He declined to evil, and involved in sin and death both himself and the whole race of men. Next, we must consider the condition of man after the fall. The intellect of man was not taken away by the fall, neither was he

¹ NIEMEYER: *Collectio*, pp. 116, 117.

robbed of his will and changed into a stock or stone ; but his intellect and will were so changed and enfeebled (*imminuta*), that they cannot any longer perform what they could before the fall. The intellect is darkened, and the will has been converted from a free into an enslaved faculty. For it is the servant of sin ; not unwillingly, but willingly. For it is still a will, and not a nill (*voluntas, non noluntas dicitur*). Hence, in respect to sin, man is not coerced either by God or by Satan, but does evil of his own voluntariness (*sua sponte*) ; and in this respect exercises the freest possible choice. But in respect to holiness, the intellect of man does not of itself rightly judge concerning divine things. The scripture requires regeneration in order to salvation. Hence our first birth from Adam contributes nothing to our salvation. Paul says, ‘The natural man perceiveth not the things of the Spirit of God, for they are foolishness unto him ; neither can he know them, because they are spiritually discerned.’ The same apostle asserts, that ‘we are not sufficient of ourselves to think any good thing as of ourselves ; but our sufficiency is of God.’ But it is evident that the mind or intellect is the guide and leader of the will ; if therefore the guide is blind, it is easy to see how far the will also is affected. Wherefore, there is no free will to good in an unrenewed man ; no strength for acting holily. Our Lord, in the Gospel says : ‘Verily, verily, I say unto you, whosoever committeth sin is the servant of

sin.' And the apostle Paul asserts that 'the carnal mind is enmity against God ; for it is not subject to the law of God, neither indeed can be.' In the third place, we are to consider whether the regenerate have free will, and how far (an regenerati sint liberi arbitrii, et quatenus). In regeneration, the intellect is enlightened by the Holy Spirit, so that it apprehends the mysteries and will of God. And the will itself is not only changed (*mutatur*) by the Spirit, but is strengthened in its energies (*instruitur facultatibus*), so that it spontaneously wills and performs the good. Unless we concede this we deny Christian liberty, and bring in legal servitude. The prophet (Jer. xxxi. ; Ezek. xxxvi.) represents God as saying : 'I will put my law in their inward parts, and write it in their hearts.' Our Lord (John vii.) also says : 'If the Son make you free, ye shall be free indeed.' Paul, also, says to the Philippians (Phil. i. 29) : 'Unto you it is given in the behalf of Christ, not only to believe on him, but also to suffer for his sake ;' and again (Phil. i. 6) : 'I am confident that he which hath begun a good work in you, will perfect (*ἐπιτελέσει*) it until the day of Jesus Christ ;' and again (Phil. ii. 13) : 'It is God which worketh in you, both to will and to do.'"

Respecting man's agency in regeneration, the Second Helvetic Confession teaches that the human activity is the effect of the Divine activity. "The regenerate," says this creed, "in the choice

and working of that which is good, not only act passively, but actively also (*regeneratos in boni electione et operatione, non tantum agere passive, sed active*). For they are acted upon by God, that they themselves may act what they do act (*aguntur enim a Deo, ut agant ipsi, quod agant*). Rightly does Augustine adduce the fact that God is styled our helper (*adjutor*). But no one can be helped, except as there is activity in him (*nequit autem adjuvari, nisi is, qui aliquid agit*). The Manichaeans despoil man of all activity, and make him as a stock or stone.”¹

By the above phrase “acting passively,” the formers of this creed appear to mean, that the sinful will, in relation to the strictly *renewing* agency of the Holy Spirit, is recipient, or is acted upon, while yet it is a *will* and not a stone; and by “acting actively,” they mean that as a consequence of this passivity it becomes spontaneously active in holiness. The regenerating energy does not find or leave the human will inert and lifeless, like a stock or stone, but makes it willing and energetic to good, with the same energy and intensity with which it had been willing and energetic to evil.

¹ NIEMEYER : *Collectio in locis*.

§ 3. *Melanchthon's Synergism.*

Melanchthon took a leading part in the construction of the Augsburg Confession and the Apology; both of which asserted the Augustinian doctrine of original sin, and the monergistic theory of regeneration. But when the difficult points involved in the doctrine of grace and regeneration came to be discussed among the Protestants, and the Calvinistic division, in particular, asserted the helplessness of the human will with great energy, and emphasized the tenet of election and predestination, Melanchthon receded somewhat from his earlier opinions, and adopted a species of synergism. He expressed his views in a revised form of the Augsburg Confession, which goes under the name of the *Variata*, and in his important theological manual, entitled *Loci Communes*. Instead of explaining regeneration as Luther and Calvin did, and as he himself did when the Augsburg Confession was drawn up, as the effect of the Divine efficiency simply and solely, he asserts that “concurrunt tres causae bonae actionis, verbum Dei, Spiritus Sanctus, et humana voluntas assentiens nec repugnans verbo Dei.” The human soul, according to Melanchthon, though apostate, yet retains an appetency faint and ineffectual, yet real and inalienable, towards the spiritual and the holy. Into this seeking, or faint striving (*clinamen*) in the right direction, the grace

of God enters, and brings it to a result. This form of synergism, though the nearest to monergism of any, because it reduces down the human factor to a minimum is, yet, not the monergism of Luther and Calvin. Hase, who is certainly not biassed in favor of monergism, remarks that "the synergism emanating from Melanchthon may be regarded as a remote tendency to Pelagianism ; first, in that the co-operation of man toward his own change of character (Bessrung) appears to be founded upon natural endeavors, and not upon the inward operation of the Holy Spirit ; and secondly, in that the non-resistance of the sinner at the commencement of the change of heart is represented as a positive active concurrence of will." ¹

§ 4. *Zuingle's Doctrine of Original Sin.*

The only one of the leaders of the Protestant Reformation who did not accept the Augustinian doctrine of original sin was *Zuingle*. This active and energetic mind seems to have inclined to that theory, prevalent in the second and third centuries, which we have designated by the general name of the Greek anthropology, and which reappeared in Semi-Pelagianism. But the opinions of *Zuingle* upon original sin were confined to the circle of his

¹ HASE: *Hutterus Redivivus*, p. 275. See further extracts in MÜNSCHER-VON CÖLLN-NEUDECK-
ER: *Dogmengeschichte*, III. 428. Compare *History of Symbols*, *su-
vra.*

own personal influence, and did not spread like those of Luther and Calvin through the Protestant churches. They were not adopted into any symbol, and did not constitute the foundation of any ecclesiastical body.

Zuingale sent a statement of his theological sentiments to the diet at Augsburg in 1530, where so many religious parties were represented. It is entitled Zuingale's *Fidei Ratio*, and from it we extract the following representation of his views of original sin. "I think this in regard to original sin. That is properly sin which is transgression of the law ; for where no law is there is no transgression ; and where there is no transgression there is no sin properly so called,—that is to say, so far as by sin is meant wickedness, crime, villainy, or guilt. I acknowledge, therefore, that our first father sinned a sin that is truly sin,—that is, wickedness, crime, and turpitude. But those who are generated from that person did not sin in this manner,—for what one of us bit with his teeth the forbidden apple in Paradise ? Hence, whether we will or no, we are compelled to admit that original sin, as it is in the posterity of Adam, *is not truly sin*, in the sense already spoken of ; for it is not a crime committed against law. Consequently, it is properly speaking a disease and condition. A *disease*, because as Adam fell from love of himself, so also do we fall. A *condition*, because as he became a slave, and obnoxious to death, so also we are born slaves

and children of wrath, and obnoxious to death . . . Adam died, on account of sin, and being thus dead, that is sentenced to death, in this condition [status] he generated us. Therefore we also die,—so far as he is concerned, by his fault and culpability; but so far as we are concerned, by our condition and disease, or, if you prefer, ‘sin,’—but sin improperly so called. Let us illustrate by an example. A man is taken captive in war. Upon the ground of his own personal hostility to his captors, and treachery towards them, he deserves to be made a slave, and is so held. Now they who are born of him in this condition are slaves,—not by virtue of their own fault, guilt, or crime, but by virtue of their condition [status], which condition is the consequence of the guilt of their father, who had deserved to come into it by his individual fault. The children in this instance are not laden with crime itself, but with the punishment, fine, loss, or damage of crime,—that is, with a wretched condition of servitude.”¹

The difference between this view, and that of the Lutheran and Calvinistic symbols from which we have quoted, is plain. So far as the *will* is concerned, Zuingli does not hold the doctrine of the Adamic unity, and hence he cannot concede from his position the doctrine of a common apostasy and guilt. The Adamic transgression, according to the Zuinglian theory, was only nominally and by a mental fiction the transgression of the posterity, and hence

¹ NIEMEYER : Collectio, pp. 20, 21.

the sinfulness of it when attributed to the posterity, is only nominal. At the same time, he left unanswered that question which drove Augustine towards the theory of Traducianism, viz.: Why are the posterity of Adam, who by the supposition are entirely innocent of Adam's act of apostasy, visited with all the dreadful temporal and eternal consequences of that act? For Zuingle expressly says that the posterity, though guiltless of the primitive act of apostasy, are "born slaves, and *children of wrath*, and obnoxious to death."

CHAPTER VIII.

THE ARMINIAN ANTHROPOLOGY.

§ 1. *Arminian theory of Original Sin.*

THE Protestant Reformation reinstated, we have seen, the Augustinian anthropology. Both the Lutheran and Calvinistic creeds teach the doctrines of the Adamic unity, both as to soul and body, of the imputation of the original act of apostasy to all men and the guilt of original sin, and of monergism in regeneration.

The *Arminians* were a Protestant party who receded from this dogmatic position of the first Reformers, and made some modifications of the doc-

¹ For sources see : ARMINIUS : Opera (translated by Nichols) ; EPISCOPIUS : Opera, Ed. Roterdami, 1665 ; LIMBORCHUS : Theologia Christiana ; BRANDT : History of the Reformation in the Low Countries, Vol. III. ; JEREMY TAYLOR : On Original Sin ; JOHN TAYLOR : On Original Sin ; WHITBY : On Original Sin ; OWEN : Display of Arminianism ; EDWARDS : On Original Sin ; HALLAM : Literature of Europe, Vol. II. (Harpers' Ed.).

trines of sin and grace which were in the direction of the Greek anthropology and the Semi-Pelagianism of the Ancient Church, though not identical in every respect.

The clearest and most particular statement of the Arminian system, in its first form, is found in the *Confession or Declaration*¹ drawn up by Episcopius, and in the *Apology* which he subsequently composed in explanation and defence of it. The writings of Arminius, although they do not furnish any formal creed-statement, nevertheless throw much light upon the process by which Arminianism was gradually formed by a mind that had been trained up under Beza, and had reacted from his supra-lapsarianism.

The Arminian anthropology accepts the doctrine of the Adamic unity, and states it in substantially the same phraseology with the Lutheran and Calvinistic symbols; but it *explains* the phraseology very differently from them. The language of the *Confession or Declaration*,² upon this subject, is the

¹ Confessio sive Declaratio Remonstrantium; Apologia pro Confessione. EPISCOPIUS: Opera II. Ed. Roterdami, 1665.

² The statement of ARMINIUS is also very closely similar in phraseology to that of the Calvinistic symbols. "The whole of this [Adamic] sin, however, is not peculiar to our first parents, but is common to the entire race and to all their posterity, who, at the

time when this sin was committed, were in their loins, and who have since descended from them by the natural mode of propagation, according to the primitive benediction. For in Adam 'all have sinned.' Wherefore, whatever punishment was brought down upon our first parents, has likewise pervaded, and yet pursues all their posterity. So that all men 'are by nature the chil-

following. "Adam together with Eve transgressed the law of God. By this transgression, man, in accordance with the divine threatening, was made liable to eternal death and manifold miseries, and was deprived of that primitive felicity which he had received in creation . . . But since Adam was the stem and root of the whole human race . . . he involved all his posterity who, as it were (quasi), had been shut up in his loins and were to issue from him by natural generation, in the same death and misery, and implicated them with himself, so that all men, indiscriminately, the Lord Jesus Christ alone being excepted, through this one single sin of Adam (*per hoc unicum Adami peccatum*) have been deprived of that primitive felicity, and have lost that true righteousness which is necessary in order to eternal life, and thus are born even now exposed to that death which we have mentioned, and to manifold miseries. And this is commonly denominated original sin. *In respect to which, nevertheless, the doctrine must be held, that the most benevolent God has provided for all a remedy for that general evil which was derived to us from Adam, free and gratuitous in his beloved Son Jesus Christ, as it were a new and another Adam. So that the hurtful error of those is plainly apparent, who are accustomed to*

dren of wrath,' obnoxious to condemnation, and to temporal as well as to eternal death." ARMI-

NIUS : Disputatio VII. (Nichols' translation, I. 486).

*found upon that [original] sin the decree of absolute reprobation, invented by themselves."*¹

The doctrine of Redemption seems to be brought to view in the above statement, in such a connection as to imply, that the evil which has come upon the posterity of Adam is of the nature of a misfortune, and not of a fault. It is not a sin that intrinsically merits eternal reprobation, so that God would have been just had he provided no redemption from it. Mankind are indeed subject to loss by their connection with the progenitor, but the Divine compassion has granted a compensation in the method of salvation.

Hence, when this phraseology respecting the Adamic connection and sin comes to be interpreted in the *Apology*, we find that the Arminian theologians hold original sin to be original *evil* only, and not guilt. The following extracts from the careful explanation given by Episcopius show this. "The Remonstrants do not regard original sin as sin properly so called, which renders the posterity of Adam deserving of the hatred of God ; nor as an evil which by the method of punishment properly so called (*per modum proprie dictae poenae*) passes from Adam to his posterity ; but as an evil, infirmity, injury (*infirmetas, vitium*), or by whatever other name it may be called, which is propagated to his posterity by Adam devoid of original righteousness.

¹ CONFESSIO REMONSTRANTIUM: Caput VII.

Whence it results, that all the posterity of Adam, destitute of the same righteousness, are wholly unfit for, and incapable of attaining eternal life,—either to return of themselves into favor with God, or to discover a way whereby they may return,—except God by his new grace go before them, and restore as well as supply (*restituat ac sufficiat*) new strength by which they can attain it. And this the Remonstrants believe to have been signified by the expulsion of Adam from paradise, the type of heaven. For this calamity (*calamitas*) happened not only to Adam, but was common with him to all the posterity of Adam. But that original sin (*peccatum originis*) is not evil in any other sense than this,—that it is not evil in the sense of implying guilt and desert of punishment (*malum culpae, aut malum poenae*),—is plain. It is not evil in the sense of implying guilt, because to be born is confessedly an involuntary thing, and therefore it is an involuntary thing to be born with this or that stain (*labes*), infirmity, injury, or evil. But if it is not an evil in the sense of implying guilt, then it cannot be an evil in the sense of desert of punishment; because guilt and punishment are correlated . . . So far, therefore, as original sin is an evil, it must be in the sense in which the Remonstrants define the term; and is called original *sin* by a misuse of the word ‘sin’ (*καταχρηστικῶς*). And this was the very sentiment of Zuingle,—at least that which he at first asserted,

and defended; whether he afterwards retracted it, is not certain.”¹

In defining the doctrine of imputation, the author of the *Apology* denies that the posterity were one with Adam in the primal act of apostasy, and, consequently, affirms that the Adamic transgression cannot be imputed to the posterity as truly and properly their sin. “The Remonstrants acknowledge that the sin of Adam may be said to be imputed to his posterity, so far forth as God has willed that the posterity of Adam should be born subject to the same evil to which Adam subjected himself by his sin,² or, so far forth as God has permitted the evil, which had been inflicted upon Adam as a punishment, should flow and pass over to his posterity [not as *punishment*, but as propagated evil]. *But there is no ground for the assertion, that the sin of Adam was imputed to his posterity in the sense that God actually judged the posterity of Adam to be guilty of, and chargeable with (reos), the same sin*

¹ *Apologia pro Confessione Remonstrantium*, Cap. VII. in EPISCOPIUS: Opera II.

² Yet this “evil,” according to the statement in the *Confessio sive Declaratio*, is “eternal death, together with manifold miseries.” Eternal death, therefore, falls as punishment upon Adam, and as evil but not punishment upon the posterity. In the *Apology*, it is taught that temporal death, or the death of the body, is not di-

rectly a part of the penalty threatened to Adam. The body of Adam was mortal by creation, but in case he had not sinned, death would not have befallen it, by reason of a divine prevention, —“mortem homini primo naturalem fuisse, sed mortem, quae naturalis homini futura fuisset, non eventuram homini fuisse divino beneficio, nisi peccaret.” *APOLOGIA*, Cap. VII.

and crime (culpa) which Adam had committed. Neither scripture, nor truth, nor wisdom, nor divine benevolence, nor the nature of sin, nor the idea of justice and equity, allow that they should say that the sin of Adam was thus imputed to his posterity. Scripture testifies that God threatened punishment to Adam *alone*, and inflicted it upon Adam *alone*; the Divine benevolence, veracity, and wisdom, do not permit that one person's sin should be imputed, strictly and literally, to another person; it is contrary to the nature of sin, that that should be regarded as sin, and be properly imputed as sin, which was not committed by individual will (*propria voluntate*); it is contrary to justice and equity, that any one should be charged as guilty, for a sin that is not his own, or that he should be judged to be really guilty who in respect to his own individual voluntariness is innocent, or, rather, not guilty. And the injustice is the greater, in proportion as the punishment which follows the imputation is severer. Consequently, it is the height of injustice, when the penalty is an eternal suffering."¹ Arminius, also, in his *Apology* or *Defence*, remarks: "It may admit of discussion, whether God could be angry on account of original sin which was born with us, since it seems to be inflicted upon us by God as a punishment of the actual sin which had been committed by Adam, and by us in him [putatively or nominally,

¹ *Apologia pro Confessione Remonstrantium*, Cap. VII.

i. e.] . . . I do not deny that it is sin, but it is not *actual sin* . . . We must distinguish between actual sin and that which is *the cause of other sins*, and which on this very account may be denominated ‘sin.’”¹ In further proof of the position, that the hereditary evil which is transmitted by propagation does not render the soul worthy of eternal damnation, as it would if it were really and properly sin, the *Apology* makes the following statement respecting the character of infants: “The Remonstrants decide with confidence, that God neither will, nor *justly can*, destine to eternal torment any infants who die without actual and individual sins, upon the ground of a sin which is called ‘original,’ which is said to be contracted by infants by no individual fault of theirs, but by the fault of another person, and which is believed to be theirs for no other reason than that God wills arbitrarily to impute it to them. This opinion is contrary to the Divine benevolence, and to right reason; nay it is uncertain which is greater, its absurdity or its cruelty.”

These extracts are sufficient to prove that the Arminian theologians did not believe that the unity between Adam and his posterity, which they asserted in their *Confession or Declaration*, was of such a nature as to make the first sinful act of Adam a common act of mankind, and thereby justify the imputation of original sin as truly and properly sin.

¹ ARMINIUS : Works by Nichols, I. 374.

Though employing the Augustinian phraseology respecting the Adamic connection, they put a different interpretation upon it from that which is found in both Lutheran and Calvinistic symbols. Their objection to the doctrine that original sin is guilt, proceeds upon the assumption that Adam's act of apostasy was purely *individual*, and that the posterity were not in the progenitor in any such real sense as the phraseology of their own doctrinal statements, if taken in its strict and literal acceptance, would imply.

§ 2. *Arminian Theory of Regeneration.*

The Arminian anthropology also accepts the doctrine of the impotence to good of the apostate will, and states it in substantially the same phraseology with that of the Lutheran and Calvinistic symbols ; but it makes *explanations* and *modifications* that bring it into conflict with some fundamental positions of the Reformers upon this subject.

The *Confession or Declaration* of the Remonstrants makes the following statement: "Man has not saving faith from himself, neither is he regenerated or converted by the force of his own free will ; since, in the state of sin, he is not able, of and by himself, to think, will, or do any good thing,—any good thing that is saving in its nature, particularly conversion and saving faith. But it is necessary that he be regenerated, and wholly renewed,

by God in Christ, through the truth of the gospel and the added energy of the Holy Spirit,—in intellect, affections, will, and all his faculties,—so that he may be able (*possit*) rightly to perceive, meditate upon, will, and accomplish that which is a saving good.”¹ This taken by itself, and understood in its literal obvious sense, would express the monergism of Augustine, Anselm, and the Reformers; but a *theory of grace* is associated with it that differs essentially from theirs. This theory is presented in the following extract from the *Confession*: “Although there is the greatest diversity in the degrees in which grace is bestowed in accordance with the Divine will, yet the Holy Spirit confers, or at least is ready to confer, upon all and each to whom the word of faith is ordinarily preached, as much grace as is sufficient for generating faith and carrying forward their conversion in its successive stages. Thus, sufficient grace for faith and conversion is allotted not only to those who actually believe and are converted, *but also to those who do not actually believe, and are not in fact converted.* . . . So that there is no decree of absolute reprobation.”² This view of grace is synergistic. Every man that hears the gospel receives a degree of grace that is sufficient for regeneration. If, therefore, he is not regenerated it must be from the want of some *human* efficiency to co-operate with the Divine; and therefore the differ-

¹ *Confessio sive Declaratio*,
Cap. XVII.

² *Confessio sive Declaratio*,
Cap. XVII.

ence between the saved and the lost, the elect and the non-elect, is ultimately referable to the human will. So far as the divine influence is concerned, the saved and lost stand upon the same position, and receive a degree of grace that is sufficient to save. But the former makes the grace effectual by an act of his own will; while the latter nullifies it by the same method. According to the monergistic theory, on the contrary, no man receives a grace that is sufficient for regeneration who does not receive such a degree of Divine influence as overcomes his hostile will; so that regeneration is not conditioned upon any human efficiency, but is the result of a sovereign and irresistible energy. The dependence upon grace, in regeneration, in the Arminian anthropology, is *partial*; in the Calvinistic anthropology, is *total*. "Grace," says Limborch,¹ "is not the *solitary*, yet it is the *primary* cause of salvation; for the co-operation of free will is due to grace as a primary cause; for unless the free will had been excited (*excitatum*) by prevenient grace, it would not be able to co-operate with grace." Here the influence of grace upon the will is that of excitation or stimulation, and not of renovation. Hence Limborch can properly denominate the will's activity, *co-operation*. The faculty is inert and sluggish, as distinguished from averse and hostile, and hence it can co-work in its own regeneration.

¹ Theologia Christiana, Lib. IV. cap. xiv. § 21.

The doctrine of human inability and divine grace is still further modified by the Arminian theologians, by the position that *God cannot demand faith irrespective of the bestowment of grace*. This is very explicitly asserted by Arminius, in his answer to the question: ‘Can God, now, in his own right, require from fallen man faith in Christ, which he cannot have of himself? Or does God bestow on all and every one, to whom the gospel is preached, sufficient grace by which they may believe if they will?’ This was one of ‘Nine Questions’ that were presented to the professors of divinity in the university of Leyden, for the purpose of obtaining their views; and to it Arminius gave the following reply: “The parts of this question are not opposed to each other; on the contrary they are in perfect agreement. So that the latter clause may be considered as giving the reason, why God may require from fallen man faith in Christ which he cannot have of himself. For God may require this, *since he has determined to bestow on man sufficient grace by which he may believe*. Perhaps, therefore, the question may be thus stated: ‘Can God, now, in his own right, demand from fallen man faith in Christ which he cannot have of himself, though God neither bestows on him, nor is ready to bestow, sufficient grace by which he may believe?’ *This question must be answered by a direct negative*. God cannot by any right demand from fallen man faith in Christ which he cannot have of himself,

except God has either bestowed, or is ready to bestow, sufficient grace by which he may believe if he will.”¹

This doctrine that the obligation to faith does not rest upon fallen man irrespective of the aids of the Holy Spirit grew logically out of the Arminian definition of original sin. The inherited corruption has indeed brought man into such a condition that he cannot renew and save himself; but his corruption is an ‘infirmity’ or ‘injury’ and not a sin and fault. It is physical evil, and not culpable transgression. It is the result of Adam’s *individual* act of apostasy, and not of an agency common to him and his posterity. The disability, therefore, under which man labors at birth is a misfortune, and not a crime. Original sin is not guilt. As a consequence, it is no more than equitable, that God should furnish a grace that shall be a sufficient assistance to overcome the inherited evil. In accordance with this view, the *Apology* of the Remonstrants teaches that God grants a common grace to the heathen, which if rightly used is sufficient to secure moral virtue and salvation. The argument is as follows: “In order that an act may be morally good, it is sufficient if it accords with right reason, —i. e., if it proceeds from a mind which, though it be ignorant of the written law and the gospel, is really actuated by a desire for virtue, honesty, and probity, and does not intend to do anything con-

¹ ARMINIUS : Works by Nichols, I. p. 383.

trary to the divine will, and is not influenced by vain glory and self-love. For that a morally good act does not necessarily include the distinct intention to do only that which the written law or gospel commands,—viz.: the positive desire to promote the divine glory, and faith in Christ,—is evident from the nature of the case; for there have been many in every age, and still are to this day, who never even heard of the written law and gospel, who, nevertheless, no one would venture to deny, were and are morally good and virtuous (*quos tamen moraliter bonos ac virtuosos esse aut fuisse, nemo facile negaverit*).” In answer to the objection drawn from the text: “Without faith it is impossible to please God,” the *Apology* explains this to refer to a *special* divine approbation, such as was shown to Enoch in his translation. It has no general reference. Again, the text: “Whatsoever is not of faith is sin,” does not refer to justifying faith, but to sincerity and confidence in the mind.¹ With this, accords the following statement of Limborch, who ranks with Episcopius as authority in the estimation of the Dutch Arminians. The question is asked: Are all those who are destitute of the knowledge of the gospel to be numbered among the lost, upon the ground that they have no means whereby they can attain to eternal life? To this Limborch answers: “This does not appear at all conformable to truth. . . . On the contrary, if certain

¹ *Apologia Remonstrantium*, Cap. VI. EPISCOPIUS: Opera II. 146.

[pagans], in proportion to the measure of strength granted to them through that grace which is common to all men, strive after natural uprightness (*honestati naturali operam dent*), we believe that they also are pleasing to God (*Deo gratos esse*), in proportion to the kind of life they lead, nor are certainly excluded from salvation, and at the very least are not to be adjudged to eternal fire.”¹

Such being the Arminian theory of original sin and regeneration, it was natural and logical that the Arminian statement of the doctrine of predestination and election should also differ from that of Augustine and Calvin in a very marked degree. Arminius's first doubts in respect to the Calvinism in which he had been educated took their origin in this part of the system. Beza, under whom he had studied theology, had adopted the *supra-lapsarian* statement of the doctrine of predestination, which renders the doctrine more austere and repelling than the *infra-lapsarian*² representation. In his reaction, he, and his followers after

¹ *Theologia Christiana*, Lib. IV. cap. ii.

² *Supra-lapsarianism* holds, that the decree to eternal bliss or eternal woe precedes, in the order of nature, the decree to apostasy; *Infra-lapsarianism* holds that it succeeds it. According to the *Supra-lapsarians*, the primary decree is to bliss or woe; and the decrees to create men, that they

shall apostatize, and from this apostasy some be recovered and some reprobated, are merely the means of accomplishing the primary decree. According to the *Infra-lapsarians*, the decrees to create men, and that they shall apostatize, are prior to that of election and reprobation; because men are elected from out of a state of sin and ruin, or else are

him, adopted a theory of election and predestination which differs essentially from that of the Reformers, and from the Augustinian. It is the theory of *conditional election*; or of election upon the ground of a foreseen faith.

Arminius's views are explicitly stated by himself, in his *Declaration of Sentiments*, which he delivered before the States of Holland in 1608, and are as follows: "The first decree of God concerning the salvation of man is that by which he decreed to appoint his Son, Jesus Christ, for a Mediator. The second decree of God is that by which he decreed to receive into favor *those who repent and believe* . . . but to leave in sin, and under wrath, all impenitent persons and unbelievers. The third divine decree is that by which God decreed to administer, in a sufficient and efficacious manner, the *means* which were necessary for repentance and faith. The fourth divine decree is that by which God decreed to save and damn certain particular persons. This decree has its foundation in the foreknowledge of God, by which *he knew from all eternity those individuals who would believe through his preventing grace, and through his subsequent grace would persevere*, . . . and by which foreknowledge, he likewise knew those who would not believe and persevere." ¹

reprobated in it. Election supposes apostasy as a fact. The Synod of Dort favoured Infra-lapsarianism, in opposition to Go-

mar, who endeavoured to commit the Synod to Supra-lapsarianism.

¹ ARMINIUS: Works by Nichols, I. 247.

Upon examining this phraseology it will be found to teach that the decree of election is not a decree to *originate* faith in the sinner, but to *reward* faith in him. So far as the production of faith itself is concerned, the electing decree only furnishes the "means" which are necessary for repentance and faith. The efficiency that is to use these means is partly the energy of the Holy Spirit,—implied in the administration of the means "in a sufficient and efficacious manner,"—and partly the energy of the human will. By this last, the decree of election is conditioned. God decrees to bestow salvation upon those who make the "means" which he bestows, and the degree of divine influence which he grants, actually efficacious by their own self-decision.¹

§ 3. *Recapitulation.*

A recapitulation of the principal characteristics of the Arminian anthropology, as derived from the original sources, gives the following particulars :

1. The Arminians, in the controversy with the Calvinists, asserted that original sin is not guilt; and that a decree of reprobation to eternal punishment could not be founded upon it.² 2. The Arminians

¹ Compare History of Symbols.

² "The Synod rejects the error of those who teach that it is not true that original sin of itself is

sufficient to condemn the whole human race, and merits temporal and eternal punishment." Canones Synodi Dordrechtanae,

held that original sin does not include a sinful inclination of the will ; it is an inherited corruption whose seat is the physical and intellectual parts, but not the voluntary.¹ 3. The Arminians asserted that by reason of original sin, man of himself is unable to be morally perfect and holy ; but inasmuch as the inherited corruption which is the cause of this inability is involuntary, the inability is a misfortune and not a fault, and therefore man is not obligated to be morally perfect without the renewing grace of the gospel. 4. Adam's act of apostasy was purely individual, and therefore cannot be imputed to his posterity as guilt. 5. The will of man, though not competent to perfectly obey the law of God without the assisting influence of the Holy Spirit, is competent to co-operate with that assistance.² 6. The influence of the Holy Spirit is granted upon condition that the human will concurs and co-works.

Cap. III. IV. NIEMEYER: Collectio, p. 717.

¹ "The synod rejects the error of those who teach that spiritual gifts are not lost from the *will* of man in spiritual death, because the will was never corrupted in itself, but is only impeded by the darkness of the intellect and the inordinate appetites of the flesh : which impediments being removed, the will is able to exert its innate freedom,—that is, of itself, either to will or to choose, or not to will or not to choose whatever good is set before it." Ca-

nones Syn. Dordrecht. NIEMEYER: Collectio, p. 713.

² "The synod condemns the error of those who teach that grace and free will are each partial and concurrent causes at the commencement of conversion ; that grace does not precede the efficiency of the will in the order of causality,—that is, that God does not efficiently aid (*juvare*) the will of man to conversion, before the will itself moves and determines itself." Canones Synodi Dordrechtanae, NIEMEYER: Collectio, p. 715.

The success of the divine influence depends upon the use which man makes of his own will ; consequently, election is conditional upon a foresight that a particular man will co-operate with the Holy Spirit.

CHAPTER IX.

TOTAL SURVEY OF THE HISTORY OF ANTHROPOLOGY.

A REVIEW of the ground we have gone over in Anthropology will help to generalize, and classify, the materials which we have thus collected from the various sources and authorities.

In the *first* place, the doctrines of sin and grace, in their more difficult and scientific aspects, did not seriously engage the attention of the Church during the first three centuries after the closing of the New Testament Canon. No controversy arose respecting original sin and regenerating grace, until the opening of the 5th century. The Church, both East and West, generally held the doctrine of an inherited corruption as distinguished from an inherited guilt, the doctrine of synergistic regeneration, and was silent upon the doctrine of election and predestination. *Secondly*. At the same time, in these first centuries, previous to the Pelagian controversy, there were two tendencies at work, that had reference to the

doctrine of original sin. One was, to convert the doctrine of inherited corruption or evil, into that of inherited guilt. The other was, to abolish the doctrine of inherited corruption altogether. The first tendency reached its terminus in Augustinianism; the second in Pelagianism. *Thirdly.* The theory of Pelagius, which rejected the doctrine of original sin in any definition of it, was condemned by the whole Church, East and West. This left within the Church two main currents of opinion in anthropology,—that of the 2d and 3d centuries, and that of Augustine; or, the Greek and Latin Anthropologies. The first was the doctrine of inherited evil but not inherited guilt, with its logical corollaries. The last was the doctrine of inherited guilt, with its logical results. *Fourthly.* The Augustinian anthropology was rejected in the East, and though at first triumphant in the West, was gradually displaced by the Semi-Pelagian theory, or the theory of inherited evil, and synergistic regeneration. This theory was finally stated for the Papal Church, in an exact form, by the Council of Trent. The Augustinian anthropology, though advocated in the Middle Ages by theologians like Gottschalk, Bede, Anselm, Odo, and Bernard, slumbered until the Reformation, when it was revived by Luther and Calvin, and opposed by the Papists. *Fifthly.* After Protestantism had become established, the old antagonism between the two theories of inherited guilt and inherited evil, again revived in the Calvinistic and Arminian

controversy, and has perpetuated itself down to the present time,—the whole of modern evangelical Christendom being ranged partly upon one side, and partly upon the other side of the line that separates these two systems.

The opposing currents of opinion in Anthropology, then, have been the following. In the *Ancient Church*, the Greek and Latin anthropologies in their more general forms prevail at first, and gradually pass over into the more distinct statements of Augustinianism and Semi-Pelagianism,—Pelagianism being rejected by both parties. In the *Mediaeval Church*, Semi-Pelagianism has sway, with the exception of some influential minds. At the *Reformation*, the Protestants re-instate Augustinianism, and the Papists maintain the mediaeval Semi-Pelagianism. In the *Modern Church*, the Calvinists re-affirm the positions of the first Protestant symbols, while the Arminians recede from them towards the Semi-Pelagian theory,—both parties alike rejecting the Socinianism which had come into existence, and which corresponds to the Pelagianism of the Ancient church.

BOOK FIFTH.



HISTORY

OF

SOTERIOLOGY.

LITERATURE.

ANSELMUS : Cur Deus Homo ?

PETAVIUS : De theologicis dogmatibus, Liber XII.

BELLARMINUS : Disputationes de controversiis fidei adversus hujus temporis haereticos.

GERHARDUS : Loci Theologici, Tom. IV.

CANONES CONCILII TRIDENTINI : in locis.

GROTIUS : Defensio fidei catholicae de satisfactione.

LIMBORCH : Theologia Christiana, Liber III.

SOCINUS : Praelectiones Theologicae, Cap. XVI.-XVIII.

HOOKE : On Justification.

DAVENANT : Disputatio de justitia (translated by Allport).

OWEN : On Justification.

MAGEE : On Atonement and Sacrifice.

BAUR : Versöhnungslehre.

MÖHLER : Symbolik (translated by Robertson).

BAUR : Der Gegensatz des Katholicismus und Protestantismus.

EVANGELISCHE KIRCHENZEITUNG, 1834 : Geschichtliches aus der Versöhnungs-und Genugthuungslehre.

HASSE : Anselm von Canterbury, Bd. II.

REDEPENNING : Origenes.

CHAPTER I.

SOTERIOLOGY OF THE ANCIENT CHURCH.

§ 1. *Preliminary Statements.*

IN presenting the history of the Doctrine of Atonement, we shall use the term in its strict signification, as denoting the *expiatory* work of Christ. Soteriology has sometimes been made to include the subjects of Christology and the Incarnation in such a manner that the distinctively peculiar agency of the Redeemer constitutes only a very subordinate part of this division of Dogmatic History. The doctrinal history of Petavius¹ furnishes a striking example of this. This writer treats of the work of Christ under the general head of the Incarnation. While the entire work comprises sixteen books, each containing upon an average fifteen chapters, the sacrificial work of Christ is briefly discussed in one, or at most in two,² of the chapters of the twelfth

¹ PETAVIUS: De theologicis dogmatibus.

² Chapters VI. and IX.

book. This was owing partly to the fact that the *Person* of Christ, in this history of ecclesiastical opinions, was far more in the eye of the historian, than the *work* of Christ; and partly because the distinctively Protestant doctrine of vicarious satisfaction was not very much a matter of interest for the strenuous though learned Jesuit. While, therefore, the history of the Arian and Sabellian heresies, and of the Monophysite and Monothelite controversies, is thoroughly written, and drawn from the immediate sources, the opinions of the apostolic, patristic, and scholastic periods, respecting the relations of the work of Christ to Divine justice, are exhibited in a very meagre and unsatisfactory manner.

Taking the term atonement in its technical signification, to denote *the satisfaction of Divine justice for the sin of man, by the substituted penal sufferings of the Son of God*, we shall find a slower scientific unfolding of this great cardinal doctrine than of any other of the principal truths of Christianity. Our investigations in this branch of inquiry will disclose the fact, that while the doctrines of Theology and Anthropology received a considerably full development during the Patristic and Scholastic periods, it was reserved for the Protestant church, and the Modern theological mind, to bring the doctrines of Soteriology to a correspondent degree of expansion.

§ 2. *Gnostic and Ebionite Theories of the Atonement.*

During the first two centuries, the Christian theologian was led to investigate the doctrine of the work of Christ, either by the attacks of heretics, or the defective statements of pretended believers. As in the history of the doctrine of the Trinity, we found exact statements to be forced upon the church by the inaccurate statements of false teachers, so we shall see in the history of the doctrine of Atonement, that the truth received its scientific development no faster than the Christian mind was urged up either to a defensive, or a polemic position, by the activity of the heretic or the latitudinarian. There were two heretical views of the Atonement, during the first two centuries, which, inasmuch as they affected the true view of the work of Christ, gave direction to the orthodox statements of it. These were the *Gnostic* and the *Ebionite*.

Gnosticism appeared in two forms, and broached two theories respecting the Person and work of Christ. That of Basilides (A. D. 125) affirmed only a human suffering in the Redeemer, which was not expiatory, for two reasons: first, because as merely human it was finite, and inadequate to atone for the sins of the whole world of mankind; and, secondly, because the idea of substituted penal suffering is inadmissible. Penal suffering, or suffering for pur-

poses of justice, Basilides maintained, of necessity implies personal criminality in the sufferer, and therefore can never be endured by an innocent person like Christ. 'The principle of *vicarious substitution*, in reference to justice, is untenable.' The Gnosticism of Marcion (A. D. 150) affirmed a divine suffering in the Redeemer, which however was only apparent, because the Logos having assumed a docetic, or spectral human body, only a seeming suffering could occur. This suffering, like that in the scheme of Basilides, could not of course be expiatory.¹ It was merely emblematical,—designed to symbolize the religious truth, that man in order to his true and highest life must die to the earthly life. The *Ebionite* denied any connection between man and God in the Person of the Redeemer, other than that which exists in the life of any and every man. Rejecting the doctrine of expiation altogether, he occupied the position of the Jew, whom Paul so constantly opposes, and insisted upon a purely legal righteousness.

If now we examine these Gnostic and Judaizing theories, we find that they agree in one capital respect,—viz.: in the rejection of the Scripture doctrine of a real and true *expiation* of human guilt. The Gnostic and the Ebionite, though differing

¹ "For Thou hadst not forgiven me any of these things in Christ: nor had He abolished by His cross the enmity which by my sins I had incurred. For how could He,

by the crucifixion of a *phantasm*, which I believed Him to be?" AUGUSTINE: Confessions, V. ix. 16.

much in their general notions respecting the Person of Christ, both agreed in regard to his atoning work. Both alike rejected the doctrine of *atone-ment*, in the strict and proper meaning of the term, as signifying the satisfaction of justice.

§ 3. *Soteriology of the Apostolic Fathers.*

The first endeavour of the orthodox mind, in opposition to these heretical opinions, was, consequently, to exhibit the nature and purpose of the sufferings and death of Christ. So far as their nature is concerned, they were uniformly and distinctly affirmed to be the sufferings and death of a theanthropic Person,—i. e., 'a being in whom Deity and humanity were mysteriously blended in the unity of a single personality.' With respect to their purpose, the point with which we are more immediately concerned, we shall find less distinctness in the earlier than in the later periods of the history of this doctrine; yet at the same time, an unequivocal statement that the purpose of Christ's death is judicial, and expiatory of human guilt.

In the writings of the *Apostolic Fathers*, we obtain the views of the Church upon the doctrine of the Atonement during the first half century after the death of the last inspired apostle (A. D. 100–150). Examining them, we find chiefly the repetition of Scripture phraseology, without further attempt at an explanatory doctrinal statement. There

is no scientific construction of the doctrine of Atonement in the writings of these devout and pious disciples of Paul and John; yet the idea of vicarious satisfaction is distinctly enunciated by them. *Polycarp* († 168), the pupil of John, writes in his Epistle to the Philippians: "Christ is our Saviour; for through grace are we righteous, not by works; *for our sins, he has even taken death upon himself*, has become the servant of us all, and through his death for us our hope, and the pledge of our righteousness. The heaviest sin is unbelief in Christ; his blood will be demanded of unbelievers; for to those to whom the death of Christ, *which obtains the forgiveness of sins*, does not prove a ground of justification, it proves a ground of condemnation."¹ "Our Lord Jesus Christ suffered himself to be brought even to death *for our sins*; . . . let us, therefore, without ceasing, hold steadfastly to him who is our hope, and the earnest of our righteousness, even Jesus Christ, 'who *bare our sins* in his own body on the tree.'"¹ *Ignatius* († 116), the pupil of John, is perhaps somewhat less urgent than Polycarp, in respect to the point of vicarious satisfaction. He seems more inclined to consider the work of Christ in reference to the sanctification than the justification of the believer. It is a favourite view with him, that the death of Christ brings the human soul into communion with Christ. It is the means

¹ POLYCARPUS: Ad Philippos, 1, 8.

of imparting that principle of spiritual life which was lost in the fall. Christ's redemptive work is a manifestation of love, of self-denying and self-imparting affection on the part of the Redeemer, by which a corresponding affection is wrought in the heart of the believer. And yet the *expiatory* agency of Christ is explicitly recognized by Ignatius. In one passage, he speaks of Christ as the One "who gave himself to God, *an offering and sacrifice for us.*" In another place, he bids believers to "stir" themselves up to duty, "*by the blood of God.*" In another place, he remarks that "if God had dealt with us according to our works, we should not now have had a being;" but that now under the gospel, we "have peace *through the flesh, and blood, and passion of Jesus Christ.*"¹ In *Barnabas*, the pupil of Paul, we find a clear expression of the atoning agency of the Redeemer. Such phraseology as the following contains the doctrine of justification as distinguished from sanctification: "The Lord endured to deliver his body to death, that we might be sanctified *by the remission of sins which is by the shedding of that blood.*"² *Clement of Rome*, a disciple of Paul, in his First Epistle to the Corinthians speaks, generally, more of Christ's work than of other parts of the Christian system, and dwells particularly upon his death. The view of Christ's sufferings, he says,

¹ IGNATIUS: Ad Ephesos, 1; Ad Magnesios, 10; Ad Trallios (Preface).

² BARNABAS: Epistola, 5.

consumes pride, teaches us humility, and draws us to the death of penitence (c. 7). Hence it is a chief sign and duty of a Christian continually to have the death of Christ before his eye. His meaning in this, says Dorner, is not merely that Christ has presented us an example of humility and patience, though this thought is not foreign to Clement (c. 16); but his death is the principle, or efficient cause of true repentance,—i. e., works that repentance which in faith receives actual forgiveness of sins. For “his blood was given for us, was poured out for our salvation; *he gave, by the will of God, his body for our body, his soul for our soul*” (c. 49). Every explanation of these passages, continues Dorner, is forced, which does not find in them the idea of vicarious substitution, and this not merely in the sense of a subjective disposition, like that which led Christ to suffer for the good of others, but an objective work producing objective results, in reference to the Divine nature and government.¹ Hence, the name so frequently given to Christ in the Epistle to the Hebrews of “high priest” is very common in Clement. The following extracts exhibit the distinctness with which Clement discriminated justification from sanctification: “Let us look steadfastly to the blood of Christ, and see how precious his blood is in the sight of God, which being shed for our salvation hath obtained the grace of repent-

ance to the whole world. . . . We are not justified by ourselves, neither by our own wisdom, or knowledge, or piety, or the works which we have done in holiness of heart, but by that faith by which almighty God hath justified all men from the beginning.”¹ In the statement that “we are not justified by the works which we have done in holiness of heart,” the most subtle form of the doctrine of justification by works is precluded, fourteen centuries before its enunciation at Trent.

It is evident from this examination of the very brief writings of the Apostolic Fathers, that they recognized the doctrine of atonement for sin by the death of the Redeemer as one taught in the Scriptures, and especially in the writings of those two great apostles, John and Paul, at whose feet they had most of them been brought up. They did not, however, venture beyond the phraseology of Scripture; and they attempted no rationale of the dogma. Their unanimous and energetic rejection of the doctrine of justification by works evinces that they did not stand upon the position of legalism. The evangelical tenet was heartily and earnestly held in their religious experience, but it was not drawn forth from this its warm and glowing home, into the cool and clear light of the intellect, and of theological science. The relations of this sacrificial death to the justice of God on the one hand, and to the conscience of

¹ CLEMENS ROMANUS : Ad Corinthos, 7, 32.

man on the other,—the judicial reasons and grounds of this death of the most exalted of Personages,—were left to be investigated and exhibited in later ages, and by other generations of theologians.

§ 4. *Early Patristic Soteriology.*

Passing from the Apostolic to the *Primitive Fathers*, we find some progress in the scientific statement of the doctrine of Atonement. Yet, taken as a whole, the body of Patristic theology exhibits but an imperfect theoretic comprehension of the most fundamental truth in the Christian system,—imperfect, that is, when compared with the very able scientific construction of the doctrine of the Trinity which we have found in the Patristic writings.

One characteristic of the Early Patristic Soteriology which strikes the attention is the important part which the doctrine of Satan plays in it. The death of Christ is often represented as ransoming man from the power and slavery of the devil. Such passages as Colossians ii. 15, and Hebrews ii. 14,—“Having spoiled principalities and powers [Satanic dominion], he made a show of them openly, triumphing over them in it. . . . That through death he might destroy him that had the power of death, that is, the devil,”—were made the foundation of

this view.¹ The writer who exhibits it more plainly and fully than any other, is *Irenaeus* († 200?). As an illustration of his sentiments, we quote a passage from the first chapter of the fifth book of his important work, *Adversus Haereses*: “The Word of God [the Logos], omnipotent and not wanting in essential justice, proceeded with strict justice even against the apostasy or kingdom of evil itself (apostasiam), redeeming from it (ab ea) that which was his own originally, not by using violence, as did the devil in the beginning, but by persuasion (secundum suadela[m]), as it became God, so that neither justice should be infringed upon, nor the original creation of God perish.”²

Two interpretations of this phraseology are possible. The “persuasion” may be referred to Satan, or to man; and the “claims” alluded to may be regarded as those of the devil, or of law and justice. The first interpretation is that of Baur, who thinks that he discovers a heretical idea in Irenaeus, the great opponent of heretics; a Gnosticising tendency in the most vehement opposer of Gnosticism. According to Baur, Irenaeus substitutes the Devil for the Demiurge, in his scheme, so that the difference between himself and his opponents is merely nominal. The Gnostic, with his crude notions of a

¹ Perhaps a text like Isaiah xlix. 24: “Shall the prey be taken from the mighty, or the *lawful captive* be delivered?” falls into the same class.

² IRENAEUS: *Adversus Haereses*, V. i. 1 (Ed. Harvey). See further extracts from Irenaeus, in MÜNSCHER-VON CÖLLN, I. 426.

Supreme Deity, and a descending series of inferior divinities, very naturally attributed to the inferior being what properly belongs only to the Supreme God. Creation, for example, was the work of a subordinate divinity, the Demiurge in his terminology. The Creator of the world and the God of Christianity, in the Gnostic scheme, were two distinct beings, in necessary and irreconcilable hostility to one another. Man has fallen into the power of the Demiurge and his demons, and redemption, according to the Gnostic, is the endeavor of the Highest Divinity to deliver man from their power.

Now, according to Baur, Irenaeus, living in the very midst of the heat and glow of this ingenious and imposing system of speculation, though intending to oppose it with all his might, was yet unconsciously affected by the spirit of the time, and moulded into his own system elements that were purely Gnostic. The notion of a conflict between the Redeemer and the Demiurge, Baur contends, laid the foundation for the first form of the orthodox theory of the atonement.¹ The ransoming of man from the power and slavery of Satan, in the view of this writer, is equivalent to the ransoming of man from the power and bondage of the Demiurge and his demons; and, accordingly, we have in the treatise of Irenaeus, though written professedly against the Gnostic scheme, only an expansion of

¹ BAUR: Versöhnungslehre, 28, 29.

the same general notions that appear in the Ophite and Marcionite Gnosticism.¹

But the other view which may be taken of this phraseology of Irenaeus, and of the Early Fathers is unquestionably the correct one, and to this we turn our attention; first making some preliminary remarks respecting the Early Patristic Soteriology. It is not to be denied that in the writings of the first three centuries, disproportionate attention is bestowed upon the connection between redemption and the kingdom of darkness, and upon the relation of apostate man to Satan. The attribute of divine justice ought to have been brought more conspicuously into view by the theologian of this period, and the person and agency of the devil have retired more into the back-ground. It was reserved for a later age, as we shall see, to make this modification in the mode of apprehending the doctrine, and thereby bring the Soteriology of the church into closer agreement with the general instructions of revelation. For it is very plain that in seizing so rankly, as the theological mind of this age did, upon those few texts in which the connection and relations of Satan with the work of Christ are spoken of, and allowing them to eclipse those far more numerous passages in which the Redeemer's work is exhibited in its reference to the being and attributes of God, it was liable to a one-

¹ Compare DORNER's criticism upon this view of Baur. *Person Christi*, I. 497 (Note).

sided construction of the doctrine. Redemption unquestionably in one of its aspects looks hell-ward. The kingdom of Satan does feel the influence of the mediatorial plan, and any theory that should entirely reject this side and relation of the atonement would be destitute of some features that are distinctly presented in the Scripture representations of the general doctrine. But it was an error in the Soteriology of these first ages that a subordinate part of the subject should have been made so prominent, and in some instances so exclusive a characteristic. Having made this concession, however, in respect to the scientific value of the Early Patristic theory of the atonement, we proceed to show that there was a difference in kind between it and the Gnostic theory, and no essential difference between it and the later Protestant theory. This difference consists in the recognition of the *judicial* and *piacular* nature of Christ's work.

All true scientific development of the doctrine of the Atonement, it is very evident, must take its departure from the idea of divine justice. This conception is the primary one in the Biblical representation of this doctrine. The terms, "propitiation" and "sacrifice," and the phraseology, "made a curse for us," "made sin for us," "justified by blood," "saved from wrath," which so frequently occur in the revealed statement of the truth, immediately direct the attention of the theologian to that side of the divine character, and that class of

divine attributes, which are summed up in the idea of justice. And as we follow the history of the doctrine down, we shall find that just in proportion as the mind of the Church obtained a distinct and philosophic conception of this great attribute, as an absolute and necessary principle in the divine nature, and in human nature, was it enabled to specify with distinctness the real meaning and purport of the Redeemer's Passion, and to exhibit the rational and necessary grounds for it.

Now turning to the writings of the Patristic period, we shall see that the sufferings and death of the Redeemer are, in the main, represented as sustaining their most immediate and important relation to the justice of God. It is not to be disguised that the distinctness with which this is done varies with different writers. We shall find in this period, as in every other one, some minds for whom the pollution of sin is more impressive than its criminality, and in whose experience the doctrine of justification is less formative than the doctrine of sanctification. For, in tracing the construction of a systematic doctrine, we are to observe that there may be agreement between the views of two different writers, while yet one grasps the subject with much greater firmness, discriminates with much greater distinctness, and affirms with much greater confidence and certainty, than the other. Again, the neglect to make the positive and scientific statement is by no means tantamount to a denial of the

positive and scientific statement. The mind may merely be in obscurity, and unable to take a clear scientific view, much more, to present one. But its tendency is towards the thorough systematic statement, and though unable to make it itself would cordially accept it when made by another mind. Compare Irenaeus with Anselm, for example. That part of the work against the Gnostic heretics which treats of the atonement is by no means equal in clearness, discrimination, and fullness, to the *Cur Deus Homo*; and yet it would be incorrect, for this reason, to represent the soteriology of Irenaeus as contradictory to that of Anselm. In these instances, in which the difference between two writers is owing to further expansion, and not to intrinsic contradiction in opinions, the text applies, "He that is not against us, is for us."

Consider, for example, the following extract from the Epistle *Ad Diognetum*. "God himself gave up his own Son a ransom for us (ὁ ἑαυτοῦ υἱὸν ἑαυτοῦ ἵνα ἡμῶν), the holy for the unholy, the good for the evil, the just for the unjust, the incorruptible for the corruptible, the immortal for the mortal. For what else could cover our sins, but his righteousness? In whom was it possible for us the unholy and the ungodly to be justified, except the Son of God alone? O sweet exchange! O wonderful operation! O unlooked for benefit! That the sinfulness of many should be hidden in one, that the righteousness of

one should justify many ungodly.”¹ Is not the whole doctrine of vicarious satisfaction contained in these words? Would not the attempt to find their full meaning short of this require the same sort of effort, and ingenuity, which must be employed in order to explain away the element of vicariousness from such Scripture texts as teach that the Redeemer was “made sin,” was “made a curse,” and is a propitiatory sacrifice? The silence of the writer respecting those questions which arise when the scientific construction of the doctrine is attempted,—such as: How is the penal suffering of the Divine substitute made efficacious to the sinner? How is this suffering an infinite and adequate one?—the silence upon these and kindred questions, the answer to which would involve a fuller development of the doctrine of the Person of Christ than had yet been made, and the neglect to enter into a systematic construction, is very far from being evidence that the writer of this Epistle rejected the doctrine of pardon through expiation, as Baur contends.² For one needs only to ask the question: Would a theologian who positively and totally *rejected* the doctrine of satisfaction have expressed himself at all in the terms of this extract? to see that the faith and feeling of an Anselm and a Luther dwelt in the heart of this writer of the second century.

¹ Epistola ad Diognetum. JUSTINUS MARTYR: Opera, p. 238, Ed. Par. 1742. Though probably not the work of Justin Martyr, it un-

doubtedly belongs to the 2d century.

² BAUR: Versöhnungslehre, 26 (Note).

Returning again to Irenaeus, we find in the very extract cited by Baur as proof that Irenaeus substituted the Devil for the Demiurge in his soteriology, the evidence that he too took his departure from the attribute of divine justice. For *why* could not the Deity deliver man from Satan by force, by the mere exercise of the divine omnipotence? Because, in the words already cited, “the Logos, omnipotent and *not wanting in essential justice*, proceeded according to strict justice even towards the kingdom of evil (apostasiam), redeeming from it that which was His own originally, not by violence but by persuasion, as it became God, *so that neither justice should be infringed upon*, nor the original creation of God perish.” In this extract, Baur asserts that *diabolum* is the elliptical word, so that the “persuasion” exercised by God terminates upon Satan. The Deity persuades the Devil to relax his grasp upon a being who originally belonged to God, and has come into the power of Satan only by deception, and consequently by injustice. To this interpretation there are three objections.¹

1. This mode of representing the relation between the Supreme Being and the Satanic Spirit implies a dualistic theory of God and universe; but there is no dualism in the system of Irenaeus. In the Gnostic theory, the two beings, and the two

¹ “Whether Irenaeus regards the ransom as actually paid to the devil, is not clear from his repre-

sentation, but Origen teaches this unmistakably.” HASSE · Anselm, II. 487.

kingdoms of light and darkness, stand very nearly upon an equality. It would be in keeping with Gnostic ideas, to represent the Holy One as plying the Evil One with arguments and entreaties to release a creature whom he could not deliver by virtue of resources within himself. But there is no such dualism in Irenaeus. No one can peruse the five books against the Gnostic heresies, without seeing on every page evidences of that exalted idea of the Supreme Being which pervades the Scriptures, and which utterly forbids that leveling process by which the Infinite Jehovah is degraded to a mere rival of Satan, and by which the kingdom of darkness becomes as eternal and independent as the kingdom of light. If we do not find the Soteriology of Irenaeus as fully elaborated as that of the Reformers, we do find that his Theology, in respect to the point of the absolute supremacy of God over evil as well as good, is as distinct and scriptural as that of Calvin himself. We must therefore refer the "persuasion," spoken of in this extract from Irenaeus, to man; such indeed is indisputably the reference in other passages.¹ Irenaeus means to

¹ Compare IRENAEUS: *Adversus Haereses*, V. xxv. (Ed. Harvey). Some light is thrown upon the meaning of the word "justice" in the extract under consideration, by the following passage from *Adversus Haereses*, III. vi. (Ed. Harvey): "*Haerere itaque fecit et adunivit quemadmodum praediximus, hominem deo. Si*

enim homo non vicisset inimicum hominis, non justé victus esset inimicus." Here the word "*justé*" evidently signifies *fitness* or *adaptation*. He who redeems man must be both God and man,—as Irenaeus proceeds to argue in the context. See, also, DORNER: *Person Christi*, I. 479 (Note).

teach, that as man fell *freely*, by the deception and persuasion of the Devil, so he must be recovered from his fall in a manner consistent with moral freedom. Mankind did not apostatize through compulsion, but by persuasion (*suadendo*) ; consequently their redemption must take the same course, even though Satan should derive advantage from this renunciation of the use of power on the part of the Almighty, and the consequent possibility, by reason of the appeal to the free will of the creature, of man's still remaining his slave.

2. Again, the "justice" spoken of in this extract, by which the method of salvation is limited, is plainly an attribute in the Divine Nature, and not a mere claim of the Devil upon either man or God which requires satisfaction. The two attributes of omnipotence and justice are exhibited side by side, and the latter limits the former, by virtue of its necessary moral character. The former is merely a natural attribute, and unallied with a moral one like justice, or still more if opposed to it, would not be the attribute of a holy and good Being. Isolated omnipotence is isolated force, and as such belongs properly to the pantheistic conception of the Deity. In the theistic conception, all the natural attributes are regulated by the moral, and cannot be regarded as operating in isolation from each other, or in opposition to each other. This Irenaeus clearly teaches, in saying that the "Logos all powerful, and perfectly just, yet proceeds in *strict justice* even in respect to the apostate

world itself." The doctrine taught in this phraseology is the same that is contained in the Protestant statement of the doctrine of the atonement, viz.: that the work of Christ preserves the harmony of the divine attributes in the plan of redemption, so that the omnipotence of the Deity shall not overthrow the justice of the Deity, by arbitrarily remitting the penalty due to transgression without any satisfaction of law.

3. Still another evidence that Irenaeus contemplated the "justice" whose claims were to be satisfied by the atonement of the Son of God, as intrinsic in the Deity, and not extrinsic in Satan, is found in the fact that he held to the absolute and not merely relative necessity of the death of Christ, in order to human salvation. We shall have occasion hereafter to allude to this point, and therefore shall touch it briefly here.

In discussing the nature of the atonement, the question naturally arises: Does the necessity of expiation in order to pardon arise from the nature of the case, or from an arbitrary arrangement? could the Deity have dispensed with any or all satisfaction of justice, or is justice of such an absolute and necessary character, that it would be as impossible to save the guilty without an antecedent satisfaction of this attribute, as it would be for God to lie? Now, in answering this question, Irenaeus is found among that class of the Fathers who affirm the ab-

solute necessity of an atonement;¹—another class inclining to the view of a relative necessity, or a necessity dependent upon the optional will and appointment of God. This is conclusive evidence that he could not have regarded the chief and sole obstacle in the way of human redemption as consisting in Satan's character and claims. For nothing extrinsic to the Deity could thus *inexorably* limit the divine omnipotence. Yet, according to Irenaeus, this omnipotence is thus limited. The necessity of atonement is absolute and unavoidable. The limitation must, therefore, be a *self*-limitation, and proceed from an immanent attribute in the Deity, and this attribute is eternal justice.

We conclude this sketch of the opinions of Irenaeus with a paraphrase and expansion of Dorner's summing up.² "Justice, in the scheme of Irenaeus, stands between the physical attributes of infinity, omnipotence, etc., and the ethical attributes of compassion and love, as a protector and watch. For this reason, God will and can accomplish no work that is spiritual in a merely physical manner; he must win over man by the manifestation of that which is spiritual,—that is, by the highest and fullest possible exhibition of his love. But love is of two kinds, active and passive; the former manifests itself by doing something *to* its object, the latter by suffering something *for* it. The highest and fullest manifes-

¹ IRENAEUS: *Adversus Haereses*, III. xix (Ed. Harvey).

² DORNER: *Person Christi*, I. 480.

tation of love would consequently include the passive form of the affection, as well as the active form,—an endurance namely, of suffering in behalf of the object of benevolence, if suffering is necessary from the nature of the case. But suffering is absolutely necessary, because now that sin and guilt have come into the world divine justice cannot be satisfied except by penal infliction. Consequently the manifestation of the love of God takes on a passive as well as active form, and vicariously bears the penalty of guilt in the place of the criminal.”

For these reasons, therefore, it is impossible to concede the position of Baur, that the foundations of the Church doctrine of the atonement were laid in the theory of the satisfaction of the claims of Satan, and not of divine justice. If this theory can be found in any of the Christian Fathers, it must be in Irenaeus. But this writer shows no traces of such a dualism as is implied in a struggle between God and Satan. He represents the limitations in the method of redemption as being of an absolute and inexorable nature, such as can proceed only out of an immanent attribute of the Godhead. One of the most important portions of his work¹ is devoted to the proof that the sufferings of Christ were real, and

¹ IRENAEUS: *Adversus Haereses*, III. xix. (Ed. Harvey). It is a singular assertion of NEANDER (*Church History*, I. 642) that in the writings of Irenaeus, “not the slightest mention is to be

found of satisfaction done by the sufferings of Christ to divine justice,”—especially, as he finds the doctrine of satisfaction in the comparatively brief and indirect statements of Justin Martyr.

not, as the Gnostic maintained, spectral and docetic; and this for the purpose of showing that the satisfaction made for sin was real and absolute. It cannot, therefore, be supposed that this influential church Father of the early centuries was involved, without being aware of it, in the errors of Gnosticism, and that his Soteriology is only a modification of a scheme which he spent his best strength in combating.

§ 5. *Alexandrine Soteriology.*

Passing from Irenaeus to the school of Alexandrine theologians, we come to less correct and discriminating views of the atonement. This school, of whom Clement of Alexandria and Origen were the founders and heads, felt the influence of the Gnostic systems to some extent, besides being itself animated by a remarkably strong speculative spirit. The Alexandrine theologian was unduly engaged with those questions respecting the origin of the material universe, and of moral evil, which had so bewildered the mind of the Gnostic. Men like Origen desired to answer these questions, and in the endeavour oftentimes lost sight of those more strictly theological subjects which address themselves to the moral consciousness of man, and are connected with his religious character and future destiny. Such thinking upon such subjects

falls more properly within the sphere of cosmogony and theosophy, than of theology.

We had occasion to observe, that the Gnostics all agreed in denying the *vicariousness* and *judicial intent* of Christ's suffering, however greatly they differed among themselves upon other points. Neander remarks that Basilides "admitted no such thing as objective justification in the sight of God, or forgiveness of sin in the sense of deliverance from the guilt and punishment of sin. Every sin, whether committed before or after faith in the Redeemer, or baptism, must, according to his scheme, be in like manner expiated by the sufferings of the individual himself."¹ But though the word "expiate" is employed in this statement of the opinions of Basilides, it is plain from the fact that a forensic justification is excluded, that it can be employed only in the sense of purification. Suffering is disciplinary only. The scheme of Basilides did not recognize sin in the form of guilt, and thereby related to law and justice. It was evil, disharmony, corruption, and bondage; but not a crime originated by the free will of a responsible creature, distinct from, and accountable to his creator. The "expiation" of sin spoken of was only the disciplinary suffering which the individual sinner undergoes, in the process of purification. It was not penal, or satisfactory to justice.

The school of Valentinus held the same general

¹ NEANDER: Church History, I. 412, 413.

views upon this point, with that of Basilides. Ptolemaeus, one of the leading disciples of Valentinus, writing to Flora, a Christian woman whom he endeavoured to convert to Gnostic views, represents punitive justice as something irreconcilable with the perfect goodness of the Supreme God, from whom he contends this world with its evil and suffering could not have sprung. On the contrary, he represents justice, in the strict sense, to be the peculiar attribute of the Demiurge, and hence a sort of medium quality lying between the perfect goodness of the supreme Deity, and unmixed evil. In accordance with these views, he supposed that that portion of the Old Testament economy which was penal and judicial in its nature proceeded from the Demiurge; and, as contradicting the essential character of the Supreme God who is unmixed benevolence, was afterwards wholly abolished by the Saviour. In consistency with these views, he regarded the capital punishment of the murderer as only a second murder, because it is retributive instead of disciplinary and educational, and the state generally as belonging only to the kingdom of the Demiurge, because it is founded upon and represents that retributive justice which is altogether foreign from the Supreme God.¹

There is no need to quote from the opinions of other schools of Gnosticism, in further proof that the attribute of justice was subtracted from the nature

¹ NEANDER: Church History, I. 437-439.

of the Supreme Being, and placed in that of an inferior, and, to some extent if not entirely, hostile one. Justice is regarded in this scheme as something *unjust*, tyrannical, not founded in reason, and therefore not found in the Supreme Deity. That such a view should be taken of an attribute so fundamental to all sovereignty and dominion, is not strange, when we consider the radical error and fatal defect of the system. Gnosticism did not hold the doctrine of creation from nothing; it held only that of development out of antecedents. As a consequence it could not logically hold the doctrine of a free finite will. There was for it no truly and strictly accountable moral agent. Man, like nature, was an evolution from the essence of the Supreme Deity, not directly indeed, but really, through a descending and a degenerating series of powers and attributes. The successive grades of this evolution become feebler and feebler as they recede further from the aboriginal fountain of existence, until man appears, the last link and refuse of the interminable series, the feeble vanishing point of a primarily tremendous process of life and energy. Now where upon this scheme, is there any free will or free agency for man? Where, any finite unit distinct from the Deity, capable of self-determination, left free to remain holy as created or to fall into evil, and held responsible for the use of this high but hazardous endowment? Is it strange that such a being as this, the poor remnant and dreg of a course of develop-

ment that has been degenerating and corrupting for ages upon ages, a miserable wreck thrown upon the shores of existence by the ebb and flow of tides fluctuating through infinite space and everlasting time,—is it strange that such a being as this, with no true centre and starting point of its own, should be affirmed to sustain no legitimate relations to such an awful attribute as retributive justice? Is it strange that in the plan by which such a being was to be redeemed from the evil and misery which are inevitably connected with such a descending series of evolutions, no provision was needed or was made for *guilt* or *crime*, and that only a purifying process constitutes the entire process of human restoration, according to the Gnostic?

Now the school of Clement and Origen, though opposing the Gnostic system with earnestness, was nevertheless influenced and affected by it to some extent. To how great an extent, is a somewhat disputed question amongst dogmatic historians. We are inclined to regard the views of Origen concerning the doctrine of Atonement and all the related topics, as being at a greater remove from the scriptural data and view, than concerning the other doctrines of Christianity. This was the weak point at which the latitudinarian tendencies of this remarkable man showed themselves with most distinctness and energy,—as indeed the doctrine of Atonement was not the strongest side of the Patristic system generally.

There were several opinions in the scheme of

Origen which tended to confuse and injure his general view of the doctrine whose history we are investigating. They were the following :

1. The opinion that all finite spirits were created in the beginning of creation, that their number undergoes no increase, and that their history is that of alternate fall and redemption, from eternity to eternity. Origen held that God could not create an infinite number of rational beings, because his providence could not extend to every particular of a series as boundless as himself.¹ Hence, all the variety that is to be seen in the history of the created universe does not spring from the continual production of new creatures, but from changes in the old and preëxisting number. God did not create by new and different orders of beings, as angel and man. The history of man is only the change which has resulted from the apostasy of a determinate number of angelic spirits, in the angelic world, who are to be both punished and redeemed in this their mundane state of existence.

The effect of such a theory as this would naturally be, to diminish the degree and amount of evil involved in the apostasy of a rational spirit. It makes the event too common. If alternate fall and recovery is the *order of the universe*, then it is impossible that the former should be the most dreadful of catastrophes, or the latter the

¹ ORIGENES : De Principiis, II. 8 (Tom. I. 703, Ed. Basil, 1572).

most wonderful of divine interferences. If when the responsible creature falls, he falls for once and for evermore, and there is from the nature of the case no salvation except by a divine intervention, which constitutes a remarkable *anomaly* in the Divine economy, and does not at all belong to the natural order of the universe, then sin and redemption have a stupendous meaning upon both sides. But if apostasy is to be expected with regular uniformity as the cycles roll around, and redemption is to be repeated with the same uniformity whenever the occasion occurs, and the occasion occurs repeatedly, it is evident that nothing but very low conceptions can result of the nature of moral evil, and of its expiation and removal.¹ The doctrine of the preëxistence and apostasy of a fixed number of rational spirits in one mode of being, and their post-existence and redemption in another mode of being,

¹ Origen held that the efficacy of Christ's death extended to the entire apostate world, quoting in proof Coloss. i. 20: "By him to reconcile all things unto himself, whether they be things in earth, or things in heaven," and also Heb. ii. 9: Christ "tasted death for every man," meaning every sinful creature. He remarks (Com. in Johan. II. 6, and I. 40) that Christ is "the great high priest not only for man but for every rational creature" (παντὸς λογίκου τὴν ἀπαξ θυσίαν). Com-

pare, also, Com. in Matt. xiii. 8. On Rom. v. 10, he remarks, "tantam esse vim crucis Christi et mortis ejus quae ad sanitatem et remedium non solum humano huic nostro ordini, sed coelestibus virtutibus ordinibusque sufficiat." Origen also taught that Christ's redeeming agency still continues in his state of exaltation, and that he is saving the apostate continually, until the entire apostate universe is restored. See THOMAS: Origenes, p. 230, 59.

and so onward endlessly, is wholly unfavourable to just views of the awful nature of moral evil as crime before law, and of the tremendous nature of spiritual apostasy as an event that can be remedied only by the most unusual and extraordinary efforts of the Supreme Being.

2. A second opinion of Origen which tended to a defective and erroneous conception of the doctrine of Atonement was, that punishment is not judicial but disciplinary. In his Homilies upon Ezekiel he makes the following statement: "If it had not been conducive to the conversion of sinners to employ suffering, never would a compassionate and benevolent God have inflicted punishment upon wickedness."¹ Here, plainly, the judicial and retributive nature of punishment is entirely overlooked, and by implication, denied. In other places, he represents reformation as being the object of punishing the sinner; but since punishment fails, God sends his Son to break the strength of sin, so that man's suffering may be spared. The death and sufferings of Christ are represented as operating in a mystic, and somewhat magical way, upon the world of demons and of evil, so that the power of sin over mankind is shaken, and they are thereby redeemed. The righteousness of God, says Origen, is seen in the fact that God does not declare sinners to be righteous and show them favour, but in the fact that he first makes

¹ REDEPENNING: Origenes, II. 407.

them holy, and then remits their punishment.¹ Men are justified by being sanctified. Such statements show that the judicial relations of sin are omitted in Origen's soteriology. The remission of sin is made to depend upon arbitrary will, without reference to retributive justice, as is evinced by his assertion that God might have chosen milder means to save man, than he did; e. g., that he might by a sovereign act of his will have made the sacrifices of the Old Testament to suffice for an atonement for man's sin.²

3. A third opinion of Origen conducing to a defective view of the atonement was, that the punishment of sin is not endless.³ This opinion flows logically from the preceding one that punishment is not penal, but disciplinary. For an eternal suffering for sin, from the nature of the case, cannot consist with the amendment of the sinner. When, therefore, owing to the exceeding strength of human sinfulness, punishment has so lost its reforming power that even if continued forever no change of character could be wrought by it, God sends the Redeemer who by his death in a mysterious way breaks this power of sin, and thereby restores him to holiness. The death of Christ is thus a manifestation of love alone, and not of love and justice in union. Clement of Alexandria, the teacher of Origen, makes the following representations, according

¹ ORIGENES: Com. in Rom. iii.
See REDEPENNING: Origenes, II.
409.

² REDEPENNING: Origenes, II.409.

³ ORIGENES: Hom. 19, in Jerem.;
De Princip. I. 6.

to Redepenning. "The deep corruption of mankind fills God, whose compassion for man is as unlimited as his hatred towards evil, not with anger, for he is never angry, but with the tenderest and most pitiful love. Hence he continually seeks all men, whom he loves for their own sake and their resemblance to God, as the bird seeks her young who have fallen from the nest. His omnipotence, to which nothing is impossible, knows how to overcome all evil, and convert it into good. He threatens, indeed, and punishes, but yet only to reform and improve; and though in public discourse the fruitlessness of repentance after death be asserted, yet hereafter not only those who have not heard of Christ will receive forgiveness, but it may be hoped that the severer punishment which befalls the obstinate unbelievers will not be the conclusion of their history. For man, like every other spiritual being, can never lose his free will. By means of this power, at all times, here and hereafter, noble minds, aided by that divine power which is indispensable to success, are lifting themselves up from ignorance and deep moral corruption, and are drawing nearer in greater or less degree, to God and the truth."¹

Upon looking carefully at each of these three opinions of Origen, it is easy to perceive that they

¹ REDEPENNING: Origenes, I. 133-135. The citations from Clement, upon which Redepenning relies for the above representation, are: Cohortatio, 74, 79, 82, 89; Stromata, VI. 763, 764. VII. 832, 895, 860. I. 369; Paedagogus, I. 102, 137, 140, 142, 149. III. 302.

are incompatible with the doctrine of a satisfaction of divine justice. The repeated fall of the soul being a part of the course and constitution of the universe, it is absurd to put this event into any sort of relation to such an attribute as that of eternal justice, except it be a figurative one. If punishment is merely corrective, it is impossible to regard it as retributive, and to provide for its remission by the judicial suffering of a substituted victim, and that, too, an infinite one. And if punishment is not in its own nature endless and absolute, but may be stopped at any point at the option of the sovereign, then it is absurd to speak of any such claims of justice as necessitate an infinite suffering for moral evil, such as can be endured only by the finite transgressor in an endless duration, or by the infinite substitute in a limited period.

Still it ought to be added, that oftentimes the phraseology of Origen, and many of his representations taken by themselves, favour the doctrine of vicarious atonement,—so much so that Thomasius, who has composed a valuable monograph upon Origen, contends that this doctrine may be found in this Father, as well as in Irenaeus. Were it not that the opinions which have been specified enter as constituent parts into the theological system of the Alexandrine School, it would not be difficult to quote many passages from the writings of Clement and Origen whose most natural meaning would imply the strict and technical doctrine of vicarious

satisfaction. But these fundamental principles, that have been mentioned, are so contrary to the doctrine of Christ's expiation, that we are compelled to give these passages a modified meaning, and to acknowledge that only a very defective and erroneous conception of this cardinal truth of Christianity is to be found in the Alexandrine Soteriology.¹

§ 6. *Soteriology of Athanasius, and the Greek Fathers.*

Before proceeding to exhibit the history of the doctrine of Atonement in the Polemic period (A. D. 254-730), it is pertinent to make an introductory remark respecting the general course of theologizing in this age. The subjects upon which the ecclesiastical mind expended most reflection during these five centuries were those of Theology with the cognate subject of Christology, and Anthropology. It was natural, consequently, that in the polemic heat and energy of the period, those parts of the Christian system which were most vehemently assailed, and which stood in greatest need of exact definition and strict phraseology,

¹ This is also MOSHEIM's opinion: Commentaries, II. 161 sq. Compare also the whole of Mosheim's criticism of Origen's theologizing: Commentaries, Cent.

III. § 27. For extracts from Origen respecting the doctrine of atonement, see: MÜNSCHER-VON CÖLLN, I. 427.

should acquire the fullest development, and somewhat at the expense of other portions. Hence, the subtle and profound statement of the doctrine of the two natures in the one Person of Christ employed the mind of the theologian of this period, more than the exhibition of the doctrine of the *work* of Christ. The anthropological doctrine of sin, during the controversy with Pelagius, was discussed with a prevailing reference to the work of the Holy Spirit. Its subjective relations to the will of the creature, more than its objective relations to the justice and moral government of the creator, constituted the subject-matter even of this controversy, which was yet better fitted than any other one of this Polemic period to result in a more scientific construction of the doctrine of Atonement.

We need not, therefore, be surprised to find that even in this age of great theological activity, the cardinal truth of Christianity did not receive its fullest examination and clearest statement. Still, in this instance as in the previous one, we are not to regard mere silence, or a failure to make a distinct statement, as tantamount to the denial and rejection of the truth. This we found to be the error in the judgment which the school of Baur passes upon the soteriology of the Apologetic period (A. D. 100–254); and although there is less liability to commit it in reference to the Polemic period, because an evident advance in the mode of apprehending the doctrine of vicarious satisfaction is ap-

parent, still the same species of argument, derived from the failure to reduce the doctrine to a perfectly *scientific* form, might be built upon the yet incomplete soteriology of the Polemic period. The argument in this case is precisely the same in kind with that which should seek to prove that the unlettered believer, whose theological knowledge is mostly in his heart and experience, positively rejects the doctrine of atonement, or the doctrine of the trinity, because he is unable to analyse and combine its elements, and place them in the unity of a comprehensive system. Having made this prefatory remark, we proceed now to take the measure of the attainments of the ecclesiastical mind of this period, respecting the doctrine in question. And in the outset, it is obvious to the investigator, the moment he passes over from the one period to the other, that some scientific progress has been made. The tone is firmer and bolder, the discrimination is clearer and truer, and the dogma stands out with greater prominence from the mass of heretical and opposing theories.

Turning to the works of the leading theologians of this age, we are able to determine how far the catholic mind had advanced toward a scientific and self-consistent theory of the atonement.

Athanasius († 373), though laying out the chief strength of his powerful intellect in the trinitarian controversy, is distinct and firm in maintaining the *expiatory* nature of the work of Christ. He recognizes

its relations to the attribute of divine justice, and has less to say than his predecessors respecting its relations to the kingdom and claims of Satan. The more important bearings of the doctrine of vicarious satisfaction, it is evident, were now beginning to receive a closer attention, while less stress was laid upon its secondary aspects. [We can find in the representations of Athanasius, the substance of that doctrine of plenary satisfaction of eternal justice by the theanthropic sufferings of Christ which acquired its full scientific form in the mind of Anselm, and which lies under the whole Protestant Church and theology.¹

Athanasius composed no tract or treatise upon the Atonement, and we must consequently deduce his opinions upon this subject from his incidental statements while discussing other topics. In his Discourses (*Orationes*) against the Arians, there are frequent statements respecting the work of Christ, in connection with those respecting his person and dignity, and from these we select a few of the most distinct and conclusive. "Christ as man endured death for us, inasmuch as he offered himself for that purpose to the Father." Here, the substitutionary nature of his work is indicated. "Christ takes our

¹ "Andere Lehrer, wie Athanasius und Cyrillus Hieros. legen den Begriff einer Gott abgetragenen Schuld zum Grunde, und sehen in dem Tode Jesu die Beding-

ung unter welcher Gott, ohne Verletzung seiner Wahrhaftigkeit, den Menschen den ihnen gedrohten Tod erlassen konnte." MÜNSCHER-VON CÖLLN, I. 425.

sufferings upon himself, and presents them to the Father, entreating for us that they be satisfied in him." Here, the piacular nature of his work is taught, together with his intercessory office. "The death of the incarnate Logos is a ransom for the sins of men, and a death of death."¹ "Desiring to annul our death, he took on himself a body from the Virgin Mary, that by offering this unto the Father a sacrifice for all, he might deliver us all, who by fear of death were all our life through subject to bondage."² "Laden with guilt, the world was condemned of law, but the Logos assumed the condemnation (*κρίμα*), and suffering in the flesh gave salvation to all."³ Here, the obligation of the guilty world is represented not as relating to Satan but to law; and the Redeemer assumes a condemnation, or in the modern Protestant phraseology becomes a voluntary substitute for the guilty, for purposes of legal satisfaction.

There are two other portions of the writings of Athanasius which are very valuable, as indicating the opinions that prevailed in the Church during the 4th century respecting the being of God and the person of Christ, and incidentally respecting the doctrine of Atonement. They are the *Λόγος κατὰ Ἑλλήνων* (*Oratio contra Gentes*), and the

¹ ATHANASIUS: *Contra Arianos*, I. 60; compare *Cont. Arianos*, I. 41; IV. 6; I. 45. I. 51; II. 62. DORNER: *Person*

² ATHANASIUS: *Defensio Fidei Nicaenae*, § 14. Christi, I. 955, remarks that similar statements are frequent in the

³ ATHANASIUS: *Contra Arianos*, two Gregories, and Basil.

Περὶ τῆς ἐνανθρωπήσεως τοῦ Λόγου (*De incarnatione Dei*). These tracts exhibit a remarkable union of the best elements of the Grecian philosophy, with the most inward and cordial reception of Christianity; and show that the “father of orthodoxy,” as he was called, did not shrink from a metaphysical construction of Christian doctrines, and believed that they could be defended and maintained upon the necessary grounds of reason. In his *Oratio contra Gentes*, aimed against the erroneous views of the popular skeptical philosophy of the day, he endeavors to evince the absolute independence and self-sufficiency of the Deity, in opposition to a theory that would identify him with creation, or make him a part of it. Having established this fundamental position of religion, he then proceeds in his tract *De Incarnatione* to show that the Logos, both before and after his incarnation, partakes of this same self-sufficiency, which he has shown in his previous discussion belongs to the necessary idea and definition of God. This leads him indirectly to speak of the atonement of Christ, in its relations to the *necessary* nature and character of the Godhead, and in so doing he gives expression to views which harmonize exactly with the modern Protestant view of the doctrine.

“Suppose,” he says, “that God should merely require repentance in order to salvation? This would not in itself be improper, did it not conflict with the *veracity* of God. God cannot be un-

truthful, even for our benefit. Repentance does not satisfy the demands of truth and justice. If the question pertained solely to the corruption of sin, and not to the guilt and ill-desert of it, repentance might be sufficient. But since God is both truthful and just, who can save, in this emergency, but the Logos who is above all created beings? He who created men from nothing could suffer for all, and be their substitute. Hence the Logos appeared. He who was incorporeal, imperishable, omnipresent, manifested himself. He saw both our misery and the law's threatening; he saw how inadmissible (*ἄτοπον*) it would be for sin to escape the law, except through a fulfilment and satisfaction of the law. Thus beholding both the increasing depravity of men, and their condemnation to death, he had compassion upon them, and assumed a body not from any necessity of nature (*φύσεως ἀκολουθία*), for his essence is incorporeal."¹ In another place, in this treatise upon the Incarnation, he makes the statement that "the first and principal ground of the Logos' becoming man was that the condemnation of the law, by which we are burdened with guilt and eternal punishment, might be removed by the payment of the penalty."² This is the strongest possible statement of the doctrine of penal satisfaction. For Athanasius is by no means disposed to overlook or underesti-

¹ ATHANASIUS: De Incarnatione, c. vii. See DORNER: Person Christi, I. 837.

² ATHANASIUS: De Incarnatione, c. xi.-xiv., quoted by DORNER: Person Christi, I. 840.

mate the fact that one purpose of the incarnation was to reveal the Godhead to man. He emphasizes the truth that the Word became the "light of men." And yet in this passage he asserts that the first and principal ground of the incarnation is not the illumination of the human soul, but the expiation of its guilt. In this extract, the prophetic office of Christ is set second to his priestly, as distinctly as in the writings of the Reformers themselves. Comparing Athanasius, then, with the theologians of his century, we find that his view of the Atonement, with respect to the two vital points of substitution and satisfaction, was second to none in explicitness and firmness. He refers the death of Christ to the necessary nature and attributes of God without any ambiguity, embarrassment, or confusion of mind, and joins on upon the Biblical idea of a sacrifice to satisfy offended law and justice, with as much clearness and energy as any theologian previous to the time of Anselm.

The historical development of the doctrine, however, evinces as we follow it down the centuries that the same gradual progress in acquiring a *scientific* understanding of the Scripture representations is going on, which we have found in other branches of dogmatic history. Queries now begin to be made whether the representation of a ransom paid to Satan has not been too prominent in the catholic soteriology, and whether the other relations of the

work of Christ should not be investigated and exhibited. We find, for example, *Gregory Nazianzen* († 390) expressing doubts, and raising inquiries, that indicate that the theological mind was sinking more profoundly into the substance of revelation, and drawing nearer to a correct logical construction of the great doctrine. “We were,” he says, “under the power of the Evil One, since we had sold ourselves to sin, and had received in exchange the lust for iniquity. If, now, a ransom is given only to the one who has possession of the thing to be ransomed, then I ask to whom was the price of ransom given? To the Evil One himself? Shame on the rash thought (*γεὺ τῆς ὑβρεως*)! Then the robber would receive not merely *from* God, but *God himself* as a ransom and exceeding rich reward for his tyranny. Or is the ransom paid to the Father? But here the question arises, in the first place, why should it be? for God is not the being who is forcibly retaining us in his power. And, in the second place, what reason can be assigned why the Father should take delight in the blood of his only-begotten Son? since he did not even accept Isaac who was offered to him by his father Abraham, but changed the sacrifice of a rational being into that of an animal? Or, is it not plain that the Father received the ransom, not because he himself required or needed it, but for the sake of the divine government of the universe (*δι’ οἰκονομίαν*), and because man must be sanctified

through the incarnation of the Son of God.”¹ Here, although the completely adequate statement contained in the Anselmic and Reformed soteriology is not made, there is an approximation to it. The divine *government* requires this death of Christ, though the divine nature does not. But it would be impossible to follow out the position that the principles by which the administration of the universe is conducted require an atonement for sin, without coming to the yet deeper and more ultimate position of the Anselmic theory that the nature and attributes of the Godhead also require it. For what is God’s moral government but an expression of God’s moral character ; and that which is needed in order to satisfy the objective principles of the former is needed to satisfy the subjective qualities of the latter.

If we examine the soteriology of the Greek Church during the last half of the 4th and the first half of the 5th centuries, we meet with very clear conceptions of the atonement of Christ. The distinctness of the views of Athanasius upon this subject undoubtedly contributed to this ; for this great mind exerted as powerful an influence upon the Eastern doctrinal system, generally, as Augustine exercised over the Western. Athanasius, we have seen, referred back, in his analysis of the doctrine, to the *veracity* of God. God had threatened death as the

¹ GREGORIUS NAZ. : Oratio, gorius Naz. p. 436. BAUR : Ver-
XLII. Compare ULLMANN : Grö- söhnungslehre, p. 88.

punishment of sin. If, now, sin were remitted without any infliction of any kind, either upon the sinner or his Redeemer, the truth of God would be turned into a lie. The next step, consequently, was to the conception of an *exchange* or *substitution* of penalty; and Athanasius himself took this step. The substitute (*κατάλληλον*) for the death of the sinner was the death of the Saviour. This idea of substitution runs through all the Greek soteriology of the 4th and 5th centuries, and prepared the way for further statements concerning the nature and worth of Christ's sufferings, some of which we will now specify.

Cyril of Jerusalem († 386), and *Eusebius of Caesarea* († 340), in the earlier part of the 4th century, had already urged the point that Christ took the penalty of sin upon himself, and furthermore that his sufferings were not of less worth than those of mankind, because he was a theanthropic Person in whom divinity and humanity were perfectly blended. In this connection, Cyril gives utterance to a statement respecting the value and sufficiency of Christ's sufferings which reminds of those strong statements of Luther upon this subject, which a legal spirit finds it so difficult to interpret or understand. He thus expresses himself. "Christ took sin upon his own body. He who died for us was no insignificant (*μικρὸς*) creature, he was no mere animal victim (*οὐκ ἦν πρόβατον αἰσθητὸν*), he was no mere man, he was not an angel, but he was God incarnate.

The iniquity of us sinners was not so great as the righteousness of him who died for us; the sins we have committed are not equal to the atonement made by him who laid down his life for us.”¹ Eusebius reasons as follows upon Christ’s satisfaction: “How then did he make our sins to be his own, and how did he bear our iniquities? Is it not from thence, that we are said to be his body, as the apostle speaks, ‘Ye are the body of Christ, and members, for your part, or of one another.’ And as when one member suffers all the members suffer, so the many members sinning and suffering, he, according to the laws of sympathy in the same body, seeing that being the Word of God he would take the form of a servant and be joined to the common habitation of us all, took the sorrows or labours of the suffering members on him, and made all their infirmities his own, and according to the laws of humanity, bore our sorrow and labour for us. And the Lamb of God did not only these things for us, but he underwent torments, and was punished for us (*ἀλλά καὶ ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν κολασθεὶς καὶ τιμωρίαν ὑποσχων, ἣν αὐτός μὲν οὐκ ὠφείλειν*); that which he was no ways exposed to for himself, but we were so by the multitude of our sins; and thereby he became the cause of the pardon of our sins; namely, because he underwent death, stripes, reproaches, transferring the thing

¹ Οὐ τοσαύτη ἦν τῶν ἀμαρτωλῶν *τος ἡ δικαιοσύνη.* CYRILUS HIEROS.: ἡ ἀνομία, ὅση τοῦ ὑπεραποθνήσκον- *Catecheses, Lib. XIII. § 33.*

which we had deserved to himself; and was made a curse for us, taking to himself the curse that was due to us; for what was he, but a price of redemption for our souls? In our person, therefore, the oracle speaks,—whilst freely uniting himself to us, and us to himself, and making our (sins or) passions (πάθη) his own, he says, ‘I have said, “Lord be merciful to me, heal my soul, for I have sinned against thee.”’”¹ The conceptions of *vicariousness* and *infinite worth*, in connection with the sufferings of the Redeemer, were very plainly at work in the mind of the Eastern theologians, so far as it was represented by men like Cyril of Jerusalem, and Eusebius of Caesarea.

But these conceptions were wrought out into still greater clearness in the Eastern Church, by those controversies respecting the Person of Christ which commenced soon after the Trinitarian controversy was ended, and continued for more than two centuries. The student of doctrinal history is generally wearied by the minuteness and tediousness of those pertinacious analyses which were connected with the Nestorian, the Monophysite, and Monothelite controversies. They were undoubtedly too much prolonged, and, what is of more importance, were too often prosecuted with an ambitious, an envious, or a malignant temper. But they were nevertheless productive of some good results, to the

¹ EUSEBIUS: *Demonstratio Evangelica*, Lib. X. c. 1, quoted by OWEN: *On Justification*, Ch. viii.

general system of Christian doctrine. The Nestorian controversy, in particular, had the effect to bring in juster views of the nature of Christ's *Person*, and consequently of the real nature of his sufferings. The error of Nestorianism was the exact opposite to that of Eutychianism, so far as concerns the sufferings of Christ. The Eutychians held that the suffering was purely and solely of deity, while the Nestorian party taught that it was purely and solely of humanity. For although Nestorianism acknowledged the alliance of God with man in Jesus Christ, it so separated the two natures from each other in his Person, that the suffering which the Redeemer endured derived no character or value from his divinity, and was in reality not different from that of any mere man. The Church, in opposition to Nestorianism, contended that the mere juxtaposition of two natures, so that each should still remain a personality by itself, was inconsistent with the catholic doctrine of a *peculiar* species of suffering which must not be attributed either to sole deity or sole humanity, but to a theanthropic Person combining both species of being.

In this controversy, *Cyril of Alexandria* († 444) took a leading part, and in his writings we find very exalted conceptions of the worth and efficacy of Christ's atoning death, springing naturally out of his apprehension of the union of the two natures in one personality. Since, in the scheme of Cyril the two elements, the divine and the human, were

blended in the most thorough manner possible, short of a mixture or confusion which should change each into a third species of substance neither human nor divine (an error against which the catholic mind was careful to guard),—since there was this thorough union and personal interpenetration of deity and humanity in the theory of Cyril,—it is easy to see that the sufferings of a Personage so constituted could be regarded as of *strictly infinite value*. Hence a very common idea, and one frequently emphasized in the writings of Cyril, is, that Christ did not suffer as a mere ordinary man suffers, that his blood was not the blood of a common man,—for if it were, it could not suffice for the salvation of the whole world,—and that only a *God-Man* could suffer, One for all, and once for all.¹

We find this same distinct recognition of the vicarious nature of Christ's sufferings, and of their adequacy for purposes of atonement, in that distinguished theologian of the 8th century, *John of Damascus* († 750). The opinions of this mind were highly esteemed in the Greek Church, and in the Oriental Church generally. His *Ἐκθρόσις πίστεως* (*Expositio fidei*) was long the text-book in systematic theology at the East, and exerted

¹ See the quotations from Cyril's Com. in Johannem, in BAUR: *Versöhnungslehre*, p. 102 (Note). Baur's inferences, however, are drawn too much from detached passages, and not enough from

the general drift of Cyril's soteriology. Cyril went to the verge of Eutychianism at the time of the council of Ephesus, but afterwards retreated from it, and accepted the decisions at Chalcedon.

no little influence upon the Scholastic theology of the Latin Church. After the division of the two churches, the Western theologians devoted less and less attention to the writings of the Greek Fathers, but John Damascene, standing as he did at the opening of the era of Scholasticism, and partaking strongly of the systematic spirit which prevailed in it, was studied with interest and effect by the Latin Schoolmen. Upon the subject of the atonement, this writer follows the general views of the preceding Greek theologians, especially Athanasius and Gregory Nazianzen. We have already noticed the doubts expressed by this latter writer, whether the death of Christ sustained so much relation to the claims of Satan as the earlier soteriology had implied, and whether its highest and principal reference was not to the attribute of justice in the Divine Nature. John Damascene does not merely raise the query, but expresses himself with energy upon the point. "He, who assumed death for us, died, and offered himself a sacrifice to the Father; for we had committed wrong towards him (*αὐτῷ πεπλημμελήκαμεν*), and it was necessary for him to receive our ransom (*λύτρον*), and we thus be delivered from condemnation. For God forbid that the blood of the Lord should be offered to the tyrant!"¹

¹ JOHANNES DAMASCENUS: *Expositio Fidei*, III. xxvii.

§ 7. *Soteriology of Augustine, and Gregory the Great.*

Augustine († 430) is a writer whose opinions upon any subject deserve examination, and especially upon the cardinal truth of the Christian system. He marks the period immediately succeeding that represented by the Greek theologians of the 4th century, during which the spirit of investigation and of science was passing from the declining Oriental, to the strengthening Western churches. His prominent position, moreover, in the history of the Christian system generally, would lead us to infer a very great influence from his writings in the construction of so fundamental a doctrine as that of the Atonement. Upon examination, however, this expectation is somewhat disappointed. The strength and energy of Augustine's intellect were expended upon other parts of the Christian system; so that the subject of Soteriology did not receive such a profound and satisfactory treatment from him, as did that of Anthropology. Augustine's view of the work of Christ is essentially that of the Fathers who had preceded him; neither falling short, nor making any marked advance in scientific respects. Indeed, he seems to take very nearly the view which we have seen to have been held by Irenaeus respecting the judicial aspects of the doctrine. The claims of Satan are sometimes recognized in connec-

tion with those of justice, as in the following passage, which is very similar in its phraseology to that of Irenaeus. "God the Son being clothed with humanity subjugated even the devil to man, extorting nothing from him by violence, but overcoming him by the law of justice; for it would have been injustice if the devil had not had the right to rule over the being whom he had taken captive."¹ In other passages, as also in Ignatius, the claims of Satan are not noticed, and only the connection between man's sin and God's justice is alluded to,—the reconciliation between the two antagonisms being effected, as in the Protestant statement of the doctrine, by an expiatory sacrifice. "All men," he says, "are separated from God by sin. Hence they can be reconciled with him, only through the remission of sin, and this only through the grace of a most merciful Saviour, and this grace *through the one only victim of the most true and only priest.*"² In another place, alluding to our Lord's comparison of his own crucifixion with the lifting up of the serpent by Moses, Augustine thus expresses himself: "Our Lord did not indeed transfer sin itself into his flesh as if it were the poison of the serpent, but he did transfer death; so that there might be, in the likeness of human

¹ AUGUSTINUS : De libero arbitrio, III. x. (Ed. Migne, I. 1285).

² "Non ergo reconciliari nisi peccatorum remissione, per unam

gratiam misericordissimi salvatoris, per unam victimam verissimi sacerdotis." AUGUSTINUS : De pec. mer. I. lvi.

flesh, the punishment of sin without its personal guilt, whereby both the personal guilt and punishment of sin might be abolished (*solveretur*) from human flesh.”¹

These passages, and many others like them scattered all through his writings, prove indisputably that Augustine held the doctrine of vicarious satisfaction. That he did not hold it, however, in a form as perfectly well-discriminated as that in which it appears in the Anselmic theory, and still more in the soteriology of the Reformation, there is equally clear proof. Augustine sometimes *confuses justification with sanctification*, from not limiting the former term to its strict signification as the antithesis of sanctification. He sometimes employs “*justificatio*” as equivalent to the whole work of redemption. The difference between the judicial and the renovating side of redemption was not always kept in view by that usually sharp and aquiline eye. We find some few passages in Augustine which can be construed, and are by the Papal writers, to mean that man is justified in part by an inherent or subjective righteousness. This inward righteousness is indeed regarded as the work of God in the soul, and not the product of the human will. This we should expect, of course, from a mind holding with such energy and firmness as did

¹ AUGUSTINUS: De pec. mer. I. 7 (Ed. Migne, IV. 592) ; Confessiones, p. 239.

Augustine to the doctrines of total depravity, and prevenient grace. Man cannot, indeed, attribute this inward and subjective righteousness to himself as the author, and, so far, a sense of merit and a legal spirit would be excluded. But Augustine, judging from a few passages in his works, was not always careful, as were Luther and Calvin when treating of the grounds of justification, to direct attention to the fact that so far as the guilt of man is concerned, no possible amount of inward righteousness, even though wrought in the soul by the Holy Spirit, can be an *atonement*, or ground of acquittal from condemnation. Holiness of heart contains nothing of the nature of an expiation. This is found only in judicial suffering.

It is not an adaptation of means to ends, therefore, when justification is sought to be accomplished by sanctification. The “justification of the *ungodly*,” of which St. Paul speaks,—i. e. the judicial acquittal from condemnation, of a soul that is still polluted with indwelling sin, and will be more or less until it leaves the body,—cannot of course be founded upon any degree of holiness that has been wrought within it by the Holy Spirit. It must rest altogether upon an outward and finished work, namely the atoning suffering of the Son of God. This *declarative* act of God, whereby, on the ground of the objective satisfaction made to law by the Redeemer, he forgives the past, must be carefully distinguished from the subjective transforming work

of God in the soul, whereby he secures its holiness for the future.

Augustine is not always careful to mark this distinction. The term "justification" is sometimes confused with that of "sanctification," by being made to include it. The following passage from his treatise against Julian is in point. "God justifies the ungodly *not only* by remitting the sins he commits, *but also* by giving him inward love, which causes him to depart from evil, and makes him holy through the Spirit."¹ According to the Reformed symbols, justification rests *only* upon remission of sins, and remission of sins only upon the atonement of Christ. To implant a principle of love, is no part of justification. It is with reference to this occasional confusion of the two constituent parts of redemption, and the attribution to one of what belongs to the other, that Calvin makes the following remark: "The opinion of Augustine, or at least his *manner of expression*, is not to be altogether praised. For though he excellently despoils man of all the praise of righteousness, and ascribes the whole to the grace of God, yet he refers grace to sanctification, in which we are regenerated by the Spirit to new-

¹ AUGUSTINUS: Opus imperfectum contra Julianum, II. clxv. Compare WIGGERS: Augustinism, p. 201. DAVENANT, On Justification, I. 202, and elsewhere, contends in opposition to Bellarmine that Augustine never teaches that

infused righteousness is the *ground* and *cause* of justification, though he often employs the term "justificatio," sometimes in the sense of absolution from condemnation, and sometimes of sanctification.

ness of life.”¹ The implication of Calvin’s criticism here evidently is that the grace which remits penalty should be referred solely to the atoning work of Christ, and not at all to the sanctifying agency of the Holy Ghost. God acquits the human soul from condemnation because the Son of God has expiated its guilt, and not because a holy character has been produced within it. This latter is the consequent and not the antecedent. “Whom he justifies,” upon an entirely objective ground, him he sanctifies by a subjective operation in the soul.²

Another evidence that Augustine’s view of the doctrine of Atonement shared in the imperfect science of the Patristic period, is found in the fact that in some places, at least, he teaches only a *relative* necessity for an atonement. “They are foolish,” he says, “who say that the wisdom of God

¹ CALVIN : Institutes, III. xi.

² The following reference to Augustine’s phraseology is made in LUTHER’S Table Talk (Bell’s Trans. Ed. 1652, p. 208). “Philip Melancthon said to Luther, the opinion of St. Austin of justification (as it seemeth) was more pertinent, fit, and convenient, when he disputed not, than it was when he used to speak and dispute ; for this he saith : ‘ We ought to censure and hold that we are justified by faith, that is *by our regeneration*, or being made new creatures.’ Now if it be so, then we

are not justified only by faith, but by all the [inward] gifts and virtues of God given to us. Now what is your opinion, sir? Do you hold that a man is justified by this regeneration as is St. Austin’s opinion? Luther answered and said, I hold this, and am certain that the true meaning of the gospel and of the apostle is, that we are justified before God *gratis*, for nothing, only by God’s mere mercy wherewith and by reason whereof he imputeth righteousness unto us in Christ.” OWEN (Justification, Chap. IV.)

could not liberate men otherwise than by God's assuming humanity, being born of a woman, and suffering at the hands of sinners."¹ In another place, he thus expresses himself: "When the question is asked whether there was no other way whereby God could liberate man, than by his Son's becoming incarnate and undergoing the suffering of death, it is not enough merely to say that this is a good way, but also to show, not that no *other* mode was in the power of him who can subject all things to his control, but that no more suitable mode could have been adopted."² Here, the divine omnipotence is separated from the divine justice, and the possibil-

also alludes to this widening out of the term justification so as to include sanctification, as liable to introduce error into soteriology. "The Latin derivation and composition of the word 'justificatio,' would seem to denote an internal change from inherent unrighteousness to righteousness; by a physical motion and transmutation, as the schoolmen speak. For such is the signification of words of the same composition. So 'sanctification,' 'mortification,' 'vivification,' and the like, all denote a real *internal* work on the subject spoken of. Hereon, in the whole Roman school, justification is taken for the making of a man to be *inherently* righteous by the infusion of a principle or habit of grace. . . . And this appearing [appar-

ent] sense of the word possibly deceived some of the ancients, as Austin in particular, to declare the doctrine of free gratuitous sanctification, without respect to any works of our own, under the name of justification. For neither he, nor any of them, ever thought of a justification before God, consisting in the pardon of our sins and the acceptance of our persons as righteous, by virtue of any inherent habit of grace infused into us, or acted by us."

¹ AUGUSTINUS: De agone Christiano, c. 10.

² AUGUSTINUS: De Trinitate, XIII. x. "I am truly ashamed of those divines, who have nothing more commonly in their mouths, both in their disputations and discourses to the people, than 'that God might by other

ity of an infringement upon the moral attribute by the arbitrary might of the natural attribute is conceded within the sphere of the infinite. But this is to degrade the infinite to the level of the finite, by subjecting it to the same limitations and hazards with the finite. The necessity of an atonement is made to depend ultimately upon the divine option. It is not founded in the divine nature, or in the attribute of justice. This theory, if logically carried out, conducts to the position of Origen, that God might by an act of mere will have constituted the sacrifice of bulls and goats a sufficient sacrifice for human guilt. But logic could not stop even at this point. For inasmuch as there is no absolute and metaphysical necessity of an atonement, and the whole provision for satisfying justice is resolved in the last analysis into an *optional* act on the part of God, it follows that, so far as the Divine Being is concerned, an atonement might be dispensed with altogether. For the same arbitrary and almighty will that was competent to declare the claims of justice to be satisfied by the finite sacrifice of bulls

means have provided for the safety and honor of his justice, but that that way by the blood of his Son was more proper and becoming.' So said Augustine of old: but what then? Of that absolute power, which they dream of, by which he might, without any in-

tervening sacrifice, forgive sins, not the least syllable is mentioned in the whole sacred writings: nor am I afraid to affirm that a more convenient device to weaken our faith, love, and gratitude cannot be invented." OWEN: On Divine Justice, Part II. Chap. vii.

and goats would be competent, also, to declare that those claims should receive no satisfaction at all. Any principle that is surrendered in part is surrendered entirely. But it would be unjust to impute to Augustine, and those other Fathers who in this period hesitated to assert the absolute necessity of the sufferings of Christ in order to the salvation of man, the logical consequences of their position. They were afraid of limiting the power of God, and the more so, in contrast with the claims of Satan, of which we have seen they made far too much; and the indiscriminating statements which fall from them in such connections can be properly cited only to show, that it was reserved for an eye that saw more profoundly than did theirs into the idea of eternal justice, and a mind that apprehended the Pauline distinction between justification and sanctification more accurately and adequately than did theirs, to make the final scientific construction of the doctrine of Atonement.

This deficiency in Augustine's soteriology compared with the Anselmic and Protestant finds its natural explanation in the fact, that the energy of his mind was almost entirely absorbed in the doctrine of the soul's renovation by divine influence. In the first place, his own inward experience had been eminently that of spiritual bondage, corruption, and pollution. The need of grace in the form of a renewing, strengthening, and purifying power,

had been very vividly and painfully felt by him.¹ In the second place, the controversy with Pelagius directed the attention of Augustine still more earnestly to the doctrine of renovation and sanctification by the Holy Ghost. The doctrine of the atonement, though consequentially involved and in peril if the views of Pelagius should be rigorously run out to their ultimate, did not, nevertheless, come very much into the controversy. From these two causes then,—by reason of a peculiarity in his own religious experience, and the polemic interest which he felt,—the force and depth of Augustine's intellect were drawn off from the atonement proper, and expended upon that side of the general doctrine of redemption which relates to the delivery of the soul from the power and pollution, as distinguished from the guilt and condemnation, of sin.

Following the history of the doctrine of Atonement downward in the Latin Church, we find in the century succeeding that in which Augustine produced his principal treatises, one writer whose tone is firm, and whose views are discriminating, but from whom, however, such a tone and view would not have been expected considering his ecclesiastical position and circumstances. This writer is *Gregory the Great*, bishop of Rome († 604). He

¹ This, of course, is not to be understood in the sense of denying that Augustine had any experience of sin as guilt, and of the need of grace in the form of an atonement and remission of sin. It is spoken in a comparative sense only.

stands at the opening of that era of power and influence which the Roman Church was destined to pass through, as the acknowledged head of Western Christianity. Occupying such a position, and being the first marked representative of the hierarchical spirit which was now to mould and corrupt Christianity for a thousand years to come, we are naturally surprised to find in the theological writings of one whom some regard as the first pope, representations of the atoning work of Christ so much in accordance with the Pauline conception of it. The views of Gregory are expressed with even more clearness and firmness than those of some preceding theologians, who were yet less immediately connected with that distinctively Roman Church whose greatest guilt consists in mutilating and nullifying the most strictly evangelical of all the Christian doctrines, that of justification solely through the atonement of the Son of God.

In his writings, Gregory lays great stress upon the idea of a sacrifice offered in the death of Christ. He starts from the conception of guilt, and from this derives immediately the necessity of a theanthropic sacrifice. "Guilt," he says,¹ "can be extinguished only by a penal offering to justice. But it would contradict the idea of justice, if for the sin of a rational being like man, the death of an irrational animal should be accepted as a sufficient atonement.

¹ GREGORIUS MAGNUS: *Moralia in Jobum*, XVII. xlvii.

Hence, a man must be offered as the sacrifice for man; so that a rational victim may be slain for a rational criminal. But how could a man, himself stained with sin, be an offering for sin? Hence a sinless man must be offered. But what man descending in the ordinary course would be free from sin? Hence, the Son of God must be born of a virgin, and become man for us. He assumed our nature without our corruption (*culpa*). He made himself a sacrifice for us, and set forth (*exhibuit*) for sinners his own body, a victim without sin, and able both to die by virtue of its humanity, and to cleanse the guilty, upon grounds of justice.”¹

With regard to the question: To *whom* is this sacrifice offered? in other words: To what extent do the claims of Satan come into view in Gregory's scheme? even Baur, with all his determination to find the doctrine of Satan's claims in the Catholic soteriology, makes the following remark upon the passage from the *Moralia* just quoted: “It is not indeed expressly said that the sacrifice is offered to God, but this is implied in the conception of a sacrifice. Not in the devil consequently (though Gregory cannot indeed altogether get rid of the notion of a devil), but only in God, does the cause lie why Jesus must die for the sin of man.”²

¹ “Fecit pro nobis sacrificium, corpus suum exhibuit pro peccatoribus, victimam sine peccato, quae et humanitate mori, et iustitia mundare potuisset.”

² BAUR: Versöhnungslehre, 93.

§ 8. *Recapitulatory Survey.*

We have now traced the history of the doctrine of Atonement down to the opening of the Scholastic Era, and before commencing the account of the course of this great truth of Christianity during this, and the following period of the Reformation, we will briefly cast a glance backward over the course we have travelled.

It was remarked in the beginning of this history, that the doctrine of vicarious satisfaction acquired its *scientific* form more slowly than did the other great truths of Christianity, and that it was reserved for the Modern Church to give it an expansion and definition equal to that which the doctrines of Theology and Anthropology had received in the Ancient Church. The history thus far verifies the remark. We have seen that the Apostolic Fathers merely repeated the Scripture phraseology which contained the truth that was warm and vital in their Christian experience, but did not enunciate it in the exact and guarded statements of a scientific formula. Next, we find the Primitive Fathers of the 2d and 3d centuries endeavouring to exhibit the doctrine in a more speculative form. Their success was but partial; for secondary elements and truths were made too prominent, while strictly primary elements and truths, though not denied or rejected, were yet not presented with sufficient boldness in

their scientific schemes. The claims of God and of the attribute of justice were thrown too much into the background, by those of Satan. And yet the judicial aspects of the subject were continually pressing themselves with increasing force upon the reflection of theologians. A more moderate and scriptural view of the kingdom of Evil, and of its head and prince, was gradually taking the place of that exaggerated conception which, in reality, bordered too much upon the dualism of the East, to be entirely consonant with that truth which the prophet sought to enforce upon the Persian monarch, when he proclaimed that God "makes peace and creates evil.") Satan and his kingdom, while a real existence was conceded to both, were beginning to be seen in their true relations to Jehovah, who is as supreme in reference to the kingdom of sin, as to the kingdom of holiness. The sufferings of the God-Man began to be contemplated by the scientific mind more exclusively in their relations to the attributes and government of God. Though the claims of Satan were still, to some extent, regarded as the ground of the necessity of Christ's death, the drift of speculation was steadily towards the simple position, that the atonement was made for the satisfaction of justice alone, and that the only claims that are cancelled by it are the claims of law and of God.

It is necessary, however, to call attention to a new phenomenon which begins to appear in the 5th

and 6th centuries, in order to obtain a full view of the state of this doctrine at the close of the Patristic period, and particularly in order to account for the great change that came over it, in the Papal period which succeeded. The religious experience of the church itself, during the last half of the first six centuries, was undergoing a great change. In the first place, the sense of sin was declining generally. The more secular and temporal aspects of Christianity, owing partly to the alliance between Church and State, and still more to the corrupt tendencies of human nature itself, were eclipsing its more directly spiritual relations to the character and necessities of sinful humanity. Hence there was a declining sense of the need of redemption, in the church at large. Moreover, to aggravate the evil, the attention of the earnest and thoughtful minority was somewhat drawn away from the atoning work of Christ, to human substitutes for it in the form of penances. What little sense of guilt there was in the church, was somewhat dissipated, or at least made more shallow, by being expended upon those "sacrifices which can never take away sin."¹

In the second place, as we have had occasion to observe in the instance of Augustine, there was some confusion of ideas coming into the theoretical

¹ The tendency to *mix* works with faith pertains to every age, and is found very early in dogmatic history. TERTULLIAN, for example, represents martyrdom as a coöperating ground of forgiveness. See PUSEY'S translation of Tertullian, I. 106, Note b.

construction of the doctrine itself. This was partly a cause, and partly an effect of that decline in the popular experience which we have just spoken of; for we are reminded at this point, as we are at every point in the internal history of the Church, that the process of decline is one of development, and that the relation of the corrupting elements to each other is not that of mere cause and effect, but of action and reaction. Perhaps, if the feeling of guilt in Augustine's mind had been as poignant and penal as it was in Luther's, or if his eye had been as penetrating and judicial upon this single topic as was that of Calvin; perhaps if this great theologian of the Patristic period had been as thorough and profound upon this side of the subject of sin, as he was upon the other, a statement of the doctrine of justification by faith without works might have been originated in the 5th century, that by the blessing of God would have prevented the Papacy, and precluded those ten centuries of "voluntary humility," worshipping of saints, and justification by works. When the popular feeling of a period is becoming less correct and healthy, nothing in the way of means does so much towards a change and restoration, as strict accuracy, which is the same as strict orthodoxy, in the popular creed. The creed may, indeed, in the outset be far in advance of the general sentiment and feeling, but being not only the truth but the whole truth, and not only the whole truth but nothing but the truth, it begins to

draw magnetically upon the human mind, until it eventually brings it close and entirely up to its own height and vantage ground. In the period of which we are speaking, or more properly in the latter part of it, it was coming to be the popular feeling, that the pardon of past sin must depend, to *some* extent at least, upon the character and works of the individual; that the atonement of the Son of God must, in some slight degree at least, be supplemented, or strengthened, or perfected, by the works or the feelings of the believer. Even when there was the strictest orthodoxy in referring the holy character or works to the influences of the Holy Spirit, there was error, and in reality the germ of the Papal theory, in referring the remission of past transgression to renovated character and righteous works, as a procuring cause in connection with the death of the Redeemer. It was defective soteriology, to represent sanctification in conjunction with the atonement of Christ as a ground of pardon. A keener vision, that could see the distinction between the guilt of sin and its pollution, would not have confounded the work of the Sanctifier with that of the Atoner. A clearer discrimination, which could separate the penal and retributive elements of sin from its blinding, corrupting, and enslaving effects upon a rational spirit, would not have blended and confused the two parts of redemption in such a manner that one was liable to disappear from the mind and reflection of the Church. In short, a more

scientific and technical accuracy, a stricter reference of each of the *two* elements in sin to the *two* corresponding sides of redemption, would have contributed greatly to fasten the eye of the individual upon his relations to eternal justice, and upon that infinite oblation which, *alone* and *of itself*, sets the criminal once more in right relations with this fundamental attribute. In this way, the notion that a finite sacrifice can expiate guilt, either wholly or *in part*, or that the struggle after holiness, even if successful, can offset transgression and pacify conscience, would have been more likely to have been banished from the Church.

These germs of corruption in the soteriology of the Church, which we have thus noticed as beginning to appear during the last half of the Patristic period (A. D. 400–600), were gradually unfolded during the four centuries that intervened between the decline of the Patristic theology, and the breaking forth of the Scholastic. With the exception of John of Damascus in the Greek Church, and Alcuin and Scotus Erigena in the Western, this period of four hundred years (A. D. 600–1000) is marked by no individual minds of much historic character and power. Of these, the Greek theologian and the spiritual guide of Charlemagne are by far the most biblical in their opinions concerning the doctrine whose history we are investigating. The views of John Damascene we have already briefly noticed, and those of Alcuin agreed with

those of Augustine. The soteriology of Erigena was essentially defective, and could not be otherwise, springing as it did from a pantheistic view of the Trinity and of the Person of Christ. According to him, the incarnation was merely the immanence of God in the world,—a popular way of expressing the philosophic truth that God acquires distinct self-consciousness in the creature. All that was said, in a former part of this history, respecting the incompatibility of the Gnostic pantheism with the doctrine of man's distinct existence, real freedom, and amenability to retributive justice, applies with full force to the pantheism of this remarkable man, who seemed to stand by himself, and whose pantheistic views, it ought to be observed, were rejected and opposed by the church and the clergy of his time.

But the decline in respect to true views of the vicarious atonement of Christ, during this intermediate period, was owing to more general causes, than merely the opinions and influence of leading individuals. The masses of merely nominal Christians who began to be brought into the Church, after its triumph over Paganism was complete and its alliance with the State was perfected, constituted a body without a soul,—an aggregate of *professing Christians without any religious experience*. That painful process of self-knowledge, of conviction of guilt and sense of need of divine grace, which ought to initiate and precede all profession of Christianity, was too generally unknown in those large masses of

population who in these centuries bore the name, and enjoyed all the external rights and privileges of church members. Here and there, undoubtedly, there were individual minds, or a community, in whom the experience of the day of Pentecost was to be found,—a consciousness of sin, a cry for mercy, and a self-despairing recumbency upon the atonement of the Redeemer, even though confused and beclouded by the notions of the time respecting the additional need of personal penances and ecclesiastical absolutions. But the Church as a whole knew little of this experience, and hence, while holding in a passive and hereditary manner the Patristic statements respecting the Trinity and the Person of Christ, it was coming to hold a theory respecting Sin and Redemption that was altogether opposed to that form of doctrine which had prevailed during the first four centuries, in both the Eastern and the Western Church.

CHAPTER II.

SOTERIOLOGY OF THE MEDIAEVAL CHURCH.

§ 1. *Anselm's Theory of Satisfaction.*

AFTER this rapid glance at the condition of the doctrine of atonement during the last half of the first ten centuries, we pass to the examination of the soteriology of the Scholastic age. It begins with Anselm's († 1109) theory of satisfaction, elaborately wrought out in his *Cur Deus Homo?* It is remarkable that the bursting forth of a new spirit of inquiry, the dawning of a new era after five hundred years of stagnation and darkness, should have commenced with the sudden appearance of a mind of such remarkable depth, clearness, and living piety, as that of Anselm. We do not find the usual antecedents and gradual preparation, for the advent of such a spirit. The sun rises without a dawn, or a morning twilight. In the very opening of a new era which followed close upon a period of great superstition, and misapprehension of the

true nature of sin and atonement, we find a view of the work of Christ, decidedly in advance of the best soteriology of the Patristic age, and agreeing substantially with that of the Reformation. Such phenomena as these, in the history of the church, seem to conflict with the doctrine of historical development, because it is so difficult to discover any connection between antecedents and consequents. The truth is, however, that we are not able to detect the connection, because of the deficiency in our knowledge of the interior life of those distant and dark ages. God undoubtedly, in this as in all other instances in which he does not employ a miraculous agency, conducted the process upon the ordinary principles of his administration, and made it a continuity, though marked by sudden and striking changes. It finds its analogy in those processes in the vegetable world, in which the one common principle of life, after periods of long external slumber, breaks forth into unusual external power and splendour; as when the dull and prickly cactus suddenly, and to all outward appearance without any preparation, bursts into a gorgeous flower.

In this tract, entitled *Cur Deus Homo?*¹, Anselm begins and ends with the idea of an *absolute necessity* of an atonement, in order to the redemption of man. Everything is referred to a metaphysical, or necessary ground, and hence we have in this

¹ Translated in the BIBLIOTHECA SACRA, Oct. 1854, and Jan. 1855.

theory the first *metaphysique* of the Christian doctrine of Atonement. Not that the idea of a metaphysical necessity in reference to the atonement was entirely unknown up to this time. We have already noticed, that an Athanasius had distinctly urged that necessity of an expiation in order to forgiveness of sin which is founded in the divine attributes of justice and veracity, and we have found this view, for substance and informally, in all the better Patristic soteriology. But we have this view, now for the first time, in Anselm's tract, reduced to a systematic and scientific form, and cleared of those excrescences which were connected with it in the Ancient Church. Anselm is the first instance in which the theologian plants himself upon the position of philosophy, and challenges for the doctrine of vicarious satisfaction, both a rational necessity, and a scientific rationality. The fundamental position of the *Cur Deus Homo* is, that the atonement of the Son of God is absolutely or metaphysically necessary in order to the remission of sin. Anselm concedes by implication, throughout his work, that if it cannot be made out that the vicarious satisfaction of divine justice by the theanthropic suffering of Jesus Christ is required by a necessary and immanent attribute of the Divine Nature, then a scientific character cannot be vindicated for the doctrine; for nothing that is not metaphysically necessary is scientific. Hence, in the very beginning of the tract, he affirms that a

mere reference to the divine benevolence, without any regard to the divine justice, cannot satisfy the mind that is seeking a necessary basis in the doctrine of atonement. For benevolence is inclined to dispense with penal suffering, and of itself does not demand it.¹

It is not the attribute of mercy, but the attribute of justice, which insists upon legal satisfaction, and opposes an obstacle to the salvation of a sinner. Setting aside, therefore, the divine justice, and taking into view merely the divine compassion, there does not appear to be any reason why God should not by an act of bare omnipotence deliver the sinner from suffering and make him happy. This conducts Anselm to that higher position from which the full-orbed nature and character of the Deity is beheld, and he proceeds to show that compassion cannot operate in an isolated and independent manner in the work of redemption, and that if anything is done for the recovery and weal of the transgressor, it cannot be at the expense of any necessary quality in the divine nature, through the mere exercise of an arbitrary volition, and an unbridled omnipotence.

The leading positions, and the connection of ideas, in this exceedingly profound, clear, and logical tract of the 11th century, are as follows.

¹ ANSELMUS: *Cur Deus Homo*, Proslogium, c. 8, 9, and HASSE: I. 6. Compare also ANSELMUS: *Anselm von Canterbury*, II. 275.

Beginning with the idea of sin, Anselm defines this as the withholding from God what is *due* to him from man. Sin is debt.¹ But man owes to God the absolute and entire subjection of his will, at all times, to the divine law and will. This is not given, and hence the guilt, or *debt*, of man to Deity. The extinction of this guilt does not consist in simply beginning again to subject the will entirely to its rightful sovereign, but in giving *satisfaction* for the previous cessation in so doing. God has been robbed of his honour in the past, and it must be restored to him in some way, while at the same time the present and future honour due to him is being given. But how is man, who is still a sinner and constantly sinning, to render this double satisfaction, viz.: satisfy the law in the future by perfectly obeying it, and in the past by enduring its whole penalty? It is impossible for him to render it; and yet this impossibility, argues Anselm, does not release him from his indebtedness or guilt, because this impossibility is the effect of a free act, and a free act must be held responsible for all its consequences, in conformity with the ethical maxim, that the cause is answerable for the effect. But now the question arises: Cannot the love and compassion of God abstracted from his justice come in at this point, and remit the sin of man without

¹ This is in accordance with Christ's definition of sin, in the petition, "forgive us our debts" (ὁφειλήμεν).

any satisfaction? This is impossible, because it would be irregularity (*aliquid inordinatum*), and injustice. If unrighteousness is punished neither in the person of the transgressor, nor in that of a proper substitute, then unrighteousness is not subject to any law or regulation of any sort; it enjoys more liberty than righteousness itself, which would be a contradiction and a wrong. Furthermore, it would contradict the divine justice itself, if the creature could defraud the creator of that which is his due, without giving any satisfaction for the robbery. Since there is nothing greater and better than God, there is no attribute more just and necessary than that punitive righteousness innate to deity which maintains the honour of God. This justice, indeed, is God himself, so that to satisfy it, is to satisfy God himself.

Having in this manner carried the discussion into the very heart of the divine *nature*, and shown that a *necessary* and *immanent* attribute of the Deity stands in the way of the non-infliction of punishment and the happiness of the transgressor, Anselm proceeds to consider the possibility of satisfying the claims of justice,—the claims of Satan being expressly denied. There are two ways, he says, in which this attribute can be satisfied. First, the punishment may be actually inflicted upon the transgressor. But this, of course, would be incompatible with his salvation from sin, and his eternal happiness, because the punishment required is eter

nal, in order to offset the infinite demerit of robbing God of his honour. / It is plain, therefore, that man cannot be his own atoner, and render satisfaction for his own sin. / A sinner cannot justify a sinner, any more than a criminal can pardon his own crime. The second, and only other way in which the attribute of justice can be satisfied is by substituted or vicarious suffering. This requires the agency of another being than the transgressor. / But here everything depends upon the *nature and character of the Being* who renders the substituted satisfaction. / For it would be an illegitimate procedure to defraud justice by substituting a less for a more valuable satisfaction. It belongs, therefore, to the conception of a true vicarious satisfaction, that something be offered to justice for the sin of man that is greater than the finite and created, or, in Anselm's phrase, is "greater than all that is not God." In other words, an *infinite* value must pertain to that satisfaction which is substituted for the sufferings of mankind. But he who can give, and has the right to give, out of his own resources, something that is greater than the finite universe, must himself be greater than all that is not God, or than all that is finite and created. / But God alone is greater than all that is not God, or the created universe. / Only God therefore can make this satisfaction. Only Deity can satisfy the claims of Deity. But, on the other hand, man must render it, otherwise it would not be a satisfaction for *man's* sin.

/ Consequently, the required and adequate satisfaction must be theanthropic, i. e., rendered by a God-Man. As God, the God-Man can give to deity more than the whole finite creation combined could render. Furthermore this theanthropic obedience and suffering was not due from the mere humanity of Christ. This was sinless and innocent, and justice had no claims, in the way of suffering, upon it. And, moreover, only a man's obedience, and not that of a God-Man, could be required of a man. Consequently this *Divine-Human* obedience and suffering was a surplusage, in respect to the man Christ Jesus, and might overflow and inure to the benefit of a third party,—in other words, to the benefit of the transgressor for whom it was voluntarily rendered and endured.

This satisfaction made by incarnate Deity to meet the claims of one of his own attributes, Anselm represents as even more than an equivalent for the sin of mankind. We meet with phraseology in the second book of the *Cur Deus Homo?*,¹ upon this point, that is strikingly like that which we have noticed in Cyril of Jerusalem.² “You have indeed most plainly proved,” says the pupil with whom the dialogue is carried on, “that the life of this man is of so sublime, and so precious a nature as to suffice for satisfying what is due to jus-

¹ ANSELMUS: *Cur Deus Homo*,
II. c. 14, 17.

² Ante, p. 248.

tice for the sins of the whole world, and *infinitely more.*" In another place, it is remarked that "the life of the God-Man is greater incomparably than those sins which are exceeded beyond all power of estimation by his death." And in another passage, the infinite dignity and worth of the atoning death of the incarnate Deity is sought to be exhibited, by the following questions and answers. "If that God-Man were here present before you, and, you meanwhile having a full knowledge of his nature and character, it should be said: 'Unless you slay that Person the whole world and the whole created universe will perish,' would you put him to death, in order to preserve the whole creation? I would not, even if an infinite number of worlds were spread out before me. But suppose again, it were said to you: 'You must either slay him, or the guilt and misery of all the sins of the world will come upon you'? I would say, in answer, that I would sooner incur the aggregated guilt and misery of all the sins, past and future, of this world, and also of all the sin in addition that can possibly be conceived of, rather than incur the guilt of that one sin of killing the Lord of Glory."¹

The limits of this work do not permit a fuller

¹ There is a "direction" for the visitation of the sick, composed by ANSELM (Opera I. 686, Ed Migne), which is not excelled even by the salient evangelism of Luther, in

its thorough rejection of self-merit, and its vital acceptance of the atonement of Christ. It runs as follows, in the version of OWEN (On Justification). "Dost thou

examination of this remarkable composition, which exhibits a depth, breadth, and rigour of thinking, that is not surpassed by any production of the same

I believe that thou canst not be saved but by the death of Christ? The sick man answereth, yes. Then let it be said to him: Go to, then, and whilst thy soul abideth in thee, put all thy confidence in this death alone, place thy trust in no other thing, commit thyself wholly to this death, cover thyself wholly with this alone, cast thyself wholly on this death, wrap thyself wholly in this death. And if God would judge thee, say, Lord, I place the death of our Lord Jesus Christ between me and thy judgment; and otherwise I will not contend, or enter into judgment with thee. And if he shall say unto thee, that thou art a sinner, say, I place the death of our Lord Jesus Christ between thee and my sins. If he shall say unto thee, that thou hast deserved damnation, say, Lord, I put the death of our Lord Jesus Christ between thee and all my sins; and I offer his merits instead of (pro) my own, which I ought to have, but have not. If he shall say that he is angry with thee, say, Lord, I place the death of our Lord Jesus Christ between me and thy anger.} In Migne's edition, after the self-commendation of the soul into the hands of God, there follows an invocation of the

Virgin which is manifestly an interpolation of some zealous and unscrupulous Papist. It is as follows: "*Postea dicat, Maria, mater gratiae, mater misericordiae, tu nos ab hoste protege, et hora mortis suscipe: per tuum ergo, Virgo, Filium, per Patrem, et Spiritum Sanctum, praesens adsis ad obitum meum, quia imminet exitus. Amen.*" The difference between the Mariolatry of this passage, and the Paulinism of the "direction" for visiting the sick, is too great to have proceeded from the same intuition. The use of "*nos*" indicates that it is part of an ecclesiastical liturgy. In the first extract, the first person singular is intense all the way through.

It is difficult in the light of such an extract as this, as well as of the positions of the *Cur Deus Homo?* to account for the statement of NEANDER (Church History, IV. 500), that "the idea of a passive obedience, the idea of a satisfaction by suffering, of an expiation by assuming the punishment of mankind" was "far from Anselm." Neander thinks that Anselm held only to the doctrine of a satisfaction by *obedience* of the law,—what he calls *satisfactio activa*. In this he agrees with BAUR.

extent in theological literature, and deserves to be studied and pondered by every Protestant divine. For it is obvious to remark that such a view of the atonement as is here exhibited is thoroughly Biblical, and thoroughly Protestant. There may be incidental views and positions in this tract, with which the modern theologian would not wholly agree; but certainly so far as the general theory of vicarious satisfaction is concerned this little treatise contains the substance of the Reformed doctrine; while at the same time, it enunciates those philosophical principles which must enter into every scientific construction of this cardinal truth of Christianity. On both the theoretic and the practical side, it is one of the Christian classics.

For in distinctly denying the claims of Satan, and in distinctly asserting the *absolute* and *inde-feasible* claims of justice, the Anselmic theory imparts a necessary and metaphysical character to the doctrine of Atonement, by virtue of which it becomes scientific, and defensible at the bar of first principles. It enables the inquirer to see that no other mode is possible,—that there is no alternative for the divine benevolence, but either to leave the guilty transgressor to the natural and ordinary course of justice, or else to deliver him from it by satisfying its claims for him and in his stead. Baur, indeed, makes the objection that the attribute of justice entirely overrides and suppresses that of love; and that this exact and absolute satisfaction

of all the claims of legal justice, though imparting great compactness and self-consistence to the theory, yet denudes it of all its tender and merciful features and aspects. He remarks,¹ that according to the Anselmic theory of satisfaction, the whole work of redemption is carried out “not for the sake of *man*, but solely for the sake of God,”—for the sake of an inward necessity grounded in the essence of Deity. But this does not follow by any means. On the contrary, the compassion of God is seen in its most tender, because its only *self-sacrificing* form, in this light and flame of justice and law. The “inner necessity” of the divine nature does, indeed, require that justice be maintained by the punishment of sin. But Baur forgets that, in Anselm’s view there are *two* ways in which sin can be punished. And the fact that God chooses the one that spares man and tasks God,—the fact that he satisfies his own justice for the sinner, instead of leaving the sinner to satisfy it by an endless misery in his own person,—shows in the most conclusive and affecting manner that Redemption has *man’s* welfare in view, as well as the best interests of the universe, and the majestic glory of the divine nature. With good right does Anselm say, at the close of his investigation, “the *compassion* of God, which appeared to be lost entirely when we were considering the justice of God and the sin of man,

¹ BAUR: Versöhnungslehre, 170.

we have now found to be so great and so consistent with justice, that nothing greater or more just can be conceived of. For what compassion can equal the words of God the Father addressed to the sinner condemned to eternal punishment, and having no means of redeeming himself: 'Take my only-begotten Son, and make him an offering for thyself'; or the words of the Son: 'Take me, and ransom thy soul'? For this is what both say, when they invite and draw us to faith in the gospel. And can anything be more just than for God to remit all debt, when in this way he receives a satisfaction greater than all the debt, provided only it be offered with the right feeling?"¹

In closing this brief sketch of Anselm's theory of the Atonement, it is evident that if his views and experience, as exhibited in the *Cur Deus Homo?*, could have become those of the church of which he was a member and an ornament, the revival of the doctrine of justification by faith in the Lutheran Reformation would not have been needed. Such a profound and spiritual conception of sin, such a clear and penetrating consciousness of guilt, such adoring and humbling views of the divine majesty, such calm and searching apprehensions of the divine justice, such annihilation of human merit in the eye of law, and such an evangelic estimate of the atonement of the God-Man, if they could have

¹ ANSELMUS: *Cur Deus Homo?* II. 20.

been made elements and influences in the general religious experience of the Western Church, that eleventh century would have exhibited a spirit of judgment and of burning, of profound humility and self-denial, of purity and self-consecration, that would have been a dazzling contrast to the actual religious character which it presents. But the soteriology of Anselm, though exerting no little influence through his immediate pupils, did not pass over into the church at large. The sphere of his activity was the Norman and Anglo-Norman Churches. These were then upon the frontiers of Christendom, and the metropolitan clergy, as well as the imperial church, knew little or nothing of that vigorous and vital piety, and that profound and thorough theologizing, which in one of the darkest centuries in church history was radiating from the cloister of Bec, and the see of Canterbury.¹

§ 2. *Soteriology of Abelard and Lombard.*

The Roman Catholic Church in the Middle Ages, as does every ecclesiastical organization of the present day that is connected with the state, contained within its communion a variety of opinions and views, some of which were directly op-

¹ For the life and labors of Anselm, see the excellent monograph of HASSE.

posed to others. To the theory of Anselm which we have just exhibited, stands in the very sharpest contrast the theory of *Abelard* († 1142). The acuteness of this Schoolman was not sufficiently regulated by moral earnestness, and informed by a profound religious experience. We perceive immediately, in passing from the writings of Anselm to those of Abelard, that we are in communication with a very different spirit. The lofty heights of contemplation and the abysmal depths of experience have vanished. Attributes like that of justice, and facts like that of sin, are far less transcendent in their meaning and importance. The atonement is looked at from a much lower level.

Abelard begins and ends with the benevolence of God. This is divorced from and not limited by his holiness, and is regarded as endowed with the liberty of indifference. The deity can pardon upon repentance. There is nothing in the Divine Nature which necessitates a satisfaction for past transgression, antecedently to remission of penalty. Like creating out of nothing, redemption may and does take place by a *fiat*, by which sin is abolished by a word, and the sinner is received into favour. Nothing is needed but penitence in order to the remission of sin. The object of the incarnation and death of Christ, consequently, is to produce sorrow in the human soul. The life and sufferings of the God-Man were intended to exert a moral impression upon a hard and impenitent heart, which is thereby

* *command*

melted into contrition, and then received into favour by the boundless compassion of God. Abelard attributes much to the intercessory agency of the Redeemer. As the God-Man who has perfectly obeyed the divine law, Christ possesses a weight of influence with the Father which secures blessings for the sinful. In such connections, he alludes to the idea of justice. Christ was perfectly holy and just himself, and it is "just" that such a being should be heard in behalf of those for whom he became incarnate and suffered. But by justice is here meant merely fitness or propriety. When it comes to the properly judicial and retributive attribute in the Divine Nature, Abelard denies the doctrine of satisfaction, and contends that God may remit the penalty by a sovereign act of will. The only characteristic which the theory of Abelard possesses in common with that of Anselm is its denial that the claims of Satan were satisfied by the death of the Redeemer. "If a slave," says Abelard, "should desert his master, his master could justly demand that he be given up. But if a slave should seduce his fellow-slave from obedience to the master of both of them, how absurd it would be for this *slave* to set up a claim to the services of the one whom he had seduced."¹

That very celebrated Schoolman *Peter Lombard* († 1164), whose influence and authority in the

¹ ABELARD: Com. ad Rom. Lib. CÖLLN: Dogmengeschichte, II. II; quoted in MÜNSCHER-VON 163.

Roman Church is hardly second to that of Aquinas himself, declared decidedly for the soteriology of Abelard, and against that of Anselm. In his theory, the influence of the death of Christ is spent upon the subjective character of the individual soul, in softening, subduing, and sanctifying. At the same time, however, Lombard's representation apparently, but only apparently, verges towards the Anselmic theory. The claims of justice are met to a limited extent by the sufferings of the Redeemer. They deliver man from the *temporal* penal consequences of sin, provided baptism be administered and penance be performed. Lombard's principal work, entitled *Liber Sententiarum*, is a collection of all the views of the Roman Catholic Church, and an attempt to combine them into one system. But such an eclecticism as this, which endeavours to harmonize the theory of Anselm with that of Abelard, must necessarily fail. Lombard's real views were the same as those of Abelard, and the fact that the work of Christ must be supplemented by baptism and penance accounts for the remarkable popularity which the *Liber Sententiarum* has always enjoyed in the Papal Church.

§ 3. *Soteriology of Bernard and Hugh St. Victor.*

In the writings of *Bernard of Clairvaux* (†1153), we meet a more evangelical view of the atoning

work of Christ. He combats the soteriology of Abelard, as he also does his other doctrinal opinions. First, he opposes the view which Abelard held in common with Anselm, that Satan has no claims upon man, and that no Satanic claims are met by the sacrifice of Christ. Bernard, though not a mystic proper, had a mystical tendency. He belonged, as was noticed in the history of Philosophical Systems, to the Mystic Scholastics. Deeply devout in his spirit, he also cherished a high veneration for the opinions of the Fathers, especially Augustine. The rejection of a theory which entered so extensively into the soteriology of the Primitive Fathers, as did that of Satan's claims, was regarded with disfavour by Bernard, even though the pious and orthodox Anselm had given it his sanction. Connected, moreover, as it was in the instance of Abelard with other views that were undoubtedly heterodox, and with a rationalistic spirit, it was natural that a mind inclined like Bernard's to rest in a traditional and received orthodoxy should oppose this rejection of the old doctrine of Satan's claims.

Secondly, Bernard opposes the opinion of Abelard that remission of sins may occur by a sovereign act of will, without any satisfaction of the claims of law. His own religious experience was too thorough, and his respect for the opinions of the past too implicit, for him to adopt a theory that renders the Old Testament sacrificial ceremony an inexplicable enig-

ma, deprives the New Testament representations of their meaning, and agrees substantially with the later Socinian theory of redemption. At the same time, we do not find Bernard agreeing with Anselm respecting the metaphysical necessity of satisfaction. He hesitates to denominate sin an infinite evil, and to attribute to it an infinite guilt. As a consequence, he is not boldly distinct in asserting the infinite worth of the satisfaction of Christ. He is not ready, with Anselm, to assert an absolute necessity, intrinsic to the divine nature, for an atonement, but prefers to stand with Augustine upon the ground of a relative necessity founded upon the optional will and arrangement of God. In short, the difference between these two theologians, who undoubtedly were much alike so far as concerns their religious experience and practical use of truth, consists in the fact that Anselm was a metaphysician, and could not stop until he had traced back his faith to the eternal and necessary principles of the divine nature and government; while Bernard could hold the doctrine at a middle position, without subjecting it to the rigorous tests and conclusions of science, to whose methods he was somewhat disinclined, from his mystical tendency.

Of similar general character with Bernard, was that other interesting Mystic Scholastic, *Hugo St. Victor* († 1140). His view of the atonement, however, approaches somewhat nearer, in technical respects, to that of Anselm, than did that of Bernard.

While unwilling to give up the old patristic notion of a satisfaction of Satan's claims, he is distinct in asserting and exhibiting the relations of the work of Christ to the divine nature. The sacrificial element, as distinguished from the legal, is very apparent in this Schoolman. He speaks often of the Deity as *propitiated*, and fastens upon those passages of Scripture in which this Old Testament idea is presented. "The Son of God," he says, "by becoming a man paid man's debt to the Father, and by dying expiated man's guilt."¹ Here, both the legal and the sacrificial elements are combined in one proposition.

§ 4. *Soteriology of Bonaventura.*

Thus far, we have been examining the opinions prevalent in the first part of the Scholastic Age,—viz., in the 11th and 12th centuries. The highest intensity and energy of the systematizing spirit does not display itself until we pass into the last half of the period. The Schoolmen of the 13th and 14th centuries, though originating no views of more originality, on either side of the subject, than those of Anselm and Abelard, yet put the existing materials, whether derived from the Patristic or the Earlier Scholastic soteriology, into a more systematic and

¹ HUGO ST. VICTOR: *De sacramentis*, c. 4.

comprehensive form. Among these later Schoolmen, we shall direct attention first, and with some particularity, to *Bonaventura* (†1272).

This author, following the analytic and exhaustive method introduced by Peter Lombard, discusses the subject of the atonement under the six following questions. First: Whether it was fit in itself (*congruum*) that human nature should be restored by God. Secondly: Whether it was more fitting that human nature should be restored by a satisfaction of justice, than by any other method. Thirdly: Whether any sinless creature could render satisfaction for the whole human race. Fourthly: Whether any sinful man assisted by divine grace could make satisfaction for his own sins. Fifthly: Whether God was under obligation to accept the method of satisfaction by the death of Christ. Sixthly: Whether God could have saved the human race by some other method. We present the entire plan of his work, not for the purpose of following it out into each of its divisions, but in order to show by an example the acute, analytic, and all-comprehending method of handling subjects which was so peculiar to the later Schoolmen like *Bonaventura*, *Alexander Hales*, *Albertus Magnus*, and *Thomas Aquinas*. When subjected to the torture of such a scrutinizing and searching analysis, a doctrine or truth must necessarily be torn into pieces, and examined down to its minutest filaments and elements. The invention of the Scholastic method had the

same effect in the intellectual world, that the invention of the cotton gin, and of the roller with revolving knives, has had in the material. Subjects are reduced to their fibre.

In order to give, within as brief a space as possible, the views of Bonaventura, we will exhibit the trains of thought in his answer to the second of these questions, viz.: "Was it more fitting that human nature should be restored by a satisfaction of justice, than by any other method?" In answering this question in the affirmative, Bonaventura proves that the restoration of human nature by a satisfaction is the most fitting method, because most conducive to the maintenance: 1. of the Divine justice; 2. of the Divine wisdom; 3. of the Divine omnipotence; 4. of the Divine honour and majesty. He comes to his conclusion, by the following train of reasoning. Redemption by the method of legal satisfaction is the most fitting method, because God is both merciful and just, and consequently *both* attributes should be manifested and maintained together. Hence it was fitting that God should demand satisfaction for the dishonour and injury done to himself by man's transgression, and if man could not render this satisfaction, to provide a Mediator who could satisfy for him and in his stead. If God had been inherently unwilling to pardon sin, and had inexorably insisted upon the infliction of penalty upon the criminal, he could not have manifested his attribute of mercy. If, on the

other hand, he had pardoned sin without any satisfaction of law, he could not have manifested his attribute of justice. Thus the method of forgiveness through a satisfaction is the most befitting, taking into view the *entire* nature and character of God. But the same fitness is apparent if we take into view the nature and character of man. The object in restoring the human race is to conduct it from a state of guilt to a state of justification, and from a state of misery to a state of glory. Inasmuch as man has done dishonour to the majesty of God, it is fitting that he should do honour to the justice of God by enduring punishment; and as it is more praiseworthy in the innocent man to obtain eternal life by merit than without merit, so also it is more praiseworthy in the guilty man to be reconciled to God through a satisfaction of all legal claims, than by a method that disregards and tramples upon them.

After having in this manner established the affirmative of the question, Bonaventura proceeds to specify and refute some objections to his position. 1. It is first objected, that nothing can be so fitting and proper in God as the manifestation of his kindness and compassion, and that the forgiveness of sin without a penal satisfaction would be the greatest proof of such compassion. To this it is replied, first, that the fitness of anything is founded in its necessity. It is necessary that God should be just, but not necessary that he should show mercy.

Hence, it follows that compassion towards a criminal is not more fitting and proper than justice towards him. But, secondly, it is not true that remission by a mere volition that involves no sacrifice upon the part of God is a greater evidence of love, than remission through the blood of his Only-Begotten Son. There is no benevolence greater than that which endures suffering and death for another's welfare. 2. It is secondly objected, that the Divine independence and self-sufficiency would appear in a finer light, if God were to pardon without any satisfaction. To this it is replied, that the requirement of an atonement does not imply any conditioning of the Creator by the creature, for it is a *divine* attribute which demands the satisfaction of law. God is wholly independent of man in the work of redemption, though not independent of his own nature and character. As God requires obedience to his law, not because he is dependent upon his creatures, but because his nature and attributes demand it, so he requires an atonement for the same reason. 3. It is thirdly objected, that the Divine omnipotence would be more impressively exhibited in pardoning sin without a satisfaction, than with one. To this it is replied, that if the Divine omnipotence should abolish the claims of the Divine justice by an act of arbitrary will, one attribute in the Godhead would destroy another. But this would be suicidal; and a suicidal exercise of power is not the most impressive mode of ex-

hibiting power. Even if this could be conceived as possible, and the Divine omnipotence were regarded as able to restore the human race by a word, in the exercise of a naked and lawless almightiness, God would yet be obliged to prefer the more difficult because the more *regular* method of restoration through an atonement. 4. It is objected, in the fourth place, that the restoration of man without a satisfaction of justice would lay him under greater obligation to love and praise God. This is denied, because the surrendry of the Only-Begotten Son of God obligates the redeemed far more than a mere remission of sin without any substituted suffering would. That God incarnate endured the pains of death for us is a fact of even greater impressiveness than the forgiveness of sin itself. The foundation of human salvation is even greater than the salvation. 5. Fifthly, it is objected that God by forgiving sin without an atonement sets an example that can be imitated by man, while on the other scheme he cannot be imitated by his creatures. To this it is replied, that man in his private and individual capacity is not required to imitate God in all respects, and particularly when the *judicial* attributes of his character are involved. Punishment and retribution belong solely to the Godhead. "Vengeance is *mine*, I will repay, saith the Lord" (Rom. xii. 19). This attribute cannot be wielded at all by man, except as delegated to civil power and authority. But in respect to be-

nevolence, and the disposition to sacrifice self for the good of another,—the chief attribute which the individual man needs to have in view for imitation,—God in giving his Son as a judicial substitute for his rebellious creatures has set forth the highest possible example for imitation. 6. It is objected, in the sixth place, that it would be more fitting in God to restore the human race immediately, and without any such intervention of the creature as occurs in the assumption of human nature by the Son. Immediate rather than instrumental agency is more worthy of God. This is denied, because it is characteristic of Infinite Goodness to permit the creature to co-work with itself, so far as the nature of the creature allows of this. In the work of redemption, such a co-operation is not only possible but necessary, in order to sympathy between the Redeemer and the redeemed. In the work of creation no such co-operation of the Finite with the Infinite is possible, because the energy is not spent upon already existing materials.

In answering the third and fourth questions, viz.: whether a sinless created being could make satisfaction for the human race, and whether a sinful man if assisted by divine power could atone for his own sins,—Bonaventura takes the negative with energy and decision. Any single individual, however exalted he might be, is still finite, and compared with God, whose honour has been injured, is

on a common level with all other creatures. Consequently, his suffering would not be equivalent to the sufferings of an entire race of beings. Moreover, the idea of a satisfaction requires that it be rendered by the same species of being by whom the offence was committed. Consequently, the atonement for man's sin must be made in man's nature, and not in an angelic. It would not be fitting that the human race should owe its salvation to another species of created beings. Hence only a God-Man can render satisfaction,—*man*, that humanity may suffer; *God*, that the suffering may be of infinite value. In answer to the objection, that the life of Christ was of more value than his death, as life generally is better than death, and that consequently the life without the death would have been a more adequate satisfaction, Bonaventura asserts that the idea of satisfaction necessarily involves that of penal *suffering*, thus identifying those two conceptions, satisfaction and expiation, which Baur, we have noticed, mistakenly asserts are not identified with each other in the Anselmic theory.

To conclude this notice of Bonaventura, we remark that the influence of Anselm upon him is very apparent, and very great. He is on the side of Anselm St. Victor and Bernard, against Abelard and Peter Lombard, and exhibits the truth with a clearness of understanding, an acuteness of analysis, and a systematizing talent that render him one of the most interesting writers among the Schoolmen. At

the same time, this writer, like others of whom we have spoken, differed from Anselm in respect to the question: Is this conceded necessity of a satisfaction of divine justice, absolute or relative? Is satisfaction of law necessary because God wills it, or does he will it because it is necessary? We have found Anselm maintaining the absolute and metaphysical necessity of satisfaction in order to remission, and declaring it to be impossible from the very nature of God to dispense with it, if the guilty is to be saved. As the necessary nature of right and wrong does not depend upon the optional will of God, neither does the necessity of an atonement rest upon it. He was led to this because he regarded it as *contradictory to the idea of God*, to conceive of a schism in the Deity, and an intestine conflict between the divine attributes. He held that *the philosophical idea of God excludes that possibility of acting contrary to truth and justice, by the exercise of bare will, which attends a finite and probationary nature like that of man*. Anselm, consequently, could not distinguish as did Bonaventura and some of the later Schoolmen, two kinds of omnipotence in the divine nature, one of which is regulated, and the other unregulated, by the other attributes of the Godhead. Alexander Hales († 1245), in answering the standing question: Can human nature be restored without a satisfaction? brings out this distinction of an abstract and a concrete omnipotence in the following manner. “When it

is said that God cannot restore human nature without a satisfaction, it is to be observed, with due respect to the opinion of the blessed Anselm, that divine power is to be contemplated in two forms,—absolutely, or by itself alone, and relatively, or in connection with other attributes (*cum ordine*). In contemplating the divine power as absolute, we conceive of a certain infinite energy (*virtus*) in the Deity that is abstracted from the rest of his nature, and transcends all limitations; and with respect to *this* form, the divine power cannot have terms set to it (*non est determinare*); and it is conceded that considered in *this* mode, the divine omnipotence is able to restore human nature without a satisfaction. But in contemplating the divine power relatively, we consider it in its references to justice and mercy, and so considered, it is conceded that omnipotence can do nothing except in accordance with justice and mercy.”¹

The doctrine that there is an abstract omnipotence in God by which he might have pardoned sin without an atonement, if applied by a rigorous logic, would neutralize all that clear and cogent argumentation which we have seen Bonaventura employed to show, that it is “more fitting that human nature should be restored by a satisfaction of jus-

¹HALES : Summa, Pars III, Works II. 125 (Harpers' Ed.); Quaestio i, Membrum 4. Quoted CUDWORTH : Intellectual System, by BAUR : Versöhnungslehre, II. 532 (Tegg's Ed.). 215. Note. Compare HALLAM :

tice, than by any other method.”¹ For it implies that it is possible for the natural attributes of God to be at war with his moral ones; in other words, that the Infinite Creator is subject to that same possibility of illegitimate action that pertains to a finite and mutable creature. It implies that the philosophical idea of the Deity does not prevent his being conceived of as acting contrary to a part of his own nature.² The doctrine of the metaphysical possi-

¹ BONAVENTURA sometimes makes statements respecting the two kinds of omnipotence that are in flat contradiction to his reply to the objection, that “the omnipotence of God would appear in a more striking light, if sin were remitted without an atonement.” He says, e. g.: “God might have liberated man by the method of mere compassion, nor would there have been anything prejudicial to justice in this, if God had so willed it. For he could have abolished all demerit, and have restored man to his primitive condition by his omnipotence alone, and there would have remained in the universe nothing inordinate nor unpunished.” BAUR: *Versöhnungslehre*, 228.

² This idea of an “abstract” omnipotence accompanies the history of the doctrine of atonement down from the earliest, to the latest times. In the Ancient Church, *Irenaeus* (*Adv. Haer.* III.

xx.), *Cyril of Jerusalem*, *Basil*, and *Ambrose*, contend for an absolute necessity of Christ’s satisfaction; while *Athanasius*, *Augustine*, *Cyril of Alexandria*, *Theodoret*, and *John Damascene* assert only a relative necessity. In the Mediaeval Church, *Anselm*, and perhaps *Hugh St. Victor*, assert an absolute, while *Abelard*, *Bernard*, *Lombard*, *Hales*, *Bonaventura*, and *Aquinas* (*Cont. Gent.* IV. liv. lv.) concede only a relative necessity. In the 17th century, the subject was discussed by *Owen*, and *Twisse* (the prolocutor of the Westminster Assembly); the former asserting, and the latter denying, the absolute necessity of a satisfaction. See OWEN’S tract, *On the Nature of Justice*. GERHARD (*Loci* IV. lxxxiv.) claims that Augustine wavered between the two views; but he is mistaken, as is evident from *Aug. De Trinitate*, XIII. x. et alia. NEANDER (IV. 497) remarks, that Augustine “started

bility of the remission of sin without a satisfaction of justice, furthermore, implies that the natural attributes of God are more central and ultimate than his moral and ethical,—that might in the Deity is more fundamental and absolute than right.¹ Logically, it takes the key-stone out of the arch upon which the whole doctrine of an atonement rests. For on this scheme, when the final centre of truth is reached, a satisfaction of justice can be dispensed with; omnipotence in God “cannot have terms set to it,” and therefore it can abolish the claims of law, without satisfying them. It was, however, merely a speculative opinion in many instances. For many of its advocates were equally earnest with their opponents, in contending for the inexorable necessity of a satisfaction, when the attribute of justice is taken into view; but they were not equally consistent with them, in holding the opinion that justice

the inquiry whether any other way would have been possible; and, considered from the point of view of the divine omnipotence, he believed the answer must be in the affirmative.” *Hooker* (Eccl. Pol. V. li.) teaches a relative necessity.

¹ OWEN (Dissertation on Divine Justice, Chap. II.) notices the self-contradiction there is, in conceding that justice is an essential attribute in God, and yet that it can be set aside by an act of physical omnipotence, in the following terms: “To me, these argu-

ments are altogether astonishing; viz., ‘That sin-punishing justice should be natural to God, and yet that God, sin being supposed to exist, *may either exercise it or not exercise it.*’ They may also say, and with as much propriety, that truth is natural to God; but upon a supposition that he were to converse with man, *he might either use it, or not*; or, that omnipotence is natural to God; but upon a supposition that he were inclined to do any work without (extra) himself, *that it was free to him to act omnipotently or not.*”

itself might be abstracted, and the problem solved at a yet more central point in the divine nature, at which power is isolated from all the ethical attributes of Deity, and becomes lawless, and capable of doing anything and everything.¹

§ 5. *Soteriology of Aquinas.*

Thomas Aquinas († 1274) deserves particular attention, in the history of the doctrine of atonement. He is the strongest systematizer among the Schoolmen, and on account of his important position in the Mediaeval Church and theology merits a detailed examination. But inasmuch as his opinions upon the atonement resemble so closely those of Bonaventura, whose views we have discussed somewhat at length, we are relieved from the necessity of a minute investigation.

The dogmatic views of Aquinas respecting the atonement are found in the third part of his *Summa Theologiae*, or system of divinity.² He employs the same analytic method so common to the Schoolmen, and exhausts the subject by a series of questions and their answers. The first inquiry is con-

¹It is important to inquire, whether oftentimes this might not have been the question in the mind: "Could not the Deity have *provided an atonement* in another way?" This is very

different from saying that he could have dispensed with satisfaction altogether.

²AQUINAS: *Summa Theologiae* Quaestiones, XLVI.-XLIX.

cerning the *nature* of Christ's Passion. He endeavours to exhibit its nature, by proposing twelve queries, of which we give only the two following :

1. Was it necessary that Christ should suffer in order to the salvation of man ? 2. Was any other method of human salvation possible ? Aquinas answers the first of these questions, in accordance with the metaphysics of Aristotle, by distinguishing the different modes of conceiving of "necessity." If, by necessity be meant that which from its very nature cannot but be, and whose non-existence cannot be conceived of, then there was no necessity for the sufferings of Christ. That the Logos should become incarnate, and die upon the cross, is not founded in any antecedent and *a-priori* necessity in the constitution of the Divine Being or of the universe. The necessity is subsequent and *a poste-*, *riori*,—i. e., is consequent upon the origin of moral evil, and even then only in case it is proposed to save transgressors from the consequences of their transgression, a procedure which is itself entirely optional upon the part of God, inasmuch as he is under no necessity to redeem mankind from their sins. Again, if by necessity external compulsion be meant, then the sufferings of Christ were not necessary. But, thirdly, a thing is necessary when it is indispensable in order to the attainment of some other thing, and in this sense the death of Christ is necessary. It is not, indeed, a matter of necessity, that man's sin should be pardoned, but if it be par-

done, it is necessary that Christ should first make satisfaction to justice for its commission. Supposing the fact of sin and the fact of a divine intention to deliver man from it be given, then, says Aquinas, the sufferings of Christ become necessary, both in respect to the attribute of justice, and the attribute of mercy,—in respect to justice, because Christ by his sufferings must completely satisfy its claims; in respect to mercy, because, in man's condition of inability to satisfy the demands of the law for himself, God can display no higher compassion than in providing a satisfaction for him, and in his stead.

In answering the second question, viz.: Whether redemption could have been accomplished in some other method? Aquinas defines his position respecting the metaphysical necessity of atonement. Even though it is, abstractly considered, possible to save man in some other manner, it becomes impossible, he says, when once God has determined to accomplish the work in the way and manner he has. Aquinas, like Bonaventura, holds only to a relative necessity of the atonement. He, too, while contending with great earnestness and intellectual acumen, that a satisfaction for sin must be made to justice before sin can be remitted, *if, and so long as, justice is taken into the account*, yet asserts the possibility of throwing this attribute out of the account, in a determination of what the Supreme Being is able to do. His reasoning is as follows. "If God had willed to liberate man from sin with-

out any satisfaction, he would not have done anything contrary to justice. For he is not like a human or finite judge. The human judge cannot, without injury to justice, dismiss a criminal without punishment, because it is his function to inflict punishment upon crime committed against *another* than himself,—say, against another man, or against the general weal, or against a higher officer than himself. But God is the supreme judge and chief good of the whole universe, and there is no other being than himself with whose interests he, as a judge, is intrusted. Consequently, if *God* sees fit to remit that penalty which has been affixed to law only for his *own* glory, no injustice is done, more than when a man forgives his fellow-man an injury done to *himself* alone, without requiring any satisfaction at his hands.” This reasoning, it is evident, is founded upon the same view with that of Bonaventura, respecting the relation of the physical to the moral attributes of God. It assumes that the former are more central and fundamental than the latter, and asserts the possibility of their disjunction in the Divine administration. It implies the right of omnipotence to abolish justice; the right of power to nullify law. For although the offence of sin is committed against the same Being who is the judge and punisher of sin, yet if as sovereign he should pardon it without the satisfaction of law, he would unquestionably put honour upon his omnipotence and dishonour upon his justice. The physical at-

tribute would thus be all-controlling, and the Divine nature would become a mere unlimited and characterless force. An inward schism and self-defection would take place in the Deity, whereby one part of his nature, by a purely arbitrary act of his own, would be set in contradiction to another part; whereby the physical attributes would be arrayed in hostility to the ethical, in the very place of their harmony and equilibrium.

We find in Aquinas several new points raised, respecting the work of Christ. The first relates to the mode in which the atonement of the Son of God becomes available to the believer. Aquinas answers the objection that merit and demerit are personal, and that therefore vicarious satisfaction is impossible, by the doctrine of the *unio mystica* existing between the believer and the Redeemer.¹ Founding his view upon the statement of St. Paul (Eph. v. 30), that believers are members of the body, the flesh, and the bones of the Lord, he supposes,

¹The word "mystical" was employed in the sense of "mysterious," and signified that which is unique, and anomalous. Christ's Person is "mystical"; his sufferings are "mystical"; and the relation between him and the believer is "mystical." OWEN (On Justification, Ch. VIII.) remarks that "Christ and believers are neither one natural person, nor a legal or political person, nor any such person as the laws,

customs, or usages of men know or allow of. They are one *mystical* person, whereof, although there may be some imperfect resemblances found in natural or political unions, yet the union from whence that denomination is taken between him and us, is of that nature, and arises from such reasons and causes, as no personal union among men (or the union of many persons) has any concern in."

that a peculiar species of connection exists between the Church and its Head, by virtue of which the common principles and maxims that pertain to individual and secular life cease to be applicable. The relation of the believer to the Son of God is not the external one, of one individual to another individual, but an anomalous one, whereby a communion of interest and moral life is established, so that the sinner united by faith to his Saviour may become a ground and cause of judicial infliction upon his atoning Substitute, and the incarnate Word may become the sinner's sin-offering, and atonement. We do not find in Aquinas very full, or very clear, representations upon this difficult point; but this idea of the mystical oneness between Christ and the Church pervades his soteriology with considerable boldness. Though allusions are made to it in the earlier writers, especially in connection with the cognate doctrine of the unity of Adam and his posterity, yet it may be said that the "angelic doctor," as he was termed in the panegyrical phraseology of the time, was the first to give it prominence in the theory of Redemption.

The second new point we notice in this writer is the distinction between *satisfactio* and *meritum*. In the Anselmic theory, the work of Christ was contemplated in its relations to justice solely. The deliverance of man from condemnation was the great object in view. This is the prevalent mode of contemplating the subject in the Patristic, and

the Earlier Scholastic soteriology. But we find Aquinas raising that question which was afterwards so earnestly discussed in the Calvinistic and Arminian controversies of the 17th century,—the question, namely, whether Christ did not earn for the believer a title to eternal life, as well as of freedom from condemnation to eternal death. Aquinas answers this question in the affirmative, and makes the technical distinction between the *satisfaction* which Christ made by his sufferings to justice, and the *merit* of his obedience to the law by virtue of which the redeemed are entitled to the rewards of eternity. In other words, we find in the theory of Aquinas an anticipation of the later distinction between the “active” and “passive” righteousness of Christ.

A third new point observable in the soteriology of Aquinas is the doctrine of a *superabundance* in the merits of Christ. The Passion of the Redeemer was not merely sufficient, it was also a superabundant satisfaction for the sins of the human race. This position needs to be carefully distinguished from the statements of Anselm, in which he gives expression to his view of the infinite worth of Christ's satisfaction. There was little danger of magnifying the value of the Redeemer's Passion, in connection with the infinite demerit of sin, and hence the Anselmic theory is far more satisfactory than that of Aquinas, in respect to the point under review. This later Schoolman, though intending to

follow the opinions of the earlier, imperceptibly departs from him, by reason of a less spiritual and profound view of the nature of moral evil. Hence, in regard to the distinction between justification and sanctification, we find Aquinas involved in the confusion which we have noticed in Augustine. There is much less affinity between the soteriology of the Reformation and that of the "angelic doctor," than between it and that of Anselm; and, to this day, the Roman Catholic theologians of the more intelligent and devout class, who are not satisfied with the lowest forms of the Papal soteriology, and yet are not prepared for the New Testament theory in its purity, appropriate the opinions of Aquinas rather than those of Anselm. There is little doubt that the doctrine of a superabundance in the satisfaction of Christ, in connection with a defective view of the degree and amount of evil that was to be atoned for by it, contributed toward the distinctively Papal theory of works of supererogation, and of a treasury of merit at the command of the Church.

The distinctively Romish soteriology of Aquinas is betrayed when he comes to treat of the remission of sin, and particularly when he specifies the *ground* of it. Anselm, we have seen, referred it solely to the atoning work of Christ. In his theory, justification is the simple and sole act of God, whereby he acquits the guilty on the ground of the infinite satisfaction that has been made for sin. So far as the pardon of sin is concerned, man can do

nothing. The criminal cannot pardon himself, neither can he purchase or earn a pardon by satisfying the claims of law. He cannot do this *in part*. The sinner is *totally* dependent upon God for the remission of sin, both in respect to the declarative act by which he is acquitted, and in respect to all that judicial procedure and apparatus of atonement which must precede the declarative or justifying act. In the Anselmic scheme, as in the Protestant, remission of sin is the pure, simple, and sole act of Deity, without any co-operation or assistance from humanity.¹ But not so in the theory of Aquinas. Notwithstanding all that he has said, and well said, respecting the claims of justice, and the vicarious satisfaction of the Son of God, Aquinas, as does the subsequent Tridentine scheme, vitiates all that he has hitherto maintained on these points, by teaching that the remission of sin depends *to a certain extent* upon the character and conduct of the individual, *as a ground, or procuring cause*. The confusion of justification with sanctification, which we have observed in some passages of Augustine, re-appears in Aquinas in a more distinct and settled

¹Romans xi. 6. "And if by grace, then it is no more of works: otherwise grace is no more grace. But if it be of works, then it is no more grace, otherwise work is no more work. Galatians v. 2-5. "Behold I Paul say unto you, that if ye be

circumcised, Christ shall profit you nothing. For I testify again to every man that is circumcised, that he is a debtor to do the whole law. Christ is become of no effect unto you, whosoever of you are justified by the law: ye are fallen from grace."

statement. In conformity with this view, Aquinas represents the expiatory value of the atonement as dependent upon the believer's conformity to law. In order that the satisfaction of Christ may be an adequate one for the sinner, he must be "configured" to Christ. The atonement is not sufficient alone and by itself. It must be supplemented by personal character and good works, and in some cases by penances. This "configuration" to Christ, requisite in order that His satisfaction may be complete, is brought about in a sacramental manner by baptism. In case of sin after baptism, the believer must be "configured" to Christ by a personal suffering in the form of penance, as well as by the acceptance of the sufferings of the Redeemer. Aquinas concedes that the suffering of Christ is of far greater value than that of the man himself, yet plainly teaches that the latter enters as a co-operating factor with the former, in laying the foundation for the remission of the committed sin. It is not in itself sufficient to atone for sin, but in connection with the sacrifice of Christ it has a value of its own which cannot be dispensed with in making up the full sum of legal satisfaction. The penance of the baptized man is imperfect; it has not the merit of condignity (*condigna peccato*); but it is graciously accepted in connection with, and reliance upon, the satisfaction of Christ.¹

¹ AQUINAS (Summa, Quaestio requisite that those who sin after
xlvi. Artic. 3) asserts that "it is baptism should be configured to

We have in these views of Aquinas sufficient reason for asserting, that notwithstanding the correctness of his soteriology up to a certain point and in certain relations, the fatal error of the Romish theory is contained in it. This error, to state it in a word, does not consist in denying the need of a satisfaction of justice, or even the great value of Christ's satisfaction for sin, but in asserting in connection with this, the necessity of a *co-operating* and *completing* satisfaction on the part of man. The amount of this finite element varies in different writers and ages of the Romish Church, but the presence of the element itself in any amount is what

the suffering Redeemer through something of penalty or passion which they endure in themselves, which nevertheless is far from being a strict offset for sin (*condigna peccato*), even though the sacrifice of Christ coöperate with it." Again (*Summa*, Pars III. Quæst. i. Art. 1), Aquinas distinguishes two kinds of satisfaction,—that of the God-man, and that of man. The first is that of "condign" or strict satisfaction, as the act of God incarnate. The second, that of man, may be said to be "imperfectly sufficient, by reason of the willingness of the offended party to accept it, although it is not a strict and literal satisfaction." The boldest form of stating the doctrine of a coöper-

ating satisfaction on the part of man is found in GABRIEL BIEL, (*Sententiae*, Lib. III. Distinct. xix, Conclus. 5). "Though Christ's passion is the principal ground of merit upon which grace is conferred, nevertheless it is not the sole and total meritorious cause, because with the merits of Christ there always concurs some act of him who receives grace, which [act] has either the merit of condignity, or congruity." See BAUR: *Versöhnungslehre*, 243, 351. Compare with Aquinas's distinction of two kinds of satisfaction, one of which does not satisfy, PASCAL's account of the "proximate power" and "sufficient grace" of the Jesuits, in the first and second Provincial Letters.

distinguishes the distinctively Papal from the distinctively Protestant theory of the atonement.¹

§ 6. *Soteriology of Duns Scotus.*

A controversy respecting the atonement sprang up between *Duns Scotus* and the followers of Aquinas, which involved fundamental principles in ethics and religion, and divided the Romish Church into two great parties of Thomists and Scotists. Duns Scotus denied the Anselmic doctrine that sin is of infinite demerit, and consequently denied that the suffering of Christ is of infinite value.² The relation of the atonement of the Son of God to the sin of mankind, he maintained, is merely an arbitrary and constituted one. The principle upon which he

¹ The thoroughly Papal idea of *adding* to personal merit by works is expressed with great naïveté by ST. SIMON (*Memoires*, Vol. I. Chap. iii, St. John's Translation). "The king particularly expressed his regret that my father [who had just deceased] had not been able to receive the last sacraments. I was able to say that a very short time before, my father had retired for several days to Saint Lazare, where was his confessor, *and added something on the piety of his life.*" The idea of a good man's expiating his own sins in part is continually appearing in

the lives of the most exemplary of the Roman Catholics. For example, TILLEMONT, a Jansenist, and a very devout and pure-minded man, thus writes to his brother who was sub-prior of La Trappe: "Everybody is not obliged to fast as you do at La Trappe, but everybody is obliged to resist the desires of concupiscence, which pride and the remains of our corruption constantly excite in us, and *to expiate the sins* into which we thus fall." BEARD: Port Royal II. 182.

² BAUR: *Versöhnungslehre*, 250 sq.

founded his theory was: "Tantum valet omne creatum oblatum, pro quanto acceptat Deus illud, et non plus."¹ There is no *interior* fitness and adaptation between Christ's atonement and man's sin. God was pleased to accept this particular sacrifice as an offset and equivalent for human transgression, not from any intrinsic value in it, but because he so pleased. He might have accepted any other substitute, or he might have dispensed with accepting any substitute at all.² In opposition to this view, the followers of Aquinas maintained the old Anselmic theory of the infinite demerit of sin, and the infinite and objective value of Christ's satisfaction. In this controversy, the soteriology of the adherents of Aquinas is more in harmony with the Protestant view and feeling; so that we might reverse what Melanchthon remarks of Augustine, and say, that "the opinion of Aquinas is more pertinent, fit and convenient when he disputed than it was when not disputing." And yet it would be difficult to see how the followers of Aquinas could in the end avoid the conclusions of Duns Scotus, if they started from that doctrine of a *relative* necessity of satisfying justice which we have seen Aquinas held, in common with all the Schoolmen excepting Anselm. If omnipotence and bare will are more ultimate in the Divine Nature than justice and truth are, then it is difficult

¹ DUNS SCOTUS: Dist. xx. lib. ² GERHARDUS: Loci Theologici, iii, in Sent. Lombardi, Quaest. I. Tom. IV. p. 122.

to see how Scotus can be censured for holding, that in the last analysis God can dispense with an atonement altogether, and that whatever value the existing judicial provision possesses in the divine plan, it possesses not in itself, but solely by virtue of its optional acceptance by the Omnipotent One who is not limited by anything, not even by his own moral attributes. The controversy, however, ran high between the adherents of Aquinas and Scotus,—the Dominican order generally siding with the former, and the Franciscan with the latter. The Nominalists in philosophy also naturally favoured the views of Scotus, as his theory was that of a nominal and putative satisfaction, in distinction from a real and objective one. The extravagantly speculative minds of the age, those who have given the reputation of hair-splitting and excessive dialectics to Scholasticism, also adopted the positions of Scotus.

§ 7. *Recapitulatory Survey.*

Casting a swift glance backward over this Scholastic period, we recapitulate the following facts, as the summary of what we have found in the history of the doctrine of Atonement.

1. The doctrine of vicarious satisfaction, or substituted penalty, was the *general* form of doctrine among all classes of minds within the pale of the Church, as it was in the Patristic period. All profess to adopt it, and its explicit denial or rejection

was deemed heresy. The Socinian position was not taken or defended by the Mediaeval theologians. 2. The doctrine of vicarious satisfaction was held in the purely Biblical form by Anselm, without mixture of foreign elements, or subtraction of intrinsic and essential characteristics. Had the Anselmic soteriology prevailed in the theory and practice of the Church generally, the Reformation of the 16th century would have occurred in the 11th. 3. The doctrine of vicarious substitution was not maintained in this pure and unqualified form by the successors of Anselm. Some of them, and those nearest to him in time, did not adopt his theory in its strictly scientific form, while yet they retained in feeling and practice its substantial features. Others, and these the later Schoolmen, while retaining the doctrine nominally and in phraseology, in reality essentially altered it; first, by confounding sanctification with justification, and, secondly, by teaching that an additional merit derived either from the church through its sacraments, or from voluntary penance on the part of the individual, is requisite in order that the satisfaction of Christ may be a complete and efficacious one. 4. In the departure from the Anselmic theory of an absolute as distinguished from a relative satisfaction, we find the germs of the subsequent Papal soteriology which during the middle and latter part of the Scholastic period shoot up with rankness and luxuriance.

CHAPTER III.

THE PAPAL SOTERIOLOGY.

§ 1. *Preliminary Statements.*

THE history of the doctrine of Atonement in the Middle Ages has disclosed two tendencies within the Western Church, in respect to the nature of Christ's work,—the one strict, and the other lax. The first has its representative in Anselm, and its expression in the theory of an infinite and real satisfaction. The second has several representatives, because it involves a descending scale. Some of the immediate successors of Anselm,—such as Bernard, the St. Victors, and Bonaventura,—retained the substance of the Anselmic view in their practical representations, yet at the same time in their theoretic statements made some modifications of the scientific positions of Anselm; of which the most important was the adoption (by Bonaventura for example) of the doctrine of the “relative” necessity of the atonement. The logical force and implication of these modifications was

neutralized, in a great measure, by the reliance of the heart upon the Person and work of the Redeemer, in the instances, certainly, of the penitent and devout Bernards and St. Victors. But the tendency itself was off and away from the strict exactitude of science, and it could not remain stationary. We have already noticed in Aquinas, and still more in Lombard, the theory of a *mixed* justification, resting partly upon the work of Christ, and partly upon the works of the individual; while the Abelards and Scotuses made statements of the doctrine of atonement that were regarded by Bernard and the adherents of Aquinas as positively heretical. The consequence was that in process of time the strict tendency was entirely overcome by the lax one. The Anselmic theory disappeared entirely from the heart of the Roman Church, and remained concealed in, at most, a very narrow circle, until it burst forth with renewed energy and vitality in the soteriology of the Reformation. The lax theory prevailed, becoming more loose and latitudinarian as the corruption of both theory and practice advanced within the Papal Church, until it finally obtained a distinct expression, and an ecclesiastical authority, in the *Soteriology of the Council of Trent*.¹

¹ This council was formally opened at Trent, Dec. 13, 1545; held its first session, Jan. 7, 1546; was transferred to Bologna, March 12, 1547; was there dissolved, Sept. 17, 1549; was re-convened at Trent, May 1, 1551; was suspended, April 28, 1552; was reopened, Jan. 18, 1562, and sat to Dec. 4, 1563.

§ 2. *Soteriology of the Council of Trent.*

The Tridentine theory makes inward holiness in conjunction with the merits of Christ the ground of justification. It founds human salvation upon *two* corner-stones. The doctors of Trent construct their exact and formal definition of justification out of that one element of error which, we have seen, somewhat vitiated the soteriology of Augustine. The unintentional confounding of the distinction between justification and sanctification, which appears occasionally in the Patristic writers, becomes a deliberate and emphatic identification, in the scheme of the Papal Church.

The Anselmic and Protestant soteriologies mean by the term "justification," that divine act, instantaneous and complete, by which sin is pardoned. If we distinguish the entire work of redemption into two parts, a negative and a positive, justification in the Pauline and in the Reformed signification would include the former and would include nothing more. Justification is the negative acquittal from condemnation, and not in the least the positive infusion of righteousness, or production of holiness. This positive element, the Reformers were careful to teach, invariably accompanies the negative; but they were equally careful to teach that it is not identical with it. The forgiveness of sin is distinct and different from the sanctification of the heart. It is an

antecedent which is always followed, indeed, by its consequent; but this does not render the consequent a substitute for the antecedent, or one and the same thing with it.¹ But the Council of Trent resolved justification into sanctification, and in the place of a gratuitous justification and remission of sins through the expiation of the Redeemer, substituted the most subtle form of the doctrine of justification by works that has yet appeared, or that can appear. For the doctors of Trent do not teach, in their canonical statements, that man is justified and accepted at the bar of justice by his *external* acts of obedience to the moral or the ecclesiastical law. This is, indeed, the doctrine that prevails in the common practice of the Papal Church, but it is not the form in which it appears in the Tridentine canons. According to these, man is justified by an *inward* and spiritual act which is denominated the act of faith; by a truly divine and holy habit or principle infused by the gracious working of the Holy Spirit. The ground of the sinner's justification is thus a divine

¹ The WESTMINSTER CONFESSION thus states the distinction between justification and sanctification. "Although sanctification be inseparably joined with justification, yet they differ, in that God in justification *imputeth* the righteousness of Christ; in sanctification, his Spirit *infuseth* grace, and enableth to the exercise thereof; in the former, sin is *pardoned*; in

the other, it is *subdued*; the one doth equally free all believers from the revenging wrath of God, and that perfectly in this life, that they never fall into condemnation; the other is neither equal in all, nor in this life perfect in any, but growing up to perfection." (Larger Catechism, Q. 77.)

and a gracious one. God works in the sinful soul to will and to do, and by making it inherently just justifies it. And all this is accomplished through the merits and mediation of Jesus Christ; so that, in justification there is a combination of the objective work of Christ with the subjective character of the believer. This statement is the more subtle, because it distinctly refers the infused grace or holiness to God as the author, and thereby seems to preclude the notion of self-righteousness. But it is fundamentally erroneous, because this infused righteousness, or holiness of heart, upon which remission of sins rests in part, is not *piacular*. It has in it nothing of the nature of a *satisfaction* to justice.¹ So far forth, therefore, as infused grace in the heart is made a ground and procuring cause of the pardon of sin, the judicial aspects and relations of sin are overlooked, and man is received into the Divine favor without any true and proper expiation of his guilt. The Papal theory of justification, consequently, stands upon the same level in the last analysis with the Socinian, or with any theory that denies the necessity of a *satisfaction* of justice.²

¹ "Then what is the fault of the church of Rome? Not that she requireth works at their hands which will be saved: but that she attributeth unto works a *power of satisfying God for sin*." HOOKER: On Justification, Works II. 538

² In this respect, Romanism and Rationalism are two extremes that meet. See the views of SARTORIUS on "the affinity of Romanism and Rationalism," in BIBLIOTHECA SACRA, Jan. 1851.

The following extracts from the *Canones* of the Council of Trent enunciate the Roman Catholic soteriology. “Justification is not the *mere remission of sins*, but also the sanctification and renovation of the inward man through the voluntary reception of grace and gifts of grace; whereby an unjust man becomes just, the enemy a friend, so that he may be an heir according to the hope of eternal life. . . The only formal cause of justification is the justice (*justitia*) of God, not that by which he himself is just, but that by which he makes us just,—that namely by which we are gratuitously *renewed* by him in the spirit of our minds, and are not only *reputed*, but really *are* and are denominated just, receiving justice into ourselves each one according to his own measure, which the Holy Spirit imparts to each as He pleases, and, also, according to each one’s own disposition and co-operation. . . When the Apostle asserts that man is justified by faith and gratuitously, his language is to be understood in that sense which the constant agreement of the Catholic Church has affixed to it; in such a manner, namely, as that we are said to be justified by faith, because faith is the beginning of human salvation, the foundation and root of all justification [*i. e.* of all virtue], without which it is impossible to please God (Heb. xi. 6). And we are said to be justified gratuitously, because none of those things which precede justification, whether faith or works, merits the grace itself of

justification.”¹ These citations from the Canons of the Council of Trent are sufficient to show that the theologians there assembled regarded justification as a renewing and sanctifying act on the part of God, and not a declarative one. It is not that Divine act whereby sin is *pardoned*, but whereby sin is *purged*.

But that the doctrine of gratuitous remission of sin upon the *sole* ground of Christ's satisfaction was thrown out of the Tridentine theory of justification, is yet more apparent from the anathematizing clauses which were added to explain and guard the so-called catholic faith. “If any one shall say that the sinner is justified by faith *alone*, in the sense that nothing else is required which may co-operate towards the attainment of the grace of justification, and that the sinner does not need to be prepared and disposed [for the reception of the grace of justification], by the motion of his own will : let him be accursed. . . . If any one shall say, that men are justified either *by the sole imputation of the righteousness of Christ, or by the sole remission of sin*, to the exclusion of that grace and charity which is shed abroad in their hearts by the Holy Spirit, and which inheres in them, or shall say that the grace whereby we are justified is merely and only the favor of God : let him be accursed. *If any one shall say that justifying faith is nothing but confidence in the divine mercy remitting sin on account of Christ, or*

¹ CANONES CONCILII TRIDENTINI : De Justificatione, vii. viii.

that this faith is the sole thing by which we are justified: let him be accursed."¹ It will be perceived from these extracts, that the Tridentine theologian regarded "justification" as prospective and not retrospective, in its essential nature. It is not the forgiveness of "sins that are past," but the cure and prevention of sins that are present and future. The element of guilt is lost sight of, and the piacular work of Christ is lost sight of with it; and the whole work of redemption is interpreted to be merely a method of purification. Thus the Tridentine theory implies, logically, that sin is not guilt, but only disease and pollution. Furthermore, according to the Papal theory, justification is not instantaneous but successive. It is not a single and complete act upon the part of God, but a gradual process in the soul of man. For it is founded upon that inward holiness or love which has been infused by divine grace. But this advances from one degree to another, never being perfect in this life, and never standing still. The consciousness of being justified before God, even if it could rest upon such an imperfect foundation at all, must fluctuate with all the changes in the internal experience. And as matter of fact, the Council of Trent declares that a man cannot be *certain* of being justified, and condemns those who affirm such certainty in the following terms: "Although it is necessary to believe that no

¹ CANONES CONCILII TRIDENTINI: De Justificatione, ix. xi. xii.

sin is, or ever has been, remitted except gratuitously by the Divine mercy on account of Christ, yet no one who affirms with confidence and certainty (*jactat*) that his sins are remitted, and who rests in this confidence alone, is to be assured of remission."

According to the Papal soteriology, the assurance of the remission of sins, and of acceptance at the bar of God, must rest upon the degree of holiness that has been infused, and not simply and solely upon Christ's oblation for sin. Hence it cannot in this life attain to certainty, because the inward holiness never in this life attains to perfection. Justification is not instantaneous and complete, but gradual and incomplete, because the infused righteousness out of which it issues is imperfect. This is distinctly taught in the tenth chapter of the "decree" concerning Justification. "Therefore being thus justified, and made friends of God and members of his household, and going from strength to strength, they are renewed, as the Apostle teaches, day by day: that is to say, by mortifying their fleshly members, and yielding them as instruments of righteousness unto sanctification, through the observance of the commands of God and the church, their righteousness itself being accepted through the grace of Christ, and their faith co-operating with their good works, they grow [in holiness], and *are justified more and more*. This increase of justification (*justitiae*), the Holy Church seeks when she prays: 'Give unto us, O Lord, increase of faith, hope, and

charity.'” By these positions of the Council of Trent, the *effect* of justification is substituted for the *cause*. That inward holiness which succeeds the forgiveness of sins is made to take the place of the atoning death and the imputed righteousness of the Redeemer. The ground of justification is thus a personal and subjective one. It is, consequently, imperfect and incomplete, and must be supplemented by greater measures of holiness and attainments in piety, and also by the external penances and good works required by the Church. “If any one shall assert,” says the 24th Canon concerning Justification, “that the righteousness received [in justification] is not preserved and also *increased* before God by good works; but that good works are only the *fruit* and *signs* of a justification already attained, and not the *cause of an increase* of justification: let him be accursed.”

§ 3. *Soteriology of Bellarmin.*

The theory enunciated at Trent received a further expansion and defence from Roman Catholic theologians. Of these, the most distinguished was *Robert Bellarmin*, whose *Disputationes*, published in 1581, constitute the most elaborate explication and defence that has yet been made of the Papal Dogmatics.¹ The theory of justification as stated

¹ For sharp and effective criticism of the positions of Bellarmin, see DAVENANT: On Justification, I. 164, seq.

in detail by the expounders of the Decrees and Canons of Trent embraces the following particulars. Justification is two-fold, and is denominated the "first" and "second." The first justification is the infusion or communication of an inherent principle or habit (*habitus*) of grace or charity; the second justification is the good works, or right life, that results from this. By the first justification original sin is extinguished, and the habits of sin are expelled. This justification is obtained by the exercise of faith, of which the meritorious and procuring cause is the obedience and satisfaction of Christ. But at this point, the Romish theory introduces a distinction that wholly neutralizes the evangelical element introduced by this latter statement. This distinction is one borrowed from the later Schoolmen, particularly Thomas Aquinas,—the distinction, viz., between *meritum ex condigno*, and *meritum ex congruo*, or merit from desert, and merit from fitness. This distinction is thus defined by Aquinas, with his usual acuteness and clearness. "A meritorious work of man may be considered in two aspects; first, as proceeding from the free will of man, and secondly, as proceeding from the grace of the Holy Spirit. If it be considered from the first point of view, there can be in it no merit of condignity or absolute desert; because of the inequality between man and God, whereby it is impossible for the creature to bring the Creator under absolute obligations. But if it be considered from the second point

of view, as proceeding from the influence of the Holy Spirit, the work of man may have the merit of congruity or fitness; because it is fitting that God should reward his own grace as a thing excellent in itself."¹ This distinction between two species of merit is connected, in the Tridentine theory of justification, with the doctrine of a "preparation" and predisposition for justification, in such a manner that although the name of merit is warily avoided, the thing itself is not. Man is prepared for justification, i. e. for the infusion of righteousness, by the common operations of his mind under common or prevenient grace. But this grace of preparation merits more grace, not by virtue of the merit of congruity indeed, but of congruity. And so onward, step by step, to the very end of the process of justification. It is easy to see how this subtle distinction, when coupled with the doctrine of an antecedent preparation, nullifies all the force of the statement that the obedience and satisfaction of Christ is the meritorious cause of a sinner's justification. For this antecedent preparation, as defined by the Canons of the Council, amounts to nothing more than a historical faith, or an assent to divine revelation.² But this is called a species of believing, which, upon the principle of congruity or fitness, deserves more

¹ AQUINAS: Summa. Pt. II. i. Qu. 114. Art. 4. See MÜNSCHER-VON CÖLLN: Dogmengeschichte § 133, 6.

² "Fidem ex auditu concipientes,

libere moventur in Deum, credentes vera esse quae divinitus revelata et promissa sunt." CANONES CONCILII TRIDENTINI: De Justificatione, vi.

grace. And this increase or fresh accession of grace is a *gratia gratum faciens*,—that is, an infused grace that expels the habit of sin, and thus justifies or makes acceptable to God. So that justification in the last analysis takes its start from the ordinary operations of the human mind, under the common influences of God's Spirit and Providence, and ends with being an inward and infused righteousness, upon the ground of which the ungodly is set in right relations to God.¹

The difference between the Papal and the Protestant soteriology is enunciated by Baur with his usual strength and discrimination, in the following terms. "The Protestant doctrine of justification

¹ "Salvation by Christ is the foundation of Christianity; as for works, they are a thing subordinate no otherwise than because our sanctification cannot be accomplished without them. The doctrine concerning them is a thing builded upon the foundation; therefore the doctrine which addeth unto them the power of *satisfying*, or of *meriting*, addeth unto a thing subordinated, builded upon the foundation, not to the very foundation itself. Yet is the foundation by this addition consequently overthrown, forasmuch as out of this addition it may be negatively concluded, [that] he which maketh any work good and acceptable in the sight of God to pro-

ceed from the natural freedom of our will, he which giveth unto any good works of ours the force of satisfying the wrath of God for sin, [or] the power of meriting either earthly or heavenly rewards, he which holdeth works going before our vocation in congruity to merit our vocation, [or] works following our first to merit our second justification and by condignity our last reward in the kingdom of heaven, pulleth up the doctrine of faith by the roots. For out of every one of these positions, the plain direct denial thereof may be certainly concluded." HOOKER: On Justification (Works, II. 538). Compare LUTHER: On Galatians, 129-30 (Carter's Ed.).

starts from the most profound consciousness of sin as *guilt*. Man is justified, subjectively, through the confident assurance that his sins are forgiven, and this assurance is through the act of faith, which is a purely receptive act; and he is justified, objectively, through a purely declarative act of God, which has reference to him as an individual. In both its subjective and its objective aspect, justification is consequently the imputation, merely, and not the infusion, of the righteousness of Christ, and is instantaneous and complete. The great difference between this view and the Papal theory of justification lies in the fact, that the Papal theory is not occupied with the negative side of the subject, viz.: the pacification of the conscience in respect to a guilt that lies in the past, but rather with the positive side, viz.: the imparting of a new principle and habit of sanctification. The principle of justification, in the Tridentine soteriology, is not faith, in the carefully discriminated and deep sense of the Protestant doctrine of justifying faith,—in reality it is not faith in any sense, but is *love*,—and justification is not a mere instantaneous and complete declaration of being righteous, but a making righteous by the infused grace of the Holy Ghost, which is successive and gradual in its nature.”¹

¹ BAUR : Dogmengeschichte, § 105. Ed. 1847. For a clear statement of the difference between the Papal and the Protest-

ant soteriology, see RIVETUS : Synopsis Purioris Theologiae, pp. 417–419.

CHAPTER IV.

SOTERIOLOGY OF THE REFORMERS.

§ 1. *Forerunners of the Reformation.*¹

IN the age immediately preceding the century of the Reformation, we have had occasion to notice a few men who were forerunners of that great movement. They were minds that had become weary of the fruitless dialectics into which Scholasticism had degenerated, and that craved a warmer and more vital Christianity than was prevailing in the great mass of the Church. We should naturally expect to meet with evangelical views of the Atonement in the writings of these men, and the expectation is not disappointed.

Wickliffe († 1404?) the English Reformer presents the doctrine of vicarious satisfaction with distinctness, though in connection with some speculations respecting the nature of sin that are somewhat peculiar. But the most remarkable of these early

¹ Compare ULLMANN: Reformers before the Reformation.

reformers, so far as the doctrine of atonement is concerned, is *John Wessel* († 1489), a man whom Hagenbach describes in the following terms: "Trained up in Scholasticism, he announced the coming end of Scholasticism, insisted upon Scripture as the sole foundation of belief, upon faith without works as the ground of justification, and upon an inward and vital piety in the heart."¹ So much has this remarkable man in common with the great German reformer, that Ullmann has entitled his interesting biography of him: "John Wessel, a forerunner of Luther." Wessel is Lutheran indeed, in his conceptions and statements of the doctrine of atonement. "It is," he says, "the greatest of wonders that the very same divine justice which is armed with an eternal law of threatening and condemnation towards the transgressor, should in the day and hour of judgment not only hold back the sword of vengeance, and absolve from the punishment threatened, but should raise the criminal to heights of glory and happiness. Who does not wonder to see the truthfulness of threatenings converted into the truthfulness of promises, so that strict truth is kept on both sides, and in both aspects? These two contradictions are reconciled in the Lamb of God, the infinite atonement of Christ. Christ, himself God, himself the priest, himself the sacrifice, has made satisfaction to himself, for him-

¹ HAGENBACH: Dogmengeschichte, 336 (Note).

self, and of himself.¹ In Christ we behold not only a reconciled but a reconciling deity ; an incarnate God who, in the sinner's place, and for the sinner's salvation, furnishes what his own attributes of holiness and justice require."

§ 2. *The Protestant and Anselmic Soteriologies Compared.*

The Reformation of the Church in the 16th century begins and ends in the doctrine whose history we are investigating. So much has been written, and so much is known, concerning the general aspects of the doctrine of atonement during this era in Church History, that we shall confine our examination to what was special and peculiar in the soteriology of the Reformers.

We have seen that the dogmatic substance of the Protestant theory may be traced from the beginning. The constituent elements are, it is true, much more apparent in some theories and ages, than in others ; but the doctrine itself of vicarious satisfaction cannot be said to be the discovery of any one age. Having a Biblical origin, and finding all its data and grounds in the revealed word, we trace its onward flow from this fountain through the centuries, sometimes visible in a broad and

¹ "Ipse Deus, ipse sacerdos, ipse hostia, pro se, de se, sibi satisfecit." WESSEL : De Causis Incarnationis, c. 17.

gleaming current, and sometimes running like a subterranean river silent and unseen in the hearts and minds of a smaller number chosen by Providence to keep alive the apostolic faith, and to preserve unbroken the line of the invisible and true Church, even though the external continuity were interrupted and broken. Men like Anselm and Wessel prepare us for men like Luther and Calvin ; and in taking up the thread of our narrative we proceed to a comparison of the Anselmic with the Protestant construction of the doctrine of atonement.

1. There is a difference between them, but this difference is formal and not material. 'The Anselmic view is predominantly *objective* in its character. Sin is contemplated in its relations to the being and attributes of God, and consequently the atonement is viewed in the same reference chiefly. This is the excellence of the theory, and in this consists its validity before the bar of reason and science. The eternal and necessary grounds of Christ's work, as they exist in the nature of Deity and in the constitution of the moral universe, are clearly exhibited, and thus the whole domain of soteriology is made to rest upon the metaphysical and universal principles of reason and justice. The soteriology of the Reformation, while adopting with equal heartiness this objective view of the Anselmic theory, unites with it in a greater degree than did this latter, the *subjective element of faith*. The atten-

tion of the theologian in the latter part of the Scholastic period, as we have seen in the sketch of Aquinas, had been directed to the *mode* in which the sinner comes into possession of that atoning work by which sin is expiated; but this point did not engage the thoughts of Anselm to any very great extent. Aquinas solved the difficulty by the doctrine of the *unio mystica*; but this, with him, possessed too much of a sacramental and magical quality, and was disjoined from the principle of intelligent belief. One of the first characteristics of the Protestant view of the atonement that strikes the attention is the part which the principle of faith plays in all the discussions. The attention is now turned to that *act in man* by which the act and work of God is *appropriated*. This was a natural consequence of the change that was taking place in the general religious views of Christendom. The mind was not satisfied with an objective and outward salvation, however valid and reliable it might be. It desired a *consciousness* of being saved. It craved an *experience* of salvation. The Protestant mind could not rest in the Church; neither could it pretend to rest in an atonement that was unappropriated. The objective work of Christ on Calvary must become the subjective experience and rejoicing of the soul itself. If we may, in this connection, employ the simple and affecting phraseology of the dying "Young Cottager," we may say that Protestantism reposes upon "Christ

there and Christ *here*," Christ on the mediatorial throne, and Christ in the believing heart,—that it unites in a living synthesis the objective atonement with the subjective faith in it.

While, however, the principle and act of faith occupies such a prominent place in the soteriology of the Reformation, we should not fail to notice that it is never represented as a *procuring cause* of justification. It is only the instrumental cause. Protestantism was exceedingly careful to distinguish justification from legal righteousness on the one hand, and from sanctification by grace on the other. It could not, consequently, concede to any species of human agency, however excellent, a peculiar and atoning efficacy. Hence, we find none of that supplementing or perfecting of the work of Christ, by the work of the creature, which we noticed in the Papal soteriology. And this applies to the highest of acts, the act of faith itself. Faith itself, though the gift and the work of God, does not justify, speaking accurately, but merely accepts that which does justify. A few extracts from the principal symbols of the Reformation will set this in a clear light. The *Formula Concordiae*, a Lutheran creed drawn up to explain more fully the views of the Augsburg Confession and guard them against misapprehension, thus defines the term "justification." "The word *justification* signifies to pronounce just, to absolve from the eternal punishment of sin, on account of the satisfaction of Christ.

... Sometimes the word *regeneration* is used for the word justification; in this case, it is necessary to explain carefully, lest the renovation which follows justification should be confounded with justification. . . . The order and distinction between faith and good works, between justification and renovation, or sanctification, should be carefully observed. For good works do not precede faith, and sanctification does not precede justification. But in the instance of conversion by the Holy Spirit, faith is first enkindled by hearing the gospel promise of pardon. This faith then apprehends and appropriates the grace of God in Christ; by which faith, the man (persona) is justified. But when the man is justified (i. e. declared free from condemnation) then he is renovated and sanctified by the Holy Spirit, and then from this renovation and sanctification the fruits, that is the good works, follow spontaneously. Neither, [though thus distinguished from each other, and set in a series] can these parts of salvation be separated from each other in actual experience, as if, e. g., true faith in Christ's atonement could stand for a while in conjunction with an unrenewed will; but in the order of causes and effects, of antecedents and consequents, they are so distributed. For, as Luther says, 'faith and works are inseparably connected; but it is faith alone and without works that appropriates the atonement, and thereby justifies, and yet faith does not remain alone, [but acts itself out,

and thus produces works].’”¹ The *Confessio Belgica*, a Calvinistic creed, thus defines the doctrine of justification. “We believe that the Holy Spirit kindles true faith in our hearts, which faith embraces Jesus Christ with all his merits, makes him its own, and peculiar (*proprium*) to itself, and seeks nothing further beyond him. / Hence we rightly say with Paul, that we are justified by faith alone, or by faith without works. / At the same time, if we speak with strict accuracy, we by no means understand that our act of faith is that which justifies us [i. e. obtains for us the remission of sin], but that the act of faith is the instrument by which we seize hold of the atonement of Christ, which alone satisfies the law and thereby obtains the remission of sin.”²

In this way, the Protestant soteriology was an advance upon the Anselmic, by being more comprehensive and complete. Agreeing with it perfectly so far as the objective work of Christ is concerned, it made further and fuller statements respecting the mode in which the external becomes internal, in the experience of the individual. It also differed from the Anselmic, in respect to a secondary topic, in rejecting the notion of Anselm that the number of the saved exactly equals the number

¹ HASE : *Libri Symbolici*, pp. 685–693.

² CONFESSIO BELGICA : Art. 22. —Faith justifies in the sense in which eating nourishes. Accu-

rately speaking, it is only the atonement that justifies, i. e. frees from condemnation; as it is the food that nourishes, and not the mere *act* of masticating.

of the fallen angels, and that redemption was intended to keep the number of pure and holy spirits good.

2. A second difference between the Anselmic and the Protestant soteriology is seen in the formal distinction of Christ's work into his active and his passive righteousness. By his passive righteousness is meant his expiatory sufferings, by which he satisfied the claims of justice, and by his active righteousness is meant his obedience to the law as a rule of life and conduct. It was contended by those who made this distinction, that the purpose of Christ as the vicarious substitute was to meet the entire demands of the law for the sinner. But the law requires present and perfect obedience, as well as satisfaction for past disobedience. The law is not completely fulfilled by the endurance of penalty only. It must also be obeyed. Christ both endured the penalty due to man for disobedience, and perfectly obeyed the law for him; so that he was a vicarious substitute in reference to both the precept and the penalty of the law. By his active obedience he obeyed the law; and by his passive obedience he endured the penalty. In this way his vicarious work is complete. Some writers contend that the distinction between the active and passive righteousness can be traced in the Patristic soteriology, and would find it wherever they find a substantially correct view of the atonement.¹ But

¹ This is done by an able writer in the EVANGELISCHE KIRCHEN-ZEITUNG for 1834, p. 523 (Note).

this is undoubtedly an extreme statement that cannot be made good. The utmost that can be claimed is, that there are passages in the Fathers, in which the beginnings of such a distinction may perhaps be detected by logical implication, but the distinction itself is nowhere formally made in the Patristic soteriology. The only writer in whom it appears with any distinctness previous to the Reformation is Aquinas, whose distinction between *satisfactio* and *meritum* has been noticed. Up to the time of the Reformation, the Christian mind was engaged with a prominence that amounted to exclusiveness with the question: "How is the soul to be delivered from condemnation?" The further question: "How is the soul to acquire a title to eternal life?" was not answered, and probably did not come much into the mind. The earliest symbol of the Reformation does not make the distinction in question. The *Augsburg Confession*, and the *Apology* drawn up in defence of it (A. D. 1530), treat only of the expiation of guilt, and Christ's passive or atoning righteousness. The larger and smaller Catechisms of Luther do the same. The *Formula Concordiae*, drawn up in 1576, is the only Lutheran symbol in which the distinction in question appears. Its statement is as follows: "That righteousness which is imputed to faith, or to the believer, of mere grace, is the *obedience*, suffering, and resurrection of Christ, by which he satisfied the law for us, and expiated our sins. For

since Christ was not only man, but truly God and man in one undivided person, he was no more subject to the law than he was to suffering and death [i. e. if his Person, merely, be taken into account, without any reference to his vicarious relations], because he was the divine and eternal Lord of the law. Hence, not only that obedience to God his Father which he exhibited in his passion and death, but also *that obedience which he exhibited in voluntarily subjecting himself to the law and fulfilling it for our sakes* is imputed to us for righteousness, so that God, on account of the total obedience which Christ accomplished (*praestitit*) for our sake before his heavenly Father, both in acting and in suffering, in life and in death, may remit our sins to us, *regard us as holy and righteous, and give us eternal felicity.*"¹ Here, Christ's fulfilment of the law is represented as the ground and procuring cause of eternal blessedness for the believer.

In the Reformed or Calvinistic symbols, we find the fact to be similar. The earlier confessions do not make the distinction, while the later do. The *Second Helvetic Confession*, drawn up by Bullinger in 1564, the most authoritative of the Reformed symbols, contains only a hint of the doctrine of the active righteousness, if indeed it contain one at all. The phraseology is as follows: "By his passion or death, and thus by everything which he did and per-

¹ HASE: Libri Symbolici, p. 68.

formed for our sakes by his advent in the flesh, our Lord reconciled the celestial Father to all believers, expiated sin, conquered death, broke the power of condemnation and of hell, and by his resurrection from the dead brought back and restored life and immortality. For he is our righteousness, life, and resurrection, in fine the fullness and absolution of all believers, as well as their most abundant safety and sufficiency.”¹ The *Heidelberg Catechism*, composed in 1562, by Olevianus and Ursinus, seems to regard the holiness and obedience of Christ as a part of the *atonement* for sin which he made. The answer to the 36th question runs as follows: “Because he is our Mediator, and by his innocence and perfect holiness covers my sin, in which I was conceived, that it may not come into the view of God.” The *Formula Consensus*, drawn up by Heidegger and Turretine in 1675, and adopted by the Swiss Churches, expressly distinguishes between the active and passive righteousness of Christ; and it, moreover, reckons the former in with the latter as constituting part of the entire work of *satisfaction*, in opposition to the views of Piscatorius, who contended that the holiness of Christ does not justify in the forensic and objective sense, but only as it becomes the inward principle of the soul,—adopting substantially the Tridentine theory of justification by sanctification. The statement of the Consensus

¹ NIEMEYER: Collectio, p. 486.

is as follows. "Christ rendered satisfaction to God the Father, by the obedience of his death, in the place of the elect, in such sense that the entire obedience which he rendered to the law through the whole course of his life, *whether actively or passively*, ought to be reckoned into the account of his vicarious righteousness and *obedience*."¹

§ 3. *Recapitulatory Survey.*

We have thus traced the history of this cardinal truth of Christianity down to the Reformation,—a point at which it received its fullest expansion, and became entirely free from those foreign elements which we have seen mixing with it in its preceding history. The doctrine was now that of pure and complete satisfaction of law. The claims of Satan, which so interfered with the full exhibition of the truth in the Ancient Church, exerted no influence upon the Protestant construction of the doctrine. The Atonement was referred solely to the divine attribute of justice, and was held to be absolutely necessary,—though the Scholastic controversy respecting relative and absolute necessity was not revived. Again, that vitiating element in the Tridentine soteriology,—the combination of human works, either internal or external, in greater or in

¹ NIEMEYER: *Collectio*, p. 734.

less degree, with that of Christ, in making up the sum of satisfaction,—was now entirely purged out. The human soul was delivered from condemnation, *solely* by the obedience and sufferings of the Son of God. Faith itself does not justify, but only accepts and appropriates that satisfaction of law made by Christ which completely justifies, alone and of itself.

CHAPTER V.

THE GROTIAN SOTERIOLOGY.

§ 1. *Preliminary Statements.*

WE have seen that the assertion of a relative necessity, only, for the satisfaction of Christ was made in its most unqualified form, and drawn out to its last consequence, by Duns Scotus in his controversy with the followers of Aquinas. He laid down the proposition that "every created oblation or offering is worth what God is pleased to accept it for, and no more." Upon this proposition, he founded the theory of "acceptilation." The term *acceptilatio*, or *accepti latio*, is borrowed from the Roman law. In the Pandects of Justinian, it is defined to be "an acquittance from obligation, *by word of mouth*, of a debtor by a creditor;" and in the Institutes of Justinian, it is called "an imaginary payment."¹ Primarily, the term does not be-

¹ "Est autem acceptilatio imaginaria solutio." JUSTINIANUS: Institut. Lib. III. Tit. 29.—"An obligation is also freed (tollitur) by acceptilation. This is an imaginary payment, for if Titius

long to the province of criminal, but of commercial law. A creditor is an absolute owner of his own property, and if he pleases to discharge his debtor from his obligation to pay the debt which he owes him, he can do so by a word without any literal payment being made. He can *call* the debt paid, and it is paid. Or he can cancel the entire debt upon the payment of a part only. This arbitrary and optional acceptance of nothing for something, or of a part for the whole of a debt, is "acceptilation." The term *acceptilatio*, when transferred as it was by Scotus to the doctrine of Christ's satisfaction, signifies that God accepts this satisfaction, not because a strictly infinite value belongs to the sufferings of the God-Man (for Scotus denied this), but because, in his infinite benevolence, he is willing to content himself with a satisfaction that is not strictly infinite. Hence, in Scotus's theory, the atonement of Christ is sufficient to satisfy the claims of law because God is willing to regard it

wishes to remit payment of that which is due to him by a verbal contract, he can do so by permitting the debtor to put to him the following question: 'Do you acknowledge to have received that which I promised you?' Titius then answering 'I do.' The acknowledgment may also be made in corresponding Greek words, ἔχεις λαβὼν δηνάρια τόσα; ἔχω λαβών. In this way *verbal* contracts are dissolved, but not

contracts made in other ways: it seemed natural that an obligation formed by words should be dissolved by words; but anything due by any other kind of contract may be made the subject of a stipulation, and be freed by acceptilation (per acceptilationem dissolvi). And as part only of a debt may be actually paid, so acceptilation may be made of a part only." SANDERS: Institutes of Justinian, p. 493.

as such, although in strict fact it is insufficient. This is justified upon the principle which Scotus lays down, that any oblation is worth what the Deity is willing to rate it at. Its value is not intrinsic and real, but acquired and nominal.

The controversy between the Thomists and Scotists, upon this and kindred points, was continued down to the Reformation, and has never been settled to this day within the Romish Church. At the time of the Reformation, we have seen that both Lutheran and Calvinistic theologians adopted the Anselmic theory of a strict satisfaction. This soteriology enters into all the Lutheran and Calvinistic symbols of the continent, and into the Episcopalian, Presbyterian, and Congregational symbols of England and America. So far, therefore, as the principal Protestant creeds are concerned, the theory of an absolute necessity of atonement, and a strict satisfaction of justice by the suffering of Christ, is the prevalent one. But the theory of a relative necessity was revived in the 17th century, and stated in an elaborate manner, by the distinguished scholar and jurist *Hugo Grotius* († 1645). It was also adopted and maintained by the leaders of the Arminian party, *Episcopus*, *Limborch*, *Curcellaeus*,¹ and constituted one of the distinctive

¹ “The elder Lutheran and Calvinistic theologians defended the intrinsic and strict equivalence of Christ’s satisfaction, as flowing

from the infinite dignity of his Person. The Arminian theologians, *Episcopus*, *Limborch*, *Curcellaeus*, and others, on the con-

points of difference between their soteriology, and that of the Reformers. As the Grotian theory is the best form in which the doctrine of a relative necessity of the atonement has been stated, and as it has exerted considerable influence upon the history of this doctrine during the last two centuries, it merits a particular examination.

§ 2. *Grotian idea of law and penalty.*

‘The soteriology of Grotius is founded upon his idea of law and punishment, and the relation which these sustain to God. Law, according to Grotius, is a *positive* statute or enactment. “It is not,” he says, “something *inward* in God, or in the Divine will and nature, but is only the *effect* of his will” (*voluntatis quidam effectus*).¹ Law, therefore, is a mere *product* on the part of God, by which he him-

trary, asserted only an acceptilation, or accepted value, in reference to Christ’s satisfaction, and upon the express ground of a relative and not absolute necessity of a satisfaction of divine justice by a God-man.” ERSCH-GRUBER: *Encyclopädie*, Art. *Acceptilatio*. At the 112th session of the Synod of Dort, “Professor Usselburgh, at the desire of the President (Bogermann), discoursed of the satisfaction of Christ for sin, in opposition to the Socinians and

Vorstius. He maintained, in the first place, that God could not forgive sin without satisfaction. Secondly, that Christ had given such satisfaction properly and truly, *and not according to any previous acceptilation*.” BRANDT: *History of the Reformation in Netherlands*. Book xxxix. (Vol. III. p. 256).

¹ GROTIUS: *Defensio Fidei*, Cap. iii. pp. 60, 310. Ed. Amstelædami, 1679.

self is not bound, because it is his own work." As the enactor of a positive statute, he has the same power to alter it, or to abrogate it, which the law-making power among men possesses. The penalty of law, consequently, is likewise a positive, and not a natural and necessary arrangement. It does not spring inevitably and naturally out of the very nature of law, and the very being of God, but is attached to the statute by a positive decision of the Deity,—which decision is optional and mutable. Hence, both law itself, and the penalty of law, in Grotius's view, may be modified in part, or even abolished altogether by an act of the Governor of the universe, because the workman has plenary power over his work. The following extracts from the writings of Grotius exhibit his opinions with sufficient clearness, "All positive laws," (and Grotius has mentioned the law of Eden as such,) says Grotius, "are relaxable. Those who fear that if we concede this we do an injury to God, because we thereby represent him as mutable, are much deceived. For law is not something internal in God, or in the will itself of God, but it is a particular effect or product of his will. But that the effects or products of the Divine will are mutable is very certain. Moreover, in promulgating a positive law which he might wish to relax at some future time, God does not exhibit any fickleness of will. For God seriously indicated that he desired that his law should be valid and obligatory, while yet at the same

time he reserved the right of relaxing it, if he saw fit, because this right pertains to a positive law from the very nature of the case, and cannot be abdicated by the Deity. Nay more, the Deity does not abdicate the right of even abrogating law altogether, as is apparent from the instance of the ceremonial law. . . It is objected to this view, that it is *naturally* just that the guilty should be punished with such a punishment as corresponds to their crime, and therefore that punishment is not a matter of optional choice, neither is it relaxable. In answer to this objection, it is to be noticed that it does not always follow that injustice is done when justice is not done. For as it does not follow that if a king is to be called generous who has given a thousand talents to some one, he is therefore to be called ungenerous if he has not given it, so it is not a universal truth that if a thing may be done with justice, it cannot therefore be omitted without injustice. As in physics, so in morals, a thing may be called 'natural and necessary' in a strict sense (*proprie*), and in a less strict sense (*minus proprie*). In physics, that is strictly natural and necessary which belongs to the very essence of a thing,—as, for example, for a sentient creature to have sensation; and that is less strictly natural which is as it were fitted and accommodated to a thing,—as, for example, for a man to use his right hand. In like manner, there are in morals certain things which are strictly natural and necessary, which follow necessarily from

the relation of the things themselves to rational natures,—as, for example, that perjury is unlawful; and there are other things which are less strictly natural and necessary,—as, for example, that the son should succeed the father [in the government]. That, therefore, he who sins deserves to be punished, and is therefore punishable, follows from the very relation of sin and the sinner to a superior power, and is strictly natural and necessary. But that any and every sinner be punished with *such a punishment as corresponds with his guilt* is not absolutely (simpliciter) and universally necessary; neither is it strictly natural, but only fitted and accommodated to nature (sed naturae satis conveniens). Whence it follows, that nothing prevents the relaxing of the law which orders this punishment. There is no mark or sign of irrevocability in the law, in the case of which we are speaking, neither is the law accompanied with a promise; therefore, neither of these two things stands in the way of a relaxation of the law. Furthermore, a threat to punish is not like a promise to reward. For from the promise to reward, there accrues a certain right or claim on the part of him to whom the promise is made; but the threat of punishment only declares the transgressor's desert of penalty, and the right to punish on the part of him who threatens. Neither is there any reason to fear lest God's veracity should suffer in case he does not fulfil all his threatenings. For all threatenings, excepting those to which the token of

irrevocability attaches, are to be understood as in their very nature diminishing nothing from the right of the author to relax them, if he shall think proper. . . . At the same time, there are reasons that dissuade from the exercise of this right. These may arise from the nature of law in the abstract, or from the nature of a particular law. It is common to all laws, that in relaxing them something seems to be worn away from their authority. It is peculiar to this law [i. e. the moral law given in Eden], that although it is not characterized by an inflexible rectitude as we have remarked, it is yet very consonant to the nature and order of things. From which it follows, not indeed that this law is never to be relaxed, but that it is not to be relaxed with facility, or for a slight cause. And the all-wise Legislator had a most weighty cause for relaxing this law, in the fact that the human race had lapsed into sin. For if all mankind had been given over to eternal death, as transgressors, two most beautiful things would have utterly perished out of the universe,—reverence and religion towards God, on the part of man, and the exhibition of a wonderful benevolence towards man, on the part of God. But in relaxing the law, God not only followed the most weighty reasons for so doing, but also adopted a peculiar and singular mode of relaxing it, concerning which we shall speak hereafter.”¹

¹ GROTIUS: *Defensio Fidei*, Caput iii. p. 310. Ed. Amstelaedami, 1679.

This idea of the Divine law as a *positive* enactment, Grotius borrowed from the province of human jurisprudence. As the earthly law-making power, be it despotic or republican, promulgates a statute, and constitutes a certain act, which is otherwise innocent, criminal by a positive enactment forbidding it, so does the heavenly law-giver. The law-maker in both instances, consequently, is higher than the law, because the law is the effect or product of his volition.* By this idea and definition of law, Grotius reduces everything back to the arbitrary and optional will of God, and thus differs from Anselm and the Reformers. According to them, the Divine will cannot be separated from the Divine nature, in this manner. God's law is not positive and arbitrary but natural and necessary, because it flows out of his essential being. The Divine will is the executive of the Divine essence. Law, therefore, is not the effect or figment of mere and isolated will, but of will in immutable harmony with truth and right. Both law and penalty, consequently, in the theory of the Reformers are the inevitable and inexorable efflux of the Divine Essence, and contain nothing of an optional or mutable nature. They can no more be "relaxed," or waived, than the attributes of omnipotence or omniscience can be. They are not below the Deity, as a positive statute respecting banking, or commerce, is below the law-making power, but they are the pure and necessary issue of the principles of justice in the Divine Mind. Neither

is law above the Deity. For it is the Divine Nature itself, proclaiming and manifesting itself throughout the universe. It, therefore, possesses the same necessary, natural, and immutable qualities that the Divine Essence itself possesses, and is incapable of "relaxation."

§ 3. *Grotian theory of relaxation and substitution.*

Having laid down this definition of law and penalty, and stated the relation which God sustains to both, Grotius next proceeds to the deduction upon which he builds his theory of satisfaction, viz. : that it is competent for God to *relax* the claims of the law, and save the transgressor. The notion of *relaxation* (relaxatio), and not *satisfaction*, of law shapes the whole scheme of Grotius. The principal points, and the course of thought in it are as follows.

Man, on account of sin, deserves to be punished with eternal death, in accordance with the divine statute and penalty announced in Gen. ii. 17. But this statute, as matter of fact, is not executed, for believers are free from eternal death and condemnation. At the same time there is no abrogation of the law, because we see it executed upon unbelievers.¹ The fact then is, that between the execution of the law at the one extreme, and the entire and formal abrogation of the law at the other, there

¹ GROTIUS: Defensio, Cap. iii. pp. 10, 310. Ed. Amstelaed. 1679.

comes in a medium course of procedure on the part of the Lawgiver. This middle course, Grotius denominates a “tempering” (*temperamentum*) of the law, a “relaxing” (*relaxatio*) of its claims, “so that although the law still continues to exist, its rigorous and exact obligatoriness is dispensed with, in reference to a certain class of persons,” viz. believers. Such a tempering or relaxation can occur, because that statute in Gen. ii. 17 belongs to the class of *positive* laws, which are relaxable (*relaxibiles*) at the pleasure of the legislator.¹ And besides this, it is neither necessary nor required by justice, that the sinner should suffer a punishment *exactly* correspondent to his transgression, but only that he be punished. Relaxation of law then is possible. This relaxation consists in merely dispensing with the penalty,—the law as a precept or rule of duty is untouched and unrelaxed.

But if these positions are correct, and there is nothing in the being and attributes of God that necessitates the strict and exact infliction of a threatened penalty,—if God by an act of will can relax, and even abrogate, a positive enactment of his own, then why does he not do it merely and simply? Why the sufferings of Jesus Christ? Why the re-

¹ GROTIUS: Defensio, Cap. iii. p. 311.—Grotius excepts as unrelaxable those particular statutes which are accompanied with an oath, or a promise of reward.

Reward when promised must be paid; but punishment when threatened may be waived by the moral governor.

laxation in and by an *atonement*? In answering this question, Grotius gives the remainder of his scheme.—Although the Deity can remit the entire penalty without any satisfaction or penal infliction so far as his own inward nature is concerned, he cannot prudently do so, so far as the created universe is concerned. God does not exist in the solitude of his own eternity; if he did, he might dispense with an atonement, and relax or abrogate law by a mere act of will. He has called a creation into existence, and towards that creation he sustains the relation of Ruler and Governor. The necessities and requirements of the created universe render it unsafe to exercise his power and right to remit the penalty of law without any satisfaction of any kind. ✕ On the ground, therefore, that the interests of the creature need it, and not on the ground that the attributes of the Creator require it, must there be an atonement in order to remission. God possesses the right to relax and even to abrogate the penalty of law; but this is prejudicial to the creature. Hence the relaxation of law must be accompanied with a provision that shall prevent the evil consequences of such a procedure. So many and so great sins cannot be remitted with safety to the interests of creation, unless God at the same time give some kind of expression to his detestation of sin. The sufferings and death of the Son of God are an exemplary exhibition of God's hatred of moral evil, in connection with which

it is safe and prudent to remit that penalty, which so far as God and the Divine attributes are concerned, might have been remitted without it.¹

The idea of "satisfaction" in the scheme of Grotius is thus a very different one from that of Anselm and the Reformers, and a comparison of the two will throw light upon both. According to Anselm, vicarious satisfaction is the substitution of a *strict* equivalent for the penalty due to man. The sufferings and death of God incarnate are equal in dignity and value to the endless sufferings of a race of creatures. In Anselm's view, there can be no relaxation of law, because it flows from the divine nature itself, and therefore "one jot or one tittle shall in no wise pass from the law till all be fulfilled." The vicarious satisfaction of law in the Anselmic theory, consequently, denotes the substitution of an exact and literal equivalent,—as when a debt of one hundred dollars in silver is paid with one hundred dollars in gold. That which is substituted is of literally equal value, though not identical in kind. The sufferings of Christ are not *identical* with those of the sinner,—for the very idea of *substituted* sufferings excludes

¹ GROTIUS: *Defensio Fidei*, cap. v.—In the Grotian scheme, the remission of penalty, being a relaxation of law, is attended with evil consequences; and the sufferings of Christ are only an expedient for remedying these evil consequences to the universe.

But in the Anselmic theory, the remission of penalty is a *regular* and *legal* procedure, because Christ's atonement satisfies all legal claims; and there are, consequently, no evil consequences to the universe to be remedied.

identity, even if it were possible for the God-Man to suffer remorse,—but they are of strictly equal value, and hence are a literal and exact satisfaction ; so that in the substitution there is not the slightest relaxation or waiving of the claims of justice, any more than there is in the above-mentioned instance in which a loan of silver is exactly and literally repaid in gold.

According to Grotius, on the other hand, vicarious satisfaction is not a strict equivalent, but an accepted and nominal equivalent. It is not a *quid* pro quo, which in and of itself extinguishes legal claims, but an *aliud* pro quo, which prevents the evil consequences of a relaxation of legal claims. In the Gro-tian theory, whenever a guilty person is released by the substituted sufferings of another, it is not upon the ground of the *intrinsic* sufficiency of these sufferings, but because of their being accepted as sufficient by the law-making power. “It is necessary,” says Grotius, “that an act of the ruler should come in, in order that the punishment (*poena*) of one person should obtain the deliverance of another. For the law requires, that he who committed the fault should receive the punishment. Now, this act of the ruler, so far as it relates to the law, is relaxation, but so far as it relates to the criminal is remission.”¹ This “interfering act,” Grotius extends to the *value* of the thing substituted, and not merely to the principle of substitution. For the Anselmic theory

¹ GROTIUS: *Defensio*, Cap. vi. See BAUR: *Versöhnungslehre*, 425 (Note).

concedes that the *substitution* of penalty must occur by an "interfering act" of the Supreme Judge; but it differs from the Grotian, in that it maintains that when the principle of vicariousness has been adopted, it then becomes necessary that that which is substituted should be a literal and not a nominal equivalent. According to Grotius, the "interfering act" of the Supreme Judge not only establishes the principle of vicariousness, but also imparts to that which is offered in the place of the sinner's punishment a nominal and accepted value, by which, though intrinsically insufficient, it becomes a sufficient compensation or satisfaction.

Grotius's idea of satisfaction appears yet more clearly in what he says in reply to an objection of Socinus. Socinus urged against the theory of a strict satisfaction that it is incompatible with compassion,—that if the claims of justice are rigorously and completely satisfied, then there is no mercy. Grotius, instead of giving the reply which Anselm and the Reformers gave,—viz.: that it is God and not man who *makes* the satisfaction, and that God's mercy consists in satisfying justice in the sinner's place,—answers as follows: "What Socinus says is, indeed, *not altogether destitute of truth*; but it is true only in case the term 'satisfaction' is taken, contrary to its signification as a legal term, to denote the *strict* and *complete* payment (*solutio*) of all that is due. But when one takes the place of the debtor, and gives something *different* (*aliud*) from

what is due, then there is a relaxation and remission.”¹ At this point, the difference between Grotius and Anselm is plainly apparent. Anselm maintains, that that which is substituted must be of strictly equal value with that for which it is substituted. The sufferings of Christ endured in the place of the sinner’s sufferings strictly and completely satisfy the claims of law. They do not satisfy nominally and because God pleases to regard them as an equivalent; but they really are a full equivalent, and he accepts them because they are. Grotius, on the contrary, maintains, that that which is substituted need not be of strictly equal value with that for which it is substituted. God can “relax” or waive the full demands of justice, and by his arbitrary decision (*acceptilationem*) constitute a partial equivalent a full and complete one. Hence, he explains 1 Cor. vi. 20,—“ye are bought with a price,”—by, “*solutione aliqua liberati sumus*,” and defines the “ransom” spoken of in 1 Tim. ii. 6, as a *λύτρον* or price of *such* a sort (*tale λύτρον seu pretium*) that the deliverer endures something *similar* to that which impends upon the guilty; and remarks that Christ has freed men from the penalty of eternal death, “*aliquid dando*.”² This “*aliquid*,” he defines to be *such* a suffering of Christ as is a remedy for the evil consequences of relaxing the strict claims of law; but not such a suffering as is a strict and

¹ GROTIUS: Defensio, Cap. vi.

² GROTIUS: Defensio, Cap. vi. § 7; viii. § 6; ix. § 3.

plenary satisfaction of all the claims of justice, rendering relaxation of law unnecessary, and having no evil consequences to be remedied.¹ Grotius entitles his work, a defence of the doctrine of "satisfaction;" but it is rather a defence of the doctrine of "relaxation." He combats the theory that the claims of justice are "satisfied" to their full extent, and upholds the theory that they are "waived" to a certain extent. The vicarious sufferings of Christ are a device by which to escape the ill effects of relaxing legal claims, and not a method of completely cancelling those claims. The demands of law, in accordance with Grotius's idea of law and of the power of the law-giver, are set aside, instead of being met. There is nothing in the Divine nature that prohibits this. And this power and right to relax the exact claims of justice enables God to accept a nominal for a real satisfaction,—to make the expression of his detestation of sin take the place of the strict infliction of the penalty of sin. This secures the welfare of the created universe, which is the only thing to be provided for.

We have spoken of the Grotian theory as the

¹ The following extracts throw light upon the Grotian scheme. "Dare *aliquid*, ut per id ipsum alter a debito liberetur, est solvere aut *satisfacere*." Defensio, ix. The death of Christ is not "*solutio rei ipsius debitae*, quae ipso facto liberet: nostra enim

mors, et quidem aeterna, erat in obligatione." Defensio, vi. "Pretii natura ea est, ut sui valore aut *aestimatione* alterum moveat ad concedendam rem aut jus aliquod, puta impunitatem." Defensio, viii.

final statement of the doctrine of a relative satisfaction, and as the re-appearance of the Scotist doctrine of *acceptilation*. Yet Grotius disclaims this. "For acceptilation," says Grotius, "denotes the act by which a creditor without any compensation *at all*, without any payment *of any sort* (*citra ullam solutionem*), absolutely extinguishes an indebtedness. Hence this conception has application only in civil law, and not at all in criminal. For, first, no one ever heard of any of the old writers who has denominated the remitting of *punishment* an 'acceptilatio.' An act of acceptilation presupposes something that can be accepted. But in the case of punishment, the ruler merely executes an infliction, but receives nothing. Secondly, acceptilation is the opposite of *every sort and kind* of satisfaction. But Christ has offered a satisfaction of *some sort*; consequently the idea of acceptilation has no place in a theory of the atonement."¹ In reply to this, it is to be observed that it is the *principle* involved in the notion of acceptilation, and not the mere term itself, which is the matter of importance. Scotus transferred the term from the commercial to the judicial province, when he taught that the Deity could accept a nominal satisfaction as a real one. In doing this, the Deity acts upon the same principle that the commercial creditor does, when he accepts an imaginary payment, or a partial payment, in lieu of a

¹ GROTIUS: *Defensio*, Cap. vii.

complete one. It is really an act of acceptilation, when God regards as an equivalent for the sufferings of man that which is not a strict equivalent for them, as it is when a creditor accepts a part of the debt as a complete payment. But this principle of a *nominal* and *accepted* value is confessedly the constituent principle in the Grotian soteriology. Grotius's definition of law as a *positive* enactment, of penalty as a positive and arbitrary matter, of the consequent power of the Divine legislator to relax or even abrogate the law and the penalty, and his denial that the sufferings of Christ are a strict equivalent,—all the elementary parts of his theory are so defined and put together, as to allow of that “interfering act” by which a nominal satisfaction may be accepted as a sufficient and a real one. The Grotian theory cannot, therefore, escape the charge of adopting Scotus's doctrine of acceptilation, by the remark that acceptilation pertains to the province of commercial law, while substituted penalty belongs to that of criminal law. The fact that within the province of soteriology it is judicial suffering that is exchanged, while within the province of trade and commerce it is money that is exchanged, does not at all affect the *principle* upon which the exchange is made. And if, in the former sphere, a kind of suffering that is not a strict legal equivalent is accepted as such by an arbitrary act of will, it is *ethically*, and *in principle*, precisely the same kind of transaction with that in which only a part

of a pecuniary debt is accepted as full payment, by an act of will on the part of the creditor, or, in the phrase of the Roman law, “by word of mouth.”¹

§ 4. *Critical estimate of the Grotian Soteriology.*

The Grotian soteriology, it is evident from this investigation, is a middle theory which participates in the peculiarities of the two theories between which it endeavours to steer,—viz. the Anselmic and the Socinian. 1. It is allied with the soteriology of Anselm and the Reformers, by its assertion that the atonement is required by the interests of the universe. In contemplating God as a Ruler, who protects the welfare of his creation by a moral government, and who will not, therefore, relax the penalty of transgression without making an expression of his abhorrence of sin, Grotius rejects the system of Socinus which altogether excludes vicarious suffering and combats it. This feature enters into the soteriology of the Reformers, also, though only as a secondary and subordinate one. According to

¹ BAUR (Versöhnungslehre, 428) truly remarks in reference to Grotius's disclaimer, that “there is no other theory to which the conception of acceptilation may be applied with greater right, than that of Grotius.” And THOLUCK (Evangelische Kirchenzeitung,

1834, p. 604) speaks of “the Scotist or Patristic theory of satisfaction” as being revived in the Protestant Church by Grotius. Tholuck, however, is in error in regarding the Patristic and Scotist soteriologies as identical.

the Anselmic view, the sufferings of Christ are required *primarily* by the imperatives of the Divine Nature, and this is the reason why they are required by the Divine Government. In adopting, therefore, the *secondary* reasons and grounds for the atonement, the Grotian theory, so far, harmonizes with the soteriology of the Reformation. 2. The Grotian theory is allied with that of Socinus, in its denial that the satisfaction of Christ is required by the nature and attributes of God. The departure of Grotius from the Church doctrine consists in what he denies, and not in what he asserts. The assertion that the welfare of the universe necessitates the sufferings of Christ in order to the remission of sin would be agreed to by Anselm and Calvin, but would be dissented from by Socinus. And, on the other hand, the assertion that the attribute of justice immanent in the Divine Nature, does not inexorably require a strict and full satisfaction in order to the remission of sin, would be dissented from by Anselm and Calvin, but would be agreed to by Socinus. The assertion that the moral law is a positive enactment, the mere product of the Divine will, that consequently it can be relaxed or even abrogated by the law-maker, and that consequently there is no intrinsic necessity for the atonement in the being and character of God,—all these are Socinian positions.

From these positions, there flow certain logical conclusions that affiliate the Grotian scheme with

that of Socinus, and set it in antagonism to that of the Reformers. They are the following. 1. The death of Christ, according to Grotius, is *exemplary* and not retributive; because it is not required by the Divine nature, but solely by the external necessities of the universe, and that outward relation which God sustains to his creatures as a protector of their welfare. But according to Anselm, and the Reformers, the death of Christ is both retributive and exemplary. Its primary characteristic is that it satisfies judicial claims; and its exemplary aspect is its secondary one. The Reformers contended that the Deity exhibits his abhorrence of sin in the *ordinary* course of his administration, and that, therefore, the incarnation and suffering of Deity in the flesh, being an *extraordinary* procedure, must have, for its primary purpose, something more than merely teaching that God is displeased with sin. There is no doubt upon this point; for this lesson is taught by the punishment of the fallen angels, and by the judgments of God in the earth,—all of which are exemplary of God's abhorrence of sin, and have a direct and strong tendency to prevent sin. The atonement, according to Anselm, is expiatory first, and exemplary afterwards; according to Grotius it is exemplary only. 2. In the Grotian scheme, the sufferings of Christ occur for the purpose of preventing future sin, and not for the purpose of atoning for past sin. The guilt of past sin may be abolished without strict

satisfaction, because there is no immanent necessity in the Divine Nature, inexorable and such as cannot be relaxed or waived, for the infliction of plenary penalty for sins that are past; and hence only an exemplary expression of God's abhorrence of sin is required in order to deter from sin in the future. But where the Grotian soteriology finds no difficulty at all, there the Anselmic finds the chief difficulty in the way of human salvation. According to Anselm, the primal necessity of the incarnation and theanthropic suffering of the Eternal Son of God lies in the fact that the very nature and attributes of Deity require that the guilt of *past* sin be completely expiated. Were the prevention of sin in the future the sole, or the chief obstacle, this could be secured by the agency of the Holy Spirit, in renewing and sanctifying the human heart. In respect, then, to the relations which the atonement sustains to the being and attributes of God, the Grotian soteriology adopts substantially Socinian principles and positions; while, so far as concerns the relations of the atonement to the external universe and the welfare of the finite creature, it adopts the positions of the Anselmic-Protestant soteriology.

CHAPTER VI.

THE ARMINIAN SOTERIOLOGY.

§ 1. *Positive Statements.*

THE Arminian soteriology was formed after Grotius had published his, and the two theologians most concerned in its construction were *Curcellaeus* and *Limborch*. Their aim was to avoid what they deemed to be the extremes of the Socinian doctrine and that of the Church. “*Sententia nostra*,” they say, “*inter duas hasce extremas media est.*”¹

The leading idea of the Arminian soteriology is that of a *sacrificial offering*. The death of Christ, like the death of the animal victim in the Mosaic economy, has for its purpose the deliverance of the guilty from punishment. And at this point, the Arminian theologian would remedy what he regarded as a defect in the Grotian scheme. According to Grotius, the death of Christ was designed to protect the interests of the created universe solely, and did not stand in relations to the Divine Nature.

¹ LIMBORCH : Theol. Christ. III. xxii.

But the Arminian divine contended that Christ's death, as that of a sacrifice, had reference to God as well as to the universe. Limborch in criticising Grotius's *Defensio Fidei*, which the latter had sent to him, remarks that the gist of the matter in respect to the doctrine of the atonement lies in the question: "An Christus morte sua, circa *Deum* aliquid effecerit?" and contends that he did. In this respect, the Arminian theory looks in the direction of the Anselmic and Reformed. But it differs from it, when it proceeds to specify *what* it is that the death of Christ effects in reference to the Divine Nature. This is done in the following particulars.

1. The death of Christ is denominated a sacrifice, but a sacrifice is not the payment of a debt, nor is it a complete satisfaction of justice for sin. It is merely the divinely-appointed *condition* which precedes the forgiveness of sin. God saw fit under the Mosaic economy to connect the remission of sin with the previous death of a lamb or a goat. If the Israelite would offer up the victim in the way and manner appointed, then God promised to forgive him. In the same way, God in the new dispensation connects the pardon of transgression with the death of Jesus Christ. In neither instance, are the claims of justice satisfied. They are waived by an act of compassion that is exerted in connection with the offering of the Son of God as a sacrifice. "Christ," says Curcellaeus,¹ "did not make satisfac-

¹ CURCELLAEUS: *Institutio Religionis Christianae*, Lib. V. Cap. xix. 15.

tion by enduring the punishment which we sinners merited. This does not belong to the nature of a sacrifice, and has nothing in common with it. For sacrifices are not payments of debts, as is evident from those offered under the law. The beasts that were slain for transgressors did not expiate the penalty which they merited, nor was their blood a sufficient *λύτρον* for the soul of man. But they were oblations only, by which the transgressor endeavoured to turn (*flectere*) the mind of God to compassion, and to obtain remission from him. Hence the formula in the law applied to those who had expiated their sins by offering a sacrifice: ‘And it shall be forgiven him.’ (Leviticus iv. 26, 31, 35, &c.)”

2. Respecting the question, whether the sufferings of Christ were penal and judicial, the Arminian divines made the following statements. Christ as a real and true offering for our sins endured the greatest sufferings in our stead, and thereby warded off the punishment which we merit. The sufferings of Christ may be regarded as penal, or of the nature of punishment, not in the sense that he endured the same thing which man deserved to endure, but in the sense that by the will and appointment of God the sufferings which he underwent *took the place of a penalty*, so that his sufferings have the same effect in reconciling God to man, and procuring the forgiveness of sin, that the sinner’s endurance of the punishment due to his sins would have had. “Jesus Christ,” says Lim-

borch," may be said to have been punished (punitus) in our place, in so far as he endured the greatest anguish of soul, and the accursed death of the cross for us, which were of the nature of a vicarious punishment in the place of our sins (quae poenae vicariae pro peccatis nostris rationem habuit). And it may be said that our Lord satisfied the Father for us by his death, and earned righteousness for us, in so far as he satisfied, not the rigor and exactitude of the divine justice but, the just as well as compassionate will of God (voluntati Dei justae simul ac misericordi), and went through all that God required in order to our reconciliation."¹ According to these positions, the sufferings of Christ were not a substituted penalty, but a substitute *for* a penalty. A substituted penalty is a strict equivalent, but a substitute *for* a penalty, may be of inferior worth, as when a partial satisfaction is accepted for a plenary one, by the method of acceptilation; or, as if the finite sacrifice of the lamb and the goat should be constituted by the will of God an offset for human transgression. And the term "satisfaction," also, is wrested from its proper signification, in that the sufferings of Christ are asserted to be a satisfaction of *benevolence*. "Our Lord satisfied . . . not the rigor and exactitude of divine justice, but the just and *compassionate* will of God,"—a use of language as sole-

¹ LIMBORCH : Theol. Chr., III. xxii. 2.

cistical as that which should speak of smelling a sound.

§ 2. *Arminian Objections to the Theory of Satisfaction.*

Having made these positive statements respecting the vicariousness of Christ's sufferings and their penal aspect, the Arminian divines make the following negative statements explanatory of their use of these terms.¹

1. Christ did not endure the full penalty due to man, because he did not endure eternal death, either in degree or in time. He did not endure it in degree, because he did not undergo absolute despair while under the burden of the wrath of God. And he did not endure it through an endless duration. 2. If Christ has *completely* atoned for our sins by enduring the full penalty, then there is nothing more that Divine grace can do for us. The remission of our sins is no longer a matter of Divine compassion, but of the Divine justice, which has been fully satisfied. 3. If Christ has made plenary satisfaction for us, God has not the right to demand either faith or obedience from us. Neither has he the right, in case we do not render obedience, to deprive us of the benefits of Christ's death, and punish us for our sins, because it would

¹ See CURCELLÆUS: *Institutio Religionis Christianae*, Lib. VII. Cap. i.

be unjust to exact a double punishment for one and the same sin.

The first of these objections, it is obvious to remark, overlooks the divinity of the substitute for man. An infinite person suffering in a finite time yields an infinite suffering, with even more exactitude than a finite person or race suffering in an endless time. The Person of Christ in respect to his divinity is strictly infinite; but man's punishment though endless is not strictly infinite. The woe of the lost is eternal only *a parte post*. Though it has no ending, it has a beginning, and therefore is not metaphysically infinite. The second objection is answered by the consideration, that the plenary satisfaction of Divine justice for the sinner by the Divine Being *himself* is the highest conceivable form of compassion,—because it is the compassion of self-sacrifice. And the fact, that after the claims of law have been *completely* met by the voluntary sacrifice of the Son of God, there are, of course, no further claims to be “relaxed” or “waived,” does not disprove the infinite pity that vicariously satisfied them. The third objection proceeds upon the baseless assumption, that because God has made an atonement for human sin, each and every man by that mere fact is entitled to its benefits. After the atonement has been made, it is still the property and possession of the Maker, and he may do what he will with his own. He may elect to whom he will apply it, and to whom he will not apply it.

CHAPTER VII.

THE SOCINIAN SOTERIOLOGY.

§ 1. *Socinian Idea of Justice.*

THE theory of Socinus respecting the work of Christ is stated with great directness and clearness. Rejecting, as he did, all mystery, and reducing Christianity to the few first principles of natural ethics, it was comparatively easy for him to be explicit in his statements, and transparent in his style.

The foundation of his theory is seen in his idea and definition of Divine justice. The doctrine of atonement, as held in the Church, rested upon the position that justice is of a necessary nature, and is an immutable attribute of God. If now it could be shown that this definition of justice is an erroneous one, the main support of the theory of satisfaction falls away.¹ Hence Socinus bent his efforts to re-

¹ SOCINUS (De Servatore, III. i.) remarks: "If we could but get rid of this *justice*, even if we had no other proof, that fiction of Christ's satisfaction would be thoroughly exposed, and would vanish."

move this foundation. "There is no such justice in God," says Socinus, "as requires absolutely and inexorably (omnino) that sin be punished, and such as God himself cannot repudiate. There is, indeed, a perpetual and constant justice in God; but this is nothing but his moral equity and rectitude, by virtue of which there is no depravity or iniquity in any of his works. This is the justice which the Scriptures speak of, and which is as conspicuous in forgiving sins, as in punishing them. But that kind of justice which we are accustomed to call by this name, and which is seen only in the punishment of sin, the Scriptures by no means dignify with this name, but denominate it sometimes the severity of God, sometimes vengeance, sometimes wrath, fury, indignation, and by other terms of this sort. Hence, they greatly err who, deceived by the popular use of the word justice, suppose that justice in this sense is a perpetual quality in God, and affirm that it is infinite. For they do not perceive that if this were the fact, God must eternally be severe and inflict retribution, and could never forgive sin; all which is contrary to the Scriptures, which teach that God is slow to anger and of great mercy. Hence it might with much greater truth be affirmed that (that compassion which stands opposed to justice is the appropriate characteristic of God; and the very opposite doctrine to that maintained by our opponents might be asserted, viz.: that God could not punish sin, because his mercy requires that sin in

any event (omnino) be forgiven. But in fact both positions are false. For, as that justice which commonly goes under this name, and which is opposed to mercy, is not an immanent characteristic of God, but only the *effect or product of his volition*, so that mercy which is opposed to justice is not an internal (propria) quality of God, but only the *effect and product of his volition*. Hence, inasmuch as that mercy which is often attributed to God does not prevent him from punishing any one whom he pleases to punish for sin, still less does that punitive justice which is very rarely (raro admodum) attributed to God prevent him from pardoning any one whom he pleases, without any satisfaction of its claims.¹”

From this extract, it is plain that Socinus conceived of the attributes of justice and mercy as less central than will. By a volition, God may punish a sin, or he may let it go unpunished. He has as much right to do the latter as the former. There is no *intrinsic* right or wrong in either case that necessitates his action. Justice like mercy is the product of his optional will. It is easy to see that by this definition of justice Socinus takes away the foundation of the doctrine of atonement; and that if it be a correct definition, the Socinian theory of forgiveness upon repentance is true. If sin is punishable only because God so determines; and if he

¹ SOCINUS: Praelectiones Theologicae, Caput XVI. (Bibliotheca Fratrum Polonorum, I. 566).

decides not to punish it, then it is no longer punishable,—if punitive justice is the product of mere will, and may be made and unmade by a volition, then it is absurd to say that without the shedding of blood, or the satisfaction of law, there is no remission of sin.¹

§ 2. *Socinian Objections to the Theory of Satisfaction.*

The first objection of Socinus to the doctrine of satisfaction was, that it excludes mercy. If sin is punished it is not forgiven, and conversely if sin is forgiven it is not punished. The two ideas of satisfaction and remission exclude and expel each

¹ PRIESTLEY (Theol. Rep. I. 417) takes the position, that “justice in the Deity can be no more than a modification of that goodness or benevolence which is his sole governing principle,” and from this he draws the inference, that “under the administration of God, there can be no occasion to exercise any severity on penitent offenders.” If justice is ultimately resolvable into benevolence, it follows that it has no indefeasible claims of its own. Whether punishment shall be inflicted in any given instance will depend upon the decisions of benevolence. Justice is not co-ordinate with benevolence, but is subordinate

to it. MAGEE (Atonement, No. xxiv) makes the following criticism upon this postulate of Priestley: “Why speak of justice as a ‘*modification*’ of the divine benevolence, if it be nothing *different* from that attribute; and if it *be* different from it, how can benevolence be the ‘*sole* governing principle’ of the divine administration? The word justice, then, is plainly but a sound made use of to save appearances, as an attribute called by that name has usually been ascribed to the Deity; but in reality nothing is meant by it, in Dr. Priestley’s application of the term, different from pure and absolute benevolence.”

other. If God's justice is satisfied by the infliction of judicial suffering, there is no room for the exercise of his mercy. If God has received a complete equivalent for the punishment due to man, then he does not show any compassion in remitting his sin.¹ But this objection overlooks the fact, that the equivalent is not furnished by man, but by God. Were the atonement of Christ the *creature's* oblation to justice, Socinus's objection would have force. But it is *God*, and not man who satisfies the claims of justice for the sinner. According to the Church doctrine, therefore, the ideas of satisfaction and mercy are combined and harmonized in a *vicarious* atonement, or the *assumption* of penalty by a competent person. If the sinner himself should pay the penalty (as the objection of Socinus implies if it is to have any force), there would be no vicariousness in the suffering, and there would be the execution of justice merely without any mercy. But when the principle of vicariousness, or *substituted* penalty, is introduced, and the incarnate Son of God endures the punishment due to sin, in the sinner's stead, *both* attributes are exercised and manifested together. For justice is satisfied by the suffering which is undergone by the Substitute, and the Substitute certainly shows the height of love and compassion in undergoing it. "Righteousness and peace meet together." The truth is, that this

¹ Socinus: Praelectiones Theologicae, Cap. XVIII. (Bib. Frat. Pol. Tom. I. 570, sq.).

objection of Socinus, which is one of his most plausible, begs the whole question in dispute *by defining mercy in its own way*. It assumes that the ideas of satisfaction and mercy exclude each other, in such a manner that they never can be harmonized in any plan of redemption. It assumes that mercy consists in waiving and abolishing justice by an act of pure will. From this premise, it follows of course that where there is any satisfaction of justice by the endurance of its demands, there is no mercy; and where there is any waiving or abolishing of these demands, there is mercy. A complete atonement, consequently, would exclude mercy entirely; a partial atonement would allow some room for mercy, in partially waiving legal claims; and no atonement at all would afford full play for the attribute, by the entire nullification of all judicial demands.

2. The second objection of Socinus to the Church doctrine of atonement was, that substitution of penalty is impossible. An innocent person cannot endure penal suffering, cannot be punished, because sin is personal (*corporalis*). God himself asserts (Deut. xxiv. 16; Ezekiel xviii. 20), that “the fathers shall not be put to death for the children, neither shall the children be put to death for the fathers; every man shall be put to death for his own sin. The soul that sinneth, it shall die. The son shall not bear the iniquity of the father, neither shall the father bear the iniquity of the son; the

righteousness of the righteous shall be upon him, and the wickedness of the wicked shall be upon him." If, then, by the sentence and decree of God, neither the son ought to be punished for the sins of the father, nor the father for the sins of the son, how can it be possible that God should be willing to exact the punishment of man's sins from any other being (*ab alio ullo*). Penalty is not like a pecuniary debt. One person can pay a sum of money for another, because money is impersonal. But one being cannot satisfy justice for another, because punishment is personal. Justice permits no vicariousness and no substitution; but requires that the very identical soul that has sinned shall suffer. There is no way, therefore, to deliver the guilty from penalty, but by an act of sovereign will. Justice is made by will, and can therefore be abolished by will whenever the Supreme Sovereign pleases to do so. God possesses the right, if he chooses, to arrest the stroke of law, because both the law and its penalty are his own product. And when, and only when, he thus arrests the operation of law by a sovereign volition, and without any substitution of penalty, he shows mercy.¹

3. The third objection which Socinus made to the doctrine of vicarious atonement was, that even if vicarious penalty were allowable and possible, Christ has not rendered an equivalent for the sin of

¹ SOCINUS: *Praelectiones*, Cap. XVIII. (*Bib. Frat. Pol.* I. 570).

man. The law threatens eternal death. Every individual transgressor owes an endless punishment to justice. It would be necessary, therefore, that there should be as many substitutes as there are sinners, because one substitute could suffer but one endless suffering. But that Christ did not endure endless death is evident from the fact that he rose from the dead. Moreover, the Scriptures assert (1 Cor. xv. 17) that “if Christ be not *raised*, your faith is vain ; ye are yet in your sins.” But if it be Christ’s *death* that saves man, as the Church theory teaches, there is no need of his resurrection. Since, therefore, Christ did not suffer eternal death, but rose again from the dead, and since it is said that unless he had risen from the dead, sin would not have been forgiven, it follows that he did not obtain the forgiveness of man’s sins by the method of judicial satisfaction through his sufferings and death. It is indeed said that the dignity of Christ’s person makes his sufferings of infinite worth. But God is no respecter of persons. Christ simply endured a finite pain, which of course could not be an equivalent for the sin of a whole world. His suffering was disciplinary, and not judicial. It was not a penal agony endured for purposes of justice, but was a natural and necessary part of his personal preparation for eternal glory. The captain of our salvation was made perfect in his own character by suffering (Heb. ii. 10). Being found in the fashion of a man, he humbled himself, and became obedient

unto death, even the death of the cross. *Wherefore* God also hath highly exalted him, etc. (Phil. ii. 9.)¹

4. Socinus contended, in the fourth place, that the obedience of Christ could not be a vicarious obedience. Christ was obligated to obey the law for himself as an individual, and therefore he could not obey it for others. This is evident from the fact that he was rewarded for his obedience and for his sufferings, as any other individual is. But even if his obedience could avail for another, it could avail for only a single individual of the human family. The alleged dignity of his Person does not relieve the difficulty. A human nature is incapable of rendering an infinite obedience; and that the Divine Nature which is Supreme and receives obedience from all creatures should itself render obedience, is absurd.²

5. A fifth objection urged by Socinus against the Church soteriology is, that the ideas of satisfaction and imputation which are associated in it are self-contradictory. If a complete satisfaction of the claims of justice has been made, this settles the matter. To make this objective and finished payment of a debt to depend upon an act of imputation upon the part of God, and of faith upon the part of man, is self-contradictory. If Christ has endured the

¹ SOCINUS: Praelectiones Theologicae, Cap. XVIII. (Bib. Frat. Pol. I. 570-573).

² SOCINUS: Praelectiones Theologicae, Cap. XVIII. (Bib. Frat. Pol. I. 571-3).

penalty due to man for sin, this is a fact, and cannot be affected by either the belief or the unbelief of the creature. An atonement that cancels the sin of the world, logically frees that world from condemnation. But according to the Church doctrine none are saved from condemnation unless this satisfaction is imputed by God, and received in the act of faith by man.¹

6. Sixthly, Socinus contended that if Christ made complete satisfaction for all the sin of man, both past and future, it follows that not only no other satisfaction is required, but that personal holiness is not necessary. Inasmuch as the Scriptures teach that without righteousness no one can enter the kingdom of God, the advocates of the doctrine of satisfaction betake themselves to the notion of an imputed righteousness, by means of which man, though sinful and polluted, is accounted or reckoned to be holy. Hence it follows from the Protestant doctrine of imputed righteousness, that even without true and actual holiness future blessedness is attainable.²

The positive part of Socinus's soteriology is found in the position, that forgiveness is granted upon the ground of repentance and obedience. There are no legal obstacles in the way of pardon, because the will of God is sovereign and supreme

¹ SOCINUS: De Christo Salvatore, Pars IV. Cap. iii. (Bib. Frat. Pol. II. 217).

² SOCINUS: De Christo Salvatore, P. IV. Cap. iii. (Bib. Frat. Pol. Tom. II. 217).

over law and penalty. Nothing is necessary, consequently, but sorrow for sin, and an earnest purpose to obey the commandments. Christ has set an example of obedience, and man is to follow it in the exercise of his natural powers.

BOOK SIXTH.



HISTORY

OF

ESCHATOLOGY.

CHAPTER I.

SECOND ADVENT OF CHRIST

§ 1. *Millenarianism.*

Millenarianism, or *Chiliasm*, is the doctrine of two resurrections (Rev. xx.),—the first, that of the righteous dead at the time of the second advent of Christ, and the second that of the righteous and the wicked at the end of the world,—and a personal corporeal reign of Christ between them, for a thousand years, upon the renovated earth. It is substantially the same with the Later-Jewish doctrine of a Messianic kingdom upon earth. The Jews at the time of the Incarnation were expecting a personal prince, and a corporeal reign, in the Messiah who was to come; and one of the principal grounds of their rejection of Christ was the fact that he represented the Messiah's rule as a spiritual one in the hearts of men, and gave no countenance to their literal and materializing interpretation of the Messianic prophecies. The disciples of Christ, being themselves Jews, were at first naturally infected

with these views, and it was not until after that Pentecostal effusion of the Holy Spirit which so enlarged their conceptions of the kingdom of God, and with which their inspiration properly begins, that they rose above their early Jewish education. In none of their inspired writings do we find such an expectation of Christ's speedy coming as prompted the question: "Lord, wilt thou at *this* time restore again the kingdom to Israel?" (Acts i. 6). For the answer of Christ to this inquiry had given them to understand, that before this event could occur Christianity must be preached in "Jerusalem, and in all Judea, and in Samaria, and *unto the uttermost part of the earth*" (Acts i. 8).

There being this affinity between Millenarianism and the Later-Jewish idea of the Messiah and his kingdom, it is not surprising to find that Millenarianism was a peculiarity of the Jewish-Christian, as distinguished from the Gentile-Christian branch of the church, at the close of the first century. It appears first in the system of the Judaistic-Gnostic *Cerinthus*, the contemporary and opponent of the apostle John. Of the Apostolical Fathers, only *Barnabas*, *Hermas*, and *Papias* exhibit in their writings distinct traces of this doctrine,—the latter teaching it in its grossest form, and the first two holding it in a less sensuous manner. There are no traces of Chiliasm in the writings of *Clement of Rome*, *Ignatius*, *Polycarp*, *Tatian*, *Athengoras*, and

Theophilus of Antioch.¹ The inference from these facts, then, is, that this tenet was not the received faith of the church certainly down to the year 150. It was held only by individuals. These, in some instances, as in that of Cerinthus, were in hostile and positively heretical relations to the church. And in the instance of those whose general catholicity was acknowledged—as Barnabas, Hermas, and Papias,—there was by no means such a weight of character and influence, as would entitle them to be regarded as the principal or sole representatives of orthodoxy. On the contrary, these minds were comparatively uninfluential, and their writings are of little importance. The ecclesiastical authority of Clement of Rome, Ignatius, and Polycarp is certainly much greater than that of Barnabas, Hermas, and Papias. So far as concerns the Apostolic age, then, the testimony of history goes to show that the literal and materializing interpretation put upon the teachings of Isaiah and St. John concerning the second coming of Christ, by the Millenarian, was not the most authoritative one,—although prevalent among the Jewish as distinguished from the Gentile Christians, and gradually becoming prevalent in the church generally, from a cause that will be noticed hereafter. A further incidental proof of the position, that Millenarianism was not the received and authoritative faith of the church from the death of the Apostles to the year 150, is found in the fact

¹ HAGENBACH: History of Doctrine, § 75, n. 6. (Smith's Ed.).

that it does not appear in the so-called *Apostles' Creed*. This symbol was not, indeed, drawn up by the Apostles, but it is undoubtedly the substance of the short confessions of faith which the catechumens of the Apostolic Church were accustomed to make upon entering the church; so that it is a full statement of what passed for the substance of Christianity with them. But in this symbol there is not the slightest allusion to two resurrections and a corporeal reign of Christ between them. The only specifications are, that Christ shall come from heaven "to judge the quick and the dead;" and that there is a "resurrection of the body," and a "life everlasting" [immediately succeeding, is the implication].

The period between the year 150 and 250 is the blooming age of Millenarianism; and yet even in this period it does not become the catholic faith, as embodied in the catholic creed. Some minds now adopt the literal interpretation of the Old Testament prophecies, and subject them to a very sensuous exegesis. *Irenaeus* and *Tertullian* give glowing descriptions of the Millennial reign.¹ Anti-Christ together with all the nations that side with him will be destroyed. All earthly empires, and the Roman in particular, will be overthrown. Christ will again appear, and will reign a thousand years, in corporeal presence on earth, in Jerusalem, which

¹ IRENAEUS: *Contra Haereses*, V. xxv. 36. TERTULLIANUS: *Adversus Marcionem*, iii. 24.

will be rebuilt and made the capital of his kingdom. The patriarchs, prophets, and all the pious, will be raised from the dead, and share in the felicity of this kingdom. The New Jerusalem is depicted in the most splendid colors. The metaphors of Isaiah (liv. 11, 12), are treated as proper terms. Irenaeus¹ describes the foundations of the rebuilt Jerusalem as literally carbuncle and sapphire, and its bulwarks crystal; and regards it as actually let down from heaven, according to Rev. xxi. 2. Tertullian puts the same interpretation with Irenaeus upon this text, and for confirmation refers to the report, that in the Parthian war, in Judea a city was observed to be lowered down from the sky every morning, and to disappear as the day advanced. The earth was to become wonderfully fertile. Irenaeus² cites with approbation from Papias the statement, that there would be vines having ten thousand branches, and each branch ten thousand boughs, and each bough ten thousand shoots, and each shoot ten thousand clusters, and each cluster ten thousand berries, and each berry would yield twenty-five measures of wine.

The Millenarian tendency became stronger as the church began, in the last half of the second century, to feel the persecuting hand of the government laid upon it. The distressed condition of the people of God led them to desire and pray for an

¹ IRENAEUS: *Adversus Haereses*, V. xxxiv.

² IRENAEUS: *Adversus Haereses*, V. xxxiii.

advent of the Head of the church that would extinguish all his enemies. It was natural that the doctrine of the personal reign of Christ should be the most prevalent when the earthly condition of the church was the most intolerable. So general had the tenet become in the last half of the 2d century, that Justin Martyr¹ declares that it was the belief of all but the Gnostics. But Irenaeus,² on the contrary, speaks of opposers of Millenarianism who held the catholic faith, and who agreed with the Gnostics only in being Anti-Millenarians; although he is himself desirous to make it appear that Anti-Millenarianism is of the nature of heresy. *Gaius*, a presbyter of Rome about the year 200, attacks the Millenarian views of the Montanist Proclus, and declares Millenarianism to be the invention of Cerinthus, and the Apocalypse a writing of this heretic. *Cyprian* maintains the Millenarian theory with his usual candor and moderation. Yet, Millenarianism does not appear in the catholic creed as an article of faith. Both Irenaeus and Tertullian, in their writings against heretics, present brief synoptical statements of the authorized faith of the church;³ but in none of them do we find the Millenarian tenet. In their synopses, there is nothing more said upon eschatological points, than is contained in the Apostles' Creed.

¹ JUSTINUS MARTYR: *Dialogus cum Tryphone*, Cap. 80, 81.

² IRENAEUS: *Adversus Haereses*, V. xxxi. 1.

³ IRENAEUS: *Adv. Haer.* I. x; III. iv. TERTULLIANUS: *De virg. vel. Cap. i.*; *Adv. Prax.* Cap. ii.; *De praescr. haer.* Cap. xiii.

The 3d century witnessed a very decided opposition to Millenarianism,—a fact which evinces that its blooming period was a brief one of about a hundred years. The Alexandrine School, under the lead of *Clement* and *Origen*, made a vigorous attack; and in the last part of the 3d century, *Dionysius*, bishop of Alexandria, succeeded by dint of argument in repressing a very gross form of Millenarianism that was spreading in his diocese, under the advocacy of *Nepos* and *Coracion*. After the 3d century, the tenet disappears very generally. *Lactantius* († 330) is the only man of any note in the 4th century who defends the system. Augustine adopted the theory in his earlier days, but rejected it afterwards. That Chiliasm could not have been generally current in the beginning of the 4th century, is proved by the manner in which *Eusebius* speaks of it. Describing the writings of *Papias*, he remarks that they contain “matters rather too fabulous.” Among these “matters,” he enumerates the opinion of *Papias*, that “there would be a certain millennium after the resurrection, and that there would be a corporeal reign of Christ on this very earth; which things he appears to have imagined, as if they were authorized by the apostolic narrations, not understanding correctly those matters which they propounded mystically, in their representations. For he was very limited in his comprehension, as is evident from his discourses, yet he was the cause why most of the ecclesiastical writers, urging the antiquity of

the man, were carried away by a similar opinion,—as, for instance, Irenaeus, or any other that adopted similar sentiments.”¹ Had Millenarianism, in the first quarter of the 4th century, been the received belief of any considerable portion of the catholic church, a writer like Eusebius, whose respect for everything catholic and ecclesiastical was very high, would not have spoken of it as “fabulous.”

The history of Millenarianism after the year 400 is reduceable to a very short compass. During the Middle Ages, it can hardly be said to have had any existence as a doctrine; though at the close of the tenth century, there was an undefined fear and expectation among the masses that the year 1000 would witness the advent of the Lord. In the period of the Reformation, Millenarianism made its appearance in connection with the fanatical and heterodox tendencies that sprang up along with the great religious awakening. Hence, the symbols when they notice the doctrine at all do so in terms of condemnation. The *Augsburg Confession* condemns Chiliasm in conjunction with the doctrine of a limited future punishment; both tenets being held by the Anabaptists of that day. “*Damnant Anabaptistas, qui sentiunt hominibus damnatis ac diabolis finem poenarum futurum esse. Damnant et alios, qui spargunt Judiacos opiniones, quod ante resurrectionem mortuorum pii regnum mundi occa-*

¹EUSEBIUS: Eccl. Hist. III. xxxix.

paturi sint, ubique oppressis impiis.”¹ The English *Confession of Edward VI.*, from which the Thirty Nine Articles were afterwards condensed, condemns it in nearly the same terms as the Augsburg. “Qui millenariorum fabulam revocare conantur, sacris literis adversantur, et in Judaica deliramenta sese praecipitant.”² The *Belgic Confession* guards the statement respecting the second advent of Christ, by teaching that the time of its occurrence is unknown to all created beings, and that it will not take place *until the number of the elect is complete*. “Credimus Dominum nostrum Jesum Christum, quando tempus a Deo praestitum, quod omnibus creaturis est ignotum, advenerit, et numerus electorum completus fuerit, e caelo rursus venturum, etc.”³

The history of Chiliasm since the Reformation presents few points of importance. During the present century, individual minds in England and America, and upon the Continent of Europe, have attempted to revive the theory,—in some instances, in union with an intelligent and earnest orthodoxy; in others, in connection with an uneducated and somewhat fanatical pietism. The first class is represented by *Delitzsch* and *Auberlen* in Germany, and by *Cumming*, *Elliott*, and *Bonar* in Great Britain; the second class by the so-called *Adventists* and *Millerites* in the United States.

The facts, then, established by this account of

¹ HASE: Libri Symbolici, p. 14.

² NIEMEYER: Collectio, p. 600.

³ NIEMEYER: Collectio, p. 387.

Millenarianism in the Ancient, Mediaeval, and Modern Churches, are the following: 1. That Millenarianism was never the oecumenical faith of the church, and never entered as an article into any of the creeds. 2. That Millenarianism has been the opinion of individuals and parties only,—some of whom have stood in agreement with the catholic faith, and some in opposition to it.

§ 2. *Catholic Theory of the Second Advent.*

The pressure of persecution being lifted off, the church returned to its earlier and first exegesis of the Scripture data concerning the end of the world, and the second coming of Christ. The representations in Rev. xx. were once more interpreted by those in Matt. xxv., which speak only of an advent at the day of judgment; and by the instructions given by St. Paul, in 2 Thess. ii., to correct the erroneous inference which the Thessalonian Church had drawn from his first Epistle to them, “that the day of Christ is at hand.” The personal coming of Christ, it was now held, is not to take place until the final day of doom; until the gospel has been preached “unto the uttermost part of the earth” (Acts i. 8); until the Jews have been converted to Christianity, after “the fulness of the Gentiles be brought in” (Rom. xi.); and until that great apostasy has occurred which is mentioned by St. Paul (1 Thess. ii.

3). The eschatology of the oldest symbol became the oecumenical doctrine, and the Church in all its ages, without even a hint of any other appearance of the risen Redeemer, has confessed in the phraseology of the Apostles Creed its belief, that "He ascended into heaven, and sitteth on the right hand of God the Father Almighty; from *thence* he shall come to judge the quick and the dead."

CHAPTER II.

THE RESURRECTION.¹

§ 1. *The Intermediate State.*

THE opinions of the Early Fathers concerning the residence of the soul in its disembodied state, between death and the resurrection, were somewhat fluctuating. The idea of a Hades, or under-world, where departed spirits dwell, was familiar to the Hebrew mind as it was to the Greek, and so far as this idea passed over to Christianity it tended to the doctrine of a state intermediate between this earthly life, and the everlasting abode of the soul assigned to it in the day of judgment. *Justin Martyr* represents the souls of the righteous as taking up a temporary abode in a happy, and those of the wicked in a wretched place; and stigmatizes as heretical the doctrine that souls are immediately received into heaven at death.² *Tertul-*

¹The materials in this and the succeeding chapter are derived mostly from BAUMGARTEN-CRUSIUS : *Dogmengeschichte*, and

HAGENBACH : *History of Doctrine* (Smith's Ed.).

²JUSTINUS MARTYR : *Dialogus cum Tryphone*, §§ 5. 80.

lian held that the martyrs went at once to the abode of the blessed, but that this was a privilege peculiar to them, and not granted to other Christians.¹ *Cyprian*, on the other hand, says nothing of an intermediate state, and expresses the confident belief that those who die in the Lord, by pestilence or by any other mode, will be at once taken to him.² In the *Alexandrine School*, the idea of an intermediate state passed into that of a gradual purification of the soul, and paved the way for the later Papal doctrine of purgatory.³

The doctrine of an intermediate state not only maintained itself, but gained in authority and influence during the Polemic period (250–730). *Ambrose* taught that “the soul is separated from the body at death, and after the cessation of the earthly life is held in an ambiguous condition (*ambiguo suspenditur*), awaiting the final judgment.”⁴ *Augustine* remarks that “the period (*tempus*) which intervenes between the death and the final resurrection of man, contains souls in secret receptacles, who are treated according to their character and conduct in the flesh.”⁵ “The majority of ecclesiastical writers of this period,” Hagenbach remarks, “believed that men do not receive their full re-

¹ TERTULLIANUS: *De anima*, lv; *De resurrectione*, xliii.

⁴ AMBROSIUS: *De Cain et Abel*, II. ii.

² CYPRIANUS: *Adv. Demetrium*; *De mortalitate*.

⁵ AUGUSTINUS: *Enchiridion*, cix.

³ REDEPENNING: *Origenes*, 235.

ward till after the resurrection of the body." Here and there, however, there was a dissenting voice. *Gregory Nazianzen* supposed that the souls of the righteous, prior to the resurrection of the body, are at once admitted into the presence of God; in which opinion he seems to be supported by *Gennadius*, and *Gregory the Great*. *Eusebius* also declares that Helena, the mother of Constantine, went immediately to God, and was transformed into an angelic substance.

In the Middle Ages and the Papal Church, the doctrine of an intermediate state was, of course, retained and defended in connection with that of purgatory. In the Protestant Church, the doctrine of purgatory was rejected; but some difference of sentiment appears respecting the intermediate state. *Calvin* combatted the theory of a sleep of the soul between death and the resurrection (*Psychopanny*), which had been revived by some of the Swiss Anabaptists, and argues for the full consciousness of the disembodied spirit. The *Second Helvetic Confession* expressly rejects the notion that departed spirits reappear on earth. Some theologians endeavored to establish a distinction between the happiness which the disembodied spirit enjoys, and that which it will experience after the resurrection of the body. They also distinguished between the judgment which takes place at the death of each individual, by which his destiny is immediately decided, and the general judg-

ment at the end of the world. Speaking generally, the doctrine of an intermediate state has found most favour in the Lutheran division of Protestants. In the English Church, since the time of Laud, the doctrine has found some advocates, chiefly in that portion of it characterized by high church views, and a Romanizing tendency. The followers of *Swedenborg* adopt the tenet, in a highly gross and materializing form.

§ 2. *The Resurrection Body.*

The doctrine of the resurrection of the body was from the beginning a cardinal and striking tenet of the Christian Church. The announcement of it by Paul at Athens awakened more interest, and provoked more criticism, than any other of the truths which he taught (Acts xvii. 32). All the early Fathers maintain this dogma with great earnestness and unanimity, against the objections and denial of the skeptics,—of whom *Celsus* is the most acute and scoffing in his attacks. Most of them believed in the resuscitation of the very same body that lived on earth. Only the Alexandrine School dissented upon this point. *Justin Martyr* affirms that the body will rise again with all its members. Even cripples will rise as such, but at the moment of resurrection will be made physically perfect. *Irenaeus* asserts the identity of the future with the

present body. *Tertullian* wrote a tract upon the resurrection, maintaining that the very same body will be raised that was laid in the grave. He answers the objection that certain members of the body will be of no use in the future life, by the remark that the bodily member is capable of both a lower and a higher service. Even upon earth, the mouth serves not only for the purpose of eating, but also of speaking and praising God. *Cyprian* follows *Tertullian* in his representations. *Clement of Alexandria*, and *Origen*, on the other hand, adopt a spiritualizing theory of the resurrection. *Origen* teaches that a belief in the doctrine of the resurrection of the body is not absolutely essential to the profession of Christianity, provided the immortality of the soul be maintained. Yet he defended the church dogma against the objections of *Celsus*, rejecting, however, the doctrine of the identity of the bodies, as giving a handle to scoffers. These idealizing views of the Alexandrine School were adopted by several of the Eastern theologians; for example, *Gregory Nazianzen*, *Gregory Nyssa*, and perhaps *Basil*.¹ But they were combatted at both the East and the West, with great vehemence. *Jerome* maintained the identity of the resurrection-body with that laid in the grave, in respect to the very

¹ *SYNESIUS* of Cyrene acknowledged that he could not adopt the current view in the church respecting the resurrection, which

was interpreted, by some, as an entire denial of the doctrine of the resurrection.

hairs and teeth. This last he proves by the "gnashing of teeth" in the world of woe. *Augustine*, in the earlier part of his Christian life, was somewhat inclined to the spiritualizing view of the Alexandrine School; but afterwards defended the more sensuous theory, though being careful to clear the doctrine of gross and carnal additions. *Chrysostom* asserted the identity of the two bodies, but directs particular attention to the Pauline distinction of a "natural body" and a "spiritual body." *Gregory the Great* maintained substantially the same views with *Augustine*.

The doctrine of the Ancient Church, that the human body will be raised with all its component parts, passed into the Middle Ages, and was regarded as the orthodox doctrine. *Thomas Aquinas*, founding upon the Patristic theory, goes into details. "The resurrection will probably take place toward evening, for the heavenly bodies which rule over all earthly matter must first cease to move. Sun and moon will meet again at that point where they were probably created. No other matter will rise from the grave than what existed at the moment of death. If all that substance were to rise again which has been consumed during the present life, it would form a most unshapely mass. The sexual difference will exist, but without sensual appetites. All the organs of sense will still be active, with the exception of the sense of taste. It is, however, possible that even this latter may be rendered more perfect, and

fitted for adequate functions and enjoyments. Hair and nails are one of the ornaments of man, and are therefore quite as necessary as blood and other fluids. The resurrection bodies will be exceedingly fine, and be delivered from the corpulence and heavy weight which is now so burdensome to them; nevertheless, they will be tangible, as the body of Christ was touched after his resurrection. Their size will not increase after the resurrection, nor will they grow either thicker or thinner. To some extent they will still be dependent on space and time; yet the resurrection bodies will move much faster, and more easily, from one place to another, than our present bodies; they will be at liberty to follow the tendencies and impulses of the soul. They are glorified, bright, and shining, and can be perceived by glorified eyes alone. But this is true only in reference to the bodies of the blessed. The bodies of the damned are to be ugly and deformed, incorruptible, but capable of suffering, which is not the case with the bodies of the saints.”¹ These representations afterwards found their vivid embodiment in the poetry of Dante, and the painting of Raffaele and Michael Angelo. *Scotus Erigena* endeavoured to revive the ideas of Origin, but his opinions found no favour.

The Patristic theory of the resurrection body was transmitted, also, to the Protestant churches,

¹ AQUINAS: Summa, P. iii. Qu. 75; quoted by HAGENBACH; History of Doctrine, § 204.

and the history of the dogma in modern times exhibits comparatively few variations from the traditional belief,—and these, mostly in the line of Origen's speculations.

CHAPTER III.

THE FINAL STATE.

§ 1. *Day of Judgment.*

THE doctrine of a general judgment was, from the first, immediately connected with that of the resurrection of the body. Mankind are raised from the dead, in order to be judged according to the deeds done in the body. The Fathers founded their views of the day of doom upon the representations and imagery of Scripture. They believed that a general conflagration would accompany the last judgment, which would destroy the world; though some ascribed a purifying agency to it. Some of them, like *Tertullian* and the more rhetorical of the Greek Fathers, enter into minute details, while others, like *Augustine*, endeavour dogmatically to define the facts couched in the figurative language of Scripture. These two classes also perpetuate themselves in the Mediaeval Church. In the Middle Ages, it was a popular opinion that the judgment would take place in the valley of Jehoshaphat. But it was found difficult to unite in a

single scene all the various imagery of Scripture,—such for example, as the darkening of the sun and moon, and yet the effulgence of light accompanying the advent of the judge. Hence theologians like *Aquinas* (Qu. 88, Art. 2.) maintained that the judgment would take place *mentaliter*, because the oral trial and defence of each individual would require too much time. In the Modern Church, the course of thought upon this doctrine has been similar to that in the Ancient and Mediaeval. The symbols of the different Protestant communions explicitly affirm a day of judgment at the end of the world, but enter into no details. Individual speculations, as of old, vibrate between the extremes of materialism and hyper-spiritualism.

§ 2. *Purgatory.*

The doctrine of purgatory was intimately connected with that of an intermediate state, and was developed along with it. In proportion as the condition of the soul between death and the resurrection was regarded as very different from its condition after the final judgment, it was natural that the intermediate state should be looked upon as one in which the everlasting destiny is not irrevocably fixed, and in which there might possibly be a deliverance from evil and peril. Those of the early Fathers who held the doctrine of an intermediate

place, made no practical distinction between the condition of the soul previous to the resurrection, and its condition after it. The wicked were miserable, and the good were happy,—and that eternally. The chief difference between the intermediate state, and the final state, for either the sinner or the saint was, that in the former the soul is disembodied, and in the latter it is “clothed upon” (2 Cor. v. 2). But in course of time, the difference between the intermediate and the final state of the soul became greatly magnified. The Scripture doctrine that there are *degrees* of reward and punishment in the future world was construed by some of the later Fathers in such a manner, as to bring the lowest grade of reward into contact with the lowest grade of punishment, and thereby to annihilate the difference in *kind* between heaven and hell. Thus, the intermediate state gradually came to be regarded as the region in which the spirit is in a vague and undecided position in respect to endless bliss and woe, and consequently as one in which the escape from everlasting misery is still possible.

The doctrine of a purification of *believers*, only, in the intermediate state, shows itself as early as the 4th century. The cleansing was confined to those who had become partially sanctified in this life. *Augustine* supposes that the teachings of St. Paul in 1 Cor. iii. 11–15 imply, that the remainders of corruption in the renewed soul may be purged away in the period between death and the final judgment.

The idea of a purifying fire is distinctly presented by *Gregory Nazianzen*. But the Papal doctrine of purgatory does not yet appear. It is not until the time of *Gregory the Great* († 604), that the doctrine attains its full form. He lays it down as an article of faith, and is the first writer who clearly propounded the idea of a deliverance from purgatory by intercessory prayer, and masses for the dead (*sacra oblatio hostiae salutaris*). “Comparing,” says Hagenbach,¹ “Gregory’s doctrine with the earlier, and more spiritual notions concerning the efficacy of the purifying fire of the intermediate state, we may adopt the statement of Schmidt, that ‘the belief in a lasting desire after a higher degree of perfection, which death itself cannot quench, *degenerated into a belief in purgatory.*’”

The dogma of purgatory, thus gradually formed, passed into the Middle Ages, and was embodied firmly in the Papal system by the decisions of the Council of Trent. Its place and influence in the Papal Church are well known.

§ 3. *Eternal Rewards and Punishment.*

That the blessedness of the good is unchanging and eternal, has been the uniform faith of the Church in all ages. Representations concerning the nature of this happiness vary with the culture, and intellec-

¹ HAGENBACH: History of Doctrine, § 141.

tual spirit, of the time or the individual. *Justin Martyr* regards the blessedness of heaven as consisting mainly in the continuation of the happiness of the millennial reign, heightened by the enjoyment of immediate intercourse with God. *Origen* holds that the blessed dwell in the aërial regions, passing from one heaven to another as they progress in holiness. At the same time, he condemns those who expect sensuous enjoyment in the heavenly state. The soul will “have a clear insight into the destinies of men, and the dealings of Providence. Among the teachings of God in that higher state, will also be instruction about the stars, ‘why a star is in such and such a position, why it stands at such and such a distance from another,’ etc. But the highest and last degree is the intuitive vision of God himself, the complete elevation of the spirit above the region of sense.” The Greek theologians, like *Gregory Nazianzen* and *Gregory Nyssa*, adopted the views of Origen, and taught that the blessedness of heaven consists in enlarged knowledge of divine things, intercourse with the saints and angels, and deliverance from the fetters of the earthly body. *Augustine* believed that the heavenly happiness consists in the enjoyment of peace which passes knowledge, and the vision of God which cannot be compared with bodily vision. One important element in the happiness of the redeemed, according to him, is deliverance from all hazards of apostasy, sin, and death,—the *non posse peccare et mori*.

The Schoolmen, while holding the essential features in the Patristic theory, endeavoured to systematize this subject, as they did every other one. They divided heaven into three parts,—the *visible* heaven, or the firmament; the *spiritual* heaven, where saints and angels dwell; and the *intellectual* heaven, where the blessed enjoy the beatific vision of the Trinity. Degrees of happiness are bestowed according to the grade of perfection. *Aquinas* supposed different gifts of blessedness, denoted by the *corona aurea* which is bestowed upon all the blessed, and the particular *aureolae* for martyrs and saints, for monks and nuns. Some of the Mystics, as *Suso*, describe the heavenly happiness under imagery derived from lovely Alpine valleys, and bright meadows, and the joyful abandonment of heart incident to the opening of the vernal season. But they are careful to remark, that all such descriptions are only an image of an ineffable reality.

The Modern Church maintains the doctrine of everlasting blessedness in essentially the same form with the Ancient and Mediaeval. The tendencies to materialize, or to spiritualize it, vary with the grades of culture and modes of thinking. The popular mind still instinctively betakes itself to the sensuous imagery and representations, with Justin Martyr and Tertullian; while the educated intellect seeks, with Origen, the substance of heaven in the state of the soul. “Most certainly,” says one of this class, “there is perfect happiness beyond the grave, for *those who have in*

this world begun to enjoy it, and this is by no means different from that which we may here at any time begin to possess. We do not enter into this state of happiness, merely by being buried. Many will seek happiness in the future life, and in the infinite series of future worlds, as much in vain, as in the present life, if they think it can be found in any thing but that which is now so near to them, that it can never be brought nearer,—viz., the Eternal.”

The punishment inflicted upon the lost was regarded by the Fathers of the Ancient Church, with very few exceptions, as endless. *Clement of Rome* (Ep. ii. 8) affirms, that “after we leave this world, we are no longer able to confess sin, and to turn from it” (οὐκ ἔτι δυνάμεθα ἐκεῖ ἐξομολογήσασθαι ἢ μετανοεῖν ἔτι). *Justin Martyr* (*ante*, Vol. i. p. 128) asserts the eternity of future punishments, in opposition to Plato’s doctrine, that they would last a thousand years. *Minucius Felix* (Cap. 35) remarks of the damned: “Nec tormentis, aut modus ullus aut terminus.” *Cyprian* (Ad. Demetr.), in similar terms, says of the lost: “Cremabit addictos ardens semper gehenna, et vivacibus flammis vorax poena, nec erit, unde habere tormenta vel *requiem* possint aliquando, vel *finem*. Servabantur cum corporibus suis animae infinitis cruciatibus ad dolorem. . . . Quando istinc excessum fuerit, *nullus jam poenitentiae locus est, nullus satisfactionis effectus*: hic vita aut amittitur, aut tenetur; hic saluti aeternae cultu Dei, et fructu fidei, providetur.” *Augustine*

argues that the misery of the lost will be endless, from the use of the word *αἰώνιος* in Matt. xxv. 41, 46, which, he maintains, must have the same signification when applied to the punishment of the evil, as to the recompense of the good. "If both things are alike *αἰώνιος*, then the term must be interpreted to mean either that both are transitory, or that both are everlasting. 'Eternal' punishment and 'eternal' life are contrasted with each other. To say that 'eternal' life will have no end, but that 'eternal' punishment will have an end, is absurd." Respecting the nature of the punishment, Augustine considers that separation from God constitutes the severity and dreadfulness of it; but leaves it to the individual to choose between the more sensuous, or the more spiritual mode of interpretation,—adding, that it is better to unite them together.¹ *Chrysostom* employs his powerful eloquence in depicting the everlasting torments of the lost; but remarks that it is of more consequence to know how to escape hell, than to know its locality or its nature.

The only exception to the belief in the eternity of future punishment, in the Ancient Church, appears in the Alexandrian School. Their denial of the doctrine sprang logically out of their anthropology. *Clement of Alexandria*, and *Origen*, we have seen, asserted with great earnestness the tenet of a plenary and inalienable power in the human will to

¹ AUGUSTINUS: *Enchiridion*, § 112; *De moribus ecclesiae*, c. 11; *De civitate*, XXI. lx. 10.

overcome sin. The destiny of the soul is thus placed in the soul itself. The power of free will (*αὐτεξούσιον*) cannot be lost, and if not exerted in this world, it still can be in the next; and under the full light of the eternal world, and the stimulus of suffering there experienced, nothing is more probable than that it will be exerted.¹ Hence, in opposition to the catholic faith, Origen maintained the doctrine of the final restoration of all human souls. At the same time, he acknowledged that this doctrine might easily become dangerous to the unconverted, and sometimes speaks of an eternal condemnation, and the impossibility of conversion in the world to come. Yet, in close connection with this very statement, he calls the fear of eternal punishment a beneficial "deception" appointed by God. "For many wise men," he says, "or such as thought themselves wise, after having apprehended the real and absolute truth respecting endless punishment, and rejected the delusion, have given themselves up to a vicious life. So that it would have been much better for them to have continued in the delusion, and believed in the eternity of future punishment."² The views of Origen concerning future retribution were almost wholly confined to his school. Faint traces of a belief in the remission of

¹ Clement and Origen both found the final recovery of Satan and his angels, upon this abiding existence of free will to good in the rational spirit. See the ex-

tracts in BAUMGARTEN-CRUSIUS: *Dogmengeschichte*, II. 218.

² BAUMGARTEN-CRUSIUS: *Dogmengeschichte*, II. 390; HAGENBACH: *History of Doctrine*, § 78.

punishments in the future world are visible in the writings of *Didymus* of Alexandria, and in *Gregory Nyssa*. The annihilation of the wicked was taught by *Arnobius*. With these exceptions, the Ancient Church held that the everlasting destiny of the human soul is decided in this earthly state.

The Mediaeval Church received the traditional doctrine respecting endless retribution. Heaven and hell were separated by an absolute and impassable gulf, but the intermediate space between them was subdivided into purgatory, which lies nearest to hell; the *limbus infantum*, where all unbaptized children remain; and the *limbus patrum*, which is the abode of the Old Testament saints, and the place to which Christ went to preach redemption to the spirits in prison. This last *limbus* was also called Abraham's bosom. *Aquinas* considers the torments of the damned to consist in useless repining and murmuring. They can change neither for the better, nor for the worse. They hate God, and curse the state of the blessed. Mystics like *Suso* describe the misery of the lost, in the same vivid and sensuous phrase in which they depict the happiness of the saints. "O! separation, everlasting separation, how painful art thou! O! the wringing of hands! O! sobbing, sighing, and weeping, unceasing howling and lamenting, and yet never to be heard. . . Give us a millstone, say the damned, as large as the whole earth, and so wide in circumference, as to touch the sky all around, and let a

little bird come once in a hundred thousand years, and pick off a small particle of the stone, not larger than the tenth part of a grain of millet, after another hundred thousand years let him come again, so that in ten hundred thousand years he would pick off as much as a grain of millet, we wretched sinners would ask nothing but that when this stone has an end, our pains might also cease ; yet even that cannot be !” The Inferno of Dante delineates the Mediaeval ideas of final retribution in letters of fire. The Dantean inscription upon the infernal gate : “Leave all hope behind, ye who enter here,” expresses the sentiment of the Mediaeval Church, with scarcely an exception. Even the adventurous *Scotus Erigena*, though suggesting a revival of Origen’s theory of the restitution of all things, did not deny the eternity of the punishments of hell. He attempted to combine both doctrines, by asserting the abolishment of evil considered as a kingdom, or a system, while yet it might continue to exist forever in certain incorrigible individuals.

The Modern Church has accepted the traditional faith upon this subject. In proportion as the inspiration and infallibility of Revelation have been conceded, the doctrine of an absolute and therefore endless punishment of sin has maintained itself,—it being impossible to eliminate the tenet from the Christian Scriptures, except by a mutilation of the canon, or a violently capricious exegesis. The denial of the eternity of future punishments, in modern

times, has consequently been a characteristic of those parties and individuals who have rejected, either partially or entirely, the dogma of infallible inspiration.

BOOK SEVENTH.



HISTORY

OF

SYMBOLS.

LITERATURE.

GUERICKE: Allgemeine Christliche Symbolik.

WINER: Comparative Darstellung des Lehrbegriffs der verschiedenen Christliche Kirchenparteien.

WALCH: Introductio in libros Ecclesiae Lutheranae symbolicos.

CALOVIVS: Synopsis Controversiarum.

HASE: Libri Symbolici Ecclesiae Evangelicae (Lutheran Symbols).

MEYER: Libri Symbolici Ecclesiae Lutheranae.

NIEMEYER: Collectio Confessionum in Ecclesiis Reformatis publicatorum (Calvinistic Symbols).

AUGUSTI: Corpus Librorum Symbolicorum (Calvinistic Symbols).

STREITWOLF: Libri Symbolici Ecclesiae Catholicae (Roman Catholic Symbols).

KIMMEL: Libri Symbolici Ecclesiae Orientalis (Greek Symbols).

CHAPTER I.

ANCIENT AND MEDIAEVAL SYMBOLS.

§ 1. *Preliminary Statements.*

THE subject of *Symbolics* naturally follows that of Special Dogmatic History. The construction of single doctrines by the thinking of the Church is succeeded by their combination into creeds and confessions of faith ; and, therefore, the history of the first process should be completed by that of the second. The importance of this topic is apparent, in the first place, from its very close connection with that of systematic theology. It differs from it, as the process differs from the product ; as the history of a science differs from the science itself. Theology constructs the compact and solid creed, while Symbolics gives an account of its plastic and flowing construction. The two subjects are therefore reciprocally related, and connected, by that great law of action and re-action which prevails in the mental world, as that of cause and effect does in the material. Hence, one serves to explain, verify, or modify, the other.

Again, the history of Creeds is important, be-

cause it imparts clear and precise conceptions of the differences between ecclesiastical denominations. Each particular branch of the Christian Church possesses its peculiarities, by virtue of which it is denominational and particular. It is sometimes difficult to specify this point of difference; so much so, that the hasty observer oftentimes concludes, from the general similarity in their religious experience, that there is really no difference between the doctrinal bases of all those denominations who "hold the head," and are properly called evangelical. The peculiarities of evangelical churches appear with more distinctness in their creeds, than in their religious experience; and hence the scientific observer must leave the sphere of feeling and practice, and pass over into that of theory and dogmatic statement, in order to reach the real difference between the varieties of Christians. For there is a difference. Organizations cannot be founded, and, still less, maintained from age to age, upon mere fictions and imaginary differences. Tried by the test of exact dogmatic statement, there is a plain difference between the symbol of the Arminian, and that of the Calvinist; but tried by the test of practical piety and devout feeling, there is but little difference between the character of John Wesley and that of John Calvin. And this for two reasons. In the first place, the practical religious life is much more directly a product of the Holy Spirit, than is the speculative construction of Scripture

truth. Piety is certainly the product of divine grace ; but the creed is not so certainly formed under a divine illumination. Two Christians, being regenerated by one and the same Spirit, possess one and the same Christian character, and therefore, upon abstract principles, ought to adopt one and the same statement of Christian belief. On attempting its construction, however, they pass into the sphere of the human understanding, and of human science, and it is within this sphere that the divergence begins, and the foundation for denominational existence is laid. In the second place, the divergence is seen in the creed rather than in the character, because one mind is more successful in understanding and interpreting the Christian experience itself, than another is. Unquestionably, evangelical denominations would be much more nearly agreed in their dogmatic theology, if the power of accurate statement were equally possessed by all. But one individual Christian comprehends the Christian experience more clearly and profoundly than another, who yet, by virtue of his regeneration, is equally a subject of it ; and, as a consequence, he comprehends the Scriptures more profoundly, and is better qualified than his fellow Christian to construct a clear, comprehensive, and self-consistent creed. All doctrinal history evinces, that just in proportion as evangelical believers come to possess a common scientific talent for expressing their common faith and feeling, they draw nearer together

so far as regards their symbolic literature. While, on the contrary, a slender power of self-reflection and analysis, together with a loose use of terms, drives minds far apart within the sphere of scientific theology who often melt and flow together within the sphere of Christian feeling and effort. Science unites and unifies wherever it prevails; for science is accuracy in terms, definitions, and statements.

In the third place, the history of Symbols is important, because it contributes to produce this talent of clear apprehension, and power of accurate statement. Symbolics affords a *comparative* view of creeds. It is therefore to theology, what comparative anatomy is to physical science, or comparative philology is to linguistic. When languages began to be compared with languages, many obscurities were cleared up which overhung the old method of investigating them, and the whole subject of definitions underwent a great improvement. The meaning of language became much more precise and full, than it had been, under this light thrown backwards and forwards, and in every direction, from a great number of languages investigated together. The same effect is produced by the comparative study of confessions of faith. Probably nothing in the way of means would do more to bring about that universal unity in doctrinal statement which has been floating as an ideal before the minds of men amidst the denominational distractions of Protestantism, than a more thorough and general ac-

quaintance with the symbols of the various denominations, and the history of their origin and formation. There would be less misapprehension and misrepresentation of the views of other parties, which is one of the chief obstacles to uniformity in confessions of faith. The honest objections that trouble the minds of those who refuse to adopt a particular form of statement would be seen, and, thus, would be more likely to be answered, instead of overlooked or perhaps ridiculed. On all sides, and for all minds, more light would be poured upon the profound mysteries of a common Evangelical Christianity, if theologians were in the habit of looking over the whole field of symbolic literature, instead of merely confining themselves to the examination of a single system. Such study would by no means result in destroying confidence in any one system, and induce that eclecticism which results in a mere aggregation that possesses no fundamental unity, and no self-subsistent force of its own. On the contrary, the theological mind would become immoveably settled in its conviction, that this or that confession of faith is the closest to Scripture data, and when asked for its symbol would exhibit it, and defend it. But, at the same time, this very confidence would beget calmness and moderation in dealing with a mind of different doctrinal views; and calmness and moderation do much toward bringing controversialists to that point of view where they see eye to eye.

§ 2. *Apostles' Creed.*

The Apostle Peter, in his answer to the inquiry of Christ: "But whom say ye that I am?", made the first formal confession of faith under the Christian dispensation. The answer: "Thou art Christ, the Son of the living God" (Matt. xvi. 16), was regarded by the Redeemer as the doctrinal basis of his kingdom upon earth; for "upon this rock,"—this cordial acknowledgment of his character and redeeming work,—he informed his disciples he would found his church.¹

A short and simple confession similar to this was made by the early converts to Christianity. The candidate for admission to the church, at his baptism, professed his faith in Christ as the Redeemer of the world. The eunuch baptized by Philip said solemnly, in connection with the administration of the rite: "I believe that Jesus Christ is the Son of God." (Acts, viii. 37.) Along with this recognition of the deity of Christ and his mediatorial work, admission into the church was also connected with a confession of belief in the doctrine of the trinity. The baptismal formula, which was invariably used, in accordance with the solemn and explicit command of Christ, naturally led to the

¹The Protestant understands that by it is meant the *person* of the "rock" to be the *confession* of Peter; the Papist contends

adoption of this doctrine into the confession made by the new convert from Paganism or Judaism. And it would have been the deepest hypocrisy and dishonesty in the candidate for baptism, to reject a doctrine that was taught and commended to him by the officiating minister, at the very moment of his reception into the church, and in the very phraseology of his initiation. In this way, the confession of faith made in the Apostolic age, by the neophyte, combined the doctrine of the trinity with that of the deity of Christ, and his mediatorial Person and work. This confession, at first, was exceedingly brief and simple, and not adopted by any formal action of the church in its public capacity,—for, as yet, general councils, or even local ones, were unknown. There is every reason, nevertheless, for believing that the practice of confessing one's faith was general and uniform among the churches. Paul reminds Timothy of the "good profession" which he had made before many witnesses (1 Tim. vi. 12); and in 1 Tim. iii. 16, there seems to be a summary that indicates a current creed-form. The concurrent testimony of the primitive Fathers goes to show that from the first, admission into the church was connected with the public acknowledgment of certain truths.

Out of these confessions, which each church adopted and used in the reception of its members, there was formed, at a very early date, what is called the *Symbolum Apostolicum*. The term *σύμβολον*,

from *συμβάλλειν* (conferre), denotes that the formula was a collocation and combination. Rufinus, at the end of the 4th century, would find in this etymology the proof of the apostolic authorship of this creed. It was constructed, he maintained, out of matter which each one of the Apostles brought in, and threw into a common stock; *σύμβολον ὅτι ἕκαστος συνέβαλε*.

The objections to this view of Rufinus, which maintained itself down to the Reformation,¹ that the Apostles formally and verbally drew up the creed which goes under their name, are the following. 1. No mention is made in the Acts of the Apostles, of any synod of the Apostles in which they composed a creed for the Christian Church,—a synod far too important to be unnoticed. 2. The Fathers of the first three centuries, in disputing with the heretics, while endeavoring to prove that the doctrine of this creed is apostolic in the sense of scriptural and true, never assert that the Apostles personally composed it. Eusebius, for example, would certainly have cited it as the Apostles' work, if he had known or believed it to be theirs. 3. This creed is cited by the Primitive Fathers with minor variations. Some of them omit the clause relating to the "descent into hell;" others, those concerning the "communion of saints," and the "life everlasting." This they would not have ventured

¹ LAURENTIUS VALLA († 1546) was the first to dispute the apostolic authorship of it.

to do, had they known the creed to be an inspired document.

But that this symbol is of the very earliest antiquity cannot be doubted; and that it is apostolic in the sense of harmonizing with the Apostles' doctrine in Scripture, is equally clear. The words of Luther respecting it are lively. "This confession of faith we did not make or invent, nor did the Fathers before us; but as a bee collects honey from the beautiful and fragrant flowers of all sorts, so is this symbol briefly and accurately put together out of the books of the prophets and apostles, *i. e.* out of the whole sacred Scripture, for children and simple hearted Christians. It is called the Apostles' symbol or confession, because Christian truth could not possibly be put into a shorter and clearer statement than this. And it has been in the church from the beginning; since it was either composed by the Apostles themselves, or else brought together from their writings or preaching, by some of their best pupils."¹

The Apostles' Creed runs as follows: "I believe in God the Father Almighty, Maker of heaven and earth; and in Jesus Christ his only Son our Lord; who was conceived by the Holy Ghost, born of the Virgin Mary, suffered under Pontius Pilate, was crucified, dead, and buried; He descended into hell; the third day He rose again from the dead; He ascend-

¹ LUTHER: Kirchenpostille, Th. xiv. 11. (Lpz. Ed.).

ed into heaven, and sitteth at the right hand of God the Father Almighty; from thence He shall come to judge the quick and the dead. I believe in the Holy Ghost; the Holy Catholic Church; the communion of saints; the forgiveness of sins; the resurrection of the body; and the life everlasting.”¹

¹ We append here the summaries of the Christian faith given by IRENAEUS and TERTULLIAN. Their coincidence with the Apostles' Creed is apparent; while yet their variations from it show that they are not mere copies of it. “The Church, though scattered through the whole habitable globe to its utmost bounds, has received from the apostles and their pupils the belief, in one God, Father almighty, the maker of heaven and earth and the sea, and all that is in them; and in one Christ Jesus, the Son of God, who was made flesh for our salvation; and in the Holy Ghost, who through the prophets announced the dispensations, and the advents, and the birth from a virgin, and the passion, and the resurrection from the dead, and the incarnate ascension into heaven of the beloved Christ Jesus our Lord, and his re-appearance (*παρουσίαν*) from the heavens with the glory of the Father, in order to gather together into one (*ἀνακεφαλαιώσασθαι*. Eph. i. 10) all things, and raise every man from the grave, that to Christ Jesus our Lord and God and Saviour

and King, according to the good pleasure of the invisible Father, every knee should bow, of things in heaven, of things in earth, and of things under the earth, and that every tongue should confess him, and that he should administer a just judgment upon all, that he should send into eternal fire evil spirits (*τὰ πνευματικὰ τῆς πορνείας*, Eph. vi. 12), and the angels who transgressed and apostatized, and the ungodly, unjust, and lawless, and blasphemous among men, but should give immortality, and minister abundantly of eternal glory, to the just and holy and those who have kept his commandments, and have continued in his love, graciously giving life to those who have been such from the beginning, and to those who have been such after repentance.” IRENAEUS: *Adversus Haereses*, I. x.—“The rule of faith is one only, unchangeable, and not to be amended, namely, the belief in one sole omnipotent God, the maker of the world; and in his Son Jesus Christ, born of the Virgin Mary, crucified under Pontius Pilate, raised from the dead on the third day, re-

Several facts of great importance, in connection with the Apostles' Creed, are worthy of notice. 1. In the churches founded by the Apostles and their pupils, a confession of faith, and therefore the formal adoption of a creed, was required of the candidate for admission to the church. 2. Although the department of scientific theology can hardly be said to have been formed, yet this oldest creed is very distinct concerning the essential doctrines of Christianity. The Apostles' Creed teaches the doctrine of the existence of God as Father, Son, and Holy Ghost; of the incarnation of the Son; of his atoning death; of his mediatorial power and kingdom; of the resurrection; and of the final judgment. 3. The Apostles' Creed is the earliest attempt of the Christian mind to systematize the teachings of Scripture, and is, consequently, the uninspired foundation upon which the whole after-structure of symbolic literature rests. All creed-development proceeds from this germ. Being little more than a collection of Scripture phraseology, it contains fewer speculative elements than the later creeds which the church was compelled to form by the counter-speculation of the human mind; and

ceived into heaven, seated now on the right hand of the Father, and to come hereafter to judge the living and dead, through the resurrection of the flesh." **TER-TULLIANUS** : *De virginibus velandis*, c. 1. The same creed, for

substance, is to be found in *De praescriptionibus adversus haereticos*, c. 13, and *Adversus Praxeam*, c. 2. See **PEARSON** : *On the Creed* (Appendix), for these and other patristic symbols.

yet, because it is composed wholly of Scripture data, it is capable of an indefinite expansion by the scientific mind in all ages. 4. This symbol contributed indirectly to the collection and fixing of the Canon. In the 1st and 2d centuries, but very few copies of the gospels and epistles were in existence. The Ancient Church had no opportunity to peruse them as the Modern has, and, consequently, the entire Biblical knowledge of the common Christian of that period was obtained from the public reading and explanation of the religious assembly. It is easy to see that in such a condition of things, a brief compendium, or summary statement of the essential truths of Christianity, that could be committed to memory and repeated by all, would be the best substitute for the lack of manuscripts. Hence, the confession of faith that might pass from mouth to mouth, like the *sacramentum* of the ancient soldier. But in course of time, the heretical or schismatical parties who advanced doctrines contrary to those embodied in these brief creeds, and who appealed to the Scriptures for justification, compelled the catholic defenders of the simple original creed, to collect and fix the Canon, and to multiply copies of it. For, in order to make out his case, the heretical or schismatical opponent of the creed cited mutilated or garbled portions of the Scripture, or writings which like the apocryphal gospels and epistles could lay no claim to inspiration. In this way, the defence of the Apostolic Creed contributed to the

spread and authority of the inspired writings themselves. 5. This earliest creed has been honoured and adopted more generally than any other single confession of faith, by all Christian denominations. It makes part of the liturgies of the various churches, and its doctrinal matter enters as a component into all the scientific creeds of Christendom.

For the proof that the clause, "He descended into Hell," in this Creed, is a late interpolation, see Shedd : *Dogmatic Theology*, II. 603-608.

§ 3. *Nicaeno-Constantinopolitan Symbol.*

The history already given of the formation of the doctrine of the Trinity renders a detailed account of this creed superfluous. This confession is closely confined to theology, or the doctrine of the Trinity and the Person of Christ ; while the Apostles' Creed, though devoting more attention to this subject than to any other, yet makes statements respecting topics in Soteriology and Eschatology. There is no fundamental variance between the trinitarian statements of these two creeds. The Nicene symbol contains a fuller expansion of the doctrine of the Apostles' Creed, that God exists as Father, Son, and Holy Ghost. This was necessitated, as was evinced in the history of Trinitarianism, by the defective or contradictory explanations given of the doctrine of the trinity. For it should be remembered, that men like Praxeas, Noetus, Beryl, and Sabellius, and even men like Arius, did not reject the doctrine of the

trinity altogether and in flat terms, like the ancient Theodotian and the modern Socinian. They held to *a* trinity, and contended that their mode of apprehending the subject was both scriptural and ecclesiastical. They claimed that they themselves, and not their opponents, were putting the right construction upon the teachings of Scripture, and also upon those of the Apostles' Creed. They could do this last the more readily, because the Apostles' Creed does not employ explanatory and technical terms. The biblical terms, Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, were freely used by the Sabellian and Arian of early times, because they put a Monarchian or Arian construction upon them. Sabellius and Arius maintained that the Apostles' Creed was intended to be understood in their sense, and hence did not object to it as a confession of faith; just as the modern Socinian interprets the doxologies of the New Testament and the baptismal formula, in accordance with his anti-trinitarian views, and does not altogether reject them as spurious portions of revelation. It became necessary, consequently, to define the doctrine with scientific precision, and to employ terms that could not by any possibility be taken in two senses. Here was the great power of the term *ὁμοούσιον*. Arians and Semi-Arians, alike, confessed their belief in "God the Father Almighty, and in Jesus Christ his Son, and in the Holy Ghost;" holding, however, that only to the first was the word deity properly applicable. But no honest

Arian or Semi-Arian could confess his belief in God the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, accompanied with the explanatory definition of the Nicene symbol, that these three terms denote three distinct persons in one essence, each consubstantial with the others. An Arian could assent to the Scripture phraseology of the Apostolic Symbol as he understood it, but not as it was interpreted by the Nicene Council, as teaching that the Son is "very God of very God, begotten, not made, being of one substance with the Father."

Hence the Nicaeno-Constantinopolitan Symbol introduces scientific conceptions, and technical terms, in order to preclude that possibility of two interpretations of language which was connected with the earlier symbol. And this is the principal difference between the earlier and the later creed. The Primitive Church, not yet troubled with heresy upon this subject, found in the simple untechnical creed all that its religious necessities required. The Later Church required, both for its scientific wants and its defensive and polemic purposes, a more elaborate and explanatory statement, in which the terms "essence," and "substance," and "hypostasis," and "personal subsistence," and the like, were used to define beyond possibility of misapprehension, or equivocation, or evasion, the terms Father, Son, and Spirit.

The Nicaeno-Constantinopolitan Symbol was the work of two oecumenical councils in 325 and 381,

and had oecumenical authority in both the Greek and Latin Churches, and in modern times is the received creed-statement among all trinitarian churches. For although doubts have been expressed by individual writers, respecting the tenet of "eternal generation," contained in the Nicene Symbol, this tenet has never been formally rejected by any trinitarian denomination.

§ 4. *The Chalcedon Symbol.*

It will be remembered, that the doctrine of the Person of Christ began to engage the speculative inquiry of the church, so soon as the doctrine of the Trinity had been established. Two councils, one at Ephesus in 431, and one at Chalcedon in 451, formed dogmatic statements upon this subject which have been regarded as biblical and authoritative by the church since that time, both Ancient, Mediaeval, and Modern. The Ephesian creed condemned the Nestorian theory of two distinct persons in Christ, and re-affirmed in the place of it the old theory of one Person consisting of two natures. The Chalcedon creed condemned the Eutychian or Monophysite theory of but one nature in Christ, and re-affirmed the old theory of two natures in the unity of one Person. The results to which these two councils came are to this day regarded as correct, and the catholic mind has not ventured be-

yond the positions established at this time, respecting the structure and composition of Christ's most mysterious Person,—a subject in some respects more baffling to speculation than that of the Trinity proper.

§ 5. *Athanasian Creed (Symbolum Quicumque).*

The authorship of this creed is uncertain. Though Athanasian in its trinitarianism, it is generally conceded that Athanasius is not its author. It does not contain the word *ὁμοούσιον*, though it teaches the truth intended by this term. It also teaches the doctrine of the procession of the Spirit from both the Father and Son. These two peculiarities are evidence of a later origin than the time of Athanasius. For it is improbable that this theologian, in drawing up a creed, would have omitted the term upon which the whole controversy in his day turned, or that he would have expressed himself so positively as does this symbol, in regard to the question of the procession of the Spirit, still mooted at that time even among the orthodox. The structure of the creed would indicate that it was drawn up at a later date, in order to furnish a symbol that would be received by both the Eastern and Western Churches. Hence it omits the term *ὁμοούσιον*, while it retains the thing, in order to propitiate the Eastern bishops who feared Sabellianism,

and teaches the procession of the Spirit from both Father and Son, to meet the views of the Western Church. This creed also contains the results of the Ephesian and Chalcedonian councils respecting the Person of Christ,—a fact which goes to prove an origin later than the time of Athanasius. It is most probable that it originated in the Western Church, and in the school of Augustine and Hilary, whose trinitarianism it embodies. The Athanasian creed was current among the French churches in the 9th century, and in the 10th century was somewhat used in Italy, and in those churches which were under the influence of Rome, particularly the English. It never prevailed to much extent among the Greek and Oriental Churches.

§ 6. *Recapitulatory Survey.*

Casting a glance backward over the history of Symbols anterior to the Reformation, we find that the confessions of faith constructed by the Church are few in number, considering the length of the period included, and are inferior as to comprehensiveness. Only four symbols, (perhaps we might say three, for the Athanasian creed is substantially the same with the Nicaeno-Constantinopolitan,) were the product of fifteen hundred years. Of these, only the first one covers the whole field of systematic divinity,—the others being confined to the depart-

ments of trinitarianism and christology. And even the Apostles' Creed makes the doctrine of the trinity by far the most prominent of Christian doctrines ; presenting less distinct, and to some degree, only implied statements respecting the topics of sin and redemption. The history of Symbols, then, previous to the Reformation, shows that while the Church was diligent and careful in constructing the doctrine of the trinity, and its cognate truths, it was comparatively negligent in regard to the doctrines of anthropology and soteriology. The results to which the catholic mind came in investigating the doctrines of theology and christology were carefully and fully expressed in a creed form, and as a consequence we find that the trinitarian heresies of Sabellianism on the one hand, and of Arianism on the other, did not trouble the Church, even though it grew more and more corrupt in faith and practice. The Papal Church is orthodox to this day, upon the doctrine of the trinity and the Person of Christ. But the results to which the catholic mind came, during the first four centuries, in investigating the doctrines of anthropology and soteriology, were not thus carefully enunciated and fixed in a creed-form. The controversy between Augustine and Pelagius, though it resulted in a body of clear and profound discussion of the very first importance to theological science in all time, did not result in the announcement of any distinct and definite symbol. Hence, there was no barrier, of a *the-*

oretical kind, to the entrance of the Pelagian theory of sin, and the legalistic theory of justification, which are characteristic of the Papal as distinguished from the Primitive and Patristic Churches. It is indeed true, that a creed enunciating the Augustinian anthropology as distinctly and unequivocally as the Nicene Symbol does the Athanasian theology would not necessarily have prevented the Church from lapsing into that defective view of human nature which appears in the Tridentine system. The doctrine of sin is more immediately practical than that of the trinity, though not more so ultimately. Deterioration in doctrine is more likely to commence in anthropology than in theology, and is more difficult of prevention, because of certain well-known tendencies of human nature. Still, it is plain that a theoretical barrier to error is better than none at all, and is certainly better than a theoretical barrier to truth. If those few advocates of the true Scripture doctrine, who appear here and there in those darkening centuries which intervene between John of Damascus and the forerunners of the Reformation, could have fortified themselves by an appeal to a symbol of authority and antiquity, in which the moral state and condition of man were distinctly represented in opposition to the Pelagian views that were becoming dominant in the Latin Church, their protest against error would have been much more effective than it was. And the same is true in reference to the doctrine of justification by

faith. It would have been more difficult to have constructed a satisfactory symbol concerning this doctrine than that of sin, owing to that confusion of justification and sanctification which, we have seen, vitiates to some extent the soteriology of Augustine himself. But if a clear evangelical statement of this great truth, such as meets us in the symbolic literature of the Reformation, could have been made and authorized in the 4th century, it is certain that it would have exerted a great influence upon minds so disposed as were those of the Middle Ages to respect authority. It is not to be asserted, that of itself it would have prevented the corruption and heresy of the Papal Church upon this subject. A higher Power, alone, working in the heart, could have prevented this, and preserved the primitive faith. But the symbol would have been a nucleus and support for those few who stood firm, and at any rate a standing witness of decline and corruption in doctrine, and a loud protest against it. It is to this day, an advantage to the Romish polemic, and a disadvantage to the Protestant, that the latter cannot point his adversary to a symbol of the first four centuries which is as distinct and Scriptural upon the subjects of sin and justification, as the Nicene Symbol is upon that of the trinity.

CHAPTER II.

MODERN SYMBOLS.

§ 1. *Lutheran Confessions.*

THE period of the Reformation is richer in its symbolic literature, than any other one in the history of the Church. After the first conflict and fermentation of the religious elements was over, the ecclesiastical mind, being now purified from the false and anti-Christian doctrines of the Papacy, felt the need of a clear and scientific statement of the results to which it had arrived. And inasmuch as the Protestants became divided among themselves upon minor and unessential points, though agreeing perfectly in their estimate of the Roman Church and system, a great number of creeds and symbols was called into existence, by the endeavor of each party to explain its own sentiments, and to justify its own position. It is for this reason, that the inquirer will find in this age by far the most massive and solid part of Christian Symbolics. The denominations of Modern Protestantism derive their creed-forms, either directly or indirectly, from this fertile period.

The Lutheran Church adopted with decision, the results to which the Patristic Church had come in the departments of theology and christology. The Apostles' Creed, together with the Nicene and Athanasian, were laid down as the foundation of the symbol which was to consolidate the new evangelical church into one external unity, in opposition to that of Rome. But the doctrines of sin and redemption had been left, to some extent, undeveloped by the Patristic mind, and entirely without definite symbolic statement, and were afterwards misstated by the Papal mind at Trent; and hence the principal part of the new and original work of the Lutheran divine was connected with these.

Of all the confessional writings of the Lutheran Church, the most important, as well as the first in time, is the *Augsburg Confession*, sometimes denominated the *Confessio Augusta*, from the term *augusta*, or *augustissima* applied to it because it was drawn up under the sanction and authority of the imperial diet.

Nearly fifteen years had elapsed since Luther had made his first public appearance as a reformer, by nailing up his ninety-five theses upon the door of the church at Wittenberg (A. D. 1517), and yet the Protestant Church had no public and received confession of its common faith. This was first made at the diet at Augsburg in 1530. There had, however, been some preparation made for the construction and adoption of this important symbol.

The steps that were previously taken are interesting, and evince the wise and prudent manner in which the leading minds of that stormy and excitable period of reform proceeded, when laying the dogmatic foundations of the future church.

The process began with a commission from John, Elector of Saxony, given in March, 1530, to his favorite theologians, Luther, Justus Jonas, Bugenhagen, and Melanchthon, to prepare a series of succinct and comprehensive articles to be discussed and defended as the Protestant form of doctrine. These theologians joined on upon work that had already been performed by one of their number. In the preceding year (1529), Luther, at a convention of Protestants at Schwabach, had proposed 17 articles to be adopted as the doctrinal bond of union. These articles, this body of commissioners appointed by the Elector adopted, and having added to their number some new ones that had respect to certain ecclesiastical abuses, presented the whole to the Elector in Torgau, in March, 1530. Hence they are commonly denominated the *Articles of Torgau*. This draft of a confession was then brought before the Protestant divines at Augsburg, for examination and adoption. Here, it received revision, and some modifications, under the leadership of Melanchthon, who guided in the discussions before the body, and who was aided during the progress of the debate by the advice and concurrence of Luther, then in Coburg, in a free and

full correspondence. The symbol having been formed in this manner was subscribed by the princes and authorities of the Protestant interest, and in their name publicly read in German before the imperial assembly, and a copy in both German and Latin presented to the emperor. The Augsburg Confession thus became the authorized doctrinal basis of Protestantism in Germany.

The general tone and spirit of this first creed of the Reformation is a union of firmness and mildness. The characteristics of Luther and Melanchthon, the two minds most concerned in its formation, are harmoniously blended in it. It is divided into two parts; the one, positive and didactic in its contents, the other negative and polemic. The first division is composed of 21 articles, in which the positive doctrines of Scripture are enunciated as the Lutherans understood and confessed them, in connection, moreover, with an express condemnation of those unevangelical and heretical views and tendencies which were already beginning to appear within Protestantism itself. The second division is composed of 7 articles, directed against those errors of the Romish ritual and worship which the Lutherans rejected,—viz., the refusal of the cup to the laity; the prohibition of the marriage of priests; the superstitious use of the mass; auricular confession; meritorious fasts; monastic vows; and the union of ecclesiastical with secular power in the office of bishop.

An analysis of the doctrine of the Augsburg Confession yields the following particulars. In theology, this symbol enunciates the Nicaeno-Constantinopolitan trinitarianism, and the Chalcedon christology. In anthropology, it adopts the Augustinian theory, as the following extracts show. "The churches teach that after the fall of Adam all men propagated according to ordinary generation are born with sin, that is, without the fear of God, without trust in God, and with concupiscence, and that this disease (*morbus*) or original vitiosity is truly sin, damning, and bringing eternal death upon those who are not regenerated by baptism and the Holy Spirit. The churches also condemn the Pelagians and others who deny this original vitiosity (*vitium originis*) to be sin."¹

Respecting the degree and intensity of sin, and its effect upon the human will, the Augsburg Confession teaches the following. "The churches teach that the human will has some liberty, sufficient for attaining morality and choosing things that appear reasonable (*ad efficiendam civilem justitiam et deligendas res rationi subjectas*). But it has not the power, without the Spirit of God, of attaining holiness or spiritual excellence (*efficiendae justitiae dei, seu justitiae spiritualis*), because the carnal man does not perceive those things that are spiritual (1 Cor. ii. 14). This Augustine says in the same

¹HASE: Libri Symbolici, 9, 10.

words, 'We acknowledge that free will is in all men; that it has, indeed, a rational judgment, by means of which it is able to begin and to finish without God's grace not those things which pertain to God, but only those works which pertain to this present life, the good as well as the bad,—the good I say, meaning those which are in their place right and proper; e. g. to will to work in the field, to will to eat and drink, to will to have a friend, to will to have clothes, to will to build a house, to will to marry a wife, to will to raise cattle, to learn an art, or whatever good it may be that pertains to this present life.' The churches also condemn the Pelagians and others who teach, that without the Holy Spirit, by natural powers alone, we are able to love God supremely."¹ This Confession, then, exhibits the Latin in distinction from the Greek anthropology, and favours the monergistic theory of regeneration.

In its soteriology, the Augsburg Confession, as would be expected, is eminently evangelical. "The churches teach that men cannot be justified before God by their own power, merit, or works, but are justified on account of Christ, through faith, when they believe that they are received into favour and their sins are remitted for Christ's sake, who made satisfaction for our sins by his death. This faith God imputes for righteousness before

¹ HASE: Libri Symbolici, 14.

Him (Rom. iii. and iv.).”¹ After alluding to the alteration made by the Papists in their statement of the doctrine of good works,—viz., that man is justified not by works alone, nor by faith alone, but by faith and works *together*, which is the Tridentine theory,—the Confession proceeds to speak thus concerning good works: “Our good works cannot reconcile God, or merit remission of sins, grace, and justification, but we obtain all these by faith *alone*; by believing that we are received into favour for the sake of Christ, who *alone* is the mediator and propitiation by which the Father is reconciled. This doctrine respecting faith is everywhere taught by Paul ‘By grace are ye saved through faith, and that not of yourselves, it is the gift of God. Not of works, &c.’ . . . Our churches also teach that it is necessary to perform good works, not however in order to merit pardon and remission of sins, but because God wills and commands them.”²

In its eschatology, the Augsburg Confession enunciates the catholic doctrine concerning future retribution and the second advent of Christ. “The churches condemn the Anabaptists, who are of opinion that there will be an end to the punishment of lost men and devils. They likewise condemn those who are disseminating Jewish opinions, that prior to the resurrection of the dead the saints are to pos-

¹ HASE: Libri Symbolici, 10.

² HASE; Libri Symbolici, 17, 18.

sess the kingdoms of the world, the wicked being everywhere overcome" (oppressis).¹

Though decidedly Protestant upon the cardinal doctrines, the Augsburg Confession contains some remnants of that unscriptural system against which it was such a powerful and earnest protest. These Popish elements are found in those portions particularly which treat of the sacraments; and more particularly in that article which defines the sacrament of the Supper. In Article XIII., the Augsburg Confession is careful to condemn the popish theory, that the sacraments are efficacious "*ex opere operato*,"—that is, by their intrinsic efficacy, without regard to faith in the recipient, or to the operation of the Holy Spirit,—but when in Article X. it treats of the Lord's Supper, it teaches that "the body and blood of Christ are truly present, and are distributed to those who partake of the Supper."² This doctrine of *Consubstantiation*, according to which there are two factors,—viz., the material bread and wine, and the immaterial or spiritual body of Christ,—united or consubstantiated in the consecrated sacramental symbols, does not differ in kind from the Papist doctrine of *Transubstantiation*, according to which there is indeed but one factor in the consecrated symbol, but that is the very body and blood of Christ into which the bread and wine have been transmuted. The Lu-

¹ HASE: Libri Symbolici, 14.

² HASE: Libri Symbolici, 12.

theran theory, like the Popish, promotes a superstitious feeling in reference to the Eucharist, and does much towards nullifying the meaning and effect of Article XIII., in which a magical effect *ex opere operato* is denied to the sacraments.

Another feature in this symbol evincing that the riddance of Papal errors was not complete, is the point of *Absolution*. Article XII. thus defines it. "Repentance properly consists of these two parts; the first is contrition, or the terrors of an awakened conscience, together with the acknowledgment of sin; the second is faith, which is conceived by an apprehension of the gospel promise, or by *absolution*, and which believes that the individual's sin is remitted on account of Christ, consoles the conscience, and delivers from fear." By "absolution" is meant the official declaration of the clergyman to the penitent that his sins are forgiven him, upon finding or believing that he is exercising a godly sorrow, and is trusting in the blood of Christ. The creed adopts this practice from the custom of the Roman Catholic Church, and like this finds its warrant for it in the words of Christ: "Whosoever sins ye remit, they are remitted unto them, and whosoever sins ye retain, they are retained" (John xx. 23). In their explanation and defense of the Augsburg Confession, entitled *Apologia Confessionis*, the Lutheran divines, speaking of this power of the keys, say: "And since God really renews the soul by his word, the

keys really remit sin, according to Luke x. 16 : ‘He that heareth you heareth me.’ Wherefore the voice of him who gives absolution is to be believed not otherwise than as a voice sounding from heaven.”¹ Now, although this act of absolution is merely declarative, and the most thoroughly evangelical view is taken of the *ground* and *cause* of the remission of sins, it is evident that this act and practice puts the penitent into wrong relations to the church and the clergy, and paves the way for the distinctively Papal theory upon these points. It is true, indeed, that if there be godly sorrow for sin and a hearty faith in the work of Christ, the soul is forgiven ; but no human authority can pronounce a person to be actually pardoned, and absolve him as such, without pronouncing at the same time, by implication, that the said person is truly penitent and believing,—a fact that cannot be unqualifiedly asserted by any but the Searcher of hearts. In retaining this power of absolution, and in exercising it, the Lutheran Church unintentionally tempted its members to an undue reliance upon a human decision, and drew them away from a simple trust upon the work of Christ, contrary to its own theory and faith.

In the year 1540, ten years after the adoption of the Augsburg Confession, Melanchthon put forth an edition of the symbol, in Latin, which goes un-

¹ HASE: Libri Symbolici, p. 167.

der the name of the *variata*,—the original edition being denominated the *invariata*. The changes introduced into it by Melanchthon relate to the subjects of regeneration and the sacraments. Melanchthon, as the controversy went on between the Lutherans and the Calvinists, became more and more inclined to synergism. The original Confession, as we have seen in the history of anthropology, was decidedly monergistic, but the altered edition leans to the theory of co-operation in regeneration. With respect to the sacraments, it inclines to the Calvinistic theory, showing the reaction against the Semi-Popish theory of consubstantiation. The original unaltered Confession, alone, has symbolical authority in the Lutheran Church; but parties and individuals within it have received the *Confessio variata* with favour. The influence of Melanchthon's synergism is very apparent in some of the Lutheran theologians of Germany of the present generation, in the assertion of the existence of a *recipiency*, or preparation for the grace of the Holy Spirit, which is referred to the instinctive strivings of the human soul by virtue of its divine origin. The adoption of this view shows itself in decided opposition to the Augustino-Calvinistic doctrines of election and predestination, and a strongly polemic attitude towards the Calvinistic system.

The next document possessing symbolical authority in the Lutheran Church is the *Apologia Confessionis*.

The Protestants having thus put forth the Augsburg Confession as the summary of their belief, the Papal theologians who were present at the diet were summoned by the emperor Charles V. to prepare a critical examination and refutation of it. This they did in a document entitled *Confutatio Confessionis Augustanae*, which was read in the imperial assembly on the 3d of August, 1530. The emperor approved it, and demanded that the Protestants should return to the doctrinal basis of the Catholic Church. They asked for a copy of the Confutation, for examination, which was refused. Melanchthon then entered upon a detailed refutation of the *Confutatio*, so far as he could reconstruct the document from his own recollection on hearing it read, and from notes that had been taken by others who were present at the reading,—afterwards revising and perfecting his work, by the aid of an authentic copy of the Papal treatise that finally came into his possession. This defence of the Augsburg Confession contains an expansion of the dogmatic positions of this document, together with some attacks upon the Papal system; although the work, as a whole, breathes the mildness and moderation of the peace-loving theologian who composed it. In doctrinal respects, it is even more decided than the original Confession, particularly upon the two points most at issue between Protestants and Papists, viz.: sin and justification.

The Protestants proposed to present this Apolo-

gy at the diet held on Sept. 22d, 1530 ; but the emperor declared that he would neither hear, nor receive, any more documents from the Protestants. Thus, the Apology received no public adoption at that time. It was from the first, however, regarded by the Protestant theologians as a symbolical document, and in 1537 was subscribed as such by them at Smalcald. In connection with the Augsburg Confession, it constitutes the sum and substance of the Lutheran theology, and both together constitute the doctrinal basis of the Lutheran Church.

The results to which the Protestants had come in these two productions were wrought over, and presented at other times, before other bodies, and in other forms, according as the interests of the Protestants required. In this way, a series of symbolical writings resulted which constitute a part of Lutheran Symbolics. The following are the most important of these. 1. The *Confessio Saxonica*, or *Repetitio Confessionis Augustanae*, was drawn up by Melanchthon for the use of the Council of Trent, in 1551, and is a repetition of the Augsburg Confession, as the title indicates. 2. The *Confessio Wurtembergica* was composed by Brenz for the use of the same council, in 1552. 3. The *Articles of Smalcald* were drawn up by Luther in 1536, and subscribed by the evangelical theologians, in February, 1537. They contain, in substance, the doctrines of the Augsburg Confession and the Apology, presented in a decidedly polemic form. For

their purpose was both defensive and aggressive. By this time, the Protestant cause had become strong politically as well as morally, and when the pope, at the suggestion of the emperor, sought to call a general council at Mantua, in 1537, these Articles served to consolidate the Protestant opposition, and to prevent the Protestant churches from taking any part in an ecclesiastical assembly in which their own opinions were already condemned beforehand. In the second part of these Articles, Luther, with his characteristic energy, attacks the claims of the pope to be a universal bishop, as contrary to the nature and spirit of the true evangelical church. Melanchthon signed the articles with the conciliatory remark, that he for himself should be willing to concede to the pope the bishopric of bishops *jure humano*, and on the ground of past usage and for the sake of peace, if the pope would concede evangelical doctrine to the Protestants. This disturbed the mind of the earnest reformer, who saw that reconciliation with Rome was now impossible and undesirable, and on parting with Melanchthon, after the convention at Smalcald, Luther left him the blessing: "May God fill you with hatred of the pope." 4. Luther's two *Catechisms*, *Major* and *Minor*, were published in 1529,—the first for the use of preachers and teachers, the last a guide in the instruction of youth. These, it will be noticed, were published before the Augsburg Confession. 5. The *Formula Concordiæ* was drawn up by Andreä

and Chemnitz in 1577, and presented to the Elector Augustus, who sought to secure its adoption by the entire Lutheran Church. In this he was unsuccessful. It is a polemic document, constructed by that portion of the Lutheran Church that was hostile to the Calvinistic theory of the sacraments. It carries out the doctrine of consubstantiation into a technical statement,—teaching the ubiquity of Christ's body, and explaining the *communicatio idiomatum* as the communication of the divine attributes to the human nature of Christ. The Lutheran Church is still divided upon this symbol. The so-called High Lutherans insist that the Formula Concordiae is the scientific completion of the preceding Lutheran symbolics; while the moderate party are content to stand by the Augsburg Confession, the Apology, and the Smalcald Articles.

§ 2. *Reformed (Calvinistic) Confessions.*

The Reformed, or Calvinistic, Churches were less successful than the Lutheran in maintaining an outward and visible unity, and one consequence is a much more varied symbolical literature.

The oldest Confession of that branch of Protestantism which was not satisfied with the Lutheran tendency and symbol is the *Confessio Tetrapolitana*,—so called, because the theologians of four cities of upper Germany, Strasburg, Costnitz, Memmingen,

and Lindau, drew it up, and presented it to the emperor at the same diet of Augsburg, in 1530, at which the first Lutheran symbol was presented. The principal theologian concerned in its construction was Martin Bucer, of Strasburgh. It consists of 22 articles, and agrees generally with the Augsburg Confession. The points of difference pertain to the doctrine of the sacraments. Upon this subject it is Zuinglian. These four cities, however, in 1532 adopted the Augsburg Confession, so that the *Confessio Tetrapolitana* ceased to be the formally adopted symbol of any branch of the church, although it was always held in high repute among the Swiss churches, particularly on account of its Zuinglian attitude upon the sacramental controversy. And this brings us to the views of *Zuingle* himself, who exerted a great influence upon the Reformed Churches, in the opening period of Protestantism.

Zuingle sent a confession of faith, entitled *Fidei Ratio*, embodying his own individual opinions, to that notable diet at Augsburg in 1530, where so many religious parties and interests were represented. Previously to this, Zuingle had exhibited his views in sixty-seven articles drawn up in 1523, but almost wholly upon points pertaining to the externals of Christianity, and particularly the sacraments. But in this document he discussed the cardinal subjects of religion, and laid the foundation of that peculiar aspect of Protestantism which goes under his name.

On examination, this creed is found to differ from the Augsburg Symbol. 1. Upon the subject of original sin, the language of Zuingli is as follows. "I think this in regard to original sin. That is properly sin which is a transgression of the law; for where there is no law, there is no transgression; and where there is no transgression, there is no sin properly so called,—that is to say, so far as by sin is meant wickedness, crime, villainy, or guilt. I acknowledge, therefore, that our father sinned a sin that is truly sin, i. e., wickedness, crime, and turpitude. But those who are generated from that person did not sin in this manner; for what one of us bit with his teeth the forbidden apple in Paradise? Hence, whether we will or not, we are compelled to admit that original sin, as it is in the sons of Adam, is not truly sin, in the sense already spoken of, for it is not a crime committed against law. Consequently, it is, properly speaking, a disease and a condition. A disease, because, as he lapsed from love of himself, so also do we lapse; a condition, because, as he became a slave and obnoxious to death, so also we are born slaves and children of wrath, and obnoxious to death. . . . Adam died on account of sin, and being thus dead, that is sentenced to death, in this condition he generated us. Therefore we also die,—so far as he is concerned, by his fault and criminality; but so far as we are concerned, by our condition and disease, or, if you prefer, *sin*, but sin improperly so called.

Let us illustrate by an example. A man is taken captive in war. On the ground of his own hostility to his captors, and treachery towards them, he deserves to be made a slave, and is so held. Now, they who are born of him in this condition are slaves, not by virtue of their own fault, guilt, or crime, but by virtue of their condition, which condition is the consequence of the guilt of their father, who had deserved to come into it by his fault. The children in this instance are not laden with crime, but with the punishment, fine, loss, or danger of crime,—i. e., with a wretched condition, a servitude.”¹ The difference between Zuingli’s theory of original sin, and that of Luther and his associates as exhibited in the extracts given from the Augsburg Confession, is apparent. It is the reappearance of the old difference between the Greek and Latin anthropologies, upon this subject. 2. The second principal point of difference between Zuingli’s *Fidei Ratio*, and the Augsburg Confession, relates to the sacrament of the Supper. Zuingli’s mind was a remarkably clear one, and made distinctions with great luminousness. Respecting the Romish theory, that there is an intrinsic efficacy in the sensible sign and material symbol, he makes the same general statement with the Lutheran confession, only in a more vivid and keen style. “I believe,” he says, “nay I know, that all sacraments, so far from conferring grace, do not even bring or

¹ NIEMEYER: Collectio, 20, sq.

dispense it. In this, O Cæsar, I may perhaps seem to you to be too bold and confident. But this is my opinion. For inasmuch as grace comes, or is given, by the Divine Spirit, the entire gift of grace in the end is resolved into the influence of the Holy Ghost alone. For a vehicle or guide is not necessary to the Spirit; for that is the real virtue and power in any instance which conveys or moves other things, and not that which needs to be conveyed or moved. We never read in the Scriptures that sensible and material things, such as the sacraments are, certainly and in every instance convey the Holy Spirit; but if sensible things, are themselves ever conveyed and made operative by the Spirit, then it is this Spirit, and not the sensible thing, that is the ultimate efficient energy. If, when the mighty wind rushed onward, the tongues of flame were borne onward by the wind, then the wind was not lifted and conveyed by the tongues of flame. So, likewise, it was the wind that brought the quails and blew away the locusts; but no quails or locusts ever possessed such wings as to bear onward the winds.”¹

To the sacrament of the Supper, Zuingli applies the principle thus stated and illustrated, with great energy and decision, in such a manner as to exclude both the theory of consubstantiation and transubstantiation. His reasoning is full and detailed. He argues from scripture, from reason, and

¹ NIEMEYER: Collectio, 24, sq.

from history ; and maintains that view of the eucharist which is now widely prevalent in the Protestant churches. "I believe," he says, "that in the eucharist the body of Christ is truly present to the eye of faith,—that is, that those who thank God for the benefits conferred in Christ do acknowledge that he assumed real human flesh, really suffered in it, really washed away our sins by his blood, and thus all that was done by Christ becomes, as it were, a present reality to those who behold these symbols with the eye of faith. But that the body of Christ is present in essence and real substance,—in other words, that the natural body of Christ is present in the Supper, and is masticated by our teeth, as the Papists and certain persons who look back to the flesh pots of Egypt assert,—we not only deny, but affirm to be contrary to the word of God."¹ Zuingli concludes with specifying the particulars in respect to which the bread and wine are symbolical, and his whole theory may be summed up in the statement, that the sacrament is *commemorative* by means of emblems.

The *Fidei Ratio* of Zuingli was the work of an individual mind, and as such bears a private and not a public character. Though not adopted by any secular or ecclesiastical body, it nevertheless exerted great influence among the Swiss churches, and upon one branch of the Reformed doctrine. In this

¹ NIEMEYER : Collectio, 26.

same year, 1530, Zuingle also drew up, for the use of the Swiss, a briefer statement of doctrine, substantially the same with the *Fidei Ratio*, under the title of *Fidei brevis et clara Expositio*.

The Zuinglian system prevailed in the Swiss cantons, and especially in the city of Basle and its neighbouring ally Mühlhausen. Oswald Myconius drew up, as early as 1532, a Confession in twelve articles, after a sketch which Oecolampadius had made, which goes under the name of the *First Basle Confession* (*Basiliensis prior Confessio Fidei*). The cities of Basle and Mühlhausen adopted it, but it never obtained general currency. It is a brief and simple creed in its structure, presenting with distinctness the evangelical view of justification and the sacraments, and is considerably reserved respecting the more speculative aspects of Christian doctrine. Concerning the character of man, it speaks as follows: "We confess that man in the beginning was made upright, after the image of God's righteousness and holiness, but that he has fallen wilfully into sin, by which the whole human race has become corrupt and subject to condemnation, our nature has been weakened, and has acquired such an inclination to sin, that whenever it is not restored by the Spirit of God, the man of himself never will do anything good."¹

The most important of all the Reformed Con-

¹ NIEMEYER : Collectio, 79.

fessions that were constructed previous to the public appearance of Calvin, is the *First Helvetic Confession* (*Confessio Helvetica Prior*), sometimes denominated the *Second Basle Confession*. It originated as follows. In the year 1535, the most distinguished Reformed theologians of Switzerland assembled at Aarau, to counsel with reference to a union with the Lutherans of Germany. The first step to be taken in order to this was, of course, to draw up a creed expressive of their own views, and indicating how far they could go towards meeting the Lutherans upon controverted points. In 1536, deputies were sent for this purpose, from Basle, Zurich, Berne, Schafhausen, St. Gall, Mühlhausen, and Biel. They met in Basle, and appointed three theologians of their number to draft a confession of faith. These three were Bullinger of Zurich, Oswald Myconius and Simon Grynaeus of Basle, with whom were afterwards associated Judä of Zurich, and Groszman of Berne. This confession was subscribed March 26, 1536, by the authorities secular and ecclesiastical of the seven above-named cantons, and was adopted by all the Reformed cantons of Switzerland as their symbol. In 1537, it was sent to the Lutheran theologians at Wurtemberg, and at Smalcald, without effect, however, so far as the union of the two parties was concerned.

The First Helvetic Confession is pacific in its tone. When compared with the views of Zuingli, it is easy to see that the Swiss theologians advanced

toward the Augsburg Confession in no inconsiderable degree, without, however, taking exactly the same position respecting the controverted points. Its language upon the subject of original sin is as follows. "Man, the most perfect image of God on the earth, and having the primacy of all visible creatures, consisting of soul and body, of which the last is mortal and the first immortal, having been created holy by God, lapsing into sin (*vitium*) by his own fault, drew the whole human race into the same with himself, and rendered it obnoxious to the same calamity. And this disease (*lues*) which is termed 'original,' so pervaded the whole human race, that the child of wrath and enemy of God can be cured by no power except the divine granted through Christ. We attribute free will to man in this sense, viz. : that when in the use of our faculties of knowing and willing we attempt to perform good and evil actions, we are able to perform the evil of our own accord and by our own power, but to embrace and follow out the good we are not able, unless illuminated by the grace of Christ, and impelled by his Spirit, for it is God who works in us to will and to do according to his good pleasure ; and from God is salvation, from ourselves perdition."¹

In its anthropology, then, the First Helvetic Confession agrees with the Augsburg in recognizing the Adamic connection. It differs from the Augs-

¹ NIEMEYER : *Collectio*, 116, sq.

burg Symbol, in asserting by implication instead of directly, that original sin is guilt, and agrees with it in denying a recuperative power in the fallen will,—a point upon which Zuingle's *Fidei Ratio* is silent, neither affirming nor denying. The approximation of this principal Swiss Confession to the Lutheran is not so near upon the doctrine of the Lord's Supper, though it is easy to see some slight modification of the Zuinglian theory. The phraseology is as follows. "In the mystic supper, the Lord offers his body and blood, that is, himself, to those that are truly his, that they may live more and more in him and he in them. Not that the bread and wine are, in their own substance, united with the substance of the body and blood of the Lord; but the bread and wine, by the institution of our Lord, are symbols through which is exhibited a true communication by the Lord himself, through the ministers of the church, of his own body and blood, not as the perishing food of the flesh, but as the nourishment of eternal life."¹

The Reformed Confessions thus far examined were constructed previously to the public appearance of Calvin, and without any direct influence from him. We come now to those which were drawn up, more or less, under his influence. The *Consensus Tigurinus* was composed by Calvin himself, in 1549, and was adopted by the Zurich theologians. It comprises twenty-six articles, which

¹ NIEMEYER: Collectio, 120, sq.

treat only of the sacrament of the Supper. It grew out of a desire upon the part of Calvin, to effect a union among the Reformed upon the doctrine of the Eucharist. The attitude of Calvin respecting the Sacramentarian question was regarded by the Lutherans, as favourable rather than otherwise to their peculiar views. His close and cordial agreement with Luther upon the fundamental points in theology, together with the strength of his phraseology when speaking of the nature of the Eucharist, led the Swiss Zuinglians to deem him as on the whole further from them than from their opponents. In this *Consensus Tigurinus*, he defines his statements more distinctly, and left no doubt in the minds of the Zurichers that he adopted heartily the spiritual and symbolical theory of the Lord's Supper. The course of events afterwards showed that Calvin's theory really harmonized with Zuingle's; for as the Lutheran scheme of consubstantiation expanded, the two parties became less and less cordial, so that the High Lutheran of the present day exhibits a temper towards the Calvinistic theory of the sacraments hardly less inimical than that which the early Lutheran manifested towards the Papacy.

Calvin, in 1551, drew up a confession entitled the *Consensus Genevensis*, which contains a very full exhibition of his theory of Predestination, to which topic it is confined. Its purpose was, to unite the Swiss churches in the reception of his own views, upon a topic far more difficult of comprehension

than the sacraments, and respecting which there was some difference of opinion among the Swiss theologians. Zuingle had taught the doctrine of absolute predestination, and so far as his views had prevailed in Switzerland there was a readiness to receive those of Calvin. In this Consensus, which the Genevan theologians adopted, and which acquired almost universal authority among the Reformed churches of Switzerland, the Calvinistic theory of Predestination is presented with great clearness and comprehensiveness.

The *Second Helvetic Confession* (*Confessio Helvetica Posterior*) is one of the principal symbols of the Reformed Church. It was constructed by Bullinger, in 1564, who was intrusted with this labour by a body of Swiss theologians, mostly from the cantons of Zurich, Berne, and Geneva. It was adopted by all the Reformed churches in Switzerland, with the exception of Basle (which was content with its old symbol, the *First Helvetic*), and by the Reformed churches in Poland, Hungary, Scotland, and France. It enunciates the strictly Calvinistic view of the sacraments in opposition to the Lutheran view, and maintains the Calvinistic theory of predestination. As this creed represents the theology of that great division of Protestantism which received its first formation under the guidance of Zuingle and the Swiss theologians, and was completed under that of Calvin and his coadjutors, it merits some detailed examination.

1. Upon the doctrine of the Trinity, its teaching is as follows. "We believe that God, one and indivisible in essence, is, without division or confusion, distinct in three persons: Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, so that the Father generates the Son from eternity, the Son is begotten by an ineffable generation, but the Holy Spirit proceeds from each, and that from eternity, and is to be adored together with each, so that there are not three Gods, but three persons, consubstantial, co-eternal, and co-equal, distinct as hypostases, and one having precedence of another as to order, but with no inequality as to essence."¹ 2. Respecting the doctrines of Predestination and Election, the Helvetic statement is as follows. "God, from eternity, predestinated or elected, freely and of his own mere grace, with no respect of men's character, the saints whom he would save in Christ, according to that saying of the apostle: 'God chose us in himself before the foundation of the world.' Not without a medium, though not on account of any merit of ours. In Christ, and on account of Christ, God elected us, so that they who are engrafted in Christ by faith are the elect, but those out of Christ are the reprobate."² 3. Upon the topics of Sin, Free Will, and Justification, the Helvetic Confession makes the following statements. "Sin we understand to be that native corruption of man, derived or propagated to us all from our first

¹ NIEMEYER: *Collectio*, 470, 471.

² NIEMEYER: *Collectio*, 481.

parents, by which, immersed in evil concupiscence and averse from good, but prone to all evil, full of all wickedness, unbelief, contempt and hatred of God, we are unable to do or even to think anything good of ourselves. In the unrenewed man there is no free will to do good, no power for performing good. The Lord in the gospel says, ‘Whosoever committeth sin is the servant of sin.’ The apostle Paul says, ‘The carnal mind is enmity against God, for it is not subject to the law of God, neither indeed can be.’”¹ “Justification, in the meaning of the apostle, signifies remission of sins, absolution from guilt and punishment, reception into favour, and pronouncing just,”—all upon the ground of the fact, that “Christ took the sins of the world upon himself, endured their punishment, and satisfied divine justice.”² Concerning the Eucharist, this symbol is Zuinglian. It teaches that the elements are signs,—not vulgar or common, but “sacred” “consecrated” emblems. “He who instituted the Supper, and commanded us to eat bread and drink wine, willed that believers should not perceive the bread and wine only, without any sense of the mystery (*sine mysterio*), as they eat bread at home, but they should partake spiritually of the things signified, i. e. be washed from their sins through faith in Christ’s blood and sacrifice.”³

The Second Helvetic Confession, besides having

¹ NIEMEYER : Collectio, 477, 480. ² NIEMEYER : Collectio, 494.

³ NIEMEYER : Collectio, 514, 515.

great currency among the Reformed churches within and without Switzerland, was recast and condensed into two other symbols: 1. The *Confessio Palatina*; 2. The *Repetitio Anhaltina*. These were local confessions, drawn up for the use of provincial churches only.

The *Formula Consensus Helvetici*, one of the most scientific of Calvinistic symbols, was composed at Zurich, in 1675, by Heidegger, assisted by Francis Turretin of Geneva, and Gereler of Basle. It was adopted as their symbol by nearly all the Swiss churches, though with hesitation on the part of some of them. Controversies, however, continued without abatement among them, so that this symbol did not prove to be the bond of union which it was designed to be, and since 1722 it has ceased to have authority as an authorized symbol, though much esteemed by the High Calvinistic party.

This Confession was called out by that modified form of Calvinism which, in the 17th century, emanated from the school at *Saumur*, represented by Amyraut, Placaeus, and Daillé. Concerning the Atonement, its language is as follows. "We do not agree with the opinion of those who teach that God purposes the salvation of all men individually, provided only they believe, by reason of his philanthropic benevolence, or because he is moved by a certain love of the fallen race of mankind that is prior to his purpose of election; by a certain 'conditional will,' or 'primal compassion,' as they term it,—that is, by

a wish or desire on his part that is inefficacious.”¹ Upon this, follows a statement of the doctrine of atonement that limits its application to the individual by the electing purpose of God, which purpose infallibly secures the saving acceptance of the atonement by the operation of the Holy Spirit. Respecting the doctrine of Original Sin, the Formula Consensus teaches, that the ground of the imputation of Adam’s sin to his posterity as guilt, is a real and not a nominal one; in other words, that the charge of original sin upon the individual, as true and proper sin, is founded upon its commission by the race in the person of the progenitor, and not upon its fictitious imputation to the individual by an arbitrary act of God. The phraseology is as follows. “We are of opinion, that the sin of Adam is imputed to all his posterity by the secret and just judgment of God. For the apostle testifies that all sinned in Adam; that by the disobedience of one man many were made sinners; and that in the same man all die. But it does not appear how hereditary corruption, as spiritual death, could fall upon the entire human race, by the *just* judgment of God, unless some fault (*delictum*) of this same human race, bringing in (*inducens*) the penalty of that death, had preceded. For the most just God, the judge of all the earth, punishes none but the guilty.”²

The *Heidelberg Catechism* (*Catechismus Palati-*

¹ NIEMEYER: Collectio, 732.

² NIEMEYER: Collectio, 733.

nus)¹ possesses the double character of a symbol, and a book for systematic instruction. In connection with the Second Helvetic Confession, it is the most generally adopted of the Reformed Confessions, and has great authority outside of the particular communions that adopt it.

As early as the middle of the 16th century, the Palatinate of the Rhine, a large and important division of Germany lying upon both banks of the river, had adopted the Augsburg Confession, chiefly under the influence of its Electors. In the year 1560, the Elector Frederick III. introduced the Swiss doctrine and worship. His successor, Lewis VI., in 1577 carried the Palatinate back again to a Lutheran symbol, the Formula Concor-diae. John Casimir,² the successor of Lewis, restored the Reformed doctrine, which after that time became the prevalent one in the Palatinate. In order to give the Reformed party a definite and established organization, Frederick III. commissioned two Heidelberg theologians to compose a catechism. These were Ursinus, a student of Melanchthon's, and Olivianus,—the first of whom performed the principal labour. The catechism was laid before the superintendents or bishops, and preachers, in 1562, for their acceptance; and in the following year it was pub-

¹ See the excellent Monograph commemorative of the tercentenary of this symbol, published under the auspices of the Ger-

man Reformed Church in America, by Scribner, New York, 1863. ² In 1583. GIESELER: IV. 484-494.

lished, in the name of the Elector, as the doctrine of the Palatinate, and was introduced into the churches and schools of the land.

The Heidelberg Catechism is one of the best of the many systems of Christian doctrine that were constructed in the prolific period of the Reformation. Though not composed directly for such a purpose, as were the Lutheran Formula Concordiae and the Calvinistic Formula Consensus, it is better fitted than either of them to unite both branches and tendencies of Protestantism. It consists of three parts. The first treats of the misery of man; the second of his redemption; the third of his happy condition under the gospel. It contains 129 questions and answers, arranged for the 52 Sabbaths of the year. In doctrine, it teaches justification with the Lutheran glow and vitality, predestination and election with Calvinistic firmness and self-consistency, and the Zuinglian theory of the sacraments with decision. It was originally composed in German; has been translated into Latin, Greek, and Hebrew, as well as into nearly all the languages of modern Europe; was approved by the highly Calvinistic synod of Dort, and is regarded with great favour by the High Lutheran party of the present day.

The *Confessio Belgica* was first drawn up as a private confession by Von Bres, in 1561. It contains 37 articles, and is thoroughly Calvinistic. It was composed in French, and was first printed in Walloon French and Dutch in 1562. In 1571, it

was revised, and adopted by the entire Holland Church in the 16th century. After another revision of the text, it was publicly approved by the synod of Dort in 1618.

The *Confessio Gallicana*, a Calvinistic symbol, was composed by a synod of the Reformed party convened at Paris in 1559. Theodore Beza sent a copy of it to Charles IX. It was subscribed by a synod at Rochelle in 1571, and is the adopted confession of the French Protestant Church. The French Reformed churches in Holland also receive this as their symbol.

The *Confessio Scoticana* was constructed in 1560, by the Scottish preachers,—principally by John Knox. It is Calvinistic in substance and spirit, and was introduced throughout Scotland by state enactment.

The *Canons of the Synod of Dort* constitute a highly important portion of the Calvinistic symbolics. In the beginning of the 17th century, Arminianism had arisen in Holland, and to oppose it this synod was convened. Besides the Holland theologians, there were representatives from many of the foreign Reformed or Calvinistic churches,—though the former had the preponderating influence.¹ The

¹ The synod was composed of 61 East Friesland, and Bremen. The
Hollanders,—viz. : 5 professors, States General levied one hun-
36 preachers, and 20 elders,— dred thousand guilders upon the
and 28 foreign theologians, from provinces, to defray the expenses
England, Scotland, the Palati- of the deputies to the synod.
nate, Hesse, Switzerland, Nassau,

synod met Nov. 13, 1618, and continued in session until May 9, 1619; held discussions with the Remonstrants, or Arminians, who appeared in synod by 13 deputies headed by Episcopius; and drew up, during the 154 sessions, 93 *Canones* which combat the principal tenets of the Arminians, and develop the Calvinistic system. The Reformed churches in the Netherlands, France, the Palatinate, the greater part of Switzerland, and the Puritans in Great Britain received these canons as the scientific and precise statement of Christianity. The English Episcopal Church, in which at that time the Arminian party was dominant, rejected the decisions of this synod, and a royal mandate of James I., in 1620, forbade the preaching of the doctrine of predestination.

The Dort Canons are composed in a positive, and a negative form. After the statement of the true doctrine according to Calvinism, there follows a rejection of the opposing Arminian errors. The following extracts from the *Rejectio errorum* indicate the views of the Synod upon the doctrines of Original Sin, Free Will, and Atonement. "The synod rejects the error of those who teach that it is not true that original sin of itself is sufficient to condemn the whole human race, and merits temporal and eternal punishment. . . . The synod rejects the error of those who teach that spiritual gifts, that is good dispositions and virtues, such as holiness and justice, could have had no place in the will

of man when *first created*, and consequently could not be separated from it in the fall. . . . The synod rejects the error of those who teach that spiritual gifts are not lost from the *will* of man in spiritual death, because *the will was not corrupted*, but is only impeded by the darkness of the mind, and the inordinate appetites of the flesh,—which impediments being removed, the will is able to exert its innate freedom, i. e. of itself either to will or to choose, or not to will or not to choose, whatever good is set before it. . . . The synod condemns the error of those who teach that grace and free will are each *partial and concurrent causes* at the commencement of conversion; that grace does not precede the efficiency of the will, in the order of causality,—i. e., that God does not efficiently aid the will of man to conversion, before the will itself moves and determines itself. . . . The synod rejects the error of those that teach that Christ by his satisfaction has not *strictly merited* faith and salvation for those to whom this satisfaction is effectually applied, but that he has only acquired for the Father the authority or plenary power of treating *de novo* with mankind, and of prescribing whatever new conditions he pleases, the performance of which depends upon the free will of man, so that it may be that no man will fulfil them, or that all men will.”¹

¹ NIEMEYER: Collectio, in locis.

The *Thirty-Nine Articles* of the English Church, like the constitution of the English State, were a gradual formation. Under King Edward VI., archbishop Cranmer and bishop Ridley drew up a symbol, in 1551, for the Reformed Church in England, which was entirely Calvinistic in substance and spirit. This was adopted by a synod at London, in 1552, and thereby received public sanction. It goes under the name of "The Forty-Two Articles of Edward Sixth." This symbol was revised by the bishops of the English Church under Queen Elizabeth, in 1562. The revision comprised a creed of thirty-nine articles, which was sanctioned by a synod in London in 1562, and by act of Parliament in 1571. It is a Calvinistic creed upon all points of doctrine with the exception of the sacraments. With respect to this subject, it was intended to be a mean between the Lutheran and Calvinistic theories. Its polity is prelatical episcopacy, the reigning sovereign being the earthly head of the church.

The *Westminster Confession* is the result of the deliberations of the Westminster Assembly, a synod of divines called by Parliament, in opposition, however, to the will of Charles I., for the purpose of settling the government, liturgy, and doctrine of the Church of England. It met July 1, 1643, and sat till February 22, 1648, four years six months and twenty-two days, in which time it held 1163 sessions. The members were chosen from the several counties of England, and thus the council contained

representatives of the Presbyterian, the Episcopalian, and the Independent parties. The great preponderance, however, was on the part of the Presbyterians, since many of the Episcopal divines, though elected, refused to attend, upon the ground that as the king had declared against the convocation it was not a legal assembly ; and the Independents were a far smaller body than either of the other two. The system of doctrine constructed by this Assembly is thoroughly Calvinistic, and bears a close resemblance to the canons of the synod of Dort. The Westminster Confession was adopted as their doctrinal basis by the Presbyterians of England, and took the place of the *Confessio Scoticana* in Scotland. It is also the symbol of the Presbyterian Church in America.¹

The *Savoy Confession* is a symbol adopted by the Puritan Independents in England, who were not satisfied with the Westminster Confession so far as the polity and discipline of the churches was concerned. As yet they had formally adopted no common creed. The Presbyterian assembly had urged them to this, reminding them that their brethren in New England had already done it. Under the authority of Cromwell, an assembly was convened at the Savoy, in London, October 12, 1658, composed of above one hundred ministers and delegates from

¹ See NEAL : History of the Puritans, and HETHERINGTON : History of the Westminster Assembly, for an account of the Westminster Confession.

the Independent churches, among whom were John Howe, then Cromwell's chaplain, John Owen, Joseph Caryl, and Thomas Goodwin, who is styled by Anthony Wood "the very Atlas and patriarch of Independency." A committee was chosen, of whom Goodwin and Owen were at the head, to draw up a new confession, with the instruction to keep as close to the Westminster upon doctrinal points as possible. This they did, saying in their preface that they fully consent to the Westminster Confession, for the substance of it.¹

The Savoy Confession differs from the Westminster upon the subject of polity. It teaches "that every particular society of visible professors agreeing to walk together in the faith and order of the gospel is a complete church, and has full power within itself to elect and ordain all church officers, to exclude all offenders, and to do all other acts relating to the edification and well-being of the church. . . . The way of ordaining officers, that is, pastors, teachers or elders, is, after their election by the suffrage of the church, to set them apart with fasting and prayer, and imposition of the hands of the eldership of the church, though if there be no imposition of hands, they are nevertheless rightly

¹ "The difference between these two confessions is so very small, that the modern Independents have in a manner laid aside the use of it in their families, and

agreed with the Presbyterians in the use of the Assembly's catechism." NEAL: Puritans, II. 178 (Harper's Ed.).

constituted ministers of Christ ; for it is not allowed that ordination to the work of the ministry, though it be by persons rightly ordained, does convey any office-power, without a previous election of the church. No ministers may administer the sacraments but such as are ordained and appointed thereunto. The power of all stated synods, presbyteries, convocations, and assemblies of divines, over particular churches is denied ; but in cases of difficulty, or difference relating to doctrine or order, churches may meet together by their messengers, in synods or councils, to consider and give advice, but without exercising any jurisdiction.”¹

The connection between the Calvinism of the Continent and the Puritanism of England, we have seen, is very close and intimate ; that between the Puritanism of Old England and of New England is equally close, so that this is a proper place in this history of Symbols to introduce the creeds of the New England churches. The oldest of them, and one of the most important, is the *Cambridge Platform*. In 1646, a bill was presented to the General Court of Massachusetts, for calling a synod of the churches to draw up some platform of discipline and church government.² The bill was passed, but owing to scruples of some of the deputies the law did not take effect. The matter was then pro-

¹ NEAL : Puritans, II. 178, 179 (Harper's Ed.).

was the only directory in use up to this time.

² COTTON'S "Book of the Keys"

pounded to the churches, and by them a synod was convened. It met, sat fourteen days, and then adjourned to June 8, 1647. Owing to epidemical sickness it soon adjourned, and met again August 15, 1648. At this session, the Platform was constructed and adopted. The synod consisted of the clergy of Massachusetts, with as many others as could be collected from the other New England colonies. Hubbard and Higginson, who personally remembered them, describe them as "men of great renown in the nation from whence the Laudian persecution exiled them. Their learning, their holiness, their gravity, struck all men that knew them, with admiration. They were Timothies in their houses, Chrysostoms in their pulpits, and Augustines in their disputations."

The Platform prepared by this synod, which sat fourteen days, was presented in October, 1648, to the churches and the general government, for their consideration and acceptance. It was adopted by the churches, and after some discussion by the general court,—the latter declaring "their approbation of the said form of discipline, as being, for the substance thereof, what they had hitherto practised in their churches, and did believe to be according to the word of God." Thus, the document received in Massachusetts the sanction of law, and was adopted and in force in all the New England colonies, until superseded in Connecticut by the Saybrook Platform, in 1708.

The Cambridge Platform is wholly confined to polity. It makes no statements of doctrine whatever. Like the Savoy Confession, it refers to the Westminster Symbol for a dogmatic statement. In their preface, the authors of the Cambridge Platform say: "Having perused the public confession of faith agreed upon by the reverend assembly of divines at Westminster, and finding the sum and substance thereof, in matters of doctrine, to express not their own judgment only, but ours also; and being likewise called upon by our godly magistrates, to draw up a public confession of that faith which is constantly taught and generally professed amongst us; we thought good to present unto them, and with them to our churches, and with them to all the churches of Christ abroad, our professed and hearty assent and attestation to the whole confession of faith, for substance of doctrine, which the reverend assembly presented to the religious and honourable parliament of England, excepting only some sections in the 25th, 30th, and 31st chapters of their confession, which concern points of controversy in church discipline, touching which we refer ourselves to the draft of church discipline in the ensuing treatise." Respecting the subject of church government and discipline, this Platform agrees with the polity of the Savoy Confession,—teaching as that does, that the individual church possesses all political power within itself, even to the ordination of its minister, and that councils or synods have nothing but advisory powers.

The second New England symbol, both in time and importance, is the *Boston Confession*. A synod of the churches in the province of Massachusetts, called by the General Court, assembled in Boston September 10, 1679, in which the Cambridge Platform was re-adopted as the form of church polity. This synod then held a second session, May 12, 1680, for the purpose of forming a confession of faith. On the 19th of May, 1680, the result of the deliberations of this synod was presented to the General Court for acceptance, whereupon the following order was passed: "This court having taken into serious consideration the request that hath been presented by several of the reverend elders, in the name of the late synod, do approve thereof, and accordingly order the confession of faith agreed upon at their second session, and the platform of discipline consented unto by the synod at Cambridge anno 1648, to be printed for the benefit of the churches in present and after times." This is the only dogmatic confession that has been drawn up in the New England churches and by the New England divines, and for this reason it deserves some particular notice and examination.

The Cambridge Synod of 1648 adopted the Westminster Symbol, in place of forming a new one for themselves. This Boston Synod of 1680 both adopt an antecedent symbol, and construct another of their own. In their preface to their Confession, the Boston Synod employ the following language

“It hath pleased the only wise God so to dispose in his providence, as that the elders and messengers of the churches in the colony of Massachusetts in New England, did, by the call and encouragement of the honoured general court, meet together September 10, 1679. This synod at their second session, which was May 12, 1680, consulted and considered of a confession of faith. That which was consented unto by the elders and messengers of the Congregational churches in England who met at the Savoy (being for the most part, some small variations excepted, the same with that which was agreed upon first by the assembly at Westminster, and was approved of by the synod at Cambridge in New England, anno 1648, as also by a general assembly in Scotland), was twice publicly read, examined, and approved of,—that little variation which we have made from the one, in compliance with the other, may be seen by those who please to compare them. But we have, for the main, chosen to express ourselves in the words of those reverend assemblies, that so we might not only with one heart, but with one mouth, glorify God and our Lord Jesus Christ. As to what concerns church government, we refer to the platform of discipline agreed upon by the messengers of these churches anno 1648.”

Having thus re-affirmed the Calvinism of the Westminster and Savoy Confessions, this synod proceed to the formation of a confession of faith in their own language and terms; from which the fol-

lowing citations exhibit the views of the New England churches and divines of that period. "In the unity of the God-head, there be three persons, of one substance, power, and eternity, God the Father, God the Son, and God the Holy Ghost; the Father is of none, neither begotten, nor proceeding; the Son is eternally begotten of the Father; the Holy Ghost eternally proceeding from the Father and the Son." This confession, it is obvious, like the Calvinistic confessions generally, adopts the Nicaeno-Constantinopolitan Trinitarianism. The Anthropology of the Boston Confession is indicated in the following extracts. "God having made a covenant of works and life thereupon, with our first parents, and all their posterity in them, they being seduced by the subtilty and temptation of Satan did wilfully transgress the law of their creation, and break the covenant in eating the forbidden fruit. By this sin, they and we in them fell from original righteousness and communion with God, and so became dead in sin, and wholly defiled in all the faculties and parts of soul and body. They being the root, and by God's appointment standing in the room and stead, of all mankind, the guilt of this sin was imputed, and corrupted nature conveyed to all their posterity descending from them by ordinary generation. From this original corruption, whereby we are utterly indisposed, disabled, and made opposite to all good, and wholly inclined to all evil, do proceed all actual transgressions. Every

sin, both original and actual, being a transgression of the righteous law of God, and contrary thereunto, doth in its own nature bring guilt upon the sinner, whereby he is bound over to the wrath of God and curse of the law, and so made subject to death, with all miseries, spiritual, temporal, and eternal. . . . God hath endued the will of man with that natural liberty and power of acting upon choice, that is neither forced, nor by any absolute necessity of nature determined, to do good or evil. Man in his state of innocency had freedom and power to will and do that which is good and well pleasing to God ; but yet mutably, so that he might fall from it. Man by his fall into a state of sin hath wholly lost all ability of will to any spiritual good accompanying salvation, so as a natural man being altogether averse from that good, and dead in sin, is not able by his own strength to convert himself, or to prepare himself thereunto. The will of man is made perfectly and immutably free to good alone, in the state of glory only.” The Boston Confession agrees, then, with the Latin in distinction from the Greek anthropology, in maintaining the two positions that original sin, equally with actual, is guilty transgression of law, and deserves the punishment of eternal death ; and that the will of man after the fall does not possess that power to good which it had by creation and anterior to its apostasy.¹

¹ This doctrine of the impotence of the apostate will, thus endorsed by the most important of the New England synods, was

The Soteriology of this confession is seen in the following extract. "Christ by his obedience and death did fully discharge the debt of all those that are justified, and did by the sacrifice of himself, in the blood of his cross, undergoing in their stead the penalty due unto them, make a proper real and full satisfaction to God's justice in their behalf; yet inasmuch as he was given by the Father for them, and his obedience and satisfaction accepted in their stead, and both freely, not for anything in them, their justification is only of free grace, that both

re-affirmed by the two most distinguished of New England theologians. The elder EDWARDS (On the Will, Pt. III. § iv.) combats the power of contrary choice, without which self-conversion is impossible, in the following terms: "The will, in the time of a leading act or inclination that is diverse from or opposite to the command of God, and when actually under the influence of it, *is not able to exert itself to the contrary*, to make an alteration in order to a compliance. The inclination is unable to change itself; and that for this plain reason, that it is unable to *incline* to change itself." HOPKINS (Works, I. 233-235) remarks, that "every degree of inclination contrary to duty, which is and must be sinful, *necessarily implies and involves an equal degree of difficulty and inability to obey*. For, indeed, such inclination of

the heart to disobey, and the difficulty or inability to obey, are precisely one and the same. *This kind of difficulty, or inability, therefore, always is great according to the strength and fixedness of the inclination to disobey; and it becomes total and absolute when the heart is totally corrupt, and wholly opposed to obedience. . . .* St. Paul says: 'The carnal mind is enmity against God, for it is not subject to the law of God, neither indeed can be.' None can think the apostle means to excuse man's enmity against God, because it renders him unable to obey the law of God, and cannot be subject to it. The contrary is strongly expressed, viz., that this enmity against God is exceeding criminal, in that it is directly opposed to God and his law, and *involves in its nature an utter inability to obey the law of God,—yea, an absolute impossibility.*"

the exact justice and rich grace of God might be glorified in the justification of sinners.”

Upon the topics, then, of trinitarianism, anthropology, and soteriology, the Boston Confession of 1680 is in harmony with the Protestant confessions of the Old World. And what is especially worthy of notice, with regard to those shades and differences of doctrinal statement which prevailed within the wide and active mind of Protestantism, the New England churches, as represented by this synod, adopted the more strict and not the more latitudinarian statements of doctrine. Respecting the more difficult and disputed points in dogmatic theology, the Boston Confession gives the same definitions, and takes the same positions, with the Augsburg Confession of the German Lutherans, the Second Helvetic of the Swiss Calvinists, the Dort Canons of the Dutch Calvinists, and the Westminster Confession of the English Puritans.

A synod of the churches in the Connecticut colony met in 1703, which adopted the Westminster and Savoy Confessions, and drew up certain rules of ecclesiastical discipline. This synod was only preparatory, however, to another more general one which they had in contemplation. In 1708, a synod was convened by the legislature, and met at Saybrook. This body adopted for a doctrinal confession the Boston Confession of 1680, and drew up the *Saybrook Platform* of government and discipline which approximates to the Presbyterian, in

delegating *judicial* powers to churches organized into a "Consociation." The confession of faith and platform were approved and adopted by the legislature of Connecticut, in October, 1708.

§ 3. *Papal Confessions.*

The fountain-head of the modern Papal theology is the *Canones et Decreta Concilii Tridentini*. The need of a general synod to counteract the progress of the Protestant churches had long been felt by the Papal body, and after considerable delay pope Paul III. convened one at Trent, on the 13th of December, 1545, which with intermissions continued to hold its sessions until the year 1563. A papal bull of Pius IV., issued on the 26th of January, 1564, confirmed the decisions of the synod; forbade, under the severest penalties, all clergymen and laymen from making explanations or commentaries upon them; and reserved to the pope the further explication, as need might be, of the more obscure points of doctrine contained in them. The Tridentine Symbol did not immediately acquire equal authority in all Roman Catholic countries. In the greater part of Italy, in Portugal, in Poland, and by the German emperor, the council of Trent was formally declared to be oecumenical. But in Catholic Germany its decisions were only tacitly accepted; in Spain, Naples, and Belgium, they were adopted

with a special reservation of royal rights; and in France, where the council met with strong opposition, they were received only by degrees, and with respect to strictly dogmatic points. The decisions of the Tridentine Council, which were passed not unanimously but by a majority vote, fell into two classes. The first, entitled *Decreta*, contain detailed statements, in positive propositions, of the Papal doctrine; the second, entitled *Canones*, explain in a brief manner the meaning of the *Decreta*, and condemn the opposite tenets of the Protestant church,—ending, always, with the words “*anathema sit.*” Their teachings in theology, anthropology, soteriology, and eschatology, have been indicated in the several divisions of this history.

A second document possessing symbolical authority in the Papal Church is the *Professio fidei Tridentina*, which pope Pius IV., in a bull issued in 1564, required all public teachers in the Romish Church, all candidates for clerical or academical honours, and all converts from other churches, to subscribe. It is composed of the Nicaeno-Constantinopolitan symbol, together with extracts from the Tridentine Canons. It obligates the subscriber to belief in the Nicene doctrine; in the entire body of ecclesiastical tradition; in the interpretation which the Church has given to the Scriptures; in the seven sacraments and their Catholic administration; in the statements of the Council of Trent concerning original sin and justification; in the

mass, transubstantiation, purgatory, invocation of saints, and worship of images; in the authority of the church to give absolution; in the Roman Church as the mother and teacher of all other churches; and in the pope as the vicegerent of Christ to whom obedience is due.

A third document of a symbolical character in the Papal Church is the *Catechismus Romanus*, drawn up at the command of the pope by three distinguished Papal theologians, under the supervision of three cardinals. It was published in Latin, under the authority of Pius IV., in 1556, and introduced into Italy, France, Germany, and Poland, by the votes of provincial synods. It adheres closely to the Tridentine Canons; though it enters into details upon some points respecting which the Tridentine Canons are silent, such as the sovereignty of the pope and the limbus patrum. Although this catechism was published by papal authority, several other catechisms have attempted to supplant it. The Jesuits, toward the close of the 16th century, during the controversies that arose respecting predestination, endeavored to weaken the influence of the Roman Catechism, by the two *Catechisms of Canisius*, a member of their body. One of these was intended to be a dogmatic manual for clergymen, and the other a book of instruction for children and youth. They were translated into many languages, and exerted a great influence in connection with the educational system of the Jesuits. The

pope, however, refused to give them papal authority, though strongly urged to do so by the Jesuit party. The *Catechism of Bellarmin*, published in 1603, also the work of a Jesuit, was authorized by pope Clement VIII. as a true exposition of the Roman Catechism, and obtained a wide circulation. Besides these documents, the *Confutatio Confessionis Augustanae* or answer to the Augsburg Confession, the bull *Unigenitus* of Clement XI. issued in 1711, and the liturgical books of the Roman Church, particularly the *Missale Romanum* and the *Breviarium Romanum*, are important auxiliary sources of the Papal doctrine.

§ 4. *Confessions of the Greek Church.*

The Greek Church lays at the foundation of its dogmatic system the Apostles' Creed, and the decisions of the seven oecumenical councils which were held previous to the schism between the East and the West,—viz., the first and second Nicene, in 325 and 787; the first, second, and third Constantinopolitan, in 381, 533, and 680; the Ephesian in 431, and the Chalcedon in 451. It differs from the Roman Church, in rejecting the decisions of all councils held at the West since the division of the two churches.

Besides these, there are several symbolical documents which the Greek Church adopts as the expression of its faith. The most important of them

is the *Confessio Orthodoxa*, drawn up in 1642, by Peter Mogilas, the metropolitan bishop of Kiew, to counteract a tendency towards Protestantism that was showing itself in the Russian Church. It was published first in Russian, then in Modern Greek, and afterwards in Latin and German. Another creed is the *Confessio Dosithei*, composed by a Greek patriarch of Jerusalem, in opposition to the Calvinistic system. Still another is the *Confessio Gennadii*, which the patriarch Gennadius of Constantinople composed and presented to the sultan Mohammed II., on his conquest of Constantinople in 1453, as the statement of the Christian faith. It does not enter into the differences between the Greek and Latin systems, but is an expression of the general truths of the Christian religion.

§ 5. *Arminian Confessions.*

The Arminians take their name from Arminius (†1609), first a pastor at Amsterdam, afterwards professor of divinity at Leyden. He had been educated by Beza in the opinions of Calvin, but as early as 1591 began to express his dissent from Calvinism, upon the points of free-will, predestination, and grace, as being too rigid and severe. The Arminians were also called Remonstrants, because in 1611 they presented a remonstrance to the States-General of Holland, praying for relief from the harsh treatment of their opponents.

The Arminians formally adopted no symbol. One of their characteristics was a lower estimate than the Reformed churches cherished, of the value of confessions generally. Hence, their opinions must be sought in the writings of their leading minds. The principal sources are the following: 1. The writings of Arminius; particularly his controversy with Francis Gomar, his colleague. 2. The *Confessio Pastorum qui Remonstrantes vocantur*, drawn up by Episcopius († 1643). 3. The *Remonstrantia* of Peter Bertius,—a specification of the five articles (*Quinque articulares*) held by the Arminians, in opposition to the Calvinistic five points. 4. The writings of Grotius (apologetical and exegetical); of Limborch (dogmatical); of Curcellaeus, Wetstein, and Le Clerc (exegetical).

The controversy between the Arminians and Calvinists turned chiefly upon three Calvinistic points, viz.: the absolute decree of election; the irresistibility of special grace; and the limitation, in the divine intention, of the merit of Christ's death to the elect. 1. The Arminians held that the decree of election is conditional, or dependent upon the divine foreknowledge that grace will be rightly used in the instance of the elect. The Dort Canons maintain that the electing decree secures the right use of grace itself, as well as bestows grace. 2. The Arminians held that the atonement of Christ is intended for all men alike and indiscriminately. As matter of fact, however, it saves only a part of

mankind. The reason why the atonement does not save all men alike and indiscriminately lies in the fact, that the will of the finally lost sinner defeats the divine intention. There is no such degree of grace as is irresistible to the sinful will. The effectual application of the atonement, therefore, depends ultimately upon the decision of the sinner's will, and this decision in the case of the lost defeats the divine purpose. In opposition to this view, the Dort Synod held that the atonement, though sufficient in value for the salvation of all men, was intended only for those to whom it is effectually applied, viz.: the elect. The Holy Spirit possesses a power that is irresistible, in the sense that it can subdue the obstinacy of any human will however opposed to God. Hence, the application of the atonement depends, ultimately, not upon the sinner's decision but the divine determination to exert special grace. There is, therefore, no defeat of the divine intention, and the atonement saves all for whom it was intended. 3. The Arminians held that grace is necessary in order to salvation, but that regenerating grace may be both resisted and lost. The Dort Synod, on the contrary, held that regenerating as distinct from common grace is able to subdue all opposition of the sinful will, and therefore cannot be resisted in the sense of being defeated or overcome, and therefore cannot be lost.

§ 6. *Socinian Confessions.*

The Socinians laid still less stress upon symbols than the Arminians. The principal writings having a confessional character among them are the following: 1. The *Cracovian Catechism*,—composed mostly of passages of Scripture. It was drawn up by Schomann, and published in 1574, for the use of the Polish churches. 2. The *Catechism of Faustus Socinus*,—published at Racovia, 1618, in an unfinished form, owing to the death of Socinus. 3. The *Racovian Catechisms*,—the larger composed by Schmalz and Moscorovius, and published in 1605; the smaller by Schmalz, in 1605. These are the principal symbolical product of Socinianism, and are drawn very much from the writings of the Socini.

ALPHABETICAL INDEX.

- A** BELARD, i. 46, 163; his view of faith and reason, i. 186; his trinitarianism, i. 337; his soteriology, ii. 287.
- Absolution (Lutheran), ii. 452.
- Acceptilation, ii. 347, sq.
- Advent (second) of Christ, ii. 398, 450.
- Adventists, ii. 397.
- AGASSIZ, i. 1.
- AHRIMAN, i. 245.
- ALBERTUS MAGNUS, i. 82, ii. 293.
- Alogi, i. 259.
- ALCUIN, i. 177, ii. 111; his statement of the relation of the person to the essence, i. 347; soteriology of, ii. 270.
- ALEXANDER, bishop of Alexandria, his opposition to Arius, i. 307.
- Alexandrine School, i. 67, 159; anthropology of, ii. 31; soteriology of, ii. 226.
- AMBROSE, i. 12, 343, ii. 34, 49; anthropology of, ii. 48, sq.; eschatology of, ii. 401.
- AMMON, i. 218.
- AMALRICH, of Bena, i. 179, 227.
- Anti-Judaizing Gnostics, i. 116.
- Anti-Trinitarians, i. 253.
- ANGELO, i. 5.
- ANSELM, i. 11, 46, 164, 177, 179, ii. 218; his view of reason and faith, i. 179; argument for Divine existence, i. 231, sq.; his use of substantia and essentia, i. 370; his trinitarianism, i. 376; anthropology of, ii. 114-139; definition of original sin, ii. 115, sq.; relation of the individual to the species, ii. 120, sq.; realism of, ii. 117; idea of the will and freedom, ii. 127, sq.; inability of the creature to originate holiness, ii. 132; impossibility of God's originating sin, ii. 136; soteriology of, ii. 273, sq.; maintains the absolute necessity of atonement, ii. 274; definition of sin as debt, ii. 277; strict satisfaction required, ii. 279; his evangelical "direction" for the visitation of the sick, ii. 282; influence of his system, ii. 286, 318; his soteriology compared with the Protestant, ii. 336, sq., 355; his idea of law, ii. 355.
- Antiochian School, anthropology of, ii. 39; attitude of towards Pelagianism, ii. 101.
- Anhalt, confession of, ii. 471.
- Anabaptists, ii. 450.
- A priori argument for the divine existence, i. 238.
- A posteriori argument for the divine existence, i. 230.
- Apollinarism, i. 394.
- Apologia confessionis Augustanae, ii. 455.
- Apologies, i. 30, 103; defect in mediaeval, i. 188.
- AQUINAS, i. 12, 46, 82, 179, ii. 293; his view of faith and reason, i. 181; his trinitarianism, i. 376; relation of the individual to the species, ii. 121; soteriology of, ii. 304, sq.; relative necessity of atonement, ii. 306; doctrine of unio mystica, ii. 308, 337;

- distinction between *satisfactio* and *meritum*, ii. 309; doctrine of superabundance of merit, ii. 310; confusion of justification with sanctification, ii. 312; his notion of 'configuration,' ii. 313; distinction of merit of condignity and congruity, ii. 329; his eschatology, ii. 405, 409, 413, 417.
- ARISTOTLE, on the enslaved will, i. 54, 55; on immortality, i. 55; his definition of faith, i. 54.
- Aristotelianism, influence of, i. 52; errors of, i. 53, sq.; agreement with Platonism, i. 57; prevalence of, i. 66, 76, 81.
- ARIUS, i. 307, ii. 435.
- Arianism, relation of to Origenism, i. 307; christology of, i. 393.
- Arminians, confessions of, ii. 495, sq.
- Arminianism, anthropology of, ii. 178-196; definition of original sin, ii. 179; original sin not guilt, ii. 182, 477, sq.; impotence of the sinful will, ii. 186; God cannot require faith irrespective of grace, ii. 189; doctrine of the Adamic unity, ii. 190; doctrine of conditional election, ii. 193, 496; soteriology of, ii. 370, sq.; Christ's death not a substituted penalty, but a substitute for a penalty, ii. 373; not a complete satisfaction, ii. 374.
- ARNOBIUS, i. 229.
- ARNOBIUS, the younger, ii. 103.
- Artemonites, i. 68, 259.
- ATHANASIUS, i. 46, 70, 229, 280; his definition of Sabellianism, i. 260; his opinion of Origen, i. 291; of the Semi-Arians, i. 313; of Eusebius, i. 313; his doctrine of eternal generation, i. 321, sq., 327, 332, sq.; his doctrine of the Holy Ghost, i. 356, 361; his definition of hypostasis, i. 369; his anthropology, ii. 37; his soteriology, ii. 239, sq.
- ATHENAGORAS, i. 119, 127.
- Atonement, defined, ii. 204; relative and absolute necessity of, ii. 223, 258, 300, 302, 316.
- AUBERLIN, ii. 397.
- Augsburg Confession, trinitarianism of, i. 379; anthropology of, ii. 152, sq., 166, sq.; soteriology of, ii. 342; condemns chiliasm, ii. 596; account of, ii. 445, sq.
- AUGUSTINE, i. 46, 230; Platonic studies of, i. 69; acquaintance with Aristotle's writings, i. 74, 152; his idea of revelation, i. 143; of the church, i. 144; his *De civitate Dei*, i. 154; his definition of faith, i. 155, 158; view of relation of faith to reason, i. 161; of miracles, i. 167; of eternal generation, i. 344; specimens of his trinitarian exegesis, i. 351; combats pre-existence, ii. 9; attitude towards traducianism, ii. 15, sq., 77; his anthropology, ii. 50-91; his earlier synergism, ii. 51; his conception of the power of contrary choice, ii. 55, 65; his distinction between relative and absolute perfection, ii. 55; his conception of voluntariness, ii. 58; his idea of will and freedom, ii. 60, sq.; view of freedom and necessity, ii. 64; of the bondage of the will, ii. 66; his theory of regeneration, ii. 66; degrees of grace, ii. 68; his doctrine of predestination, ii. 70; of irresistible grace, ii. 73; concerning the salvation of pagans, ii. 74; doctrine of the Adamic unity, ii. 76-79, 90; of the voluntariness of sin, ii. 79-91; impossibility of God's sinning, ii. 84; his soteriology, ii. 253, sq.; occasional confusion of justification with sanctification, ii. 255; maintains a relative necessity of atonement, ii. 258; his eschatology, ii. 401, 405, 408, 410, 412, 414.
- AVITUS, of Vienne, ii. 105.
- BACON, i. 3, 65.
- BARNABAS, i. 267; soteriology of, ii. 209; chiliasm of, ii. 390.
- BASIL, the Great, his doctrine of the Holy Ghost, i. 357; his eschatology, ii. 404.
- Basle, confession of, ii. 464.
- BASILIDES, ii. 205, 227.

- BAUMGARTEN-CRUSIUS, method of, i. 36; extracts from, i. 130, 153.
- BAUR, i. 231, 261; his statement of Origen's trinitarianism, i. 297, 300; of Irenaeus's soteriology, ii. 213, sq.; his objection to Anselm's doctrine of satisfaction, ii. 284; his statement of the difference between the Protestant and Papal soteriologies, ii. 331; his criticism on the Grotian theory of satisfaction, ii. 366.
- BAXTER, i. 92, 204.
- BEDE, ii. 111.
- Begotten, eternally. See Generation.
- Belgic Confession, ii. 475; its definition of justification, ii. 340; notice of chiliasm, ii. 397.
- BELLARMIN, ii. 144, 151; his soteriology, ii. 328; twofold justification defined, ii. 329.
- BENTLEY, i. 207, 216.
- BERNARD, i. 46, 179; his view of faith and reason, i. 183; his trinitarianism, i. 376; his soteriology, ii. 289.
- BERTIUS, ii. 496.
- BERYL, i. 255, ii. 435.
- BIEL, i. 82; his soteriology, ii. 314.
- BOCCACCIO, i. 87.
- BOETHIUS, i. 73.
- BOLINGBROKE, system of, i. 200; its influence in France, i. 216.
- BONAR, ii. 397.
- BONAVENTURA, his creationism, ii. 23; soteriology of, ii. 293, sq.
- Boston Confession, ii. 484, sq.
- BOYLE, i. 207.
- Breviarium Romanum, ii. 494.
- BUCER, i. 444.
- BUGENHAGEN, ii. 446.
- BULL, i. 290, 312, 338; his view of Origen's trinitarianism, i. 301; opinion concerning the Nicene use of *ὁυσία* and *ὑπόστασις*, i. 369; concerning the Nicene idea of subordination, i. 339.
- BULLINGER, ii. 465.
- BUNSEN, i. 255, 263.
- BURNET, i. 404.
- BURTON, i. 270.
- Buthos, i. 240.
- BUTLER (Bishop), his Analogy, i. 212.
- BUTLER (Archer), i. 249.
- CÆSARIUS of Arles, ii. 105.
- CALVIN, i. 46, 91, 144, 158, 311, ii. 30; his trinitarianism, i. 320, 321, 380, sq.; his creationism, ii. 24; conception of human bondage, ii. 66; his anthropology, ii. 155; his criticism upon Augustine's soteriology, ii. 257.
- Cambridge platform, ii. 482, sq.
- CASSIODORUS, i. 73.
- Catechism, of Luther, ii. 457; Romanus, ii. 493; of Canisius, ii. 493; of Belarmin, ii. 493; Socinian, ii. 498.
- CELSUS, i. 63, 118, 133; ii. 403.
- CERINTHUS, ii. 390.
- Chalcedon, council of, i. 398; christology of, i. 399, sq.
- CHAUCER, i. 88.
- CHRIST, person of, i. 392, sq., 399. See Person.
- CHRYSOSTOM, anthropology of, ii. 39; eschatology of, ii. 405, 415.
- CHUBB, i. 200.
- Church (universal), defined, i. 32.
- Circumincision, i. 347.
- CLARKE (SAMUEL), i. 207, 215; his trinitarianism, i. 386, sq.
- CLEMENT of Alexandria, i. 117, 119, 124, 129, 130, 147, 229; trinitarianism of, i. 274, sq.; anthropology of, ii. 31; soteriology of, ii. 230, sq.; his idea of future punishment, ii. 235; attacks chiliasm, ii. 395; eschatology of, ii. 404, 415.
- CLEMENT of Rome, i. 265, 267; soteriology of, ii. 209; eschatology of, ii. 414.
- COLERIDGE, i. 1, 66, 159.
- COLLINS, i. 199, 215.
- CONDILLAC, i. 216, 217.
- Congregational churches, trinitarianism of, i. 493, ii. 484.
- Consensus Tigurinus, ii. 467; Genevensis, ii. 468.
- Consubstantiation, ii. 451.
- CONYBEARE (John), his reply to Tindal, i. 203.

COWPER, i. 8, 168, 226.
 Creation de nihilo, i. 11, sq.
 Creationism, defined, ii. 10 ; prevalence of, ii. 11 ; critical estimate of, ii. 11.
 CREUZER, i. 207.
 CUDWORTH, i. 11, 59, 63, 129, 204, 205, 243, 326, 347, 349.
 CURCELLAEUS, ii. 349, 370.
 CUVIER, i. 4.
 CYRIL of Jerusalem, anthropology of, ii. 38 ; soteriology of, ii. 247.
 CYRIL of Alexandria, i. 338, 398, ii. 8 ; soteriology of, ii. 250.
 CYPRIAN, anthropology of, ii. 47 ; chiliasm of, ii. 394 ; eschatology of, ii. 401, 404, 414.
D'ALEMBERT, i. 217.
 DAMIAN of Alexandria, i. 377.
 DANTE, i. 87.
 DES CARTES, i. 1, 25.
 Deism, i. 97, 98.
 DELITZSCH, ii. 397.
 Developement, defined, i. 8 ; discriminated from creation, i. 11 ; discriminated from improvement, i. 15.
 DIDYMUS, of Alexandria, ii. 417.
 DIDEROT, i. 217.
 Dinanto, David of, i. 179, 190, 227.
 DIONYSIUS of Rome, his statement of trinitarian theories, i. 304.
 Dominicans, ii. 317.
 DORNER, i. 281 ; ii. 210 ; his opinion regarding Origen's trinitarianism, i. 300 ; regarding Irenaeus's soteriology, ii. 224.
 Dort, synod of, ii. 194, 195 ; canons of, ii. 476, sq., 496.
 DOSITHEUS, confession of, ii. 495.
 Dualism, i. 225, 228.

EBIONITISM, i. 106, 259 ; its denial of atonement, ii. 206.
 ECKART, i. 227.
 EDWARDS, Jonathan, trinitarianism of, i. 383 ; traducianism of, ii. 25 ; his theory of imputation, ii. 163 ; his anthropology, ii. 488.
 ELLIOTT, ii. 397.
 Encyclopaedism, i. 216, 217.

ENGELHARDT, method of, i. 57.
 Epicureanism, i. 60, 63.
 EPIPHANIUS, i. 106, 152, 361.
 EPISCOPIUS, ii. 181, 349.
 Ephesus, council of, i. 398.
 ERASMUS, i. 83.
 Essence, distinguished from Person, i. 363, 364.
 EUSEBIUS, of Caesarea, i. 106, 263 ; trinitarianism of, i. 310 ; anthropology of, ii. 247 ; his opposition to chiliasm, ii. 395.
 EUSEBIUS, of Nicomedia, i. 310.
 Eutychianism, i. 397, ii. 250.

FATHERS (Primitive), attitude of towards philosophy, i. 121-123, 126, 153 ; anthropology of, ii. 29 ; soteriology of, ii. 265.
 Faith, pagan idea of, i. 154 ; patristic definition of, i. 155, sq. ; relations of to reason, i. 184 ; not the procuring cause of justification, ii. 338, 340.
 FAUSTUS, of Rhegium, ii. 103.
 FIGINUS, i. 86.
 FLEURY, i. 343.
 Formula Concordiae, anthropology of, ii. 154, sq., 168 ; its definition of justification, ii. 338 ; its distinction of active and passive righteousness, ii. 342 ; its origin, ii. 458.
 Formula Consensus Helvetici, anthropology of, ii. 157, sq. ; origin of, ii. 472.
 Franciscans, ii. 317.
 French philosophers, their interpretation of Locke, i. 94.
 FUSELI, i. 12.

GAIUS, ii. 394.
 GALE, i. 129 ; his Court of the Gentiles, i. 205.
 Gallican confession, ii. 476.
 GANGAUF, ii. 5, 54.
 GAUNILO, i. 235.
 Generation (Eternal), distinguished from creation, i. 317, sq. ; from emanation, i. 318 ; necessity of, i. 323, sq. ; distinguished from human generation, i. 334, 343 ; confined to the hy-

- postatical character, i. 339, sq., 343 ;
 metaphysical definition of, i. 347 sq.
GENNADIUS, ii. 103.
GERELER, ii. 159.
GIBBON, i. 120.
GIESELER, i. 149.
GILBERT of Poitiers, i. 377.
GILL, on eternal generation, i. 344.
GLADSTONE, i. 57.
Gnosticism, i. 114, 252 ; its theory of
 creation, ii. 28 ; of evil, ii. 28 ; of
 atonement, ii. 205 ; its idea of just-
 ice, ii. 229.
God, in history, i. 25 ; name of, i. 223 ;
 proofs of his existence, i. 229, sq. ;
 impossible that he should sin, ii. 55.
GOMAR, ii. 496.
GOTTSCHALK, anthropology of, ii. 113,
 114.
Greek anthropology, ii. 27, 41 ; its idea
 of will, ii. 60, sq. ; its prevalence, ii.
 198.
Greek Church, i. 40, 361 ; confessions
 of, ii. 294.
GREGORY NAZIANZEN, i. 71, 358 ; his
 anthropology, ii. 39 ; his eschatology,
 ii. 404, 411, 412.
GREGORY NYSSA, i. 71, 152, 358, 361 ;
 anthropology of, ii. 39 ; eschatology
 of, ii. 404, 412, 417.
GREGORY THE GREAT, ii. 74 ; soteriology
 of, ii. 262 ; eschatology of, ii. 405, 411.
GROTIUS, i. 57, ii. 496. ; soteriology of,
 ii. 347, sq. ; law a positive enact-
 ment, ii. 350 ; strict punishment de-
 pendent upon the divine will, ii. 353 ;
 law capable of relaxation, ii. 354 ;
 his theory of relaxation, ii. 356 ; the
 death of Christ required to prevent
 the evil consequences of relaxation
 of law, ii. 358 ; his theory of substi-
 tution, ii. 360 ; the sufferings of
 Christ not a strict, but an accepted
 satisfaction, ii. 362 ; his disclaimer
 of acceptilation, ii. 364 ; alliance of
 his theory with the Anselmic, ii.
 366 ; with the Socinian, ii. 367.
GRYNAEUS, ii. 465.
GUERICKE, i. 255, 262, 268, 294, 310,
 392, ii. 26, 51, 114.
HAGENBACH, method of, i. 35 ; ex-
 tracts from, i. 146, 161, 354, ii. 44,
 400, sq.
HALES, i. 82, ii. 293.
HALLAM, i. 202, ii. 27.
HALYBURTON, reply to Herbert of Cher-
 bury, i. 204.
HARVEY, i. 57.
HEFELE, i. 267.
HEGEL, i. 96, 227, 240.
HEIDEGGER, ii. 158.
Heidelberg catechism, soteriology of,
 ii. 344 ; origin and account of, ii.
 473, sq.
HELFFERICH, i. 81, ii. 39.
HELVETIUS, i. 216.
Helvetic (First) Confession, anthropol-
 ogy of, ii. 169, 465.
Helvetic (Second) Confession, trinitari-
 anism of, i. 379 ; anthropology of, ii.
 169 ; soteriology of, ii. 343 ; origin
 and account of, ii. 469.
HERBERT of Cherbury, i. 97 ; system
 of, i. 192.
HERMAS, chiliasm of, ii. 390.
HIEROCLES, i. 118.
HILARY, i. 225, ii. 103, 440 ; trinitari-
 anism of, i. 377 ; creationism of, ii.
 11 ; anthropology of, ii. 49, 50.
HILDEBERT, i. 182.
Hindoo trinity, i. 244.
HIPPOLYTUS, i. 225 ; trinitarianism of,
 i. 285 ; anthropology of, ii. 43.
History, definition of, i. 7 ; sacred and
 secular, i. 18, 24 ; profane, i. 19 ; re-
 lation of dogmatic to external, i. 25 ;
 general dogmatic, i. 33 ; special dog-
 matic, i. 34, 39 ; biographic, i. 43.
HOBBS, system of, i. 197.
HOOKE, i. 83, 253, 264, 318, 392, 396,
 ii. 30 ; soteriology of, ii. 323, 331 ; defi-
 nition of a trinitarian person, i. 341,
 346 ; of Christ's person, i. 397, 404,
 407.
HOPKINS (Samuel), trinitarianism of, i.
 383 ; christology of, i. 408 ; tradu-
 cianism of, ii. 25 ; original and actual
 sin, ii. 81 ; anthropology of, ii. 489.
HORSLEY, i. 57, 386.
HOWE, i. 232, 317, 343, 365, ii. 74.

HUMANITARIANS, i. 259.

HUME, i. 138, 202.

HYPOSTASIS, i. 363, 364.

IGNATIUS, i. 265; soteriology of, ii. 208; epistles of, i. 266, 267.

Imputation, mediate, ii. 158, sq., 472; immediate, ii. 159, sq., 472.

Infinite, positive conception of, i. 185.

Infralapsarianism, ii. 192.

Intermediate state, ii. 400 sq.

IRENAEUS, i. 11, 106, 117, 147, 174; trinitarianism of, i. 282; soteriology of, ii. 213, sq.; chiliasm of, ii. 392; doctrine of resurrection, ii. 403; symbol of, ii. 432.

JACOBI, i. 159.

Jansenists, i. 191.

JEHOVAH, translation of the word in the Septuagint, i. 224.

JEROME, i. 332; eschatology of, ii. 404.

JOHN DAMASCENE, i. 177; soteriology ii. 251.

JOHNSON (Samuel), i. 168.

Judaism, i. 105.

Judaizing Gnostics, i. 115.

Justice, as related to omnipotence, ii. 222.

JUSTIN MARTYR, i. 119, 121, 127, 128, 136, 174; trinitarianism of, 268, sq.; anthropology of, ii. 28, 33; soteriology of, ii. 218; eschatology of, ii. 400, 403, 412, 413, 414.

KANT, theism of, i. 95; deism of, i. 97, 218; moral argument for divine existence, i. 239; his idea of the will as a power of causation and not of alternative choice, ii. 62.

KLIEFOTH, method of, i. 38.

LACTANTIUS, i. 55, 127; chiliasm of, ii. 395.

Latin anthropology, ii. 27, 45, 91; its idea of will, ii. 60, sq.; its prevalence, ii. 198.

LARDNER, i. 215.

LECHLER, i. 203.

LEIBNITZ, i. 71, 95, ii. 1.

LELAND, i. 173, 198, 201.

LEO, the Great, ii. 111.

LIEBNER, i. 81.

LIMBORCH, ii. 188, 349, 370, 496; soteriology of, ii. 371, sq.

LOCKE, philosophy of, i. 93.

Logic, function of, i. 2.

Logos-idea, i. 230; derived from the Old Testament and not from Plato, i. 130.

LOMBARD, soteriology of, ii. 288.

LUCIAN, i. 63.

LUTHER, i. 46, 90, 145, 166; traducianism of, ii. 24; anthropology of, ii. 152, sq.; criticism of upon Augustine's soteriology, ii. 258; on the Apostles' creed, ii. 431; catechisms of, ii. 457.

Lutheran church, symbols of, ii. 444, sq.

MACAULAY, i. 198.

MACKINTOSH, ii. 27.

Macedonians, i. 358.

MAGEE, criticism of upon Socinus, ii. 379.

MANDEVILLE, i. 203.

Manichæans, i. 146.

MARCELLUS of Ancyra, i. 361.

MEIER, i. 300, 303, 304.

MELANCHTHON, i. 47, 91; synergism of, ii. 173, 454.

Method, importance of in history, i. 1.

Methodology, aim of, i. 4.

Millenarianism, relation of to the Later-Jewish doctrine of the Messianic kingdom, ii. 389; never the Catholic doctrine, ii. 391, 394.

MILMAN, i. 79, 82, 154, 173, 245, 396.

MINUCIUS FELIX, i. 129; eschatology of, ii. 414.

Miracles, i. 165; not magical, i. 166; not unnatural, i. 167.

MIRANDOLA, i. 86.

Missal (Roman), ii. 493.

Mohammedanism, i. 178.

MÖHLER, ii. 151.

Monarchians, i. 254, 260, 309; christology of, i. 394.

Monergism, ii. 44.

Monographs (Biographic), i. 45.
 Monotheism, in the pagan world, i. 55, 56, 126.
 Monophysitism, i. 397,
 MORE (Henry), reply of to Hobbs, i. 205.
 MORGAN, attack of upon the Old Testament, i. 200.
 MORGAN, on the trinity of Plato, i. 57.
 MOSHEIM, his opinion respecting Origen's theological system, ii. 237.
 Mother of God, i. 399.
 MUNSCHER-VON CÖLLN, i. 292; ii. 93.
 MYCONIUS, ii. 464, 465.
 Mysticism, two species of, i. 79.
 Mystics, Platonism of, i. 77; scholasticism of, i. 77, 182; latitudinarian, i. 81, 85; heretical, i. 80.

NAGELSBACH, i. 57.

Nature. See Essence and Person.
 Natural religion, contrasted with revealed, i. 137.

NEANDER, i. 27, 63, 230, 258, 298, 299, ii. 114; opinion of concerning the Logos-idea, i. 130; concerning Sabellianism, i. 259; concerning Origen's trinitarianism, i. 299, 302; concerning Irenaeus's soteriology, ii. 225; concerning Anselm's soteriology, ii. 282.

Nestorianism, i. 395, 399, ii. 250.

New Nicenes, i. 371.

New Platonism, i. 60, 61, 64.

Nicene Council, problem before, i. 308; its idea of sonship, i. 329, sq.; critical estimate of its results, i. 372, sq.

NIEBUHR, i. 65, ii. 31.

NIEDNER, i. 27.

NOETUS, i. 255, ii. 435.

Nominalists, ii. 317.

Nominal Trinitarians, i. 256; christology of, i. 393.

Nonconforming divines, philosophy of, i. 92.

OCCAM, i. 82, 90, 227.

OECOLAMPADIUS, ii. 464.

Old Nicenes, i. 371.

Omnipotence, scholastic doctrine of an abstract, ii. 301.

Ὅμοιούσιος, i. 310, 311, 374.

Ὅμοούσιος, i. 309-312, 314, 374, ii. 436.

Orange, council of, its decision against Semi-Pelagianism, ii. 105.

ORIGEN, i. 46, 106, 117, 130, 133, 157, 172; his idea of faith and science, i. 159, 164; trinitarianism of, i. 288, sq.; distinction between *θεός* and *ὁ θεός*, i. 293; theological aim of, i. 289; view respecting the Holy Spirit, i. 303; his idea of eternal generation, i. 307, 326; his theory of pre-existence, ii. 5, sq.; anthropology of, ii. 33; soteriology of, ii. 230 sq.; opposition to chiliasm, ii. 395; eschatology of, ii. 404, 412, 415.

Original sin, discriminated from actual, ii. 81; is guilt, ii. 17, 48, 76, 79-91, 117-127, 153, 155-163, 448, 466, 471, 473, 477, 478, 488; is not guilt, ii. 35, 37, sq., 94, 100, 146, 147-149, 175, 181-185, 460.

ORMUSD, i. 245.

Ὀυσία, i. 363, 364.

OWEN, i. 92, ii. 480; on confounding justification with sanctification, ii. 259; on a relative necessity of atonement, ii. 260; on divine justice, ii. 303.

PAGANISM, i. 105.

Palatine confession, ii. 471.

Pantheism, i. 13, 97, 225.

Papal system, i. 378; confessions, ii. 491, sq.

PAPIAS, chiliasm of, ii. 390.

PASCAL, i. 159.

Patricians, i. 254, 261; Christology of, i. 394.

PAULUS, i. 218.

PAUL, of Samosata, i. 257.

PEARSON, his definition of eternal generation and procession, i. 319.

Person, meaning of the term in trinitarianism, i. 343, 345, 363, 364, 371; meaning of the term in anthropology, i. 343; ii. 117, 118, 120, 123-126.

Person of Christ, four factors in the conception of, i. 392; two natures in, not confused, i. 400; not divi-

ded, i. 401; illustrated by reference to man's personality, i. 402; properties of both natures attributable to the person, i. 403; suffering of the person truly infinite, i. 404; the divinity, and not the humanity, the basis of Christ's personality, i. 406; the Logos united himself with human nature, and not with a human individual, i. 407.

PELAGIUS, fundamental positions of, ii. 93, sq.; his view of the difference between Adam and his posterity, ii. 94; his idea of grace, ii. 96; of regeneration, ii. 96; explanation of ἐφ' ᾧ in Rom. v. 12, ii. 95; his ecclesiastical trials, ii. 98, sq.; prevalence of his views, ii. 199.

PETAVIUS, ii. 203; opinion of respecting the Nicene use of οὐσία and ὑπόστασις, i. 369; Semi-Pelagianism of, ii. 113.

PETRARCH, i. 87.

Philosophy, influence of upon dogmatics, i. 28.

Philosophia prima, Bacon's estimate of, i. 3; Plato's and Aristotle's estimate of, i. 2.

PHILO, i. 61.

Pietists, i. 191.

PLACAEUS, his theory of mediate imputation, ii. 158, sq., 472.

PLATO, views of, respecting the popular religion, i. 56; respecting God, i. 138; respecting immortality, i. 139; trinity of, i. 243; his doctrine of pre-existence, ii. 5.

Platonism, errors of, i. 53, sq.; influence of, i. 52, 62, 70, 76, 86, 229; agreement with Aristotelianism, i. 59.

Platform, Cambridge, ii. 482; Saybrook, ii. 490.

PLINY, i. 61, 262.

PLUTARCH, i. 61, 194.

Polonorum Fratres, i. 384.

POLYCARP, i. 157; soteriology of, ii. 208.

POPE (Alexander), i. 201.

PORPHYRY, i. 63, 118.

PRAXEAS, i. 255, ii. 435.

Pre-existence, definition of, ii. 4; Origen its chief advocate, ii. 5., sq.; prevalence of, ii. 8; critical estimate of, ii. 9.

Presbyterian Church, trinitarianism of, i. 383.

PRIESTLEY, i. 386, ii. 379.

Procession (Eternal), i. 340, 344.

Professio Fidei Tridentina, ii. 492.

PROSPER, ii. 103.

Protestantism, soteriology of, ii. 321, 335; anthropology of, ii. 448.

PYRRHO, i. 202.

QUINQUE articulares, ii. 496.

Q **Quicumque Symbolum**, i. 71, 351, ii. 439.

RACOVIAN creed, i. 384.

R **Rationalism**, i. 218.

REDEPENNING, i. 294, 300, 301, ii. 33, 234, sq.

Reformers, philosophy of, i. 89.

Remonstrants. See **Arminians**.

Resurrection, ii. 403, sq.

Revelation, relation of to dogmas, i. 23; relation of to reason, i. 129, 130, 135, sq., 151; an infallible authority, i. 142; vague idea of, i. 171.

Righteousness, active and passive, ii. 341.

RITTER, i. 231; statement of coincidences between Plato and Aristotle, i. 58; opinion respecting Origen's trinitarianism, i. 300.

RIVETUS, ii. 332.

RÖHR, i. 218.

ROSCELLIN, i. 377.

ROSENKRANZ, method of, i. 37.

ROUSSEAU, i. 217.

SABELLIUS, i. 257, sq., ii. 435.

S **Sabellians**. See **Monarchians**.

Sacraments, ii. 451.

Satan, claims of, as related to redemption, ii. 213, sq.

Saumur, school of, ii. 158, 472.


Savoy confession, ii. 480.


Saybrook platform, ii. 490.

- SCHAFF, i. 268.
- SCHELLING, i. 96, 240, 362; opinion of respecting the Hebrew archives, i. 206; system of, i. 227.
- SCHILLER, i. 219.
- SCHLEIERMACHER, i. 226, 390; system of, i. 99.
- Scholasticism, i. 73, 84.
- SCOTUS (Duns), i. 82, 90, 227; soteriology of, ii. 315, 347.
- SCOTUS (Erigena), i. 46, 177, 226; trinitarianism of, i. 377; soteriology of, ii. 271; eschatology of, ii. 406, 418.
- Scotch philosophers, their interpretation of Locke, i. 94.
- Scotiana confessio, ii. 476.
- Scriptures, mutilations of by heretics, i. 146.
- Self-existence distinguished from necessary existence in the trinitarian controversy, i. 388.
- Semi-Arians, i. 313, 356, 358, ii. 437.
- Semi-Pelagianism, ii. 102, sq.; relation of to the Greek anthropology, ii. 108; its principal positions, ii. 109; prevalence of, ii. 199.
- SERVETUS, i. 384.
- SHAFTSBURY, opinions of, i. 198.
- SHERLOCK, i. 214, 347.
- SILESII, i. 227.
- Sin, originated *de nihilo*, i. 16, 86, ii. 54, 57, 63; original, ii. 37, 42. See Original Sin.
- Scepticism, Judaistic, i. 105; Pagan, i. 105, 117; Gnostic, i. 113; in the Church, i. 179; modern, i. 192.
- Smalcald, articles of, ii. 456.
- SOCINUS, i. 383, 384; his idea of justice, ii. 376; justice the product of optional will, ii. 377; his objections to the doctrine of satisfaction, ii. 379, sq.
- Socinian confessions, ii. 498.
- Sonship (Eternal). See Generation.
- Soteriology, of the Gnostics, ii. 205; of the Ebionite, ii. 206; of the Apostolic Fathers, ii. 207-212; of the Primitive Fathers, ii. 212-226; of the Alexandrine school, ii. 226-237; of the Greek Fathers, ii. 237-253; of Augustine, ii. 253-260; of the school-
- men, ii. 273-318; of Trent, ii. 319-332; of the Reformers, ii. 333-346; of Grotius, ii. 347-370; of the Arminians, ii. 370-375; of Socinus, ii. 376-386.
- SOZOMEN, i. 358.
- SPINOZA, i. 95, 138, 227.
- Spirit (Holy), Nicene doctrine of, i. 355.
- STAPFER, his theory of imputation, ii. 163, sq.
- STILLINGFLEET, i. 57, 145.
- Stoicism, i. 61.
- Subordination, of the Son to the Father, i. 320.
- Substance, ambiguity of the term in the Latin trinitarianism, i. 370. See Essence and Person.
- Supernatural, as related to the natural, i. 165.
- Supralapsarianism, ii. 192.
- SUSO, i. 85; eschatology of, ii. 413, 417.
- SWEDENBORG, ii. 403.
- SWIFT (Jonathan), i. 201.
- Symbol, Athanasian, (*Quicumque*), i. 71, 351, sq., ii. 439; Nicene, i. 314; ii. 435; its relations to the Apostles' Creed, ii. 435; Constantinopolitan, i. 359, ii. 435; Apostles', ii. 428; not composed by the Apostles, ii. 430; importance of, ii. 433; relation of to the Nicene, ii. 436; Chalcedon, ii. 438.
- Symbols, history of, i. 41; importance of the study of, ii. 423, 426.
- Synergism, ii. 40.
- SYNESIUS, i. 225; eschatology of, ii. 404.
- T**TATIAN, i. 119, 127, 225.
- TAULER, i. 85.
- TAYLOR (Jeremy), his idea of freedom, ii. 64.
- Terms (technical), use of, i. 362; trinitarian, i. 363, sq.
- TERTULLIAN, i. 46, 67, 117, 122, 123, sq., 143, 146, 174, 229, 282; trinitarianism of, i. 277, sq.; traducianism of, ii. 14, sq., 43, sq.; alleged materialism of, ii. 19; his synergism, ii. 46; defective

- soteriology of, ii. 267 ; chiliasm of, ii. 392 ; eschatology of, ii. 401, 404, 408, 413 ; his symbol, ii. 432.
- Tetratheism, i. 377.
- Theism (Greek), i. 55, 61, 64, 100.
- THEODORET, i. 358.
- Theodotians, i. 259, ii. 436.
- THEOPHILUS of Antioch, i. 12.
- Thirty-Nine Articles, trinitarianism of, i. 382 ; origin of, ii. 478.
- THOMASIVS, i. 294, 298, 302.
- Thomists and Scotists, controversy between, ii. 315, 349.
- Tigurinus, consensus, ii. 467.
- TINDAL, i. 199, 203, 215.
- TOLAND, i. 199.
- Toledo, synod of, i. 361.
- Torgau, articles of, ii. 446.
- Traducianism, definition of, ii. 13 ; prevalence of, ii. 14 sq., 23, sq., 44, sq.
- Transubstantiation, ii. 451.
- Trent, council of, ii. 491 ; its ambiguous statements, ii. 140 ; definition of original sin, ii. 141 ; of original righteousness, ii. 142 ; idea of creation, ii. 144 ; of apostasy, ii. 146 ; guiltlessness of original sin, ii. 147 ; relation of the flesh to the spirit, ii. 148 ; theory of regeneration, ii. 149 ; its soteriology, ii. 321, sq. ; justification resolved into sanctification, ii. 322 ; denial of justification by faith alone, ii. 325 ; justification is progressive and not instantaneous, ii. 327 ; its mixture of human with the divine satisfaction, ii. 329, 345.
- Trinity, pagan, i. 243 ; Platonic, i. 243 ; Hindoo, i. 244 ; inadequate illustrations of, i. 276 ; finite analogue of, i. 366, sq.
- TRYPHO, Justin Martyr's dialogue with, i. 112.
- TURRETINE, his doctrine of imputation, ii. 159, sq.
- TWESTEN, i. 137, 166 ; his statement of the relation of the Person to the Essence, i. 345.
- ULLMANN, i. 81, 497.
- Unigenitus (Bull). ii. 494.
- Unitarianism, i. 383 ; relation of to the ancient Anti-Trinitarianism, i. 385.
- Unity of God, taught by pagan sages, i. 55, 56, 126 ; distinguished from singleness, i. 348.
- USHER, ii. 106.
- VALENCE, council of, ii. 105.
- VALENTINUS, his (Gnostic) idea of justice, ii. 228.
- Variata, edition of the Augsburg Confession, ii. 454.
- VAUGHN, i. 81.
- VICTOR (Hugo St.), soteriology of, ii. 291.
- VINCENT of Lerins, ii. 103.
- VOLTAIRE, i. 217.
- VON CÖLLN, i. 85.
- WATERLAND, i. 246, 275, 276, 287, 290, 303, 321, 338, 386 ; his view of Origen's trinitarianism, i. 302 ; definition of Sonship, i. 321 ; of generation by will, i. 325 ; of hypostatical character, i. 340 ; his distinction between self-existence and necessary existence, i. 388.
- WEGSCHEIDER, i. 218.
- WESSEL, soteriology of, ii. 324.
- Westminster Confession, origin of, ii. 479 ; its distinction between justification and sanctification, ii. 322 ; trinitarianism of, i. 382.
- WHEWELL, i. 1, 362.
- WHITBY, ii. 26, 30.
- WICLIFF, i. 87 ; soteriology of, ii. 333.
- WIGGERS, ii. 26, 51.
- WOLFF, i. 95.
- WORDSWORTH (Christopher), i. 255, 287.
- WORDSWORTH (William), i. 6.
- Wurtemberg Confession, ii. 456.
- ZUINGLE, ii. 153 ; anthropology of, ii. 174, sq. 460, sq. ; sacramental theory of, ii. 461, sq. ; his fidei ratio, ii. 459, sq., 467 ; his doctrine of predestination, ii. 468.

Date Due

DE 6 - '50			
FACULTY			
DE 3 - '52			
FACULTY			
DE 21 '55			
JAN 3 '62			
JAN 3 '62			
FACULTY			
FACULTY			
FACULTY			
FACULTY			
FACULTY			
FACULTY			
FACULTY			
FACULTY			
JAN 6 '67			
JUN 15 1974			
MAY 4 '75			
JUN 1975			
JUN 1975			
			



Princeton Theological Seminary-Speer Library



1 1012 01038 0956